The Legality of the UK Interception of Iranian Missiles and Permitting a Limited US Use of British Bases

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The UK government has been careful in not directly supporting the ongoing US-Israeli use of force against Iran. This is at least partly because (I’m sure) the internal view within the government is that the use of force is illegal. Indeed, in the endless political rigmarole about the deal between the UK and Mauritius on the Chagos Islands, including the Diego Garcia military base, it seems clear that one of Trump’s flip-flops on the deal was provoked by the UK essentially telling him that Diego Garcia could not be used for illegal strikes against Iran.

Now, however, the UK government has announced that it is engaging in direct action to intercept some Iranian missiles directed against UK allies in the Gulf, and also that it would permit the United States to use British bases to conduct strikes against missile facilities in Iran that have been used to fire missiles against countries in the Gulf.

Bearing in mind that it was Iran that was attacked by the US and Israel, and that Iran accordingly has the right to respond in self-defence, the question is whether these UK actions are themselves legal, as they would seem to obstruct Iran’s ability to defend itself. In my view, the UK is acting lawfully, subject to certain conditions, for the following reasons:

(1) Yes, Iran is the victim of an armed attack, and does have the right to defend itself. But any defensive use of force by Iran must be necessary and proportionate to remain defensive and remain legal.

(2) Iran likely could lawfully strike US military assets on the territory of other states, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but only if it was necessary and proportionate to do so. (This is from the standpoing of the jus ad bellum and the UN Charter; from an in bello/IHL perspective, all or most US facilities in these states clearly are military objectives.)

(3) However, from what I can gather, US military assets on the territory of Gulf states have NOT, in fact, been used to attack Iran, and there is no evidence that they will be so used. This means that Iranian strikes on those assets, which likewise entail a use of force against the territorial state, are not necessary and proportionate to repel the attack against it. Also, the manner in which Iran has struck against the Gulf states seems to indicate that it has not targeted solely US military installations on their soil, and again this would mean that its response is not necessary and proportionate.

(4) Therefore, the Iranian missile and drone strikes against Gulf countries constitute armed attacks, because they exceed the scope of lawful self-defence. Accordingly, these countries have the right to invite other states, like the UK, to assist them in repelling these attacks by means of collective self-defence.

(5) It is therefore legal for the UK to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles directed against its allies in the Gulf, or against UK assets such as the Akrotiri base in Cyprus. It is ALSO legal for the UK to permit the United States to use its facilities, such as Diego Garcia, but SOLELY for the purpose of repelling what is an Iranian attack on the Gulf states. (A more difficult question, examined in the post above, relates to Iranian missile strikes against Israel, to the extent that they target the civilian population of Israel). 

(6) It would NOT be legal for the UK to allow its facilities to be used for other US military strikes in Iran.  

(For a previous discussion of some of these issues, see this post from June last year, towards the very end).

The UK government has now published a summary of its legal position on these issues, which is in substance very similar to the view I expressed above. That this is a summary obviously means that there is a longer piece of formal advice that the Attorney-General has provided to the government on these matters, but by convention that type of advice is normally not published as such. I will quote the summary in full:

The UK condemns in the strongest terms the Iranian regime’s reckless and ongoing indiscriminate attacks against countries in the region. Such actions demand a united response to restore peace and security and prevent further escalation of the conflict.

As well as defending itself and its position in the region, the UK is acting in the collective self-defence of regional allies who have requested support.  The UK and its allies are permitted under international law to use or support force in such circumstances where acting in self-defence is the only feasible means to deal with an ongoing armed attack and where the force used is necessary and proportionate.

Accordingly, the UK has military assets flying in the region to intercept drones or missiles targeting countries not previously involved in the conflict.  In addition, the UK has responded to a US request which will facilitate specific and limited defensive action against missile facilities in Iran which were involved in launching strikes at regional allies.

The UK’s actions and related support to its allies is solely focussed on ending the threat of air and missile attacks against regional allies unlawfully attacked by Iran and who have not been involved in hostilities from the outset.  It does not signal the UK having any wider involvement in the broader ongoing conflict between the US, Israel and Iran.  

The UK remains of the view that a negotiated solution should be supported, and that further escalation into a wider regional conflict should be avoided.

