The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency: A Global South Contribution to Climate Governance

On 3 July 2025, Justice Nancy Hernandez, President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), announced the issuance of the new Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency (AO-32). In front of the crowded room where landmark cases have been litigated, Justice Hernandez summarised the most important aspects of the long-awaited AO-32 during a live-streamed notification event. This blog post examines how the IACtHR addressed the questions it chose to answer and how its rationale either reinforces or advances the understanding of how international human rights obligations intersect with the “climate emergency”, a term the IACtHR deliberately endorses as a matter of urgency, severity and complexity (¶184). To do so, the post is divided into five parts: an introduction, three subsections according to each question the IACtHR answered, and a conclusion.

1. Introductory Remarks

The AO-32 is a 234-page document resulting from the collaborative efforts of States, civil society, academics, and social movements. These groups contributed through 263 third-party written interventions from 613 actors, including nine from states, and participated in public hearings in Bridgeton, Brasilia, and Manaus, involving 183 delegations (¶¶ 8-10). This makes it the most participatory proceeding for an Advisory opinion in IACtHR history.

The IACtHR interpreted the rights under the American Convention on Human Rights and its Additional Protocol on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (San Salvador Protocol) by examining numerous legal sources, many of which were entangled in the hundreds of amicus briefs. These sources included judgments from national, regional, and international courts and tribunals, such as the KlimaSenorinnen case, international climate treaties like the Paris Agreement, and soft law, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

In a move that is not unusual for the IACtHR, it justified the reformulation of the questions it receives from the request, which originally numbered 20 and were very broad in scope. The IACtHR decided to answer three questions instead. The first question aims to clarify the scope and extent of the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil substantive rights concerning the climate emergency (¶ 28). The second question seeks to clarify the similar obligations, but concerning procedural rights. The third one, by contrast, aims to clarify the obligations concerning specific vulnerable groups, namely children, environmental defenders, women, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant and peasant communities.

In terms of structure, the IACtHR divided the AO-32 into two parts. The first outlines the factual background of climate change and its effects, as well as the normative response to it in the Americas. The second part answers the reformulated questions the IACtHR posed to itself (¶¶31-32). To achieve such a Herculean task, the IACtHR explicitly acknowledges its reliance on the IPCC reports due to their technical and political legitimacy (¶33).

In what follows, the post is structured based on the three key questions the IACtHR decided to address, namely, the substantive, procedural, and intersectional obligations concerning the climate emergency.

2. Substantive Obligations

The IACtHR emphasised that the climate emergency creates a new context of obligations for States to respect and protect substantive rights under the American Convention, entailing addressing the threats to the enjoyment of rights posed by climate impacts and measures to respond to these impacts (¶¶ 221-223). The Court clarified that States are not only prohibited from directly violating human rights but must also prevent foreseeable climate-related harms through abidance of what the Court terms “reinforced due diligence” (¶¶ 231–237). This doctrinal innovation departs from conventional usages under international environmental law, which outline preventative measures to avoid or mitigate transboundary environmental harm. Instead, the IACtHR interprets that reinforced due diligence in the context of the climate emergency constitutes a fulfilled human rights obligation if it accounts for the specific risk to the threatened rights and the level of vulnerability of the rights bearer (¶¶ 235-236).

Its assessment of States’ duties to protect rights under Art. 26 of the American Convention (economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights) marked an innovation by recognising the right to a safe climate in its individual and collective dimensions (¶ 298-304). This right underpins the protection of present and future generations and is inseparable from other protected interests, such as health, water, and food. The Court also highlighted the intergenerational dimension of State obligations (¶ 311).

In a groundbreaking post-anthropocentric move, the IACtHR recognised Nature and its components as subjects of rights, beyond their utility to humans. The Court justifies this approach by emphasising that it protects the integrity and functioning of ecosystems, offers a doctrinal tool to address the triple planetary crisis, and helps prevent irreversible existential harm (¶¶ 279-286). This recognition is based on the IACtHR’s understanding of the interdependence between human rights and environmental protection, as instated in its case law. It also reflects the turn towards ecological constitutionalism in Latin America. To implement this recognition, the IACtHR states that States have a positive obligation to adopt measures to ensure the protection, restoration, and regeneration of ecosystems (¶¶ 364-367 and 559).

