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Home Articles posted by Anne Peters

Populist International Law? The Suspended Independence and the Normative Value of the Referendum on Catalonia

Published on October 12, 2017        Author: 

In his speech before the Catalan regional parliament on 10 October 2017, the Catalan President Carles Puigdemont suspended a declaration of independence but stated that the referendum of 1st October gave the Catalans a mandate for creating a sovereign state. This post examines whether this assertion is borne out by international law. I submit that neither the Catalans and their leaders nor the central government act in an international law-free zone.

A declaration of independence would not violate international law

The International Court of Justice, in its Kosovo opinion of 2010, found that a unilateral declaration of independence does “not violate general international law” (para. 122) ─ if such a declaration is not “connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (para. 81; see also paras 84, 119-121 on non-violation). The ICJ in that Opinion inverted the legal question placed before it (which had been whether the declaration of independence was “in accordance with international law” (para. 1)). The Court had also shied away from saying anything meaningful on secession (as opposed to the speech act of declaring independence). In result, the Advisory Opinion came out as a parsimonious if not meagre restatement of the law.

Disproportionate use of force (police and military) is prohibited by international law

However meek, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is relevant for Catalonia also with regard to the prohibition on the use of force. The Court here said that “unlawful use of force” would taint a declaration of independence and make it violative of international law (para. 81), but did not say when such resort to force would indeed be “unlawful”. Also, the ICJ did not say whose use of force although it probably had the separatists themselves in mind. Read the rest of this entry…

 

 “Vulnerability” versus “Plausibility”: Righting or Wronging the Regime of Provisional Measures? Reflections on ICJ, Ukraine v. Russian Federation, Order of 19 April 2017

Published on May 5, 2017        Author: 

The ICJ order of 19 April 2017 in the case Application of the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism and the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) seeks to safeguard the interests of ethnic minorities in Crimea, and to protect the victims of armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine.

As Iryna Marchuk reported on this blog, the ICJ indicated provisional measures only on the basis of the CERD but not on the basis of ICSFT. The Court notably obliged the Russian Federation to refrain from constraining the representative body of the Crimean Tartars and to ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian language in Crimea (para. 102). The Court also “reminds” both parties of the Minsk Agreement on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and “expects” them to work towards its full implementation (para. 104).

Has the Court hereby, once again (and maybe contre gré), acted as a protector of human rights and minorities more than as the quintessential inter-state dispute settlement body? And does this tell us anything about the relative importance of individual rights over inter-state obligations in the web of international law? The two buzz words “plausibility of (state) rights” versus “human vulnerability”, juxtaposed by Judge Cançado Trindade in his separate opinion (esp. in paras 36 et seq) even insinuates a possible conflict between two paradigms. This blog explores the dualism of the states’ international legal status and individual international law-based rights, and the opportunities and risks of the “humanisation” of international law, manifest in these proceedings. Read the rest of this entry…

 

After Trump: China and Russia move from norm-takers to shapers of the international legal order

Published on November 10, 2016        Author: 

The Western media hardly reported that on Tuesday 8th November 2016, the Chinese Premier, LI Keqiang, visited Russia. Maybe the date of the visit (the day of the de facto election of the US President) was chosen to convey a message. The deepening Chinese-Russian partnership seeks to work towards an alternative to what is perceived by the leaders of those two powers to be a US-dominated world order. It is plausible that an unpredictable, inexperienced, and undiplomatic US President will contribute to a weakening of that order. It is also likely that all recent moves will entail some changes in international law.

Let us recapitulate the latest official statements. On the official English-language website of the Chinese government, the Chinese Premier commented yesterday’s meeting as follows: “China−Russia cooperation is not only beneficial to the two sides, but also to regional and world peace, stability, development, and prosperity.”

A more detailed exposition of this view was offered by Ms FU Ying, the co-chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and the current vice minister of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. She gave a speech at a meeting of a Russian intellectual elite-discussion circle (the “Valdai Club”) which was quickly published in China Daily − European Weekly of October 28 – November 3, 2016, entitled “Major Countries Need to Build Trust”.

Read the rest of this entry…

 

The New Arbitrariness and Competing Constitutionalisms: Remarks on ECtHR Grand Chamber Al-Dulimi

Published on June 30, 2016        Author: 

In a judgment published on 21 June 2016, the ECtHR Grand Chamber confirmed a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR by Switzerland. The history of the case is summarized in my post on the chamber judgment of 26 November 2013. Al-Dulimi was considered by the relevant UN sanctions committee to be the former head of finance of the Iraqi secret service under Saddam Hussain (a fact which he apparently never denied), and he ran the firm Montana Management, registered under the laws of Panama. Al-Dulimi’s bank accounts in Switzerland had been frozen in 2004 by Switzerland pursuant to Resolution 1483 (2003). The main findings of the new Grand Chamber judgment are reported by Marko Milanovic in his post.

