Substantive Implications of the Duty of Vigilance Ruling Against TotalEnergies

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In its 25 June 2026 judgment in NAAT et al. v. TotalEnergies, the Paris Judicial Court ordered TotalEnergies to update its vigilance plan within six months to address climate-related risks arising from its Scope 3 emissions—emissions from the combustion of its oil and gas which account for around 90% of its carbon footprint—and to include appropriate measures to mitigate those risks or prevent serious harm.

The TotalEnergies ruling has far-reaching substantive implications for companies subject to the Duty of Vigilance Law and the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (‘CS3D’), and constitutes a new building block in the legal architecture for climate protection. The ruling builds on an emerging global judicial dialogue in which courts draw on each other’s decisions, with principles developed in climate cases against States now informing corporate accountability (Climate Litigation Network, Laying the Foundations for Our Shared Future, p. 18).  By doing so, it consolidates the normative foundation of corporate climate obligations across domestic and international legal orders.  

A ruling that goes beyond the Shell appeal decision

This judgment goes a step further than other decisions on the merits in corporate framework cases to date, particularly the appeal decision in Milieudefensie v. Shell. The Shell ruling affirmed the corporate duty to mitigate emissions, but stopped short of awarding a remedy (the decision is currently on appeal before the Dutch Supreme Court). The TotalEnergies judgment is a breakthrough because it not only affirms this duty but also awards a remedy. Specifically, TotalEnergies has been ordered to assess climate-related risks resulting from its Scope 3 emissions [150, 183 and 209], and—crucially—adopt and effectively implement ‘reasonable, concrete and consistent’ measures to prevent or mitigate those risks [218]. This is in accordance with the Court’s view that the Duty of Vigilance Law requires companies ‘to take preventive action … to address the serious risks and harms to which they contribute through their activities’, in line with soft law principles [136].   

This is only the first chapter of the court’s assessment on the merits in the case. While the Court has declined to order specific measures under the Duty of Vigilance Law [219], it retains ‘judicial oversight’ over the adoption and effective implementation of appropriate mitigating measures by TotalEnergies [218]. TotalEnergies can expect further judicial scrutiny of its updated vigilance plan in due course.

The Court reserved its decision on the remaining claims under the Ecological Damage Law pending TotalEnergies’ revised vigilance plan [253-254]. If deemed insufficient, it may still rule on the company’s liability under that regime—similar to those invoked in other corporate climate litigation (e.g., Milieudefensie v. Shell, Falys et al. v. TotalEnergies, Asmania et al. v. Holcim)—and on the plaintiffs’ requested mitigation measures, including a specific emissions reduction order and a ban on new oil and gas projects. 

As we have seen in decisions against governments (Klimaseniorinnen and Bonaire; see further here) and in fossil fuel phase-out cases (Greenpeace Nordic; see further here), even rulings that leave defendants some discretion as to how they comply with their climate obligations set substantive standards that require real behavioural and regulatory change.

The Court severely restricted TotalEnergies’ options to comply with its vigilance obligations

Given the constraints laid down by the Court, the implications of the order to draw up a new vigilance plan may have a similar effect to the specific remedies sought by the plaintiffs—aimed at reducing expansion and production of oil and gas—that the Court declined to order under the Duty of Vigilance Law.

First, while the Court did not elaborate on the standard of vigilance, its reliance on the OECD Guidelines for interpreting the Duty of Vigilance Law suggests that the revised vigilance plan may ultimately be assessed against the Paris Agreement’s objective of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, a position endorsed in the Shell appeal ruling ([7.67]). The OECD Guidelines explicitly state that companies must align with internationally agreed global temperature goals ([76]).

