The War on Terroir Continues: The Escalating Conflict Between the U.S. and the EU on Geographical Indications

In a time when the views of the European Union and the United States of America appear to be drifting further apart each day, long-standing issues are resurfacing once again. Tim Josling’s 2006 article “The War on Terroir” describes the transatlantic trade conflict between the U.S. and the EU concerning Geographical Indications (GIs) through the lense of its time, remaining hopeful in view of an adequate multilateral conclusion during the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Now, exactly 20 years later, this conflict has reached unforeseen heights due to the unprecedented belligerence of the Trump Administration in matters of foreign agricultural trade policy and its conviction to combat European trade alliances. Throughout the conclusion of new pluri- and bilateral free trade agreements and the reformation and renewal of multilateral fora, the EU will find itself in an old, but familiar battlefield: meats and cheeses.

Terroir, Geographical Indications and an Everlasting Conflict

Terroir describes the intrinsic value of an essential connection between the origin of a product and its quality or reputation attributed to it specifically due to that origin. The legal expression of this value can be found in the type of intellectual property known as “Geographical Indications”. Prominent examples include Bordeaux, Feta, Darjeeling Tea and Nuremberg Sausages. Protected throughout different international instruments since 1883, Art. 22 (1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”. This arguably minimalist protection of GIs in Art. 22, 23 TRIPS can be attributed to a central underlying conflict between the U.S. and the EU concerning their view on the need for strict GI regulation and protection.

The U.S. position on GIs has historically been one of restraint. Instead of implementing a sui generis protection system for GIs, they have opted for an incorporation through certification marks established under trademark law, specifically 15 U.S. Code § 1054 implemented through the Lanham Trademark Act, as well as specific requirements under which regular trademarks using geographical terminology may be accepted. Any regulatory expansion beyond these measures, specifically a stricter regulation on the multilateral level and in foreign trade policy, has been deemed as a potential form of protectionism by excluding market access for incoming producers. 

The European position on the other hand emphasizes cultural and economic advantages of GI regulation as well as the need for consumer and producer protection through reliable information. Regulation (EU) No. 2024/1143, amending Regulations (EU) No. 1308/2013, (EU) 2019/787 and (EU) 2019/1753, provides for a sui generis “unitary and exhaustive system” for GI protection. Extending this protection beyond regional borders, specifically negotiated clauses on GIs are incorporated in most newly concluded free trade agreements by the EU to strengthen the value of its GI protection. These historically grown and politically entrenched positions have been a bone of contention throughout all GI negotiations in international fora and were usually solved through minimalist compromises or regional avoidance.

A New Era: 2025 Special 301 Report 

The Office of the United States Trade Representative has ushered in a new era in this conflict through revisions of U.S. foreign trade policy described in the 2025 Special 301 Report. It states that “[t]he EU GI agenda remains highly concerning because it significantly undermines protection of trademarks held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market access for U.S.-made goods that rely on the use of common names (…)”. Specifically, the U.S. aims to confront the “EU’s aggressive promotion of its exclusionary GI policies” by ensuring that GI protection does not deprive interested parties of the ability to use such common names. 

Regarding the concern for common names, it should be emphasized that Art. 28 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 declares generic terms to be not fit for registration as GIs. It thereby follows that due to this formulation, the U.S. considers several European GIs to be common and seeks to lessen their global protection. Concerning the enforcement of such ambitions, the Report states the aspiration to “bilaterally (…) address concerns resulting from the GI provisions in existing EU trade agreements (…)”, then naming a non-exhaustive list of relevant countries. It follows that instead of bilateral consultations with the EU directly or through multilateral fora, such as the WTO, the U.S. seeks to strongarm certain countries, with which the EU either has a trade agreement or is currently negotiating one, to pick sides based on preferential agricultural policy and market access. As it stands, this development in U.S. foreign trade policy does not only widen the trench between two countries with opposing views, but to separate two systems of GI protection and establishing a clear partition between those countries that choose to follow one or another.  

Negotiating for Allegiance

A clear show of power in this policy change have been the recently concluded Agreements on Reciprocal Trade. A prominent example here is the situation of Argentina. The United States of America – Argentine Republic Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment of February 2026 includes in Art. 2.5 the obligation not to restrict U.S. market access due to the use of individual cheese and meat terms listed in an annex to the agreement, such as Feta, Asiago and Gorgonzola. In conflict with this obligation stands the duty of Argentina under Art. 13.33 (4) of the EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement. Therein, Argentina commits to protect those GIs included in Annex 13-B to the agreement, specifically once again Feta, Asiago and Gorgonzola. Resulting from this open conflict of obligations, Argentina may decide to deem the terms listed in the agreement with the U.S. to be generic, thereby directly violating Artt. 13.35 (10), 13.38 of the EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement by nonetheless allowing for the use of terms on products imported from the U.S., which generally fall under European GI protection. 

Whether such a decision would also violate Art. 18 (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by defeating (at least partially) the object and purpose of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, as Argentina has previously taken first legislative steps to ensure the ratification of the agreement, remains a point of discussion. Further,  from a regional perspective, such a unilateral decision might also violate Art. 1 of the 1991 Treaty of Asunción. The parties thereto, including Argentina, committed themselves to establishing a common market which shall involve “the adoption of a common trade policy in relation to third States or groups of States (…)”. Whether a possible violation of the rules of the trade bloc as a whole has occurred is currently under investigation by Brazil.

Concerning the possibility of a similar issue in a trade agreement between the EU and Malaysia, such negotiations being formally relaunched since January 2025, the U.S. has included an identical phrase in Art. 2.5 of the Agreement Between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade of October 2025. However, this does not remain the sole concern, as Art. 2.4 includes a unique reference that reads “[f]or greater certainty, Malaysia shall not protect or recognize a predetermined list of geographical indications”. Such an attempt to preemptively withhold recognition for certain GIs specifically opposes the European approach, which often includes an agreed upon list of protected GIs, and may directly conflict with the EU text proposals on Intellectual Property in Section 2, Sub-Section 4. The recent 3rd round of negotiations between the EU and Malaysia claims that further discussions between the States will follow in the coming weeks, as undoubtedly the formulation of an accepted GI framework stands under the pressure of bilateral obligations between Malaysia and the U.S.

Similar situations may arise in regard to the protection afforded under Art. 246 (1) of the EU-Central America Association Agreement and its conflict with Art. 2.4 of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of El Salvador on Reciprocal Trade, as well as Art. 2.4 of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Guatemala on Reciprocal Trade, both of January 2026.

Concerning emerging trade agreements by the EU, the U.S. has implemented identical phrases in agreements with Cambodia and Taiwan. On the 20th of February 2026, such an agreement was also concluded with Indonesia, sparking renewed interest due to its effect on the recently finalized EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.  

With Hesitance Europe Will Not Succeed

The future of European trade and agricultural policy will critically rely on the resilience and enforcement of EU trade agreements in light of parallel foreign attempts to undermine their application. As the recent aggressive stance in U.S. foreign agricultural trade policy awaits a European reaction, the EU must act swiftly and implement pending agreements as well as finalize negotiations concerning new ones to reaffirm and strengthen its position with foreign partners. Hesitance in the implementation, such as the recent referral of the EU-Mercosur Agreement to the Court of Justice of the European Union by the European Parliament, will put both the EU and its trading partners in a difficult situation, as legal uncertainty about the application of the agreement and the inability to simultaneously comply with opposing obligations might weaken the global European position. As a multilateral solution currently seems out of reach, only the implementation of existing agreements and negotiations for future ones will show whether the European or the U.S. rationale will emerge victorious in internationally establishing their ideology on the protection of terroir.