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Home Posts tagged "complementarity"

The Duty to Investigate Civilian Deaths in Armed Conflict: Looking Beyond Criminal Investigations

Published on October 22, 2018        Author: 
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Writing in the Times last Friday, General David Petraeus, former commander of US Central Command, added his voice to the familiar refrain that ‘European human rights law’ has given rise to the ‘judicial pursuit of British soldiers and veterans’. Petraeus may be correct in stating that the British emphasis on criminal investigations would never obtain in the US, but looking at some of the legal issues behind his claims undercuts his assumption that ‘restoring the primacy of the law of armed conflict’ would remove scrutiny over the actions of military personnel on the battlefield.

A year after the winding up of the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), the controversies over accountability for the UK’s military action in Iraq certainly show few signs of going away. Sections of the press continue to mount a vociferous campaign against the residual work of the Iraq Fatality Investigations (IFI), while calls for investigations into alleged civilian fatalities from more recent UK military action over Mosul are growing.

I reflected on this experience in the course of completing a chapter on international legal obligations to investigate civilian deaths for a new book just published, The Grey Zone: Civilian protection between human rights and the laws of war. The many years of investigations in the UK have arguably resulted in a failure either to deal effectively with outstanding allegations or to deliver justice to many Iraqi victims. This perception may of course be influenced by continuing political disagreement over international military action in Iraq, but it also stems from the particular approach the UK has taken to investigating violations, including the heavy reliance on criminal law. In the current generation of devastating air campaigns, what lessons can be learnt?

UK practice

Beside the need to address public concern about the conduct of military action in Iraq, UK practice on investigations has been driven largely by duties under the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

The UK’s approach was established early in Iraq (and later applied to UK operations in Afghanistan), with all incidents involving civilian casualties being referred for investigation to the Service Investigation Branch of the Royal Military Police. Comparing US military investigations with those of other states in Naval Law Review in 2015, Commander Sylvaine Wong of the US Navy JAGC noted that the UK had, ‘as a matter of domestic policy, taken the most dramatic steps to rely solely on criminal law enforcement investigations for incidences of civilian casualties.’ Read the rest of this entry…

 

Another Challenge for Colombia’s Transitional Justice Process: Aggravated Differential Treatment between Armed Forces and FARC

Published on October 19, 2018        Author: 
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A new proposal for a constitutional amendment has caused another highly controversial debate in Colombia. The proposal foresees the creation of “special chambers” within the Colombian Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, SJP) with the exclusive competence to try members of the Armed Forces. Just a quick reminder: The Final Peace Agreement was concluded between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) in November 2016. It introduced the SJP as the Peace Agreement’s single legal mechanism, responsible for bringing all parties to the conflict to justice. The new government and its party in the Colombian Congress (“Centro Democrático”) are keen to make some reforms to the SJP. A few weeks ago we have discussed here a proposal to radically limit the access of the SJP and other organs of the Colombian TJ System to information related to national security. The now proposed constitutional amendment is the result of a debate that had already started earlier this year at the time of the negotiations regarding the SJP’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). It evolved around the introduction of Article 75 RPE which provides for a special procedure for the Armed Forces in relation to the crimes committed during the armed conflict. The rule was finally adopted and ultimately paved the way for this recent proposal.

The authors of the proposal (among them former President Alvaro Uribe Vélez, one of the Peace Agreement’s most vocal opponents) consider that the Armed Forces “have fought in the name and in favor of the legitimate State”, including those members  that committed crimes not eligible for amnesty; in contrast, the FARC are characterized as just a “criminal organization pursuing criminal purposes” (Explanatory Statement to the proposal (ES), p. 11 [all translations by the author]). The proposal’s aim is, of course, to strengthen the position of the Armed Forces, especially of those members involved in international crimes and thus possibly subject to national or international proceedings. However, as it stands the proposal will do a disservice to the Armed Forces which should rather stick to the existing mechanisms of the SJP in order to have higher security with regard to the International Criminal Court (ICC). For reasons of space, I cannot explain here the multiple problems of the proposal with regard to the current Colombian constitutional system (especially, but not exclusively regarding the SJP), and its international obligations (regarding the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ICC and under International Humanitarian Law). Instead, I will focus on the serious problem that the proposal creates for its presumed beneficiaries with regard to the preliminary examination undertaken by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).

The proposal has implications for the application of the complementarity principle, which regulates the relationship between national jurisdictions and the ICC. Read the rest of this entry…

 

The Situation Concerning the Mavi Marmara at the ICC: What might the next move of the Prosecutor be?

Published on March 22, 2016        Author: 
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In early summer 2010, around fifty people were seriously injured and ten Turkish nationals died on a vessel which was part of the ‘Freedom Flotilla’: the Mavi Marmara ship. The incident saw the establishment of a UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission, a separate panel of inquiry appointed by the UN Secretary-General, a Turkish Commission and a Israeli Commission of Inquiry (aka “Turkel Commission”). The Israeli Defense Force (IDF)’s storming of the ‘Freedom Flotilla’, have subsequently been subject to judicial proceedings both domestically in Turkey, and internationally at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In May 2014, four arrest warrants were released by Istanbul’s Seventh High Criminal Court against former IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, former Navy Chief Eliezer Marom, former Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin and former Naval Intelligence chief Avishai Levy. A year earlier, on 14 May 2013, a referral was received by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) from the authorities of the Comoros, a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, in relation to the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla’s incident (registered vessels situation). Six months after Turkey issued its arrest warrants, the OTP announced in its report under Article 53 (1) Rome Statute that it had decided not to investigate the registered vessels situation.

OTP’s decision not to investigate was based on the ‘gravity’ criteria of the Rome Statute. According to the OTP, ‘the potential case(s) likely arising from an investigation into this incident would not be of “sufficient gravity” to justify further action by the ICC.’ In so doing, the OTP did not consider the other two criteria for declining to investigate, namely, complementarity and the interests of justice. As Kevin Jon Heller predicted, the Comoros ‘appealed’ the OTP’s decision and on 16 July 2015, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) requested the Prosecutor to reconsider its decision not to open an investigation. Acting under Article 53 (3) (a), the PTC took issue with several aspects of the OTP’s decision not to investigate (see comments here and here).

In this post, my aim is to analyze the OTP’s decision not to investigate on the basis of gravity and the PTC’s request to the OTP to reconsider its decision. I argue that OTP’s gravity assessment was hasty and came at the expense of assessing the potential complementarity of the Turkish proceedings. Read the rest of this entry…