Fifteen Years of the UN Ombudsperson: Due Process as Competitive Advantage

This year marks the 15th anniversary of one of the most quietly revolutionary institutions in global governance: the Office of the United Nations Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

The Office was established by the Security Council to provide an independent, impartial review mechanism for those on the counterterrorism sanctions list. Its establishment was a direct response to the Kadi litigation in European courts, which revealed what many had long argued: UN counter-terrorism sanctions lacked even the most basic guarantees of due process. Individuals could be designated without knowing the case against them and without being able to challenge their listing. 

The first UN Ombudsperson, Judge Kimberly Prost, took up the role in 2010, marking the beginning of what would become a rare experiment in procedural fairness at the heart of the Security Council’s counter-terrorism apparatus. Judge Prost, a Canadian judge, brought not only credibility but integrity to the fledgling institution. In a twist that captures the volatile politics of global governance, Judge Prost has recently herself been placed on a US sanctions list for her role as a judge on the International Criminal Court. It is a strange paradox: the architect of UN due process protections for targeted sanctions now finds herself a target of US politicized sanctions.

This moment should give us pause. The system of international law and global accountability, including the sanctions tool, is being actively undermined. In this climate, the imperative must be to strengthen, rather than erode, principled institutions of global governance. Yet the institutional footing of the Ombudsperson is increasingly precarious. As of October 2025, the role will be vacant once again following the early resignation of Richard Malanjum, the third consecutive Ombudsperson to step down before completing a full term. If the Office is allowed to atrophy, the UN may not only forfeit its capacity to offer a credible, procedurally legitimate alternative to unilateral sanctions, but risks jeopardising the future of sanctions as a tool of collective security.

Voice and Exit in the Sanctions Marketplace

For much of the post–Cold War era, the UN Security Council held unparalleled authority to impose binding international sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. But that world is rapidly fading. Today, the sanctions landscape looks less like a coherent system of collective security and more like a crowded competitive market, where alternative sanctions regimes not only compete with the UN, but often surpass it in scale, agility, and perceived effectiveness.

Albert Hirschman’s seminal theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty offers a powerful lens through which to assess the health of institutions. According to Hirschmann’s theory, when users in a system grow dissatisfied, they can either voice concerns in the hope of reform or exit the system altogether in favour of alternatives. 

For several decades, states, scholars and policy think tanks exercised voice: calling for due process, transparency, and safeguards within the Security Council. However, voice has gradually given way to exit – quiet, steady, and structural. States have increasingly turned to autonomous sanctions regimes, particularly those of the US, EU, and UK, bypassing the slow and politically fraught deliberations of the Security Council.

The figures tell the story. The UN maintains 14 sanctions regimes, encompassing fewer than 900 individuals and entities globally. By contrast, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which contains tens of thousands of names. In 2024 alone, the US added 3,135 new listings. The EU and UK, spurred in part by the war in Ukraine, have also issued sweeping designations, increasingly making unilateral sanctions — not UN measures — the default sanctions tool. The result is that the UN is fast becoming a spectator in its own domain, sidelined by unilateral alternatives.

Due Process and the UN’s Competitive Advantage

And yet, amidst this waning influence, the UN still holds one crucial edge: relative legitimacy.

Unlike autonomous sanctions, which are often perceived as extensions of national power or geopolitical coercion, UN sanctions are, in principle, backed by the consensus of the international community. This is where due process becomes not just a moral imperative, but a strategic necessity. In today’s crowded and contested sanctions marketplace, the relative legitimacy of the Security Council sanctions regime is a rare and dwindling commodity – and it must be protected.

By comparison, US sanctions increasingly suffer from a legitimacy crisis. They are widely viewed as politicised tools of pressure. Since 1992, it has become an annual tradition for the UN General Assembly to condemn US sanctions on Cuba as unilateral coercive measures, with the latest resolution adopted with a vote of 187 in favour, 2 against. US sanctions against prosecutors and judges of the International Criminal Court, UN officials and NGOs reinforce concerns that US measures are more about power than principle.

Equally troubling is how US sanctions operate. OFAC procedures are opaque and unaccountable. There is no guarantee of a hearing, no obligation to disclose the evidence, and few reasoned explanations. Delisting petitions can take years, often with no transparency and little feedback. As Peter Robinson, legal representative for sanctioned individuals (and no great supporter of the Ombudsperson or Security Council sanctions processes) remarked at a recent seminar: ‘It’s like night and day. When I’m before OFAC, it’s like hell. And being before the UN Ombudsperson is comparatively like heaven.’

The UN Ombudsperson framework offers a principled alternative: it brings a modicum of independence, fairness and accountability into sanctions governance. If the UN fails to sustain the Ombudsperson process, it risks accelerating the delegitimization of sanctions as a collective security tool. The Ombudsperson is not a panacea – but it is a beginning. And fifteen years on, we should be building on that beginning, not dismantling it.

