Sudan’s Death Sentences Against RSF Leaders: Complementarity and Accountability Under International Law

On 12 July 2026, the Anti-Terrorism and Crimes Against the State Court in Port Sudan sentenced General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (‘Hemedti’), commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and fifteen others to death in absentia (See also here and here). The convictions relate to the killing of West Darfur Governor Khamis Abdallah Abakar in June 2023 and a broader campaign of violence in and around El Geneina, with charges including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (See here and here). A few days before the sentences, a United Nations Fact-Finding mission had found that the RSF and allied militias committed mass killings, sexual violence, and ethnically targeted attacks against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities, while similar grave crimes have been documented elsewhere in Darfur. The RSF denies targeting civilians, claiming its operations were directed against military forces and armed groups. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) also face credible allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The significance of these proceedings under international law depends on whether crimes committed after 2023 fall within the Darfur situation referred to the ICC by the UNSC in 2005 (for detailed analysis, see here), and whether Sudanese proceedings bear upon complementarity under Article 17 of the Rome Statute that established the ICC. This post considers (a) the ICC’s jurisdiction, (b) whether domestic proceedings constitute a relevant national case for complementarity, and (c) whether trials in absentia culminating in death sentences under one party to an ongoing conflict satisfy fair process guarantees. It argues that the proceedings engage the complementarity regime but raise serious questions about procedural legitimacy under international human rights law.

The Scope of ICC Jurisdiction

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 referred “the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002” to the ICC Prosecutor, geographically limited to Darfur but with no end date. The Prosecutor is investigating attacks in El Geneina and El Fasher, including evidence linking crimes to senior RSF leadership. The RSF arose from Janjaweed militias funded by former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, infamous for ethnic cleansing against non-Arab communities in Darfur during the 2000s. Many recent crimes occurred in the same region, against the same communities, and through similar patterns of ethnic violence.

Jurisdiction must still be demonstrated. Lentner has argued on this blog that ICC jurisprudence requires crimes after a referral to remain sufficiently linked to the crisis that triggered it. The present war began in April 2023 between SAF and RSF after Sudan’s political and military order changed (for a brief narration of the genesis of the recent conflict, see here). The fall of al-Bashir in 2019, the transitional period, the 2020 peace arrangements, and the transformation of allies into belligerents may support the view that the present conflict is not a continuation of the 2005 referral. Lentner suggests a new UNSC referral or Sudanese acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute would be required.

This post argues otherwise: Resolution 1593 has no closing date, and ICC jurisprudence allows later crimes to fall within a referred situation if sufficiently linked. The common territory, continuity between RSF and Janjaweed, identity of affected communities, and recurrence of ethnically directed violence establish the requisite link. Thus, post-2023 crimes remain within the referral’s scope, opening the question of complementarity.

Complementarity in Sudan’s Current Context

Sudan’s territorial jurisdiction over alleged crimes is clear. Article VI of the Genocide Convention contemplates trial before a competent tribunal of the territorial State, and the Rome Statute presumes national courts bear primary responsibility for prosecuting international crimes. The ICC intervenes only when jurisdiction and admissibility conditions are met. Sudan retains jurisdiction over crimes in West Darfur, and the SAF’s control of the court does not negate this. Nor can RSF leaders deflect responsibility by pointing to SAF crimes; criminal responsibility is individual.

Sudanese judgments do not displace ICC jurisdiction but may render corresponding ICC cases inadmissible. The threshold question is whether Sudanese proceedings concern the same person and substantially the same conduct as any ICC case. Since defendants have been convicted, the analysis must distinguish between prosecutions pending or recommencing upon appearance (Article 17(1)(a)) and cases where the person has already been tried (Article 17(1)(c), with Article 20(3)). Whether an in absentia conviction is final, and whether it would be set aside upon appearance, is material.

Neither the fact of in absentia proceedings nor the existence of convictions alone determines admissibility. The assessment depends on whether domestic and ICC proceedings concern substantially the same conduct and, if Article 20(3) applies, whether national proceedings lacked independence or impartiality. The political context of one belligerent prosecuting another informs but does not decide the issue. The conduct of the trial in absentia and availability of a fresh trial upon appearance bear upon legality, while compatibility with fair process guarantees is a distinct question.

Trials in Absentia and Death Sentences

International law does not absolutely prohibit trials in absentia. Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR protects the accused’s right to be tried in their presence. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has recognized that in absentia proceedings may be compatible if the accused was informed but declined to attend. Nonappearance cannot be treated as waiver without convincing evidence of sufficient notice. The accused must have effective defence opportunities, ordinarily through counsel, and a meaningful means of challenging the conviction upon appearance. Published accounts do not establish whether defendants received notice, whether lawyers were appointed, or whether Sudanese law guarantees retrial rather than limited appeal. These concerns bear directly on legality.

Article 6 of the ICCPR permits death sentences only within narrow limits. In General Comment No. 36, “the most serious crimes” are interpreted as intentional killing. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes include conduct not necessarily involving intentional killing. A death sentence must rest on individual findings of responsibility for conduct meeting that threshold. Mandatory death sentences, preventing consideration of circumstances, constitute arbitrary deprivation of life. In Mbenge v. Zaire, the Human Rights Committee held that a death sentence imposed after proceedings violating fair-trial guarantees also violated the right to life.

International humanitarian law points the same way. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits sentences and executions without judgment by a regularly constituted court affording indispensable guarantees. The SAF–RSF conflict is a non-international armed conflict, satisfying the threshold of Additional Protocol II. Article 6 of the Protocol requires an independent and impartial court, notice of charges, defence rights, and conviction only based on individual responsibility. These guarantees apply even if RSF is accused of atrocities.

Accountability During Ongoing Conflict

Where one belligerent convicts its opponents while credible allegations against its own forces remain unexamined, independence and legitimacy are naturally questioned. The Sudanese judgment can be understood as domestic accountability only if followed by measures permitting its claims to be tested. Judgments and evidence must disclose how defendants were notified and represented, guarantee full rehearing or effective review upon appearance, and remove the death penalty as an obstacle to extradition and cooperation.

Accountability in such contexts is fragile. Trials conducted amid war risk being perceived as instruments of political struggle rather than impartial justice. For Sudan’s proceedings to contribute meaningfully, they must demonstrate fairness, transparency, and willingness to prosecute crimes committed by all parties. Otherwise, they risk undermining rather than strengthening the legitimacy of international criminal law.

Conclusion

Sudanese courts may exercise jurisdiction over crimes in West Darfur, even under a warring party’s authority. The harder question is whether such courts can demonstrate that defendants were tried as individuals rather than representatives of the opposing belligerent, especially when proceedings occurred in absentia and ended in death sentences. The same caution applies to the ICC. Resolution 1593 may extend to atrocities committed during the present war, given continuities in territory, actors, victims, and methods, though this must be established. Only then can Sudan’s proceedings acquire relevance for complementarity under ICC jurisprudence. The judgment should neither be dismissed as legally worthless nor accepted merely because it condemns grave crimes. Its contribution to accountability will depend less on condemning RSF leaders than on whether convictions carrying death sentences, entered in absentia amid war, can withstand exacting legal scrutiny.