In another radical pronouncement grounded in an ecocentric paradigm, the IACtHR declared that the prohibition against causing massive and irreversible environmental harm is a jus cogens norm (¶ 293). As such, protecting ecological integrity is at the same normative level as the prohibition of torture, slavery or genocide; therefore, it is not derogable and universal. Indeed, the IACtHR considers that all States must cooperate to bring an end to conduct that violates the protection of a healthy environment (¶ 294).

Notably, the Court endorsed a fair shares framework to assess State responsibility, grounded in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR–RC) (¶¶ 325-328). This includes consideration of historical emissions and the current capacity to act, aligning with the equity-based approaches outlined in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. AO-32 thus demands differentiated but ambitious climate action, tethered to both science and justice.

3. Procedural Obligations

In AO-32, the Inter-American Court affirmed that procedural rights are not merely procedural formalities but indispensable guarantees for the effective exercise of substantive climate rights (¶ 458). These include the rights to access information, public participation, and access to justice—all of which are foundational to transparent and equitable climate governance.

A crucial innovation is the Court’s recognition of a broad locus standi in climate-related cases. The Court emphasised that victims of climate-related impacts should be able to access justice even when residing outside the territory of the  State that caused the harm (¶ 551). Although the opinion avoids explicit reference to extraterritorial obligations, it affirms that where a causal link can be established between State conduct and transboundary damage, standing must be guaranteed across borders, a significant normative step in the climate justice landscape (¶¶ 550-551).

The Court also reinforced the connection between justice and reparation. It held that the right to an effective remedy under Article 25 ACHR entails comprehensive and tailored reparation measures—ranging from restitution and rehabilitation to compensation and guarantees of non-repetition (¶¶ 556–559). These measures must reflect the nature of harm to the climate system, the needs of vulnerable communities, and the urgency of ecosystem recovery.

Additionally, the Court recognised the right to science as a corollary of access to information (¶¶ 471-487). States must ensure that individuals and communities have access to the best available science, as well as traditional and Indigenous knowledge, to understand and contest climate-related decisions that affect them. This right includes the State’s duty to generate and disseminate reliable, accessible, and culturally relevant scientific data.

Taken together, the procedural obligations outlined in AO-32 promote a participatory, evidence-based, and inclusive approach to climate governance, grounded in a broad access to justice, equity, and knowledge pluralism.

4. Intersectional Obligations

In response to the third question, IACtHR reformulated the question and articulated a comprehensive interpretation of States’ obligations towards groups in situations of vulnerability. Drawing on its rich jurisprudence on structural inequality, the Court emphasised that the climate emergency exacerbates and intensifies pre-existing patterns of discrimination (¶ 588). It therefore required States to adopt intersectional approaches to climate governance—ones that account for how multiple and overlapping axes of marginalisation shape individuals’ and communities’ exposure to climate-related harm.

The Court identified several groups deserving of heightened protection, including children, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendants, rural and peasant communities, persons with disabilities, older persons, women, and environmental defenders. Crucially, the Court did not treat these groups as homogenous categories but stressed the contextual and dynamic nature of vulnerability (¶¶ 595–596). States must therefore design climate measures that reflect the specific lived experiences, risks, and adaptive capacities of each group.

Beyond recognition, the Court mandated differentiated obligations. These include prioritising resources and protective measures for groups facing heightened climate risks, ensuring culturally appropriate adaptation and health interventions, and facilitating meaningful participation, particularly of women and Indigenous authorities in decision-making (¶¶ 595-629).

