magnify
Home Articles posted by Anne Peters

Passportisation: Risks for international law and stability – Part II

Published on May 10, 2019        Author: 

Editor note: This is Part II of a two-part post. See Part I here.

Part One of the blogpost examined the recent Russian decrees on a fast track procedure for conferring Russian nationality on inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine and explained international legal principles which govern such extraterritorial naturalisations. 

III. Striking the Balance: International Legal Limits on Passportisation

The conflicting individual and governmental interests and the overarching global value of a stable repartition of jurisdictions are reconciled by posing specific legal limits on the power of a state to naturalise citizens of another state.

The Prohibition of an Arbitrary Refusal to Release One’s Nationals

The prohibition of arbitrary decisions concerning nationality issues has emerged as a standard of reference in the international law of nationality. The Report of the UN Secretary General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, 14 December 2009 (A/HRC/13/34), stated that “[T]he notion of arbitrariness could be interpreted to include not only acts that are against the law but, more broadly, elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability also” (para. 25).

A state may not categorically and without any legitimate reason (i.e. arbitrarily) prevent its citizens from acquiring a different citizenship. Inversely, a state may validly oppose the naturalisation of its citizens if its governmental interests outweigh both the interests of the concerned natural persons and the interests of the naturalising state. In that case, the refusal to release its national would not be arbitrary. A state’s refusal to release a national who continues to reside within its own territory is presumptively not arbitrary.

The Requirement of a Factual Connection

International law has traditionally required that there be a factual relationship between the person to be naturalised and the naturalising state. It has never allowed a state to confer its nationality by naturalisation upon persons possessing the nationality of another state and to whom the conferring state has no factual relation at all. Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Human Rights
 
Comments Off on Passportisation: Risks for international law and stability – Part II

Passportisation: Risks for international law and stability – Part I

Published on May 9, 2019        Author: 

I. Fast track to Russian nationality

On 24 April 2019, the Russian President issued an Executive Order identifying groups of persons entitled to a “fast-track procedure” when applying for Russian citizenship otherwise regulated by the Russian Law on Citizenship (Federal Law No. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002). The decree facilitates the acquisition of Russian nationality by residents from various districts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions, notably without taking residency in Russia. The regions border Russia and are struck by a military conflict between the central government and separatist forces under heavy involvement of Russia. On 1st May 2019, the President issued a second “Executive Order on Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Entitled to a Fast-Track Procedure when Applying for Russian Citizenship”. The new fast track procedure is potentially open to around 4 million people living in the conflict area of Eastern Ukraine.

In the Security Council of 25 April 2019, the representative of the Russian Federation explained “that there is a high demand for Russian citizenship among people from south-eastern Ukraine whose living conditions Kyiv has made intolerable. In other words, Russia’s legislative initiative is a response to the aspirations of many thousands of people. It is not we who are forcing them to become Russian citizens but rather they themselves who desire it. We are simply providing them with an opportunity and significantly simplifying the process. (…) Why was it done? The conflict in Donbas has been going on for five years. For five years, the inhabitants of Donbas have been deprived of the ability to exercise their human rights and freedoms in Ukraine. They were denied the right to vote in the recent presidential elections.” “[T]he residents of Donetsk and Luhansk (…) have been deprived of income sources, pensions and benefits that other Ukrainian citizens are entitled to. They would not have survived without Russia (…). The people of Donetsk and Luhansk deserve to have reliable State care and social protection once again. (…) They are getting none of that from the Ukrainian Government, and we therefore felt compelled to offer them assistance.” (Vassily A. Nebenzia, Security Council 8516th meeting, Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8516, p. 15-16). The decrees might also respond to the Ukrainian draft language law which establishes Ukrainian as the language of the state and relegates Russian to a regional language (Bill №5670-d, reading in Parliament on 25 April 2019, not yet in force ).

The recently elected President of Ukraine spoke of “another unprecedented interference of the Russian Federation in the internal affairs of an independent state, a brutal violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and a complete trampling upon its obligations in the framework of the Minsk agreements. In addition, the Kremlin therefore deliberately and cynically violates international humanitarian law, which prohibits the occupation authorities from changing the citizenship of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.” (24 April 2019).

In the UN Security Council Meeting of 25 April 2019, numerous delegates criticised the Russian measures. The Slovak OSCE Chairmanship expressed “deep concern”.

