Xi’s, Putin’s and Trump’s (Not So) Competing World Orders

The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the world’s pre-eminent and most inclusive multilateral forum, started last week in New York. Rather than a cause for celebration, the gathering unfolded amid stark reminders of the present: a world riven by wars, growing geopolitical rivalries, and shifting power balances—compounded by President Trump’s unilateralism. While many speakers invoked multilateralism, the session’s theme, “Better Together,” felt more like a weary refrain than a genuine aspiration. This was sharply illustrated as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took the podium, only to be met by dozens of representatives walking out of the hall in protest, underscoring the deep divisions and unresolved conflicts shadowing the assembly. A festive spirit was notably absent.

On the other side of the planet, just three weeks earlier, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) 2025 summit convened with a very different vibe. Tianjin, a bustling Chinese metropolis known for its stand-up comedy and Beijing opera, hosted over 20 leaders from Central and South Asia, all gathered in a display of warm diplomacy. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shared laughter and camaraderie. Modi and Putin’s hand-in-hand entrance signalled their united front against Washington’s tariffs and oil pressures. Xi’s usual stone-faced expression was softened, Modi and Putin’s shared a 45-minute ride in Putin’s bulletproof Russian-made Aurus limo, which Modi then shared on social media. But more importantly, the 2025 SCO summit seemed to aim to present an alternative vision of the world order to the one offered by the United States under Trump’s presidency (see here, here and here). That vision, at least as presented, is a celebration of multilateralism.

This post juxtaposes the narratives emerging from President Trump’s UNGA speech with those of the 2025 SCO summit, mapping out two distinct—yet at times convergent—worldviews. The analysis first explores the themes, rhetoric, and tone of each address, showing the language and symbolism that are used to define priorities and signal intent. Then, the discussion shifts to the underlying logic and strategic ambitions behind these competing outlooks. Finally, the post draws the threads together to assess what these rival visions reveal about the future direction of global order, and how multilateralism is being contested, redefined, or undermined in this dynamic landscape.

Trump at the 80^th UNGA session

President Trump’s vision of the world can be summed up in his well-known slogan: “America First.” From the start of his first mandate, he showed little regard for multilateralism and/or the international legal order. He once tweeted the UN to be “just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time”. His second term doubled down on erratic unpredictability, unilateralism and arbitrariness in international relations. His executive actions included withdrawing funding from UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and UNRWA, manifestly unlawful proposals such as annexing Greenland and seizing the Panama Canal (discussed on EJIL: Talk!: here, here, and here), and continued transactional diplomacy and tariff policy (also EJIL: Talk!: here and here). So, no one could reasonably have expected Trump’s UNGA speech to brim with accolades to multilateralism and calls for a world order based on international law. Nor could one expect from Trump a typical presidential speech, carefully crafted and filled with diplomatic courtesies. But even with such admittedly low expectations, no one could have anticipated just quite how surreal, abrasive and unfiltered his UNGA address would be.

Lasting close to an hour, it was mostly a mix of grievances, self-congratulation and stern admonitions (see also media reports here, here and here). What follows is its essence, distilled.

After a lament about his faulty teleprompter, Trump proudly began detailing his achievements, including supposedly reviving the US economy, spearheading historic trade deals, and bolstering military strength. Moreover, he claimed: “In a period of just seven months, I have ended seven unendable wars.” This claim has been debunked, as some of these wars never existed (e.g. like the war between Serbia and Kosovo) or never ended or Trump did not play a crucial role in ending them (see a factcheck here).

Then Trump turned to his grievances. He lamented the UN’s failure to act in conflicts he allegedly personally ended and questioned its fundamental purpose:

What is the purpose of the United Nations? The U.N. has such tremendous potential. I’ve always said it. It has such tremendous, tremendous potential. But it’s not even coming close to living up to that potential for the most part, at least for now, all they seem to do is write a really strongly worded letter and then never follow that letter up. It’s empty words, and empty words don’t solve war. The only thing that solves war and wars is action.

Trump went on to criticize the costly renovation of the UN headquarters, recalling his own past as a real estate developer whose $500 million proposal—with “marble floors” and “mahogany walls”—was rejected. Instead, the UN chose billions worth of “terrazzo floors” and “plastic finishes,” and, he claimed, “they still haven’t finished the job.” Trump continued drawing on his personal experience that day—which also included the stalled escalator he encountered when entered the building—to say that: “All I got from the United Nations was an escalator that stopped right in the middle and a teleprompter that didn’t work.” (This would later set off a wave of conspiracy theories, as these malfunctions were framed as a deliberate act of sabotage by U.N. staff. In fact, the teleprompter was Trump’s, not the UN’s, and the escalator seems to have stopped because a safety device was accidentally triggered by his own videographer.)