The Value(s) of the UN Ombudsperson

Due process in the UN context is not only a set of procedural rights but a vehicle for expressing and embedding core public values. These are not abstract ideals. They have real consequences for the legitimacy of the system and the trust it commands from states, individuals, and civil society. The Ombudsperson has developed a process uniquely suited to achieving several core due process values.

Accuracy through Independent Review

One of the most essential public values safeguarded by the UN Ombudsperson is the accuracy of the list. The Ombudsperson contributes to this value through a rigorously structured process according to a standard of review that tests whether there is ‘sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the listing’. 

The results speak for themselves. According to the Ombudsperson’s latest report, over 70 individuals and entities have been delisted as a result of the Ombudsperson’s review. Not a single recommendation to delist has ever been rejected by the Sanctions Committee – a powerful testament to the care, diligence, and institutional authority the Office has earned. It is also clear that the listing process has improved since the mechanism was established, with the number of false listings said to have declined, if not been eliminated entirely. In a global system where misidentification or outdated intelligence can upend lives, the Ombudsperson provides an indispensable mechanism for course correction.

Continuing attention to the accuracy of the list is not just a procedural matter – it is integral to the effectiveness and integrity of the sanctions regime itself. Targeted sanctions are designed as preventive and behavioural tools, not as punitive measures. When listings are based on flawed or outdated information, or when individuals remain listed long after they have severed ties with proscribed groups, the sanctions regime risks becoming counterproductive. It may punish the wrong people, erode political and public support, and blunt the incentive for behavioural change. By ensuring that only those who continue to meet the criteria remain listed, the Ombudsperson reinforces both the legal soundness and the strategic utility of sanctions, making them more precise, more just, and ultimately more effective.

Dignity through Dialogue

Among the most distinct and humanising features of the Ombudsperson process is its emphasis on dialogue. For many individuals subject to targeted sanctions, the listing process itself is alienating and disempowering. Against this backdrop, the opportunity to participate in an open-ended, direct dialogue with the Ombudsperson is not only legally significant, it restores a degree of agency and dignity to listed individuals.

This fusion of personal interaction and procedural rigor is unique in global sanctions practice. After receiving a petition, the Ombudsperson engages in a detailed information-gathering phase, during which they seek and analyse submissions from relevant Member States, intelligence sources, and the petitioner. This is followed by a dialogue phase, involving in-person meetings between the Ombudsperson and the petitioner, usually over one or two days. The petitioner is given the opportunity to share their story, respond to the information provided (in anonymised or summarised form), and submit any clarifications or additional evidence. The Ombudsperson can ask questions, probe inconsistencies, and assess the petitioner’s credibility in real time – a vital component in determining whether continued listing is justified.

Public Accountability in the use of Confidential Intelligence

The UN Ombudsperson process must navigate a delicate balance between confidentiality and accountability, providing the potential for responsible use of sensitive intelligence while protecting individual rights. This function, crucial in counter-terrorism contexts, sets the Ombudsperson apart from judicial alternatives.

Unlike judges in domestic or regional courts, appointed through processes unfamiliar to Member States, the UN Ombudsperson is appointed through a process designed to secure both independence and state confidence. The Ombudsperson must be an ‘eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and integrity’ appointed by the Secretary-General ‘in close consultation with the Committee’. This establishes a process of direct and mutual accountability in the handling of intelligence information. It preserves a degree of independence, while ensuring that the appointee carries the stature and trust required to handle highly sensitive information. 

States that provide intelligence or sensitive material do so voluntarily, sometimes entering into specific bilateral confidentiality agreements or arrangements with the Ombudsperson. These agreements set strict terms for handling, review and non-disclosure. Ultimately, the value of the system lies not in full transparency, but in accountable discretion. In cases where critical information is withheld or inadequately supported, this can contribute to a recommendation for delisting. 

Strengthening the Office: Four Reforms for the Future

The UN has created a procedural model that commands respect, generates compliance and meets core standards. If states are serious about promoting a credible and legitimate global sanctions system, four key reforms are essential.

(1) Extend mandate across all UN sanctions regimes

The UN has built a procedural model that works. Yet, inexplicably, the model remains confined to a single sanctions regime: ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida. Every other sanctions regime is left with a weaker process. In July 2024, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2744, creating an ‘enhanced’ Focal Point mechanism for all other regimes. But the upgrade is mostly cosmetic.

The Focal Point can gather information, relay questions, and compile a summary report, but – unlike the Ombudsperson – it makes no recommendation on delisting. Its authority ends where it matters most. Even the standard of interaction falls short: in-person meetings are discouraged in favour of virtual meetings ‘to increase efficiency’. Worse still, final decisions rest with sanctions committees operating by consensus, meaning any single member can veto a delisting, regardless of the facts.

