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Home EJIL Analysis The ‘Security Council Route’ to the Derogation from Personal Head of State Immunity in the Al-Bashir Case: How Explicit must Security Council Resolutions be?

The ‘Security Council Route’ to the Derogation from Personal Head of State Immunity in the Al-Bashir Case: How Explicit must Security Council Resolutions be?

Published on September 19, 2018        Author: 
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Last week, the Appeals Court of the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court) held hearings in relation to Jordan’s Appeal from a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) II holding that it has failed to cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of Sudan’s President, Omar Al-Bashir. As is well known, Al-Bashir is presently subject to an ICC Arrest Warrant for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur, following the referral of the situation by the Security Council (SC) to the Court. He has made a series official visits to Jordan and other states parties to the ICC Statute (the Rome Statute). However, none of those states has dared to arrest him to date. Their principal argument is that Al-Bashir enjoys personal immunities from foreign domestic jurisdiction under treaties and customary international law, that these are not covered by the removal of immunity in Art. 27(2) of the Rome Statute, and are thereby safeguarded by Art. 98 of the Statute.

The hearings, together with the Appeals Chamber’s decisions leading to them, represent a unique moment in the history of international criminal law for two main reasons. First, this is the first time in which the ICC has invited, accepted and heard submissions from leading international law scholars as amici curiae, as well as engaged in direct (and sometimes heated!) oral discussions with them. Secondly, some of the legal and policy issues discussed in the hearings are of fundamental importance to international criminal law and public international law in general. They include questions such as the extent of the SC’s powers, a possible customary international law exception to personal immunities before international criminal tribunals, and the practical importance of preserving such immunities for international peace and security. Thus, watching the hearings online has certainly kept some of us entranced during the entire week.

However, aside from the special role attached to academic commentary and from the systemic issues discussed in the hearings and in the written observations, one question seems to have been at the heart of the debates on Al-Bashir’s immunities. This question is whether the SC can implicitly derogate from personal immunities otherwise applicable under treaties or customary international law, or whether it must do so explicitly. Indeed, all parties and participants seem to agree that the SC has the power to displace personal immunities and other rules of treaty or general international law, except for jus cogens norms. Yet they disagree as to how clear the Council must be in order to do so.

The argument that the SC has implicitly derogated from Al-Bashir’s immunities by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC and requesting Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court was initially put forward by Professor Dapo Akande in an article published in 2009. His original idea was that the said referral necessarily implied that the Rome Statute would become applicable to Sudan, putting it in an analogous position to that of an ICC state party, at least when it comes to cooperation with the Court. This would mean that the exclusion of immunities provided for in Art. 27(2) of the Statute would also apply to Sudan. Crucially, it was argued that this exclusion covers not only immunities before the Court’s own jurisdiction, but also and necessarily, immunities from the (domestic) adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of any state party, given, inter alia, the reference to ‘national law’. Accordingly, no state party could refuse to surrender Al-Bashir to the Court by claiming to be acting inconsistently with their obligations to grant immunities under international law, as foreseen in Art. 98(1) (or possibly Art. 98(2)). This argument was later picked up by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and upheld by PTC II in the Decision on Jordan’s Non-compliance (paras. 38-40), as well as in its earlier Decision on South Africa’s Non-compliance (paras. 74-97). It became known as the ‘Security Council route’ or ‘avenue’ and it has been reaffirmed by the OTP and some of the amici in their written and oral submissions before the Appeals Chamber (see all case records here). Moreover, one slightly modified version of this argument has come up in the course of the hearings (see here, at pp. 29-36). This variant or version of the ‘Security Council route’ is based on the idea that the SC need not apply the Rome Statute to Sudan, putting it in a position analogous to a state party, in order displace any personal immunities that might attach to its officials. Rather, the Council has directly displaced any such immunity by requiring Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court, without any detour via the Rome Statute, particularly Art. 27(2) (see PTC II’s DRC Cooperation Decision, paras. 29-30). Both of these versions of the ‘Security Council route’ are grounded on the idea that the Council can implicitly or by necessary implication remove existing personal immunities, which has been hotly contested by, in particular, Jordan, the African Union and Professor Roger O’Keefe.