The recent decrees inscribe themselves in an overall Russian policy of generously conferring its nationality on residents of those states which emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union. In Crimea, an active Russian “passportisation” policy had allegedly been pursued since 1991, until the peninsula was annexed by Russia in 2014. In two breakaway territories of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, passportisation was rampant especially around 2002 (see the analysis in: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report (“Tagliavini Report”), vol. II, Chapter 3). Russia also offers easy Russian nationality to inhabitants of Transnistria (in Moldowa).

This two part-blogpost shows that the Russian “passportisation” policy (i.e. the policy of conferring Russian nationality en masse to persons residing outside Russia) is in many respects exorbitant and risks to violate various principles of international law. Part One examines the governing principles, Part Two balances these principles, applies them to the current case, and examines the legal consequences of  exorbitant naturalisations.  Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Human Rights
 
Comments Off on Passportisation: Risks for international law and stability – Part I

The Risk and Opportunity of the Humanisation of International Anti-Corruption Law: A Rejoinder to Kevin E. Davis and Franco Peirone

Published on February 18, 2019        Author: 

Editor’s note: In the EJIL: Debate! section of the latest issue of EJIL (Vol. 29 (2018) No. 4), Anne Peters presents her provocative and disrupting idea of corruption as a violation of international human rights. Kevin Davis and Franco Peirone respond to this challenging thesis and Anne Peters rejoins in this post. 

1. Doctrine and Policy

The two comments on my article “Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights” challenge various elements of both the doctrinal analysis and the normative assessment. I had developed and defended two propositions: First, corrupt acts or omissions can under certain conditions technically be qualified as violating international human rights (notably social rights), although the difficulty to establish causality remains the most important doctrinal obstacle. Second, I argued normatively that the principal added value of a reconceptualization of corruption as a human rights violation is to offer complementary forums for redress, notably the international human rights mechanisms.

The two commentators raise very valuable points for which I am thankful. In this rejoinder, I focus only on two arguments which appear in both comments. Their first critical observation relates to the doctrinal analysis and to the problem of causation. Franco Peirone finds that “[t]he idea of identifying citizens as victims of corruption in a one-to-one relationship with the state is particularly problematic”, and he asks: “How is it possible to maintain that an individual has suffered a human rights violation because of state corruption?“ Along the same line, Kevin E. Davis points out that if a:

“national health care system is so underfunded that the state has clearly failed to satisfy its obligation to fulfil the right to health [, t]his does not necessarily mean that corruption is the cause of the human rights violation. For instance, it is possible that, if the funds had not been diverted, they would have been allocated to the military or to higher education. In this case, it cannot be said that the corruption has caused the failure to realize the right.”

The second critique relates to my policy assessment. Both commentators point out that the human rights sanctions and state responsibility for human rights violations will ultimately burden members of the general population of the corrupt state (as opposed to the criminal individual, e.g. bribe-taker or receiver of kick-backs). Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL, EJIL: Debate!, Human Rights
 
Tags:
Comments Off on The Risk and Opportunity of the Humanisation of International Anti-Corruption Law: A Rejoinder to Kevin E. Davis and Franco Peirone

The Global Compact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?

Published on November 21, 2018        Author: 

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (final draft of 13 July 2018) is scheduled for adoption at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakesh in December 2018. But in the run-up to this conference, several states, beginning with the United States already in 2017, now followed by Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others, have announced that they will  not sign the text. Will refusal to sign be relevant in terms of international law? What is the juridical quality of the Compact, which legal consequences does it have, and which normative “ripples” might it deploy in the future? The controversy over the Compact sheds light on the legitimacy of international law-making processes and on the precarious normative power of international law.

A Brief Glance at the Contents

The Compact consists of four parts. Following the preamble, the first part contains, “Vision and Guiding Principles”. The second part, “Objectives and Commitments” contains 23 objectives, proceeded by a part on “Implementation” and the final section “Follow-up and Review”. The Compact purports to set out “a common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding migration” (para. 9). The purpose is mainly to secure that migration “works for all” (para. 13).