The Government will notify the United Nations Security Council of relevant actions taken under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

This all seems right to me, for the reasons given above. In particular, the use of force by the UK to intercept Iranian drones or missiles, and the permission being given to the US, do not entail any acceptance by the UK that the US-Israeli attacks on Iran are lawful (which they manifestly are not).  

To develop some of these points a bit further, it is again legally uncontroversial that Iran has the right to defend itself. It is also legally uncontroversial that there is no right to self-defence against force being used in self-defence. However, if Iran’s response no longer meets the criteria of necessity and proportionality, its use of force will cease to have a defensive character and will become an armed attack. That is the key issue here.

A broader question of principle is whether Iran would be legally entitled to use force against US assets on the territory of other states, without obtaining the consent of those states for this use of force. That is, if A uses the territory of B to attack C, can C use force on B’s territory against A? This is a question that typically appears in the context of uses of force against non-state actors operating on the territory of some other states, in which it has been particularly controversial (‘unwilling and unable’ etc). But, having said that, in a purely interstate context, I don’t see how an attacked state could legally be precluded from trying to repel the attack by going againsts its source on the territory of another state. In particular, I’m sure that say that the United States would argue that it could use force on the territory of say Syria, without Syria’s permission, if say Russia used its military base in Syria to conduct an attack on the United States. 

The problem here is that the US military assets on the territory of the Gulf states do not appear to have been used to conduct the attack on Iran. This was a deliberate choice by the US and countries in the region, precisely to avoid complicity in an attack against Iran. Thus, for example, in a statement expressly invoking self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council note that:

Despite the numerous diplomatic efforts undertaken by the GCC countries to avoid escalation, and despite their affirmation that their territories would not be used to launch any attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the latter has continued to carry out military operations targeting GCC countries, affecting numerous civilian and residential facilities.  

The first problem with Iran’s response, therefore, is using force on the territory of these states when US assets there were not used to conduct the attack on Iran. Whether this is wholly true is not something I can obviously guarantee – personally I find it unlikely that US command and control facilities in say Bahrain had nothing to do with the attack on Iran, but perhaps that’s true, and it’s certainly largely true, in the sense that US military strikes have not directly used the territory of GCC countries. The second problem with Iran’s response is that it does not seem to be confined solely to US military asserts on the territories of these states, even accounting for the occasional error, but is affecting a substantially wider array of targets. 

So long as all this is true (and again it largely seems to be), Iran is engaging in an armed attack (or attacks) against GCC countries; it is not just repelling an attack against it by the United States. Once this falls into place, GCC countries have the right to invite the UK and the US to assist them in deflecting these attacks, by means of collective self-defence. The UK similarly has the right to permit the US to use Diego Garcia or Akrotiri to conduct strikes on Iran that are purely about preventing further attacks on GCC countries.

The key caveat here is that, in granting this permission for a ‘specific and limited defensive action’, the UK must monitor that this is in fact what the US will be doing. That is, the UK must ensure that its bases are not used for other purposes. There are many ways in which this can effectively be done, and likely is already being done, but this is the key safeguard for ensuring that the UK does not become complicit in the US-Israeli aggression against Iran. It was Iran that chose to respond to the US-Israeli attacks by essentially using a strategy of inflicting pain on its neighbours, who now have the right to invite outside help by means of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. So, strangely, we have a situation here in which Iran is simultaneously both the victim and the perpetrator of unlawful armed attacks, but that again is simply a consequence of Iran’s own choices. 

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    Veronika Bilkova says

    March 2, 2026

    Thank you for the analysis, Marko. Let's assume the attack is carried out from the territory of the US. Let's also assume Iran does not have missiles able to reach the US territory (though their potential existence is the pretext for the attack).
    How, in your view, could Iran exercise its right of self-defence in this case (against the US), beyond attempting to intercept incoming missiles over its own territory? And would it, in fact, matter for the purposes of self-defence whether particular components of the adversary’s armed forces (such as particular bases) had already been directly involved in the attack(as there is no doubt they are part of the attacker's war machinery)?
    Thank you for your view.

    Marko Milanovic says

    March 2, 2026

    Hi Veronika,

    Thanks for this. Well the scenario you speak of is the one we're in today. To defend itself lawfully, Iran can attempt to intercept enemy fire, including missiles and aircraft, but its ability to do so is very limited. It can also attack US assets on the high seas. It can also direct fire against military objectives in Israel.

