Sanctions Under Scrutiny: Towards Better Justifications in UN Sanctions Listings

The UN Security Council (UNSC) lists individuals and entities responsible for violations of sanctions regimes or international humanitarian law, resulting in asset freezes and travel bans. Those affected have two avenues for removal from the lists: the Ombudsperson (applicable to listings under the ISIL/AQAP 1267 regime), or the focal point mechanism (covering other sanctions regimes). Established in 2006, the focal point mechanism was mandated with coordinating the delisting procedures, but it remained largely ineffective. On 19 June 2024, the UNSC adopted resolution 2744 (2024), strengthening the process with a Delisting Focal Point, whose role and procedures closely resemble those of the Ombudsman (see here for context). This revitalized mechanism offers a more credible opportunity for listed individuals and entities to challenge their designations.

As we await the formal appointment of the Delisting Focal Point, it is an opportune moment to revisit a related issue that directly affects access to the delisting process: the quality of narrative summaries. These summaries are central to the sanctions process, as they form the publicly available justification for listings and the basis on which challenges are made. When they are vague or incomplete, they fail to meet due process standards and risk rendering the delisting process inaccessible or ineffective. This post argues that improving the quality and clarity of narrative summaries is essential to ensuring the fairness and credibility of the UN sanctions system. The analysis that follows is based on narrative summaries issued since 2020 across seven regimes: the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.

Origin and Purpose of Narrative Summaries

Judicial reviews, notably the landmark Kadi (2008 and 2013), Abdelrazik, Aisha Qaddafi and Kala Naft judgments stated an important principle: the right to an effective defence requires that individuals know the reasons for their sanctions in sufficient detail. In response, the UNSC in 2008 first directed the ISIL/AQAP Sanctions Committee to draft and publish narrative summaries explaining every listing decision. Today, all Sanctions Committees (except the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK regime) publish narrative summaries. While these summaries do not need to contain supporting evidence, they must provide what courts call a “useful indication” of the information and evidence that justified the designation.  

Importance of Narrative Summaries for Listed Parties and States

Narrative summaries are important to both States and sanctioned parties. For sanctioned parties, these summaries outline the allegations they must challenge to be delisted; for States, they serve as the basis for implementing UN sanctions. Despite their significance, narrative summaries are rarely scrutinized outside judicial settings. I argue that, for the following reasons, these public narrative summaries often become the sole source of information available to the above stakeholders:

First, while Committee guidelines of Yemen, Somalia, Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), DPRK, and Haiti require reasons for listing to be communicated to those listed by their government, there is no formal verification mechanism to confirm that this information has been transmitted, nor is there a requirement to inform them of amendments to summaries. Therefore, individuals and entities may only have access to the information contained in the public summaries.

Second, if the summaries are vague and unclear, individuals and entities can only communicate with the UNSC through their governments to request additional information (see, for example, paragraph 8(e) and 12(d)). This is problematic when the government supports the continuation of sanctions against them or simply is unwilling to support, for example, if the listed party is a political or military opponent.

Third, there are no guarantees that parties receive information before a listing, nor is this a requirement. Courts have concluded that there is no “right to be heard” prior to designation because of the likelihood of moving assets (see Kadi II, paragraph 7). Separately, Panels of Experts (bodies that help Sanctions Committees to monitor violations) provide parties they recommend for listing an “opportunity to respond”. Even then, in certain cases, such as threats to sources or likelihood asset movement, this opportunity is not provided (see annex 1).

While individuals and entities may eventually have limited access to additional information at the delisting process, international law requires that individuals have access to information and evidence from the outset (i.e. immediately after listing), as it is needed to defend their rights effectively (see Kala Naft, paragraph 68; Kadi II, paragraph 100).

Finally, Committee guidelines provide for periodic reviews (an annual review for Somala, sections 8 and 9, and regular reviews for Congo, Sudan, DPRK, Libya, South Sudan). Since 2020, some listings have been amended or removed, including in the Yemen, Sudan, and Congo regimes, but not all. For the above reasons, initial narrative summaries often remain the sole justification for listing, sometimes for decades.

Vague and outdated summaries also have implications for States, whose courts have emphasised the need to uphold due process before enforcing sanctions. For example, courts have specified that States must verify that at least one reason in the narrative summary is sufficiently detailed, specific, and substantiated to satisfy the due process requirements (Kadi II, paragraphs 131-145; Kala Naft, paragraph 72; Qaddafi paragraph 107). They have further held that States cannot rely on obsolete information to justify current listings (Qaddafi, paragraphs 106, 114). Globally, States do not have access to underlying intelligence or evidence and must rely on narrative summaries. Consequently, when these summaries fail to meet legal standards, States become vulnerable to legal challenges.