As Marko already pointed out, the reasoning of the Grand Chamber was carried only by a slim majority. The judgment followed the Chamber judgment in three points: First, it sought to harmonize the obligations of Member States under the UN Charter and under the ECHR, and thereby denied the conflict and evaded the question of legal consequences flowing from Art. 103 UN Charter. Second, the Grand Chamber found that although the Swiss authorities’ and courts’ refusal to review the complaint pursued the legitimate objective of maintaining international peace and security, the denial of any substantive review was disproportionate and therefore impaired “the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court“ (para. 151). Third, as the Chamber had done before, no just satisfaction was awarded to the applicant.

Read the rest of this entry…

 

New German Constitutional Court Decision on “Treaty Override”: Triepelianism Continued

Published on February 29, 2016        Author: 

By Court order of decision of 15 December 2015 (2BvL 1/12), published only recently, the German Constitutional Court (second Senate) has confirmed the practice of treaty override in tax law. The euphemism “treaty override” means that the German legislator adopts a law which violates a prior international treaty (often a treaty on double taxation). The Federal Tribunal on Finances (Bundesfinanzhof) had doubts about the constitutionality of this practice. It was convinced that a recent amendment of the Income Tax Act which is incompatible with a German-Turkish dual taxation treaty of 1985 is unconstitutional, exactly because it violates the treaty.

If in a pending judicial proceeding, a German court is convinced that a legal provision, which it needs to apply to resolve the case under scrutiny, is unconstitutional, that court must stay the proceeding and pose a reference question on the law’s constitutionality to the German Constitutional Court (Art. 100(1) German Basic Law). Such a reference procedure guarantees that the Constitutional Court retains the monopoly for declaring a law unconstitutional, and is thus a hallmark of the concentrated system of constitutional control in Germany.

Translation into constitutional questions
The judicial proceeding under Art. 100(1) Basic Law is available only for questions of constitutionality, not for questions of compatibility with international law. This worked, because the courts involved in fact “translated” the question of the relationship between international law and domestic law into a constitutional law question of the separation of powers and of constitutional principles: rule of law versus democracy.

The Federal Tribunal on Finances deemed the treaty override unconstitutional for violation of the rule of law and of the German constitutional principle of “friendliness towards international law” (“Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit”).

The Constitutional Court did not follow this view. It opined that the constitutional principle of democracy (which includes the principle of discontinuity of parliament following elections) demands that the German Parliament is free to change its mind and to make or amend a law even if this violates an international treaty which had been ratified by a previous Parliament (Order of 15 Dec. 2015, paras 53-54). Read the rest of this entry…

 

German Parliament decides to send troops to combat ISIS − based on collective self-defense “in conjunction with” SC Res. 2249

Published on December 8, 2015        Author: 

On 4th December 2015, after a parliamentary debate on 2d December, the German Parliament decided, with 445 positive votes (146 negative votes and seven abstentions), to honour the German’s Government’s formal request (BT Drucksache 18/6866 of 1st Dec. 2015 ) to send up to 1200 troops to combat ISIS. A formal parliamentary decision to deploy military abroad is required by the German Constitution (Basic Law) and a German 2005 law (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) which codifies prior constitutional case law.

The international legal basis for the deployment decision, as officially claimed by the Government, is “Art. 51 of the UN Charter in conjunction with Art. 42(7) TEU as well as resolutions 2170 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2249 (2015) of the Security Council.” In its request to Parliament, the Government explained that action against IS (by the US, Australia, the UK, and France) “in exercise of collectives self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter is covered by resolution 2249 (2015).” (BT Drs. 18/1866, p. 3). The EU-assistance clause as invoked by France on 13th November, to which all EU member States responded on 17th November with the promise for assistance, has been analysed here by Carolyn Moser. The substance of the IS resolution 2249 has been analysed on EJIL talk! by Marc Weller, by Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic.

Read the rest of this entry…

 

The (Non-)Judicialisation of War: German Constitutional Court Judgment on Rescue Operation Pegasus in Libya of 23 September 2015 (Part 2)

Published on October 22, 2015        Author: 

Editor’s Note:  This is the second of two posts discussing the ‘Rescue Operation Pegasus’ Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

4. Assessment

The legal reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Rescue Operation Pegasus Judgment is quite obviously inspired by the desire to avoid impractical results. It is somewhat in tension with the Court’s insistence on an otherwise joint and unified power of Government and Parliament (“Entscheidungsverbund”; para. 83).

