War Crimes without a War Crimes Statute? The Shajareh Tayyebeh Minab School Attack and the Possibility of Domestic Prosecution of Serious Violations of IHL in Iranian Courts

Introduction

The initiation of criminal complaints concerning the attack by the US armed forces on the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab has brought a doctrinal issue of direct practical relevance before Iranian prosecutorial authorities. The complaints filed by victims’ families transform what would otherwise remain an abstract question of international humanitarian law (IHL) into a concrete problem of domestic adjudication: how to address allegations amounting to serious violations of IHL within a legal system that does not contain a specific statutory offence of “war crimes”? This problem reflects a structural tension between the principle of legality in domestic criminal law and the position of international law that grave breaches of IHL may entail individual criminal responsibility. Domestic courts, however, typically require offences to be clearly defined in national legislation as a precondition for criminal liability. Against this background, the central question is whether the absence of an explicit domestic war crimes offence prevents Iranian courts from characterising and addressing conduct as war crimes under international law, and what legal basis—if any—may support such characterisation within domestic proceedings.

The established criminal character of serious violations of IHL and the principle of legality

Serious violations of IHL are consistently recognised under international law as conduct capable of giving rise to individual criminal responsibility, even without domestic codification. The modern articulation of war crimes is linked to the post-Second World War legal order. The Hague Regulations of 1907 established foundational prohibitions governing hostilities, including protection of civilian objects and restrictions on means and methods of warfare. The Nuremberg Tribunal affirmed individual responsibility for serious violations of the laws of war, operationalising pre-existing treaty-based prohibitions rather than creating new norms. This continuity is reflected in later developments where such violations were consistently treated as crimes, particularly intentional attacks against civilians and civilian objects.

The treaty framework developed cumulatively. Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention introduced “grave breaches” requiring penal sanctions for serious violations such as wilful killing. Additional Protocol I clarified and reinforced obligations to suppress such conduct through criminal measures. Customary international law, as confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, also recognises criminal responsibility for serious violations. Article 8 of the Rome Statute consolidates rather than creates war crimes. It is further supported by comparative domestic legislation, including that of the US, such as the law of the State of nationality of the alleged perpetrators, which criminalises serious violations of IHL and strengthens the foreseeability of criminal responsibility. Against this background, intentional attacks against civilians and civilian objects are firmly established as core war crimes. The issue is not criminalisability but legal characterisation.

The principal objection is based on the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), requiring pre-existing legal norms and prohibiting retroactive criminalisation. However, since Nuremberg, it has been accepted that responsibility may arise where prohibitions were sufficiently recognised internationally. This is reflected in Nuremberg Principle II, according to which the absence of domestic imposition of a penalty does not relieve responsibility under international law. The distinction is between criminalisation and characterisation: whether courts create new offences or identify established international legal nature. This is supported by Article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Iran must interpret accordingly. The legality principle thus does not preclude domestic adjudication of serious violations of IHL. It requires verification that the conduct was sufficiently proscribed and recognisable as criminal under international law at the time of commission. Where this threshold is met, domestic courts are not engaging in retroactive criminalisation but in the application of existing international legal norms within the domestic legal order. This assessment depends on how such norms are received within the Iranian legal system.

International law within the Iranian legal order

The issue is whether Iranian law permits domestic courts to rely on international legal norms in the absence of a specific statutory framework on war crimes. Article 9 of the Iranian Civil Code gives ratified treaties the force of law, integrating them into the domestic legal order and enabling treaty-based IHL norms to inform judicial reasoning. Iran’s ratification of the Geneva Conventions in 1957 is central. These instruments impose obligations concerning the protection of civilians, civilian objects, and medical units, and establish enforcement duties, including the obligation to search for and prosecute persons responsible for grave breaches, presupposing domestic implementation through criminal mechanisms.

Further support is found in Article 9 of the Islamic Penal Code, which permits prosecution of conduct connected to treaty obligations where jurisdictional requirements are met, particularly the presence of the accused on Iranian territory. Although not an explicit war crimes provision, it reflects openness to treaty-based obligations. Read together, these provisions show that Iranian law allows functional incorporation of international law rather than a strictly dualist approach. The significance of this framework is reinforced by Iranian judicial practice, where courts, although not previously dealing with war crimes cases, have increasingly relied on international treaties, including private international law instruments and human rights treaties, as interpretive aids alongside domestic norms, showing that engagement with international law is not exceptional. The Minab proceedings are particularly significant, as this is the first instance where prosecutors have been asked to examine allegations expressly framed as war crimes. The complaints invoke IHL and raise the question whether such conduct may be characterised as war crimes domestically despite the absence of a statute.