The Compact’s “guiding principles” are, inter alia, people-centeredness, international cooperation, national sovereignty, rule of law and due process, and sustainable development (para. 15). These are well-established and to a large extent also legally entrenched principles. The 23 “objectives” are partly generally recognised such as saving lives (objective 8), respond to smuggling (objective 9), or eradicate trafficking (objective 10). Some mainly correspond to interests of states of origin (such as promoting transfer of remittances, objective 20), others basically satisfy interests of receiving states (such as facilitating return and readmission (objective 21). In substance, the Compact partly repeats international law as it stands or refers to existing instruments (see notably preamble para. 2), partly contains platitudes, and partly contains novel ideas. Read the rest of this entry…

 

De-humanisation? CJEU, Liga van Moskeeën en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen on Religious Slaughter

Published on June 26, 2018        Author: 

Introduction

In Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen et al v. Vlaams Gewest, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) in its judgment of 29th May 2018 decided that the EU law provision allowing religious slaughter without stunning the animal only in slaughterhouses (Art. 4(4) of Regulation No 1099/2009) is valid. It does not violate primary law: neither the freedom of religion as guaranteed in Art. 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, nor the animal welfare mainstreaming clause of Art. 13 TFEU.

Two weeks earlier, US President Donald Trump spoke about migrants:

We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in — and we’re stopping a lot of them — but we’re taking people out of the country. You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people. These are animals. And we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s never happened before. And because of the weak laws, they come in fast, we get them, we release them, we get them again, we bring them out. It’s crazy. (The White House, Remarks by President Trump at a California Sanctuary State Roundtable, May 16, 2018 (emphasis added)).

Do both incidents have something in common? Both concern migrants, directly or at least indirectly. While President Trump’s statement is openly humiliating and racist, the EU regulation and its strict application by Flemish authorities that led to the CJEU judgment is not. Still, we might ask (what the Court did not) whether the Flemish case involves indirect discrimination against Muslims. I find that neither EU law nor its application violate fundamental rights. However, we need to remain vigilant because, speaking with Theodor Adorno, vilifying human and non-human animals might, in psychological and ethical terms, be related and even intertwined. Read the rest of this entry…

 

The Turkish Operation in Afrin (Syria) and the Silence of the Lambs

Published on January 30, 2018        Author: 

Operation Olive Branch

On 20th January 2018, the Turkish military started to attack the Kurdish-populated region of Afrin in Syria (“Operation Olive Branch“). With its letter to the Security Council of 22nd January 2018, Turkey justified this action as self-defence in terms of Art. 51 UN Charter. The relevant passage of the letter is: “[T]he threat of terrorism from Syria targeting our borders has not ended. The recent increase in rocket attacks and harassment fire directed at Hatay and Kilis provinces of Turkey from the Afrin region of Syria, which is under the control of the PKK/KCK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization, has resulted in the deaths of many civilians and soldiers and has left many more wounded.” (UN Doc. S/2018/53; emphasis added). Two elements are troublesome in this official Turkish justification.

Non-state armed attacks?

First, it is controversial whether armed attacks of the YPG, a non-state actor, suffice to trigger self-defence in terms of Article 51 UN Charter and underlying customary law. The current law (both Charter-based and treaty-based) is in flux, and still seems to demand some attribution to the state from which the attacks originate. (See for a collection of diverse scholarly opinion, ranging from “restrictivists” to “expansionists”: Anne Peters, Christian Marxsen (eds), “Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Impulses from the Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War”, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 77 (2017), 1-93; SSRN-version in Max Planck Research Papers 2017-17).

The ICJ case-law has not fully settled the question (see for state-centred statements: ICJ, Oil platforms 2003, paras. 51 and 61; ICJ Wall opinion 2004, para. 139). Read the rest of this entry…

 

Populist International Law? The Suspended Independence and the Normative Value of the Referendum on Catalonia

Published on October 12, 2017        Author: 

In his speech before the Catalan regional parliament on 10 October 2017, the Catalan President Carles Puigdemont suspended a declaration of independence but stated that the referendum of 1st October gave the Catalans a mandate for creating a sovereign state. This post examines whether this assertion is borne out by international law. I submit that neither the Catalans and their leaders nor the central government act in an international law-free zone.

A declaration of independence would not violate international law

The International Court of Justice, in its Kosovo opinion of 2010, found that a unilateral declaration of independence does “not violate general international law” (para. 122) ─ if such a declaration is not “connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (para. 81; see also paras 84, 119-121 on non-violation). The ICJ in that Opinion inverted the legal question placed before it (which had been whether the declaration of independence was “in accordance with international law” (para. 1)). The Court had also shied away from saying anything meaningful on secession (as opposed to the speech act of declaring independence). In result, the Advisory Opinion came out as a parsimonious if not meagre restatement of the law.