Still, I find the teleological argument fully convincing: On the premise that Parliament has the war power because it is supposed to co-decide in the face of political and military risk but not to assess the lawfulness of the operation, an ex post “ratification” does not make sense.

Importantly, in the different factual situation of an ongoing operation, parliamentary approval would have to be sought, and its refusal would deploy its effect ex nunc and oblige Government to withdraw troops (para. 87).

It is also worth noting, that – like a counter-point to the actual holding against Parliament − the Court by way of dicta highlighted and strengthened parliamentary powers in numerous respects. Read the rest of this entry…

 

The (Non-)Judicialisation of War: German Constitutional Court Judgment on Rescue Operation Pegasus in Libya of 23 September 2015 (Part 1)

Published on October 21, 2015        Author: 

Editor’s Note: This is the first of two posts discussing the ‘Rescue Operation Pegasus’ Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

In the middle of the civil war in Libya in 2011 (before the start of the UN authorised military operation), the German Chancellor, following the proposals made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, decided to evacuate 132 persons (German and other civilians) from an industrial camp in Nafurah, 400 km south of Benghazi. The operation – dubbed “Operation Pegasus” – succeeded without any combat action.

Subsequently, a group of members of the German Bundestag seized the German Federal Constitutional Court and argued that the constitutional and statutory division of powers among the Executive and the Legislative branch when it comes to deciding about military action not only demands parliamentary ex ante approval but also, in those urgent cases where the Executive is allowed to decide on its own, requires a formal ex post approval. This claim was rejected by the Court (judgment of the Second Senate, 23 September 2015, No. 2 BvE 6/11).

1. The legal framework and background

Germany is probably the state with the most detailed legal regime on parliamentary involvement in decisions on the use of military force abroad. Read the rest of this entry…

 
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Thin is beautiful – or are international lawyers anorectic?

Published on June 2, 2015        Author: 

Thin and thick and the two-pillar test

Steven Ratner’s book measures international core norms against a standard of “thin justice”. That justice is thin, because it is less demanding than the standard we would use to judge domestic law and domestic institutions, “it is a justice that reflects the thinness of the community in which it operates” (p. 90, see also p. 416). The distinction between domestic thickness and international thinness is inspired by and parallels Michael Walzer’s thick and thin morality. Ratner does not espouse a radical cosmopolitanism which claims that the standards of justice need to be independent from state boundaries, and which would not allow for distinctions based on the nationality of involved persons or on the territoriality of situations.

In the book, Ratner undertakes three operations: First, he identifies and fleshes out the thin-justice-standard. Importantly, “thin” does not mean “procedural” only, but has some substance. The standard consists of two principles or “pillars”, as Ratner calls them. The first pillar is the advancement of international and intra-state peace, the second pillar is the respect for basic human rights. In addition to a norm’s capacity to further peace and/or human rights, Ratner (at some places) employs two additional criteria: procedural fairness, as an expression of internal morality vis-à-vis participants and as an outgrowth of the rule of law (p. 409), and/or the prospects of such a norm for compliance.

Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL Book Discussion
 

Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order

Published on December 22, 2014        Author: 

The Italian Constiutional Court’s decision no. 238 of 22 Oct. 2014 (unofficial translation into English) already inspired a flurry of comments in the blogosphere (see in EJIL talk! Christian Tams (24 Oct. 2014) and Theodor Schilling (12 Nov. 2014); on the Verfassungsblog amongst others Filippo Fontanelli (27 Oct. 2014); on Opinio Juris Andrea Pin (19 Nov. 2014); on the Völkerrechtsblog Felix Würkert (11 Dec. 2014)).

In that Sentenza, the Corte refused to give effect to the ICJ’s judgment (in) Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) of 3 February 2012, in which the ICJ had upheld the principle of state immunity against allegations of serious human rights violations of German state organs committed during the Second World War.

Sentenza No. 238 is important not only because it concerns the persisting tension between respecting (state) immunity and protecting human or fundamental rights (see for a recent publication Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill 2015)), but – maybe even more importantly – because it concerns the relationship between international law (in the shape of a judgment by the ICJ) and domestic law, as applied by a domestic (constitutional) court.

Just the latest item in the sequence of domestic courts’ resistance against decisions of international bodies  

The Corte relied on its established case-law on the effects of European Union law, notably on the doctrine of controlimiti in order to erect a barrier to the “introduction” of the ICJ judgment into the domestic legal order: “As was upheld several times by this Court, there is no doubt that the fundamental principles of the constitutional order and inalienable human rights constitute a ‘limit to the introduction (…) of generally recognized norms of international law’ (…) and serve as ‘counterlimits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of European Union [and now international] law” (Sentenza No. 238, in “The law”, para. 3.2.). Read the rest of this entry…