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Trump sharply condemned immigration policies he deemed lenient, particularly in Europe— before delivering an unapologetically blunt verdict: “Your countries are going to hell” (his speech at 28’46’’). He accused the UN of creating a crisis of uncontrolled migration, depicting it as “an assault on Western countries and their borders” and called for immediate, tough actions to secure national sovereignty and control borders.

Then, climate change was dismissed as a “hoax,” “clean, beautiful coal” was celebrated, environmentalists accused of wanting to “kill all the cows”, windmills were portrayed as “pathetic.” He also went to disparage NATO allies for their hypocrisy in purchasing Russian energy, criticized China’s energy policies, highlighted the dangers posed by Iran, condemned Hamas in Gaza, claimed that London has a terrible mayor who wants to introduce Shariah law, threatened drug cartels (“Please be warned that we will blow you out of existence.”), etc, etc. I could go on, but I won’t. You get the picture.

Most of Trump’s claims were either exaggerated, misleading, or outright false (see another fact check here). More relevant to this discussion was his recurring theme of nationalism and sovereignty, championing strong borders, economic might, and military power as the path forward—unilateralism at its height. The only time he uttered the adjective “international” was when proposed a joint effort to enforce the Biological Weapons Convention, through an AI-based “verification system that everyone can trust.” He expressed hope for the UN to play a constructive role in that endeavour.

At the end of his speech, he softened his tone, calling for unity in diversity, respect for each nation’s sovereignty, and cooperation despite differences, though framed within a nationalist perspective. His teleprompter was likely working again – but the absence of references to international law, or notions such as the ‘rule-based international order,’ in a speech longer than an hour spoke louder than Trump’s words.

Xi and Putin at 2025 SPO Summit

The key speeches at the Tianjin Summit – delivered, after all that cozy chumminess, by Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi – reflected on the SCO’s historical trajectory, assessed its current standing, and outlined its ambitions for a more influential role in the future of global affairs. While this post would not delve into Modi’s address, it is important to note that collectively, these speeches projected a forward-looking multilateral narrative. They positioned the SCO as both a regional and global actor, offering an alternative vision for the world—one emphasizing a new model of cooperation, governance, security, and development grounded in sovereignty, multilateralism, and respect for cultural diversity.

The host, President Xi, put forward the idea for reform embodied in the so-called Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which included several key pillars. First, there is a sovereign equality of states. Second, the international rule of law needs to be respected, especially the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and “universally recognized basic norms of international relations.” These must be observed fully and equally. Also, “international law and rules should be applied equally and uniformly. There should be no double standards, and the house rule of few countries must not be imposed upon others.” Third, multilateralism needs to be practiced, unilateralism opposed, and “the status and authority of the UN” preserved.

In short, the general vibe, if I can put it that way, was very different from Trump’s questioning the basic purpose of the UN. And also unlike with Trump’s UNGA speech, Xi’s address made frequent references to internationalism:

We should act to defend international fairness and justice. In compliance with the principles of justice and fairness, SCO member states have engaged constructively in international and regional affairs and upheld the common interests of the Global South. We should continue to unequivocally oppose hegemonism and power politics, practice true multilateralism, and stand as a pillar in promoting a multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations.

Putin’s speech, much shorter and less structured, complemented Xi’s. However, it had a more assertive, typically Russian, tone. Putin supported China’s GGI initiative, and framed the SCO as a vehicle to counter “dictatorial practices” of certain countries, giving it a leading role in „shaping a more just and equitable system of global governance“ which „must rest on the primacy of international law and the core provisions of the UN Charter, be genuinely balanced, take into account the interests of the widest possible range of countries, and ensure opportunities for their sustainable development and security.“

Both Xi and Putin’s speeches narrated the SCO’s imagined identity as a hub for an alternative global order centered on multipolarity, sovereign equality, and respect for international law, while opposing unilateralism, hegemonism, and double standards. They presented the SCO as a more stable and predictable alternative to the disruptions associated with Trump (see also the UNGA address of Chinese Premier Li). Xi criticized “Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism,” implicitly targeting U.S. unilateralism and economic coercion, and called for safeguarding the UN’s authority—in counterpoint with Trump’s criticisms of the UN. Xi also emphasized that “no double standards, and the house rules of a few must not be imposed upon others”, alluding to Washington’s selective application of international law. Putin was more direct, condemning “dictatorial practices in international affairs” by “certain countries,” amplifying China’s criticism with a sharper tone.