    The reason why it can't direct fire at US facilities in third states is because of the sovereign rights of those states. Otherwise as I explained in my post many of those facilities (apart from e.g. embassies and such) would be lawful military objectives as a matter of IHL.

    Adil Haque says

    March 2, 2026

    Hi Marko,

    It may amuse you to know that Iran agreed with you on proportionality ... in 1993, when it told the ICJ:

    "whilst a counter-attack against the invading military force might be legitimate because it would be directly related to the protection of the State's territorial integrity against the military forces actually violating that integrity, an attack on the aggressor's military bases in a quite different part of the world would be illegitimate because directed at the wrong target."

    https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/90/8622.pdf#page=115

    A less uncivilized age, in retrospect.

    Warm wishes,

    Adil

    André de Hoogh says

    March 2, 2026

    Dear Marko,

    I have some problems with the following observations:

    "(4) Therefore, the Iranian missile and drone strikes against Gulf countries constitute armed attacks, because they exceed the scope of lawful self-defence. Accordingly, these countries have the right to invite other states, like the UK, to assist them in repelling these attacks by means of collective self-defence.

    (5) It is therefore legal for the UK to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles directed against its allies in the Gulf, or against UK assets such as the Akrotiri base in Cyprus. It is ALSO legal for the UK to permit the United States to use its facilities, such as Diego Garcia, but SOLELY for the purpose of repelling what is an Iranian attack on the Gulf states. (A more difficult question, examined in the post above, relates to Iranian missile strikes against Israel, to the extent that they target the civilian population of Israel).

    (6) It would NOT be legal for the UK to allow its facilities to be used for other US military strikes in Iran.

    [...]

    So long as all this is true (and again it largely seems to be), Iran is engaging in an armed attack (or attacks) against GCC countries; it is not just repelling an attack against it by the United States. Once this falls into place, GCC countries have the right to invite the UK and the US to assist them in deflecting these attacks, by means of collective self-defence. The UK similarly has the right to permit the US to use Diego Garcia or Akrotiri to conduct strikes on Iran that are purely about preventing further attacks on GCC countries."

    Your phrasing of "other US military strikes" here appears to suggest that there could be US military strikes from UK military bases on/in Iran in the exercise of a right of collective self-defence at the request of the Gulf States, adding at the end that this would allow "strikes on Iran that are purely about preventing further attacks on GCC countries". However, since the US and Israeli aggression is ongoing, allowing the US to strikes in Iran from its Cypriot sovereign bases or for from that on Diego Garcia makes the UK complicit in US aggression. That follows also from article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression (annex to GA Resolution 3314), which specifies that aggression includes "The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State".

    Surely, a right of self-defence of the Gulf States could not be the basis for transforming a continuing, illegal armed attack on Iran into a lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. First and foremost, international law imposes an obligation on the US and Israel to cease their wrongful conduct (Article 30 ARSIWA), and the UK ought not to facilitate the continuation of US violations of international law.

    Prime-Minister Starmer has specified that the US will be permitted "[...] to destroy the missiles at source – in their storage depots or the launchers which used to fire the missiles." Your suggestion that these will be strikes "that are purely to prevent further attacks on GCC countries" does not hold water. Instead, they will allow the US to expand its aggression and deplete Iran's resources to defend itself. If the UK wants to exercise the right of collective self-defence at the request of Gulf States, it can do so within the conditions set for the exercise of that right. What it cannot do lawfully, and ought not do, is to permit the US to continue its aggression from UK territory.

    Best wishes,
    André

    Mary Ellen O'Connell says

    March 2, 2026

    Dear Marko,

    Thank you for your swift and nuanced analysis of the United Kingdom's position. You are right to emphasize necessity and proportionality, which apply to all lawful bases of resort to force.

    I agree and have been myself highly critical of Iran's attacks in the region as unlawful because they do not meet the requirements of necessary and proportionate to its self-defense.

    But, of course, necessity and proportionality apply to the UK's assistance in defending against Iran's unlawful attacks. Necessity restricts force to a last resort and only if it will accomplish the lawful military objective.