All parties and participants have presented a series of strong and persuasive arguments either in support or against the contention that the Council can implicitly derogate from personal immunities (see here, at pp. 34–36, 39, 68–71, 91, here, at pp. 46–47, 60, 80, 110–113, 119–127, 131–134, here, at pp. 27-30, 108, 122, 126, and here, 43, 49, 54-56, 61, 93). However, there is one point which seems to have been neglected in this debate: the requirement that the SC adopt explicit language when derogating from existing treaty or customary obligations only seems to arise in the context of human rights. This is because the SC cannot, at least in principle, breach human rights, as their promotion is one of the fundamental purposes of the UN Charter (see Art. 1(3)). Thus, in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Al-Jedda, para. 102, and Al-Dulimi, paras. 139-140, 146, there is a strong presumption that the SC does not intend to derogate from fundamental human rights. This is why any derogation from those rights calls for clear and explicit language. Indeed, Jordan (para. 70) and Professor O’Keefe (para. 13) have referred to these ECtHR cases as authorities for the proposition that any derogation from immunities by the Council must be explicit. However, as all the parties and participants seem to agree, immunities are not fundamental human rights. It is true that personal immunities are an important aspect of the principle of sovereign equality of states, upon which the UN Charter is also founded (see Art. 2(1)). Yet, unlike limitations of human rights, limitations on state sovereignty are the very purpose of Chapter VII resolutions, which are meant to impose coercive measures on UN member states. In sum, there is a difference between human rights and other rules of international law when it comes to the limits to the SC’s powers.

It has been rightly pointed out that limitations to pre-existing treaties and general international law should not lightly be assumed in the context of treaty obligations (see Art. 34 VCLT). But even in the context of treaty law, the requirement is only that there is a clear intention to depart from prior obligations (see ICJ Judgment in the ELSI case, para. 50, and a Joint Dissenting Opinion in the ICJ’s Preliminary Objections Order in Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France), para. 14). Thus, in the Tadić Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has stated, in para. 287, that:

‘it must be presumed that the Security Council, where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from general rules of international law, intended to remain within the confines of such rules’ (emphasis added).

Accordingly, explicit or express wording is not required for derogations by the SC from pre-existing international law, but only a clear enough intention to do so. As Jordan and Professor Kress have remarked in the context of the use of force, the authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ has been clearly understood to refer to the use of military force (see here, at pp. 34 and 119). Therefore, it seems that an obligation to ‘cooperate fully with the Court’ is also clear enough to cover a derogation from all possible impediments to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, including immunities from foreign domestic jurisdiction (see excellent remarks by Daryl Robinson et al. here, at pp. 79-84, and here, paras. 4-10). And this is either by virtue of applying the Rome Statute and, in particular, Art. 27(2), to Sudan, or by directly displacing any personal immunities. Any more precise legal terminology would be too much to ask from a political body, especially one who makes constant use of constructive ambiguity.

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15 Responses

  1. Haakon Rønn Stensæth

    Dear Talita,

    I agree with your conclusion. In my recent master thesis I discuss the question of implicit removal of immunity, as you speak of, as well as refute the idea of a requirement for explicit reference for removal of immunity (according to the method of interpretation of UNSC resolutions). If you are interested, please have a look at chapter 5 (page 21) onward (perhaps especially point 5.3 and even more 5.3.2.3). Link: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/62606?show=full

    Looking forward to read how the Appeals Court will deal with these questions.

  2. André de Hoogh André de Hoogh

    The crux of the contribution set out above is expressed in the last paragraph, when it claims that “explicit or express wording is not required for derogations by the SC from pre-existing international law, but only a clear enough intention to do so”. Then the claim is made “that ‘an obligation to cooperate fully with the Court’ is also clear enough to cover a derogation from all possible impediments to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, including immunities from foreign domestic jurisdiction”. Finally, “[a]ny more precise legal terminology would be too much to ask from a political body, in particular one who [sic] makes constant use of constructive ambiguity”.