Behind the lofty appeals to multilateralism and sovereign equality is a deeper strategic posture—one that positions the SCO as a stable counterweight to what it portrays as the erratic and disruptive policies emanating from Washington under Trump. There is little in the SCO summit speeches that could raise eyebrows. Compared to Trump at the UNGA podium, they sound eminently reasonable. Who could oppose sovereign equality, the UN, its Charter, or “universally recognized basic norms of international relations”? Calls for “democracy in international relations” without “double standards,” all sound sensible enough. And Xi and Putin did not mock any windmills.

Yet, the SCO platitudes are, in reality, far from any genuine multilateralism—and even farther from the rule of international law as conceived by the liberal world. China and Russia’s joint common narrative—contrasting US hegemonism, protectionism, unilateralism, and double standards with a vision of an “orderly and stable international order” rooted in Westphalian sovereignty and non-interference—was set out in the 2016 Joint Declaration of Russia and China on the Promotion of International Law. This declaration prioritizes state sovereignty and regime stability over liberal ideas like human rights and democratic legitimacy (see EJIL: Talk!, Lauri Mälksoo). The SCO summit’s rhetoric clearly follows from that document. Similar themes of sovereign equality and cooperation also echoed at the 2025 BRIC’s summit or the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit.

What distinguishes the SCO is its pioneering role in crafting what Ginsburg terms “authoritarian international law”. Namely, the SCO created a legal framework– by key conventions from 2001, 2009, and 2017 – that enables its member states to suppress dissent and shield regimes by conflating political opposition with terrorism, separatism, or extremism. This framework is grounded in the old Westphalian understanding of sovereignty as absolute authority over a territory and its people, along with strict non-interference—ignoring contemporary limits imposed by international human rights or refugee law. In practice, for example, this resulted in Kazakhstan extraditing a Uyghur journalist to China despite his refugee status and risk of torture, and Kyrgyzstan returning five refugees to Uzbekistan on terrorism charges. Many such cases have been condemned by UN treaty bodies as violations of international norms (see FIDH Report, p. 9-11).

Consequently, for SCO members, notably China and Russia, multilateralism is little more than a token—a convenient term that conceals an authoritarian vision of international order, grounded in sovereign equality and non-intervention. Put like this, their stance suddenly doesn’t seem so different from Trump’s, at least at its core.

Synergies of a Dark Tomorrow

The 2025 UNGA address by Trump and the SCO summit speeches by Xi and Putin offered competing blueprints for global order. The delivery was strikingly different. Trump’s reality-show-esque bluntness, fiery rhetoric and direct insults, contrast sharply with Xi’s polished, multilateral discourse, rich in the language of sovereign equality, international law, and multilateralism. Yet beneath these surface differences like common values: sovereignty, nationalism, power.

For Moscow and Beijing, sovereignty is a fortress, codified in legalistic language which also adopts the liberal norms—such as the rule of law, diversity, inclusion, even democracy—but hollows them out from within. Flonk and Debre’s concept of “hollow multilateralism” captures this well: an authoritarian masquerade that champions regime security over human rights and accountability. This is sovereignty in its most regressive, old Westphalian form—absolute, unchecked, and impervious to modern constraints. China and Russia were promoting these ideas on sovereign equality and non-interference earlier, including by taking practical steps to implement them within the United Nations. For example, they obstructed or diluted investigations and resolutions, stressing non-interference to restrict international oversight (see a post on Just Security). They pushed for the UN cybercrime convention which focuses on state control and non-interference, diverging from models that emphasize privacy and rights (see HRW, 2024).

By contrast, Trump wears sovereignty as a banner of nationalism and unilateralism, openly eschewing or belittling multilateral institutions—even if, post-speech, he assured the UN Secretary-General of his continuing support to the UN (at 1’’58’). The strategic vacuum created by America’s retreat under Trump invites Beijing, Moscow, and their allies to fill the breach, promising an inclusive, equitable world when the reality is quite different. And, while Trump appears erratic and disruptive, Xi and Putin project stability and rationality. Yet both sides embody threats to the international order, if from different angles.

Obviously, we appear to be drifting toward a more classical form of international law—one grounded in strict Westphalian notions of sovereignty, state control, and impunity. This regression may feel unsettling, but it may also be a characteristic of the oscillations that the international system tends to undergo. Or it may be that Trump is right, and we are all going to hell.