    UK use of force in this war is not a last resort. The UK has not attempted to stand in solidarity with other states of the world to demand that the U.S. and Israel end the unlawful use of force against Iran. One day of restriction and then capitulation seems to have emboldened Trump.

    Restricting Diego Garcia was a concrete measure to oppose this unlawful war. Allowing its use under the refined distinction between offense and defense is sending the opposite message. Nor does the UK have any reason to believe that the Trump administration can be trusted to make the careful calculation of how it uses force that the UK requires. The UK knows this. It is now assisting in unlawful war.

    With greatest respect,

    Mary Ellen

    Alexander Orakhelashvili says

    March 2, 2026

    https://blog.bham.ac.uk/lawresearch/2026/03/uk-governments-legal-position-on-uks-involvement-in-the-iran-crisis/

    Marko Milanovic says

    March 2, 2026

    Adil, many thanks for that reference!

    Andre, Mary-Ellen, I do agree with you that this question is difficult. That is, any use of force by the US against the missile facilities in Iran used to target Gulf states is difficult to separate from the overall aggression that the US is committing. But nonetheless I think that a distinction can usefully be made in law and in fact. If we all agree, as we do, that Iran is committing armed attacks on GCC countries, which therefore have the right to self-defence, and then agree that GCC countries would have the right to strike the missile launchers in Iran, we then must also agree that the UK would have the right to do so, if invited to do so by GCC countries, by virtue of collective self-defence. The UK would equally then have the right to permit say France to use force against Iran's missile facilities to defend GCC countries. If all of that is right, then the only question is whether allowing the US to do so is different because it started the whole thing with its attack on Iran.

    Again, I do agree that this is not an obvious question. But I also think it's a bit too easy to say that the US could simply stop its attack, and Iran would stop its own attack. The two are causally related, obviously, but Iran made its own choice to attack its neigbhours in what is effectively retaliation.

    Clearly, the UK exposes itself to a substantial risk of aiding unlawful US acts. Whether it in fact does so depends on the safeguards it has in place. This is question of fact that I can't answer now. But my sense is that the position the UK government has taken is at least an arguable one, even if it's not a clearly correct one. (The practical wisdom of the whole thing I would leave aside).

    David Vim says

    March 2, 2026

    Dear Marko,

    Many thanks. I also think your analysis is right. But the distinction seems operationally difficult to maintain in deliberate rather than dynamic operational contexts - and dangerously open to abuse (disguised/collateral aggression).

    For example, what do you make of the following Hermerneutics: “In addition, the UK has responded to a US request which will facilitate specific and limited defensive action against missile facilities in Iran which were involved in launching strikes at regional allies”?

    This is not dynamic “interception” of unnecessary or disproportionate self defence (UDSD) but, presumably, an assessment that those sites would otherwise be used for further/ongoing UDSD. But is the UK’s position that their deliberate targeting is permissible only if the sites had been exclusively used for UDSD (not also used for legitimate SD)? Or is all that matters that Iran stops UDSD as a result whether or not the site has also been legitimately used? Incidentally, how does one even look at necessity if Iran could alternatively simply use any other launch site to conduct UDSD (noting critics would surely claim disproportionality if instead all sites were targeted by the US/ISL)? Does one just keep whacking them until they stop?

    But the underlying issue is what if these limited strikes significantly degrade Iran’s right to legitimate SD even if they hadn’t been used for legitimate SD to date? In other words, should the US (and those aiding and assisting the US) weigh this up in proportionality terms (even if the legitimate SD would alleged be against the US)? Or is a victim’s physical ability to exercise self defence actually irrelevant to the conceptual analysis of lawfulness? Iceland doesn’t have any armed forces…

    David

    Javier Eskauriatza says

    March 3, 2026

    If the UK conditionally agrees to let the USA use its military bases, but at that time it knows that the US may be unwilling to adhere to the stipulated condition (that it only use UK military bases in the defence of Gulf-Coast allies against Iranian unnecessary and disproportionate attacks), and the UK knows that it will not practically be able to ensure that the USA meets that condition in future attacks on Iran, is that enough to conclude that the UK is 'complicit' in any future acts of aggression launched by USA from UK bases? Legally, one dimension is about the customary law on state responsibility. What exactly does the UK need to know (at the time of the conditional agreement) about the future attacks on Iran by the USA from UK bases? Is it enough if it merely 'suspects' some of the attacks may violate the stipulated condition? Or is more required, something like it 'foresees as likely'? ARSIWA Art 16 speaks only of 'aid or assistance' (of the internationally wrongful act) 'with knowledge of the circumstances' (of that act). But what circumstances?