The Court also tied intersectionality to the broader duty of non-discrimination. Climate measures must not reproduce or exacerbate structural inequalities (¶ 614). Instead, they should serve as a vehicle to dismantle them, which is why the IACtHR focuses so much on multidimensional poverty as a heightened risk of climate vulnerability (¶ 627). The obligation to prevent disproportionate impacts applies across all climate policies, including mitigation, adaptation, and reparation (¶ 629).

In sum, AO-32 advances a rights-based and justice-oriented vision of climate governance—one that repositions climate action as an instrument to realise, rather than undermine, equality. Intersectionality, in this view, is not an optional lens but a binding normative requirement that States must mainstream across all phases of climate policymaking.

5. Concluding Remarks

With AO-32, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has made a historic contribution to the evolving architecture of international climate governance. By framing the climate emergency as a shared concern of regional and global dimensions, the Court reaffirmed that human rights law is not only relevant but indispensable in responding to climate breakdown.

Central to the Court’s approach is the duty to cooperate, interpreted as part of a comprehensive standard of reinforced due diligence. This signals a shift from fragmented national responses toward more coordinated international efforts—especially among countries with differentiated capacities and responsibilities. AO-32 emphasises the notion that obligations related to the climate system are primarily obligations of conduct: States must act in good faith, based on sound science, equity, and respect for human rights. In this sense, the Court deliberately avoided prescriptive formulas, such as quantified emissions reductions, as seen in the Urgenda case in the Netherlands, or global carbon budgets, as discussed by the European Court of Human Rights in KlimaSenorinnen, opting instead to embed justice-oriented principles into its legal reasoning.

Notably, the Court recognised asymmetries in historical responsibility and economic capacity, thereby incorporating a material analysis of inequality into the climate legal discourse. While it stopped short of engaging with the IPCC’s insight that the climate emergency has colonial roots—highlighting the significant role of former empires and more targeted State responsibility—the AO-32 did emphasise structural vulnerability. It named those most affected: Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant and peasant communities, impoverished people, among others.

To be sure, expectations must be tempered. AO-32’s interpretive authority formally extends to all members of the Organization of American States (OAS), but its legal traction is uneven. The United States—historically the largest emitter and currently not a party to the Paris Agreement—has no binding relationship with the IACtHR. And while Canada is a party to the OAS, it has never accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. That said, the IACtHR’s jurisprudence has had a consequential impact in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly through domestic judicial and constitutional developments. AO-23/17, on Human Rights and the Environment, laid the doctrinal foundation for AO-32 and has already been cited by bodies such as the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al., notably in relation to extraterritorial obligations. AO-32 is poised to continue this trajectory of cross-fertilisation, and it may well serve as a point of reference in the forthcoming Advisory Opinion of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

However, we should be cautious in assuming that this jurisprudence will resonate across all regional systems. The European Court of Human Rights in Duarte Agostinho, for example, has thus far shown reticence toward the extraterritorial reasoning developed in AO-23/17, suggesting it is unlikely to internalise AO-32’s more ambitious rationale anytime soon. Most importantly, the fact that a jus cogens norm is declared for ecological protection must undergo a swift reality check to assess its material limitations and manage expectations. For that, we only need to look at genocide, the quintessentially classic jus cogens norm, which is arguably being violated in Gaza, not only by Israel but in connivance with big historical emitters like Germany, the UK and the US. Since ecological harm is a globally shared responsibility that occurs cumulatively through millions of lawful transactions, perhaps jus cogens is not the most useful legal parlance, unless it serves to condemn those who are already violating other jus cogens norms in conjunction, such as through highly polluting war crimes.

Still, AO-32 matters. It matters not because it will bind powerful states, but because it provides a coherent, justice-based legal framework for climate action, from below and across. As I mentioned in a post a couple of years ago, the IACtHR had the opportunity to innovate international legal discourse, and it did. It expressed this innovation in terms of human dignity, intersectionality, ecological integrity, and global cooperation. In a world where climate governance remains fractured and unjust, the IACtHR has offered a map with Global South points of orientation—now it is up to others to chart the route.