Two Weeks in Review: 26 January—6 February 2026

The last two weeks have taken us from headlines to bylines and beyond. Front-page legal questions on USA-Greenland and Russia-Ukraine continue to occupy commentators. While others draw our attention to the lesser thumbed back pages: from colonial-era agreements in contemporary arbitration, and the recognition of Somaliland, to the “stateless eight” suspended in legal limbo at the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Domestic climate litigation continues apace, the conclusion of trade and investment negotiations in various corners of the world raise difficult questions of law and policy, and the international responsibility of Frontex pushes at the bounds of both EU and international law. Not to mention a response from members of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to calls for its dissolution.

Greenland and the threat of force

Louisa Handel-Mazzetti and Marten Zwanenburg argue that recent US statements about forcibly acquiring Greenland amount to a prohibited threat of force under international law, not mere political rhetoric. They explain that, unlike earlier remarks, the current context—specific statements, active consideration of military options, and recent US uses of force elsewhere—make the threats legally credible. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, a credible threat is unlawful if the envisaged use of force would itself be unlawful. Because annexation of Greenland would violate the prohibition on the use of force and Denmark’s territorial integrity, the threats are themselves illegal.

The “stateless eight” and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 

Kate McInnes takes us to an overlooked situation at the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). Often portrayed as a technical, residual body nearing closure, it in fact still exercises decisive control over human lives—those of the “Stateless Eight”. For over 15 years, these men—indicted by the Internatinol Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda but either fully acquitted or released after completing their sentence—have remained trapped in legal and humanitarian limbo due to the IRMCT’s failure to secure their safe relocation. Because the UN, acting through the IRMCT, determines their legal status, movement, medical care, and prospects for relocation, it has binding human rights obligations under general international law. The failed relocation to Niger and the deaths of three men illustrate ongoing, serious rights violations attributable to the UN. Closing the IRMCT before securing safe relocation and family reunification for the survivors would therefore be legally untenable and morally indefensible.

The legality of recognizing Somaliland

Eran Sthoeger makes the case that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland may be politically contentious, but is legally permissible. International law is neutral on secession and does not prohibit recognition of an effective, independent entity. He explains that Somaliland meets the factual criteria for statehood, emerged without foreign military intervention, and has demonstrated sustained self-governance and popular support through a referendum. While the move may heighten regional instability and diplomatic tensions, it does not fall within the narrow circumstances where recognition would be illegal: such as unlawful force, premature recognition, or a Security Council ban.

Frontex and the international responsibility of IOs

Tamás Molnár examines two 2025 CJEU Grand Chamber rulings on Frontex to show how EU case law is beginning to flesh out the responsibility of international organisations for human rights violations, beyond what is explicitly set out in the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. He highlights how the Court develops key under-theorised issues such as concurrent responsibility between states and IOs, causation, and adapted burdens and standards of proof in cases involving vulnerable individuals. Read through an international law lens, the judgments offer practical guidance on compensation and accountability for IOs engaged in joint operations, especially in migration control.

Russia’s new litigation strategy

Oktawian Kuc points to a change in Russia’s strategy in international litigation arising from its invasion of Ukraine. Shifting from early non-appearance to an assertive procedural strategy, Russia is now using procedural tools—such as arbitrator challenges, appeals, and counterclaims—to delay proceedings, contest institutional legitimacy, and reframe disputes away from substantive responsibility. This procedural counteroffensive highlights how active engagement, rather than abstention, can be used strategically to shape narratives and outcomes in international adjudication.

Colonial dispute-resolution in the 21st Century?

Muhammad Syed warns against reviving colonial-era agreements in modern investment arbitration, using the Sulu heirs’ $14.9 billion claim against Malaysia as a case study. He shows how an arbitral tribunal stripped the 1878 agreement of its colonial context to assert jurisdiction, only for French and Dutch courts to reject that approach and annul the awards. These decisions reaffirm that colonial dispute-resolution mechanisms cannot be transplanted into contemporary international law without confronting their historical conflicts and inequities.

Climate litigation in domestic courts

Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh takes us to the District Court of The Hague, arguing that the recent Bonaire judgment marks a breakthrough in climate litigation by treating unequal climate protection as unlawful discrimination, rather than mere policy failure. She shows how the Dutch court translated equity, vulnerability, and intergenerational justice—articulated in abstract form by the ICJ—into enforceable human rights obligations under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. In doing so, the judgment makes historically produced climate vulnerability legally legible as a claim to accelerated and differentiated protection.

In defence of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

In a recent comment, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Prof. Alice Edwards proposed dissolving the UN Working Groups on Arbitrary Detention and Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and replacing them with a new consolidated working group composed of five thematic Special Rapporteurs. This week, members of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention respond. Ganna Yudkivska, Matthew Gillett, Miriam Estrada-Castillo, Mumba Malila and Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, argue respectfully but forcefully that to do so would undermine one of the UN system’s only quasi-judicial mechanisms delivering concrete justice to individuals. They explain that the working group’s specialised expertise, geographic legitimacy, procedural rigour, and ability to act swiftly without exhaustion of domestic remedies are irreplaceable. Reform, they conclude, should focus on resourcing and strengthening such mechanisms—not rationalising them away at the cost of individual liberty.

Ecuador’s Constitution and international investment law

Ladan Mehranvar turns our attention to Ecuador and the attempts of the government to fast-track the UAE-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty. She argues that the agreement is being deliberately pushed through, in full knowledge that the investor–State arbitration it envisions is prohibited under the Ecuadorian constitution and has twice been rejected by voters in referenda. She shows how the executive and Constitutional Court are using procedural shortcuts, narrow constitutional framing, and mid-review treaty “corrections” to sidestep the constitutional prohibition and normalise ISDS by stealth. Despite substantial civil society and scholarly mobilisation and intervention, the UAE-Ecuador BIT risks becoming a precedent that hollows out constitutional and democratic limits on investment policy through legal manoeuvre rather than public consent.

Finally, Mercosur!

After three decades of negotiations, the EU has finally concluded its free trade agreement with Mercosur. Carmen Martínez San Millán explains that while the EU–Mercosur agreement may be celebrated as a major geopolitical and economic milestone, it remains deeply contested, especially within the EU. She highlights clear gains for Mercosur exporters and European industry, but significant risks for European farmers due to regulatory and cost asymmetries. Despite added safeguards and sustainability language, the revised agreement weakens enforcement of environmental and labour commitments by excluding sanctions. With legal scrutiny by the CJEU and debates over ratification and provisional application ahead, the agreement’s future remains politically fragile and legally uncertain.

As ever, announcement and events can be found here and here.