The credibility gap is also structural. The Ombudsperson is a named, independent individual of stature and integrity, appointed in consultation with the Security Council sanctions committee. The Focal Point, by contrast, was previously just a faceless unit within the Secretariat, with no transparency or visibility. Resolution 2744 calls for the Secretary-General to appoint a new Focal Point by October 2024 — but there is no public indication that anyone has been named, and no requirement that the role be filled by an individual of any particular status.

A two-tiered system is now in place: a gold standard for one regime, and a procedural shadow for the rest. If the UN is serious about legitimacy, the solution is simple. Don’t duplicate existing processes – extend the Ombudsperson process to all sanctions regimes. 

(2) Introduce automatic referral for listings

Despite its mandate, the Ombudsperson cannot assist those who do not know where, or how, to seek help. The process currently requires petitioners to initiate contact, which can be an insurmountable barrier, particularly in contexts where listed individuals are marginalized, isolated or unaware of their rights. Andrej Lang’s excellent empirical study shows that it took petitioners an average of 5 years to approach the Ombudsperson after being placed on the list. Only 23% of listed individuals have contacted the Ombudsperson, suggesting potential access difficulties.

Recent resolutions provide a basis for proactive notification. Specifically, Annex II of Resolution 2734 (2024) (paragraph 20(b)) authorizes the Ombudsperson to notify individuals of their listing status where an address is known. This could form the foundation for a more robust automatic referral mechanism.  

(3) Protect in-person meetings

One of the most vital aspects of the Ombudsperson process is its emphasis on face-to-face dialogue. As detailed in successive reports, in-person meetings are not only important for restoring a modicum of dignity and agency to the sanctions listing process, but they allow the Ombudsperson to assess credibility, ask follow-up questions, and clarify misunderstandings in a way no written process ever could. 

Recent budgetary restrictions have placed this core feature at risk. The Ombudsperson has been advised that video-conferencing should be used as a cost-cutting measure. The resolution establishing the enhanced Focal Point ‘encourages the use of virtual meetings and online platforms to increase efficiency and timeliness of interacting with the petitioner’. 

Such shortcuts come at a cost. They are particularly problematic given the practical barriers faced by the vast majority of petitioners, who require interpretation services and are often located in regions with unreliable internet. Interpreters have reported that remote video hearings are particularly challenging: they struggle to follow the petitioner’s speech due to poor audio quality, lag and the inability to read facial cues and body language, all of which are essential for accurate and nuanced interpretation. These conditions can severely compromise the quality of communication, undermining both comprehension and fairness. 

(4) Ensure institutional independence and support

Finally, the Office’s institutional foundation must be strengthened. All three of the Ombudspersons since Judge Prost have left the position before completing their full term. Their resignation letters and public comments point to the same persistent structural weaknesses: tenuous contractual arrangements; lack of status commensurate with the role and limited access to administrative support. 

By comparison, for example, UN Administrative Tribunal judges benefit from robust institutional protections. They are appointed for fixed non-renewable seven-year terms under statutes that guarantee formal safeguards and confer clear professional standing. They receive full staff privileges, access to benefits and the backing of an institutional infrastructure that reflects the seriousness of their mandate. 

The contrast with the Ombudsperson is stark. The role is currently classified as a short-term consultancy, subject to periodic renewal by Secretariat officials, and without the basic employment entitlements afforded to comparable positions, including health insurance, pension contributions or sick leave. This disparity is not merely symbolic. The contractual terms and institutional standing of the Ombudsperson shape both the perception and the performance of the role. A position tasked with reviewing the most sensitive intelligence-based sanctions decisions of the Security Council should not operate on a precarious footing. Without stable terms, adequate support, and institutional stature, the Ombudsperson’s authority is weakened, and their independence compromised. 

Conclusion

Fifteen years on, the Ombudsperson process remains one of the UN’s quiet triumphs: a principled innovation that has enhanced fairness without undermining effectiveness. It has shown that due process is not an obstacle to sanctions, it is their foundation. Accuracy improves targeting. Dialogue fosters compliance. Independent review builds trust. These are not concessions to legitimacy; they are what makes legitimacy possible. 

And yet, rather than extending and strengthening the Office, the UN has allowed it to languish – under-resourced, under-valued and confined to a single regime. This is not just inexplicable. It is counterproductive. 

In today’s fractured sanctions landscape, due process gives Security Council sanctions a competitive advantage. As legitimacy erodes and competing regimes proliferate, the Ombudsperson is a rare symbol of what principled multilateralism can look like. The question is no longer whether the Ombudsperson model works. It is whether the UN has the will to preserve what it has built and, in doing so, to protect the delicate balance between liberty and security.* 

* This blog is dedicated to the memory of Professor Conor Gearty (1957-2025), whose work on liberty and security advocates principled approaches to counter-terrorism. He was a colleague, mentor and friend and is deeply missed.