UNSC Resolution 2803

On 17 November, the UNSC by 13 votes passed an historic and deeply problematic Resolution relating to the future governance of Gaza. While China and Russia had expressed doubts and Russia had circulated an alternative draft in the run up to the vote, a flurry of US lobbying of non-member regional allies persuaded these two P5 states to register their dismay solely through abstention. What the text lacks in detail it makes up for through its boldness and rejection of standard UNSC Resolution drafting protocol and respect for international law. While various details are still being thrashed out, this post will take note of its key dimensions and seek to understand the Resolution in relation to other recent ‘peace’ plans for Palestine. Reading the text carefully also underscores how the US has creatively used UNSC procedures to radically limit any role for international law in imagining Gaza’s future.

What is in the Resolution? 

This Resolution was passed only 1 month into the latest ceasefire. Through extensive US regional negotiations, not only was full-scale fighting brought to a pause on 10 October, but Trump also rolled out his 20-point plan on 29 September. This plan is annexed to and endorsed by the Resolution itself, meaning that the two texts effectively must be read together. Both texts set out a vision of a ‘day after’ for Gaza in the wake of the ‘ceasefire’, centered on the twin pillars of governance and security as underpinned by extremely vague temporal and financial parameters.

Governance

Most importantly, the Resolution creates a transitional authority for Gaza, the Board of Peace (BoP), which will be led by Trump himself. This Board will exercise sovereign control over the Strip, and it will focus on reconstruction, training a Palestinian police force, ensuring security for neighbouring territories (that is, Egypt and Israel) especially through the demobilisation of Palestinian fighters inside Gaza, overseeing the provision of aid and authorising the operations of a peace enforcement body, the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). While the Resolution confirms that the UNSC will remain ‘seized of the matter’, all aspects of Gaza’s governance rest in the hands of the BoP itself. 

Security

The ISF will be a multilateral force comprising troops from various unspecified states, with likely contenders being Qatar, Indonesia, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan. Egypt and Israel are named many times and are positioned here as the key security actors at the ultimate behest of the US (remember, they are the two largest US aid recipients). Egypt’s special role probably arises from the following four key factors: 1) as a former occupier of Gaza (1948-1967); 2) as the first Arab state to normalise its relations with Israel in 1979; 3) as the purveyor of a counter peace plan earlier in the year to thwart Trump’s forced depopulation ‘Riviera’ plan; and 4) as the only Arab neighbouring state of the Strip. Israel’s unique role in the Resolution stems from its actual troop presence within Gaza (amounting to over 50% full control) and its enduring ‘security’ imperative that serves as the raison d’être of the ISF in the first place. Thus, ‘security’ only really speaks to Israeli framings of an elastic security imperative and not that of Palestinians in Gaza. We see this most starkly through the fact that, since the ‘ceasefire’, Israel has carried out many attacks on Gaza, resulting in over 300 deaths in its first 6 weeks. 

While the 20-point plan unequivocally states that ‘Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza’, the implications of both texts are less categorical. Egyptian and Israeli troops are given a special role in the Strip and Israel will only be expected to leave Gaza once the BoP is satisfied that Palestinian reform is completed and Israel’s security assured. In addition, the Resolution effectively cedes part of Gaza’s territory in perpetuity to Israel by setting up a ‘security perimeter’ to be controlled by Israel. 

Temporality

A clearly defined 2-year period for the BoP’s mandate jarringly sits alongside the endlessly elastic timescale of a mooted Palestinian state. While we can see that the language of the November Resolution is more robust in recognising the futurity of some semblance of Palestinian independence once the BoP is satisfied of reform ‘progress’, it still provides no guarantees for Palestinians. At every turn and as redolent of the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, Israeli security is the trump card that Trump will be able to play at his untrammelled discretion.  

Financing

Detail on funding is hazy in the Resolution. The text only notes that the World Bank and donor states will finance this massive reconstruction effort that Egypt had priced at $53 billion (surely, a radical underestimate) back in March. The language of the 20-point plan is more optimistic, clearly extolling the Gulf dictatorships as economic role models and benefactors:  

A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza (Point 10).

While Palestinians figure in the two texts, there is no attempt to justify broad-based Palestinian buy in. Remember that Palestinians in the occupied territories have not been able to hold elections since 2006 and Hamas has been systematically excluded from ‘day after’ planning. Palestinians appear in the Resolution as terrorists (where it refers to the need to demilitarise terror infrastructure); as apolitical technocrats (in its reference to day-to-day service provision under the auspices of the BoP); as humanitarian supplicants (the civilian population is deemed to have ‘suffered enough’ and is now deserving of aid); and as police officers enforcing this vision.   

What is not in the Resolution? 

What Palestinians are not portrayed as being is political agents or members of a body politic and nation-state in the making. There were Saudi efforts to see some nod to self-determination appear in the text, not as an indisputable right, but as a privilege that must be earned only once (or, if ever) Israel assents. There is no recognition of self-determination as a ius cogens norm binding on the BoP, let alone on the Security Council itself. In defiance of such language in the UNSC Resolution 2803, the UNGA passed a short counter resolution the day after, which reaffirmed ‘the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to their independent State of Palestine.’ While it is important to continue to state the law in these registers, when contrasted with the sheer might of the US-sponsored UNSC Resolution, this served only to underscore the fragility of international norms at this juncture. 

Such a failure to acknowledge a role for international law is also reflected in the absence of any scope for accountability. Typically, even in a laconic and rushed UNSC Resolution on post-conflict governance, we would expect recognition of transitional justice as a crucial element in enabling communities to repair. Here though, there are empty calls for ‘dialogue’ with no mention of current ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Galant, ICJ proceedings against Israel and Germany, or the deluge of global campaigning and advocacy that has erupted in the wake of Gaza’s genocide. 

While the focus of the Resolution is Gaza, and always had to be so in confronting the sheer scale of destruction, any attempt at peace can only work through a comprehensive framework that includes the West Bank (containing East Jerusalem) as well. This is more urgent than ever given that the West Bank has seen unprecedented settler violence, killings, torture and imprisonment and land theft over the last two years. In discursively separating Gaza from the West Bank, the Resolution defies established UN practice that has consistently treated the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem as an indivisible territorial unit – the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) – to support the realisation of Palestinian self-determination. 

What are we to make of this Resolution and its regime?

This Resolution seeks to construct a potentially illegal regime of US-backed territorial annexation of the Gaza Strip. In doing this, it also overrides the ICJ’s July 2024 ruling that had required Israel to withdraw from the entirety of the oPt. The UNGA followed up on this by setting the final date for such withdrawal as 13th September 2025. Not only has this date passed while Israeli troops remain firmly ensconced throughout the OPT, but here, the UNSC seeks to legitimise such a presence indefinitely in parts of Gaza and permanently in others. This is conquest under the auspices of the UNSC with the backing of many Arab regimes. As per so many earlier and ultimately futile attempts at peace, it is inconceivable that such a text can facilitate any scope for genuine reconciliation and repair. Instead, this Resolution establishes Trump (probably with Tony Blair as his deputy) to oversee a force of reticent, but nevertheless compliant, Muslim-majority states tasked with demobilising Palestinian fighters while reconstructing one of the most decimated and toxic spaces on Earth.