Disproportionate use of force (police and military) is prohibited by international law

However meek, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is relevant for Catalonia also with regard to the prohibition on the use of force. The Court here said that “unlawful use of force” would taint a declaration of independence and make it violative of international law (para. 81), but did not say when such resort to force would indeed be “unlawful”. Also, the ICJ did not say whose use of force although it probably had the separatists themselves in mind. Read the rest of this entry…

 

 “Vulnerability” versus “Plausibility”: Righting or Wronging the Regime of Provisional Measures? Reflections on ICJ, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, Order of 19 April 2017

Published on May 5, 2017        Author: 

The ICJ order of 19 April 2017 in the case Application of the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism and the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) seeks to safeguard the interests of ethnic minorities in Crimea, and to protect the victims of armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine.

As Iryna Marchuk reported on this blog, the ICJ indicated provisional measures only on the basis of the CERD but not on the basis of ICSFT. The Court notably obliged the Russian Federation to refrain from constraining the representative body of the Crimean Tartars and to ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian language in Crimea (para. 102). The Court also “reminds” both parties of the Minsk Agreement on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and “expects” them to work towards its full implementation (para. 104).

Has the Court hereby, once again (and maybe contre gré), acted as a protector of human rights and minorities more than as the quintessential inter-state dispute settlement body? And does this tell us anything about the relative importance of individual rights over inter-state obligations in the web of international law? The two buzz words “plausibility of (state) rights” versus “human vulnerability”, juxtaposed by Judge Cançado Trindade in his separate opinion (esp. in paras 36 et seq) even insinuates a possible conflict between two paradigms. This blog explores the dualism of the states’ international legal status and individual international law-based rights, and the opportunities and risks of the “humanisation” of international law, manifest in these proceedings. Read the rest of this entry…

 

After Trump: China and Russia move from norm-takers to shapers of the international legal order

Published on November 10, 2016        Author: 

The Western media hardly reported that on Tuesday 8th November 2016, the Chinese Premier, LI Keqiang, visited Russia. Maybe the date of the visit (the day of the de facto election of the US President) was chosen to convey a message. The deepening Chinese-Russian partnership seeks to work towards an alternative to what is perceived by the leaders of those two powers to be a US-dominated world order. It is plausible that an unpredictable, inexperienced, and undiplomatic US President will contribute to a weakening of that order. It is also likely that all recent moves will entail some changes in international law.

Let us recapitulate the latest official statements. On the official English-language website of the Chinese government, the Chinese Premier commented yesterday’s meeting as follows: “China−Russia cooperation is not only beneficial to the two sides, but also to regional and world peace, stability, development, and prosperity.”

A more detailed exposition of this view was offered by Ms FU Ying, the co-chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and the current vice minister of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. She gave a speech at a meeting of a Russian intellectual elite-discussion circle (the “Valdai Club”) which was quickly published in China Daily − European Weekly of October 28 – November 3, 2016, entitled “Major Countries Need to Build Trust”.

Read the rest of this entry…

 

The New Arbitrariness and Competing Constitutionalisms: Remarks on ECtHR Grand Chamber Al-Dulimi

Published on June 30, 2016        Author: 

In a judgment published on 21 June 2016, the ECtHR Grand Chamber confirmed a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR by Switzerland. The history of the case is summarized in my post on the chamber judgment of 26 November 2013. Al-Dulimi was considered by the relevant UN sanctions committee to be the former head of finance of the Iraqi secret service under Saddam Hussain (a fact which he apparently never denied), and he ran the firm Montana Management, registered under the laws of Panama. Al-Dulimi’s bank accounts in Switzerland had been frozen in 2004 by Switzerland pursuant to Resolution 1483 (2003). The main findings of the new Grand Chamber judgment are reported by Marko Milanovic in his post.

As Marko already pointed out, the reasoning of the Grand Chamber was carried only by a slim majority. The judgment followed the Chamber judgment in three points: First, it sought to harmonize the obligations of Member States under the UN Charter and under the ECHR, and thereby denied the conflict and evaded the question of legal consequences flowing from Art. 103 UN Charter. Second, the Grand Chamber found that although the Swiss authorities’ and courts’ refusal to review the complaint pursued the legitimate objective of maintaining international peace and security, the denial of any substantive review was disproportionate and therefore impaired “the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court“ (para. 151). Third, as the Chamber had done before, no just satisfaction was awarded to the applicant.

Read the rest of this entry…