    Frankly, this particular paragraph is perhaps not an exercise in constructive ambiguity, but certainly one of omission. Thus an obligation to cooperate is supposed to fully remove all impediments, including immunities, even though that obligation is imposed on Sudan only and not on other UN member States generally. Moreover, invoking similar language with respect to the ICTY and ICTR, claiming that this set aside immunities without mentioning the word immunity, fails because in the relevant resolutions (Resolution 827, para. 4; Resolution 955, para. 2) the obligation to cooperate was imposed on all States and not just on the successor States of the former Yugoslavia or on Rwanda. Hence, when States parties to the ICC are confronted with an obligation to cooperate based on a request to arrest and surrender President al Bashir, this obligation conflicts with their obligation under customary international law to respect the immunity of a sitting head of State.

    Thus, at a minimum, careful consideration of the language of Resolution 1593, para. 2, in the light of the Council’s previous practice, suggests that there was no ‘clear enough intention’ on the part of the Security Council ‘to remove all impediments, including immunities’. Paragraph 2 certainly does not supply that kind of ‘clear enough intention’; paragraph 6 stipulating the exclusive jurisdiction of non-States parties to the Rome Statute over their nationals also does not do so; and the verbatim record of Resolution 1593 at no point suggests that immunities on the part of officials of Sudan were even considered by the members of the Council (S/PV.5158). It is one thing to say that ‘explicit or express wording’ or ‘precise legal terminology’ is not required; it is quite another to suggest that Resolution 1593 contains language establishing the ‘clear enough intention’ of the Council to set aside immunities (quod non).

  3. Adil Haque

    Terrific post. Many thanks.

  4. Eduardo Ancona Bolio

    Great post! Very interesting

  5. Talita de Souza Dias

    Dear André,

    Many thanks for your comment.

    I agree that the permissibility of implicit derogations from immunities and other rules of general international law, and the interpretation of Res. 1593 are two separate things, and my goal with this post was to focus on the former (which is a key prior step to undertaking the latter analysis). And this is because I believe that others have already sufficiently demonstrated that Sudan’s obligation to cooperate fully with the Court does entail an obligation to waive any immunities before the domestic jurisdiction of other states and the Court itself, if we apply the VCLT to Res. 1593. In particular, I agree with Darryl Robinson that the word ‘fully’ cannot mean less than the removal of all impediments to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, including any obstacles to the prior arrest and surrender of a suspect by domestic authorities. I also agree with Claus Kress that there is no need to resort to Art. 27(2) of the Statute in order to reach this conclusion. An obligation to fully cooperate with the Court already does the job.

    One clarification about my reference to the jurisprudence of the ICTY: it wasn’t made with the purpose of comparing the specific provisions on immunities that operated in the context the ICC, the ICTY, and the ICTR. I don’t think that this is even necessary. In particular, it is immaterial that Res. 1593 was only binding on Sudan and that Res. 827 and 955 were binding on all UN members. If 1593 removes any immunities that Sudan might attach to its officials, then at the very least states parties to the Rome Statute have an obligation to arrest those officials if they are found on their territory, in accordance with Articles 86, 87 and 98(1) of the Statute. Instead, the conclusion of the ICTY which is cited in the post is simply a general statement about the powers of the SC and their relationship with general international law, which I believe applies in the context of immunities. The fact that it was the ICTY that made that statement is of no particular consequence, except that the said conclusion applies generally in the context of international criminal law.

  6. André de Hoogh André de Hoogh

    Dear Talita,

    While appreciating your response, you make certain jumps in your reasoning that are questionable. You start out by saying, and here I agree, that Sudan must waive the immunities of Al Bashir in order to give effect to the obligation to cooperate fully with the Court. But next, all of a sudden, you claim (invoking Robinson) that the obligation to cooperate fully means “the removal of all impediments to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, including any obstacles to the prior arrest and surrender of a suspect by domestic authorities”. The jump in reasoning that you make here is from an obligation that is clearly imposed on Sudan alone to a right of all other States to cooperate with the Court irrespective of their obligations under international law. However, the domestic authorities that must give effect to the obligation to cooperate fully are the domestic authorities of Sudan, not the authorities of other States. Thus, two different assertions are involved and the latter cannot logically be derived from the former.

