The Security Council and the Western Sahara: Between Self-Determination and Implicit Recognition of Moroccan Sovereignty

On 31 October 2025, the Security Council voted in favour of Resolution 2797 extending the mandate of the long-standing UN mission to Western Sahara, but this time referenced Morocco’s 2007 Autonomy Proposal – which envisions the territory as self-governing under Moroccan sovereignty – as a basis for negotiations and the final status of Western Sahara. Although the Resolution is still not available, the final draft, known as the “draft in blue”, outlines the following in its operative part:

Calls upon the parties to engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking as basis Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal, with a view to achieving a final and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, recognizes that genuine autonomy could represent a most feasible outcome and encourages the parties to submit ideas to support a final mutually-acceptable solution.

The Resolution, which was authored by the US, received 11 votes in favour, three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia), while Algeria did not vote. The initial proposal by the US appears to have called for the parties to engage in discussions without delay using Morocco’s autonomy proposal as “the only framework to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution.” This view was rejected by a number of States and thus the final text reflects a more nuanced language (for a good overview of negotiations, see here). Some States, including those who voted in favour of the Resolution, stated that they do not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Nevertheless, I argue that this Resolution marks the first instance in which the Security Council has permitted and promoted a final status for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. This development carries significant implications for the future of the territory’s status and international law.

Morocco has long considered Western Sahara part of its territory and largely administers it. On the other hand, in 1976, the Sahrawi independence movement declared the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in portions of Western Sahara. The territory remains one of the largest “unfinished” cases of decolonization, still listed among the seventeen UN non-self-governing territories. The right to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara was recognized by the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) in its 1975 advisory opinion. The Court found that while there were some historical ties between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco prior to Spanish colonization, those ties were not sufficient to establish Moroccan sovereignty over the territory (paras 70, 162, 63). The UN Security Council and UN General Assembly have, in numerous resolutions, endorsed the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people without endorsing Morocco’s sovereignty as a basis for negotiation, and, since 1991, established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to promote a peaceful settlement and facilitate the referendum. However, the referendum has still not been conducted.

This shift in the Security Council raises the question of whether the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, including the right to create a State, remains a genuine right, or whether that has been attenuated by a new legal and practical reality. The future negotiations will shed further light on this issue, but it would not be an exaggeration to state that Resolution 2797 undermines the realization of the right to self-determination in a colonial context. 

Security Council Determining the Contours of the Future Political Status

As part of its wide-ranging powers to maintain peace and security, the Security Council has often determined the status of disputed territories and the contours of negotiated settlements. The ICJ, in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, found that “contemporaneous practice of the Security Council shows that in situations where the Security Council has decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution” (para 114). The Court also determined that acting contrary to such terms constitutes a breach of international law.

In that context, the Court found that the terms of the Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo did not prohibit the declaration of independence but listed several other resolutions that did prohibit independence based on their terms. For example, in Resolution 1251, the Security Council reaffirmed that a “Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded” (para 114). The Council thus set out specific conditions regarding the permanent status of Cyprus. Indeed, there is a host of resolutions prohibiting independence, such as Resolution 787 concerning Republika Srpska, Resolution 1037 concerning Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, and Resolutions 1225 and 1255 concerning Abkhazia, among others.

Against this background, the language of Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025) on Western Sahara could be viewed as defining the contours of what is permitted in the territory’s future political status. Given that Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara has, until now, lacked any basis in international law, the Resolution seeks to render permissible what was previously impermissible. Certainly, the Sahrawi people may, hypothetically, choose to become part of Morocco and even opt for no autonomy. Hence, at a purely hypothetical level, one could rightly state that Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara is and was always an option. However, considering decades of stalemate and the living conditions of the Sahrawi people, it is more than clear that autonomy within Morocco is not a viable solution for them. It must be recalled that “to date, of a total of around 500,000 Sahrawi, approximately 250,000 are living in refugee camps in Algeria, another quarter are living in the area of Western Sahara under Moroccan control, and the remaining quarter are living in other parts of the world” (para. 127). This is the context. Hence, although Resolution 2797 does not explicitly prohibit outcomes inconsistent with Morocco’s 2007 Autonomy Proposal, its mere acknowledgment of such an outcome heavily influences what the final status is likely to be. This must also be understood in light of the broad political support Morocco has garnered for its claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

One possible outcome could be that, following a failure to reach an agreement on the final status, States recognize Western Sahara as part of Morocco’s sovereignty on the grounds that “Morocco has done all it could to achieve a compromise”. Under international law, there is no obligation to negotiate indefinitely. Hence, States may begin to regard Western Sahara as an obstacle to resolving the final status. Prior to Resolution 2797, such an outcome would have been incompatible with international law. This, in itself, speaks to the potential impact and significance of the Resolution.

Reconciling Security Council Resolution 2797 with the Right to Self-Determination of the Sahrawi People

Resolution 2797 does not prohibit the independence of Western Sahara, and as such one can make an argument that there is no legal conflict between Resolution 2797 and the peremptory norm of self-determination. At the same time, it can also be argued that the recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, as a basis for negotiation, does undermine the reason d’etre of the right to self-determination and its realization for the Sahrawi people, as it effectively disfavours the right to establish an independent state. In a decolonization context, this represents a clear exception – although the case of Southern Cameroons may offer a comparable example.

This raises the question of whether the present Security Council resolution is compatible with the UN Charter and international law. The issue of conflict and the primacy of norms is long-standing. In the context of the fragmentation of international law, many scholars have debated the relationship between Article 103 of the UN Charter and other binding rules of international law. However, this discussion has largely remained theoretical when it comes to Security Council resolutions that interfere with jus cogens norms.

The Court of First Instance in the Kadi case considered the possibility of a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens, but as the rights invoked did not have a jus cogens status, it found no violations. Interestingly, the CJEU has recently upheld the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people in the Front Polisario II case. It remains to be seen whether further developments concerning self-determination will again come before the EU courts.

Another way to address this tension would be for the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legality of specific terms of Security Council Resolution 2797. This could mark the first instance where there is a direct tension between the terms of a Security Council resolution and the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, including the right to establish a State. However, given the limited international support currently available to Western Sahara, such a development may be overly ambitious.

The Security Council and Coercion: Lawful but Awful

When the Security Council acts, it does not find it necessary to explain the legal basis of its resolutions. Yet, as Judge Higgins has observed, Security Council debates and resolutions reveal a “political operation within the law, rather than decision according to the law”. Resolution 2797 represents a case of political operation outside and incompatible with the law. It demonstrates how the permanent members of the Security Council can employ binding resolutions to resolve disputes in ways inconsistent with the rules and principles of international law.

This situation resembles what Mohamed S. Helal calls the Great Power Concert, akin to the Concert of Europe established by leading European powers in the nineteenth century to manage European affairs. Like the Great Power Concert, the principal purpose of the Security Council is to maintain peaceful relations among the most powerful states in the international system. I have not been persuaded by this view for a number of reasons, including that the Security Council has largely operated within the bounds of law, as Higgins argued. However, in our present circumstances – where commitment to international law has reached a tipping point, and powerful states openly conduct and threaten acts of aggression – there is a real risk that the Security Council could become a mechanism for resolving disputes in ways contrary to international law.

One should rightly fear a situation in which the Security Council adopts binding resolutions based purely on considerations of effectiveness rather than legality, one that treats international law as an obstacle rather than a means of ensuring peace. One can only imagine what the future of Ukraine or other countries might look like if the Security Council were used to settle disputes without international law as its anchor.