Recent legislative developments support this trajectory. The Draft Bill on International Crimes (October 2025) proposes codification of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Existing law also shows openness, notably Article 5(2) of the Law on Countering Human Rights Violations and Adventurous and Terrorist Actions of America in the Region (2017), referring to American persons involved in violations of IHL and human rights law. This framework is reinforced by the object and purpose of treaties aimed at preventing impunity. A restrictive reading of domestic silence would contradict the Geneva Conventions and is consistent with Article 15(2) of the ICCPR, requiring interpretation of legality in light of general principles of law recognised by the community of nations. Criminal law is always concerned with the principle of legality, requiring that acts or omissions be criminalised at the time of commission. However, under Article 15(1) ICCPR, acceptance of these complaints and initiation of investigations would not violate the principle of legality or the rights of the accused: the criminalisation of intentional attacks against civilians, civilian objects, and protected persons is well-established in international criminal law, as well as in the domestic laws of many states—including the US, the State of nationality of the alleged perpetrators. In any event, whether a specific statute exists or not, procedural safeguards must always be respected.

Accordingly, Iranian law does not require explicit codification of every international crime for judicial recognition, leaving space for treaty-based and customary international law, provided legality and foreseeability are respected. The significance of these issues is no longer theoretical, as the Minab proceedings directly test how far IHL can operate within the Iranian legal order when allegations of war crimes are formally presented.

The case of the Minab school attack

The practical relevance of the foregoing analysis becomes evident in the attack of 28 February 2026 against the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab. According to public accounts and victims’ submissions, the school was struck during military operations attributed to US forces, resulting in at least 156 deaths, including a large number of children. Criminal complaints have been filed by victims’ families before the competent Iranian prosecutorial authorities. For the purposes of legal analysis, the factual allegations remain subject to judicial determination and are not assumed as established. However, the complaints characterise the attack as involving serious violations of IHL, including wilful killing, attacks against civilian objects and specially protected objects, and the infliction of serious physical and psychological harm. If established, such conduct would fall within well-established categories of war crimes under customary and treaty-based international law. The legal significance of the case lies not in the attribution of responsibility but in the characterisation of the alleged conduct. The immediate question confronting Iranian prosecutors is whether the absence of a domestic war crimes statute relieves them of the obligation to investigate conduct already widely recognised as criminal under international law, or whether Iranian courts, acting as territorial courts, may treat such conduct as giving rise to war crimes responsibility under international law, rather than solely as ordinary offences such as homicide.

A categorical refusal based solely on legislative silence risks transforming a gap in codification into a barrier to accountability despite applicable treaty obligations and incorporation mechanisms within the Iranian legal system. By contrast, an interpretive approach would permit domestic authorities to recognise the established international character of the alleged conduct and give effect to it through existing provisions of Iranian law, including Article 9 of the Civil Code and Article 9 of the Islamic Penal Code, interpreted in light of Article 15(2) of the ICCPR. This does not mean that all obstacles to prosecution disappear. Questions concerning immunities, jurisdictional requirements, or the possible requirement under Article 9 of the Islamic Penal Code that suspects be present within Iranian territory may arise at a later stage in proceedings. Those issues, however, are distinct from the threshold question whether the absence of a specific war crimes statute necessarily prevents the initiation of investigations and the legal characterisation of alleged conduct as a war crime.

Conclusion

The Minab proceedings raise a novel question for the Iranian legal system: whether conduct already recognised as criminal under IHL may be investigated and characterised as a war crime despite the absence of a dedicated domestic war crimes statute. The significance of the case lies less in the specific allegations than in the opportunity it provides to clarify the relationship between international criminal norms and the Iranian legal system. The case may become an important reference point for determining the extent to which Iranian courts and prosecutors may rely on IHL when addressing allegations of serious violations of the laws of war. More broadly, it may contribute to ongoing debates concerning the domestic implementation of international criminal norms in legal systems that have not yet comprehensively codified international crimes.

Image credit: CC BY 4.0 Abbas Zakeri