    Indeed, this is why my observation on the difference with the resolutions creating the ICTY and ICTR is relevant, because Resolutions 827 and 955 imposed an obligation on all States to cooperate fully and not just on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Other States (in effect, as you say, UN members) would therefore, if confronted with a claim of immunity, have had to give effect to that obligation to cooperate fully. In essence, what you and others do is to equate the obligation to cooperate fully and waive the immunity of Al Bashir on the part of Sudan with an actual removal of immunity simply by reference to the existence of that obligation. Thus, in this kind of reasoning it becomes immaterial whether Sudan, on which the obligation is imposed, is fulfilling that obligation or is instead violating it. As we know, Sudan is in effect not cooperating fully and has not waived the immunity of Al Bashir.

    Sudan could cooperate fully with the ICC in various ways: 1. to arrest Al Bashir and transfer him to the custody of the ICC (this would not raise any issues of immunity); 2. not invoke immunity when confronted with measures of other States leading to his arrest and transfer; 3. waive his immunity when confronted with measures of other States leading to his arrest and transfer. Sudan’s non-cooperation, while a violation of the obligation to cooperate fully imposed by Resolution 1593, does not magically make the obligations of other States to respect the immunity of a sitting head of State disappear; for that to happen, a waiver is required. This is, in effect, what article 98(1) of the Rome Statute recognises, and this is why the Court must “first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity”. Contrary to what you claim in your contribution, the Council has not implicitly or by necessary implication removed immunity, and has not directly displaced immunity by requiring Sudan’s full cooperation, precisely because that obligation requires action by Sudan amounting to cooperation.

  7. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree

    China and Russia always insist that the personal immunity of the incumbent Head of State is absolute, with no exception whatsoever. See their statements in the Sixth Committee of the UNGA regarding the ILC’s topic ‘Immunities of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’. Therefore, had the issue of al-Bashir’s immunity been raised in relation to the UNSC resolutions referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, these two States would have voted against any denial of the personal immunity of al-Bashir so long as he remains Head of State?

  8. Talita de Souza Dias

    Dear André,

    There is no jump, but two different sources of obligations and two different sets of addressees. As I explained in my previous comment, while Sudan’s obligation not to pose any embarrassments to the Court’s jurisdiction (including immunities) is grounded on Res. 1593, that of ICC states parties is grounded on the Rome Statute, particularly, Articles 86, 87 and 98(1). Moreover, you need to bear in mind that no one can comprehensively address those issues of interpretation and interaction between different sources of law in a single blog post (which is meant to be succinct). Hence my focus on the issue of implicit/explicit derogation from immunities by the Council, and my (necessarily) short analysis of the interpretation of Res. 1593 and its interaction with the Statute. This is obviously a topic that requires a much lengthier analysis, which does not fit entirely in a blog post and which I believe others have already sufficiently covered elsewhere. In particular, I refer you to the transcripts of the hearings and the written observations of the parties and participants in Jordan’s Appeal for a more detailed analysis of the question of interpretation of Res. 1593.

    In response to your second point on the comparison with the ad hoc tribunals: yes, it is only because I conclude that that Res. 1593 implicitly removes Sudan immunities (without the need of any action on the part of Sudan), that it becomes irrelevant whether or not the Resolution is directed to all UN members or not. As I explained in my previous comment, in the case of Jordan’s non-compliance, all that matters is that Jordan was a state party and, as such, was under an obligation to cooperate fully with the Court in accordance with the Rome Statute.

    On your third point: this is indeed one possible interpretation of Res. 1593, but I personally don’t think it is the only or the most evident one. I do not think that an obligation to cooperate fully necessarily requires any action by the relevant state, especially if/when no action, in a material sense, is required, as is the case with the removal of immunities. In other words, why would the Security Council expect an action from Sudan when it comes to immunities when it can itself remove them? This is a rather ineffective reading of an obligation to cooperate fully, in my opinion. In sum, I think it all comes down to what is the interpretation that more clearly transpires from the resolution. Although reasonable people have disagreed on what that interpretation is, I think that a careful interpretation of Res. 1593, especially based on its text and the principle of effectiveness, leads to a clear enough outcome in the sense of the direct removal of any immunities of Sudan.