    Alex Fox says

    March 3, 2026

    Dear Marko,

    You are making an erroneous statement that requires a more nuanced analysis. You write:

    “From what I can gather, US military assets on the territory of Gulf States have not, in fact, been used to attack Iran, and there is no evidence that they will be so used. This means that Iranian strikes on those assets, which likewise entail a use of force against the territorial State, are not necessary and proportionate to repel the attack against it.”

    This is not correct. The fact that certain US military assets located in other States have not (yet) been used to attack Iran is not necessarily determinative. A more refined approach would ask whether, in the circumstances, the victim State (here, Iran) could effectively halt or repel an ongoing unlawful attack by targeting military capabilities of the aggressor (here, US) — even if the particular assets in question have not themselves been used to carry out the attack. If striking those assets is necessary to stop the armed attack and proportionate to that defensive objective, it may be arguable that such action falls within the scope of lawful self-defence. The mere fact that the specific assets have not been used to launch attacks does not, in itself, preclude a claim of necessity and proportionality in self-defence.

    Best,
    Alex

    Marko Milanovic says

    March 3, 2026

    Many thanks again for all the comments.

    David, you are right that the issue is factually contingent and complicated. I would say, however, that if the UAE et al would be justified to destroy the Iranian launchers (and not just the missiles themselves), as I think everyone would agree they would be, then this also entails that states acting in the collective self-defence of the UAE et al would have the same right. All Iran would need to do to preserve those assets (in ad bellum terms) is to cease its attacks on GCC countries.

    Javier, you are also right that these issues of complicity are also very complex. You can find my thoughts on them here: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol97/iss1/48/
    The basic point though is that this a fairly unique situation in which the US is committing ongoing aggression, and the UK assistance is meant to carve out only those targets in Iran that Iran is using to commits its own aggression. So the UK must be under a continuous duty to monitor actively, and if it realizes that the US is not staying within the limits it has to disallow any further use of the bases.

    Alex, I'm not sure what my 'erroneous statement' exactly was. It's not simply that US assets in GCC countries have not been used to conduct attacks against Iran, but as I've said that there is no evidence that they will be so used. On the contrary, GCC countries repeatedly made assurances to Iran that this will not happen. I see no reason to disbelieve them. If that changes, sure, Iran could plausibly argue that striking at them was necessary and proportionate. And as a matter of IHL, there's no doubht that US military facilities in GCC countries are military objectives. Note, however, also the point that Iran has clearly targeted civilian infrastructure in GCC countries, and not just US bases.

    Zainab Abdulai says

    March 3, 2026

    Hi Marko

    Thank you for your analysis. I agree with the issues raised about the letting the US mount attacks from UK bases and whether the legality of specific attacks can be practically parsed out. From The Guardian today: The UK is expected to allow the US to use RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire and Diego Garcia in the Chagos Islands to bomb Iran’s “missile cities”, sites where high-speed ballistic missiles, Iran’s most dangerous weapons, are stored and can be launched from.
    Given that depleting Iran's missiles is a stated goal of the US' (unlawful) action, will there not be difficulty arguing that attacks against missile cities where weapons have not been launched are purely or even primarily for collective defence of GCC countries?

    Matthias Hartwig says

    March 3, 2026

    Dear Marko Milanovich, I fully share your opinion that any targeting of civilian objects is a breach of international law. Attacks against military objects of the Gulf States can also be qualified as an armed attack as far as the Gulf States do not use them to take military measures against Iran. However, as for the military bases of the US in the Gulf States the situation is different. They can be and must be considered military objects, as even if they have not been used by the US by now, they may become points of military activities any time. It would be too sophisticated to qualify all military facilities as non military objects as long as they are not involved in military actions. There would be only an exception if the Gulf States clearly and convincingly prohibited the US to use the bases for the attack against Iran and if they took strong measures to this end. I have not heard anything which comes close to it.

