Two Weeks in Review: 29 June—10 July 2026

“The test of a first-rate intelligence,” according to F. Scott Fitzgerald, “is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” For international lawyers in these times of the Board of Peace and the Gaza Riviera, this kind of functional cognitive dissonance has become less a mark of intelligence than a basic job requirement. But contrary to common usage, Fitzgerald did not have cynics and pragmatists in mind—quite the opposite. He continues, “One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise.” In this spirit, commentators over the last fortnight have turned their attention to what Pope Leo’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas can teach us about AI governance, China’s “quiet renegotiation” of UNCLOS and its application in times of war, and the continuity of statehood for soon-submerged island states—as well as the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision on the termination of the UK–Rwanda Asylum Partnership Agreement, battlefield medicine and the principle of unnecessary suffering, and the echoes of the inter-war London Committee in Trump’s Board of Peace. Not to mention the first post in a mini-symposium on the international legal implications of a possible Russia-Ukraine peace treaty.

UNCLOS in times of war and its quiet renegotiation

Michael Raff examines the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s award in Ukraine v. Russian Federation (PCA Case No. 2017-06): while it upheld jurisdiction and found Russia in breach of its environmental obligations under Articles 123, 192, 194, 205 and 206 UNCLOS, it rejected Ukraine’s navigation, underwater cultural heritage and aggravation claims, and granted only declaratory relief. The award underscores the importance of careful claim framing—particularly the limits imposed by ne ultra petita—and confirms that environmental cooperation duties under UNCLOS persist even during armed conflict. More broadly, the case illustrates the resilience of Annex VII arbitration as a mechanism for maintaining rules-based legal engagement between belligerent states, notwithstanding the absence of reparations or coercive remedies.

Vito De Lucia examines the China Institute for Marine Affairs’ 2026 assessment of UNCLOS and argues that its significance lies less in its substantive positions than in its argumentative architecture. He identifies four distinct “registers” through which the report simultaneously defends the authority of UNCLOS, resists expansive arbitral interpretation (including criticism of the South China Sea Arbitration), limits UNCLOS’s constitutional status, and contests unilateral maritime claims by non-parties such as the United States. This register-switching supports a broader project: preserving the multilateral maritime order while opening conceptual space for alternative governance frameworks—notably China’s Global Governance Initiative—to provide strategic orientation for ocean governance. More broadly, it argues that the report reflects a ‘quiet renegotiation’ of the maritime order, in which operational practice, legal argument and competing governance narratives are increasingly used to reshape the law of the sea without formal treaty revision.

Continued statehood under water

Jean-Baptiste Dudant argues that the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 80/263 brings the emerging international consensus on the continuity of statehood for island states threatened by sea-level rise close to crystallisation, going further than the ICJ’s 2025 Climate Change Advisory Opinion by unequivocally affirming continued statehood. He explains how the interaction between the International Law Commission, island state practice, and the General Assembly has generated a powerful normative synergy, while emphasising that key legal questions concerning the conditions and consequences of continuity remain unresolved. Although the resolution strengthens the case for the progressive development of customary international law, further state practice is needed before this paradigm shift can be regarded as fully settled.

Pope Leo and AI governance

Gustavo Leite Neves da Luz turns to AI governance and invites us to consider Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica Humanitas: while not a source of international law, its vocabulary of dignity, peace, social justice, and the common good gives international lawyers a diagnostic vocabulary for asking whether the regulation of AI is serving a higher good, or merely supervising technological systems after their social direction has already been set. In this light, Gustavo examines how existing instruments may inadequately address structural inequalities and private concentrations of power, looking in particular at the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/265, the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, and the EU AI Act. This perspective has implications for international human rights law, international humanitarian law (including Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions), and debates on AI-enabled warfare. If taken seriously, this perspective should urge international law to direct technological development towards human dignity and the common good, rather than merely regulating its expansion.

Rwanda v. United Kingdom, PCA

Kevin W. Gray examines the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s award in Rwanda v. United Kingdom concerning the termination of the UK–Rwanda Asylum Partnership Agreement, arguing that its principal significance lies in its interpretation of Article 13 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which governs treaties concluded by an exchange of instruments. He explains how the Tribunal distinguished between the formal requirements of Article 13(a) VCLT, which it found were not satisfied, and the broader inquiry under Article 13(b) VCLT, under which the majority held that the parties’ negotiations, correspondence, and subsequent conduct nevertheless established consent to be bound. While the award clarifies the requirements of Article 13(a), it leaves unresolved the evidentiary threshold and methodology applicable under Article 13(b), ensuring that this underexplored provision will remain a fertile area for future treaty litigation.

Medical advances and the principle of unnecessary suffering

Asher Rottenberg puts the case that advances in battlefield medicine require a renewed legal assessment of the principle of unnecessary suffering under international humanitarian law; particularly in relation to high-velocity ammunition and the injuries it causes. He explains that, as modern medical evacuation and surgical techniques have reduced preventable deaths and amputations, the legal inquiry under Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions must focus increasingly on injuries that remain foreseeably severe, irreversible, and difficult to correct. Medical advances do not in themselves determine unlawfulness—but they should trigger renewed scrutiny under both the substantive prohibition on superfluous injury and the weapons review obligation in Article 36 AP I, prompting an expert reassessment of whether certain ammunition designs remain compatible with contemporary understandings of military necessity and human suffering.

The Board of Peace and the London Committee 

Rémi Furhmann examines the parallels between Trump’s Board of Peace and the London Committee during the Spanish Civil War, arguing that both represent forms of legal experimentation by powerful states outside established multilateral mechanisms. He explains how these bodies share common features: unusual modes of creation, reliance on existing institutions to legitimise alternative structures, exclusion of affected communities, and the redefinition of “peace” in ways that prioritise great-power interests over self-determination. These departures from established international organisations risk undermining the legitimacy of the very powers that create them, illustrating a broader crisis in which dominant states seek to reshape multilateralism through parallel legal frameworks rather than through existing international law institutions.

Mini-symposium: a peace treaty for Ukraine

Four years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EJIL:Talk! turns its attention to the international legal issues surrounding a possible peace treaty.

In the first post of this mini-symposium, Anne Peters, Gregory Fox and Florian Kriener consider the international legal constraints on any future Russia–Ukraine peace agreement. They argue that territorial concessions could be invalid under Articles 52 and 53 VCLT if procured through coercion or if they conflict with peremptory norms prohibiting aggression and territorial acquisition by force under the UN Charter. They further explore the legal limits on UN Security Council endorsement, accountability mechanisms for international crimes (including under the Rome Statute), reparations, and the requirements of self-determination and the Ukrainian Constitution for any territorial settlement. In short: international law offers no easy reconciliation between the competing imperatives of achieving peace and upholding the post-1945 legal order by refusing to legitimise the fruits of unlawful aggression.

As ever, events and announcements can be found here and here.