    Dear Kriangsak,

    Although I think that statements or actions of individual states are important interpretative tools, especially in the context of SC resolutions, they are not in themselves decisive. This is especially in the case of inaction, because no one can really know for sure what they really mean, or whether they are grounded on a political or legal belief. Ultimately, the resolution needs to be interpreted by looking at its text, together with its context and object and purpose. In particular, it is generally accepted that, in the context of negotiations between multiple states, including members of the Security Council, the final text is the most reliable expression of their collective will.

  9. Kriangsak kittichaisaree

    But the final text of the SC resolution does not clearly stipulates the denial of the immunity of al Bashir. On the contrary, the practice of China and Russia that have veto power in the SC are unequivocal that there is no exception whatsoever to the personal immunity of the incumbent troika. One may put forward theoretical arguments one way or another but, in reality, had this issue of immunity been specifically raised during the negotiation the two would have vetoed it. See also the reports and draft articles of ILC Special Rapp. KOLODKIN, twice legal adviser of the Russian MFA, re immunities of State officials from foreign crim. Jurisdiction. Kolodkin still sits opposite me every working day these days and I find it weird to ask him the obvious after he has repeatedly explained Russia’s legal position and his legal opinion re this kind of immunity…

  10. Hannes

    Dear Talita,

    Thank you for this well written post! However, I am afraid I must agree with André on this. I do not think that the language “to cooperate fully” meets the “clear intention” requirement. As he has already pointed out, one way of full cooperation would be for the Sudanese authorities to arrest Al-Bashir and transfer him to the ICC. Once before the Court, Art 27(2) would apply anyway. So in this scenario, the question of immunities does not arise in the first place. And while I think we can all agree that Sudan is obliged to waive Al-Bashir’s head of state immunity under SC Res 1593, such waiver is is not an inevitable corollary of “full cooperation”.

    Also, you point towards the ELSI case to demonstrate that a waiver might very well be implicit. However, the exact wording of the ICJ in ELSI was “Yet the Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.” (para 50) This combination of “clear intention” + “not tacitly” in my view, if anything, rather points towards a requirement of explicitness. O’Keefe, for example, referred to that very paragraph in his submission in order to bolster his argument in favour of explicitness. (although he later conceded, for other reasons, that a waiver can indeed be implicit). So whatever the exact requirement may be, I doubt that it is met by the language of SC Res 1593.

  11. Kriangsak kittichaisaree

    Al Bashir paid an official visit to China in Sept 2015 and a State visit to Russia in Nov. 2017 at the invitations of the President of China and that of Russia, respectively, and despite the SC res. referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC and the arrest warrant against him.

  12. Talita de Souza Dias

    Hi Hannes,

    The ICJ didn’t quite say that immunities cannot or can never be tacitly dispensed with, as you put it. Rather, it seems to be referring to the specific case at hand to conclude that, in that particular case, it was unable to ‘accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with’. This is particularly evidenced by the use of the past tense, rather than the present (e.g. ‘an important principle (…) cannot be tacitly dispensed with’). In any event, ELSI was a case relating to treaty law, i.e. relationships between states. Things are a little bit different for the SC, which has more powers than any individual state to derogate implicitly or explicitly from general international law.

  13. Talita de Souza Dias

    Another clarification on ELSI: while the ICJ referred to tacit displacement or ‘dispensation’ in its factual findings of the case, it did seem to be measuring those facts against the legal standard of clear intention (‘in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so’). In sum, from that sentence, it seems to me that the Court was saying that the parties, in that case, did not tacitly dispense with immunities, because the legal standard of clear intention wasn’t met. Hence my reliance on the clear intention standard. Thus, in my view, the ICJ’s statement only reinforces the conclusion that it remains open to the parties to tacitly or implicitly waive immunities, as long as in the treaty there are words that make clear their intention to do so.