    Best wishes,

    Matthias

    Friedrich Arndt says

    March 3, 2026

    Dear all, in an attempt to add to Prof. Milanovic's 'side' on the 'necessity/complicity' dimension of UK assistance to US strikes against missile launchers raised by Profs deHoogh and O'Connol:

    (1) IMHO, the GCC cannot be prohibited from hitting the launch sites and be relegated to 'stand in solidarity' with those asking for a cessation of the UoF by the US and accept a high level of uncertainty when attempting to shoot down incoming missiles and UACs in the meantime, just because diplomatic pressure on the US is a - completely hopeless and imporbable - hypothetically available alternative that would 'send the right signal'. Interception of Missiles is a very dangerous game of chance and risk, and most (with the exception of Prof. Orakhelashvili) seem to agree that it may be justified under necessity and proportionality tests, to hit the launchers and not just the missiles if they pose a recurrent threat of improbable-to-intercept attack. The same logic must apply to the "last resort" test vis-à-vis diplomatic avenues and the defence against excessive self-defence.

    (2) I do not see how that could be any different for the UK's aid in collective self-defence. UK appeals to Trump to cease the UoF are clearly as hopeless and doomed to fail as Omani, Chinese, or Iranian appeals for that matter.
    The UK is a sovereing State. So are the GCC States. And the US/Israeli aggression does not prima facie affect their right to defend themselves against the strays or excess of Iran's reaction for the sole reason of having diplomatic contacts with the former.

    (3) Everyone seems to agree that the US cannot justify ITS hitting of the same launchers as self-defence, bc THEY are the original aggressor, and therefore, THEY have other presumably effective means, i.e., the cessation of the illegal use of force, available.

    (4) If one accepts (1) and (2) on necessity, the argument, that acts of assistance by the UK for US use of force against the launchers - even though the same UoF would be legal for the UK to take themselves - are illegal, appears to me as one of complicity, of aid and assistence to the US in the commission of illegal strikes.

    (5) But at least pursuant to Art. 16 (b) ARSIWA, it is a requirement of complicity that the aided act must have been wrongful if committed by the aiding state (which they are not for the UK if one accepts (1) and (2)).

    (6) Now here, the discussion may find a better footing: the commentary to Art. 16 (b) refers to the precedent of Iran (!) accusing the UK (!) of having provided military supplies, including chemical weapons, to Iraq, aiding Iraq's aggression against Iran (para.7); the precedent of Germany providing the use of its territory to US/UK intervention in Lebanon and that of the UK tolerating US use of its bases for bombardments of Libya (para.8). The decisive distinction from the case at hand then appears to be, that neither the UK in the first and third, nor Germany in the seconde example could present any justification vis-a-vis Iran, Lebanon or Libya respectively.

    I then tend to agree with Prof Milanovic, that it is at the very least arguable for the UK to (a) be justified in helping destroy the launchers, (b) to do so by supporting, in and of themselves, illegal US strikes.

    André de Hoogh says

    March 4, 2026

    An afterthought Marko:

    How do you expect Iran to distinguish between US strikes in Iran that, in your view, would constitute an exercise of collective self-defence for the Gulf States, and other US strikes that amount to aggression?

    Frankly, I don’t see how this is possible, neither in law nor in fact.

    Marko Milanovic says

    March 5, 2026

    Hi Andre,

    I'd agree that it would be difficult for Iran to make this distinction, but the difficulty is also one of Iran's own making. US strikes against short-range Iranian missile launchers would seem to be an obvious example, in that these could only be used against Gulf countries. US strikes against IRGC bases around the country would seem an obvious example of what is NOT purely defensive action with regard to Iran's attacks on GCC states. The same goes for the US torpedoing an Iranian ship hundreds of miles away from the Gulf. But this issue is to some extent moot, because Iran has little or no effective air defence capability left - so no purpose to them distinguishing between aggressive or defensive US action (not that they'd do so anyway).

    André de Hoogh says

    March 6, 2026

    You say: "US strikes against short-range Iranian missile launchers would seem to be an obvious example, in that these could only be used against Gulf countries."

    The suggestion that such missiles can 'only' be used to attack Gulf countries is simply inaccurate, because those same short-range missile launchers can/could also be used against US warships in the Gulf or near Iran. E.g.:

    https://news.usni.org/2026/03/02/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-march-2-2026

    https://tass.com/world/2097249