Current Issues with the Narrative Summaries

The following shortcomings are based on standards established by courts, including in the Kadi and Qaddafi cases. While these decisions directly bind only certain member States, the due process principles they articulate are universal.

1. Insufficient Specificity and Analysis of Information

Many narrative summaries contain general and vague reasons for listing. For example, narrative summaries for arms embargo violations can omit locations, dates, weapon shipments, or vessels involved. For human rights violations, they can lack information on specific incidents including dates and locations (see here, here and here). Some listings presume command responsibility (see, for example, here) without a case-by-case analysis of the commander-subordinate relationship required under international law on attribution of responsibility (see this criticism of EU sanctions).

While it’s common knowledge that armed groups recruit children in Congo or that arms smuggling occurs in Yemen, general assertions cannot legally justify stripping individuals of their rights. In comparison, Nkalubo’s listing (Congo), Cherizier’s listing (Haiti) or Souleman’s listing (CAR) specifies dates, locations, attack details, and types of human rights violations.

2. Use of Media Reports as Verification

While referencing Panel reports is desirable, the Yemen sanctions regime’s reliance on media reports undermines evidentiary integrity. Since 2020, five of seven narrative summaries have used media reports as “verification” or part of the reasons for sanctions.

For example, al-Hamzi’s listing cites a single media report from March 2021 to “verify” an “active military role” for a designation in October 2022. A 20-month-old article cannot credibly establish a current military role.

These references also complicate the delisting process: must individuals refute media allegations alongside narrative summaries? Some cited articles introduce claims absent from the UNSC’s formal reasoning for listing: in al-Marrani’s listing in 2022, allegations about recruiting and blackmailing women appear exclusively in media cited in the narrative summaries, not in contemporary Panel findings or the UNSC’s stated justification.

The evidentiary concerns deepen when cited outlets maintain clear affiliations with conflict parties, or when their journalistic methods remain opaque, contrasting sharply with the Panel of Experts’ transparent methodological standards (see annex 1). The al-Sa’adi listing exemplifies the deterioration: vague media assertions about naval mine-laying, replace the precise evidence found in authoritative documentation (paragraph 110 -114). It is true that at times citing panel reports may block the Sanctions Committee consensus on a listing (for example, when Panel reports identify countries where mines were reportedly produced). In such cases, citing paragraph numbers without reproducing paragraphs from the report could be an alternative (compare with Baluku listing in Congo where seven Panels of Experts’ reports are cited).

3. Reference to Confidential Documents

Some narrative summaries compound transparency problems by citing confidential documents as justification. This listing of al-Shaer, for instance, references a “UN Panel of Experts’ Statement of Case of 28 August 2019” containing classified information that cannot be disclosed. Such citations create a fundamental contradiction: how can individuals challenge evidence they cannot access? Unless clear procedures exist for sharing confidential materials at the time of listing, such documents should remain uncited, while including as much non-confidential information as possible in public summaries.

Roots of Inconsistency

The inconsistent standards adopted in narrative summaries primarily stems from institutional neglect. The ISIL/AQAP regime confronted intense legal scrutiny that forced procedural reforms and more rigorous justifications (see EJIL: Talk! blog posts here, here, here, and here). Other regimes, operating under the Delisting Focal Point mechanism, have escaped similar judicial pressure (exceptions include the Qaddafi judgement). The 16-year delay in appointing a delisting focal point with comparable functions to the 2009 Ombudsman highlights clear institutional neglect and slow progress on comparable due process guarantees outside the ISIL/Al-Qaeda regime. These institutional weaknesses render current narrative summaries a poor reflection of the Council’s commitment to due process standards, undermining both the legitimacy of individual sanctions and the credibility of the system itself.

Conclusion

The above analysis rests on a fundamental principle of international law: individuals must have meaningful opportunities to challenge Security Council sanctions. While the expansion of the Focal Point’s mandate is a welcome step in demonstrating UNSC adherence to due process rights, this would be meaningless if the narrative summaries do not meet requisite standards. I recognize that it will be impractical to recommend that the UNSC reviews all narrative summaries for due process compliance because of resource constraints and divergent views within the Council. However, the Council should nonetheless ensure that future summaries address known deficiencies. For individuals and entities that are already listed, I recommend that the Council allow them to request clarifying information about the reasons for their listings from the Delisting Focal Point, without triggering the delisting process. The Focal Point could then liaise with the Sanctions Committees to provide listed parties as much information as necessary to meet due process standards, while maintaining confidentiality of sources. This two-track approach would offer a pragmatic way forward for enhancing the credibility and fairness in sanctions processes.