  14. zhai

    This is a great discussion, and I enjoyed reading it. I tend to agree with André that the term “to cooperate fully” does not necessarily mean removal of immunities that Sudan enjoys as a sovereign State, given the attitudes of some members in the Security Council on issues of immunities which Kriangsak also mentioned. I also think there is an issue about what is meant by to “cooperate fully”. Without clearer indication in the resolution or in relation to the resolution, can the term “fully” go as far as derogating from any international law rule that does not allow Sudan to “cooperate fully” with ICC? This example does not seem to exist in practice for this case– but would the term go so far to obligate or allow Sudan to actively go and capture the wanted person while he or she is in a foreign State, with the consent or without the consent (as in Eichmann case) of that foreign State? Also, while noting views that ‘limitations on state sovereignty are the very purpose of Chapter VII resolutions’, but do we read this resolution 1593 in favour only of what may have been argued as promoting “human rights” under Article 1(3) of the UN Charter? After all, “human rights” is only one aspect of Article 1(3), and Article 1 also states other purposes of the UN, including maintenance of international peace and security and developing friendly relations between nations. Questions may be raised on how the reading of the mere phrase “to cooperate fully” as requiring the removal of immunities (and as mentioned no further indication on removal of immunities in the resolution or in relation to the resolution) can be compatible with the purposes of UN overall. Any views on these questions will be interesting.

  15. Talita de Souza Dias

    Dear Zhai,

    Thank you for your comment.

    I am mindful that the text of Res. 1593, and, in particular, the expression ‘cooperate fully’, although a key tool for interpreting the resolution, is not the only one. As I mentioned in my previous comments, we also need to look at context and object and purpose, as well as preparatory works whenever there’s doubt. And in the case of Res. 1593, I believe that the context and object and purpose are particularly instructive, in addition to the text. Specifically, the principal aim of an SC resolution is to bring a situation before the ICC, in accordance with the Rome Statute. As such, the Statute is also part of the Res. 1593’s context. Significantly, ‘cooperate fully’ is the same formula that the Statute uses to impose cooperation obligations on states parties and accepting states (i.e. states accepting the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to an Art. 12(3) declaration). Therefore, in my view, this means that the obligations of Sudan in matters of cooperation are analogous to those of states parties and accepting states. Although this is yet another debate, I believe that states parties to the Rome Statute have undertaken not to oppose any immunities they might have before the domestic jurisdiction of other states so as to hinder an ICC proceeding. This is my interpretation of, inter alia, Articles 86, Article 89(1), and possibly Article 27(2). A word of caution in relation to statements made by states, especially after the adoption of Res. 1593: states change their minds all the time about obligations they have undertaken in past, but this cannot, in itself, negate those obligations. Even if we have to take into account subsequent practice in interpreting treaties and SC resolutions, these must express the agreement of the parties, which is not the case of the statements you referred to. Of course, this would be different if the SC itself adopted a resolution clarifying the meaning of Re. 1593, in which case this would be an authentic interpretation of the resolution.

    On your point about Eichmann, one could not interpret an SC resolution as implicitly authorising forced abduction, as this would violate fundamental human rights of the individual abducted, especially freedom of movement. The SC could only do so explicitly and justifiably. One clarification on the strong presumption that the SC does not intend to derogate from human rights: this is not about interpreting SC resolutions only in favour of human rights, to the detriment of other UN purposes and principles. This is just an interpretative rule which aims at avoiding a violation of fundamental human rights. Its application does not override other UN purposes. On the contrary: SC resolutions are, by definition, meant to fulfill other UN purposes, in particular, maintenance of peace and security, friendly relations, etc. However, the point is that the same strong presumption of compliance does not exist for other UN purposes because the SC was designed to have enforcement powers which can encroach upon the sovereignty and internal affairs of states, and might even involve the use of military force. Indeed, Ch. VII resolutions can even address issues that were otherwise subject exclusive jurisdiction of states (see Art. 2(7) UN Charter). Therefore, most of the time, SC resolutions, by their very nature, limit some of the purposes of the UN Charter. So, in response to your last question, it is hard to conceive of an SC resolution complying, at once, with all UN purposes, especially resolutions adopted under Chapter VII as Res. 1593.

    Hope this answers your question!

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