Second, by finding a ‘very strong’ causal link between TotalEnergies’ fossil fuel extraction activities and the resulting Scope 3 emissions [176], the Court significantly narrowed the company’s options in determining the ‘reasonable, concrete and consistent vigilance measures’ required under the Duty of Vigilance Law. The Court affirmed that fossil fuel extraction ‘inevitably leads to its combustion, regardless of the place or time’ and ‘consequently to a reduction in the remaining global carbon budget through the release of a quantifiable amount of CO2 into the atmosphere’ [175]. As such, it is certain that every barrel of oil and gas extracted will lead to further warming (see Shell appeal ruling [7.106]).

Read in conjunction with the same French Court’s findings in the greenwashing decision against TotalEnergies, this finding implies that TotalEnergies will need to reconsider its expansion of fossil fuel production and may even need to reduce its production. In the greenwashing proceedings, the Court held that TotalEnergies’ plans to develop new oil and gas fields were at odds with its own claim to be on a path to carbon neutrality within the meaning of the Paris Agreement (Total Greenwashing, [123], [124] and [130]).

This conclusion is consistent with the scientific consensus. In the greenwashing case, the Court referred to successive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero by 2050 scenario and the 2025 Production Gap Report—all of which find that limiting warming to 1.5°C requires no new oil and gas fields and a managed decline in fossil fuel production (Total Greenwashing, [122]-[124]).

Taken together, the range of ‘reasonable’ vigilance measures available to TotalEnergies is therefore considerably narrowed. It is difficult to envision TotalEnergies complying with its vigilance obligations without considering halting new oil and gas projects alongside a progressive reduction in production. TotalEnergies’ initial response to the ruling foreshadows a collision course, as the company only intends to add measures aimed at reducing the carbon intensity of its products to its vigilance plan.

Consequences beyond France

The Court’s findings have strengthened the CS3D, with consequences beyond France. As the first judicial interpretation of the CS3D, the ruling is likely to shape that regime and become a persuasive authority for courts across the European Union once the Directive is transposed.

The Court stated that the CS3D extends to climate-related risks, despite the removal of former Article 22 of the CS3D via the Omnibus I Directive. Former Article 22 required companies to adopt and implement a climate transition plan consistent with limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C. It was removed following significant lobbying by industry, including the oil and gas sector (see SOMO, Global Witness).

For the Court, the Omnibus I Directive did not affect the broader due diligence obligations contained in the CS3D, which continue to encompass adverse climate impacts [142-146]. Specifically, the Court found that climate change constitutes an ‘adverse environmental impact’ falling within the due diligence framework established by Articles 7 to 16 CS3D [142-144]. With this interpretation, all companies subject to the CS3D will be required to assess climate-related risks arising from their emissions and to adopt appropriate measures to mitigate them. The Court’s view regarding the close alignment between the French Duty of Vigilance Law and the CS3D also suggests that its reasoning on Scope 3 emissions is equally applicable under the CS3D [141].

The ruling has the potential to preserve—at least in part—the practical effect of former Article 22. It also rebuts a common corporate defence (see Milieudefensie v. Shell and Milieudefensie v. ING) that the removal of Article 22 means that companies have no legal duty to mitigate their emissions. Scholars had already concluded that this obligation is independent from Article 22.

Finally, the implications of this judgment are likely to reverberate in litigation beyond France. Reflecting the trend identified in the latest Climate Litigation Trends report—which found that at least 50% of decisions in corporate framework cases reference government cases—this judgment draws on and applies rules of international law as clarified by the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, Klimaseniorinnen and Greenpeace Nordic) to corporate cases; for example by recognising the threat posed by climate change to human rights [139]. Courts in other jurisdictions are likely to draw on this judgment in turn, contributing to a convergence of principles governing corporate climate liability. A case in point is Falys et al. v. TotalEnergies, which has been adjourned precisely so the Belgian court could take the French TotalEnergies judgment into account. In the next steps of the TotalEnergies case, we can expect the Paris Court to continue drawing inspiration from climate litigation to date and contributing to the emerging legal architecture for climate protection.

Next steps

The next hearing is scheduled for 21 January 2027 (around the same time as the Dutch Supreme Court is expected to rule in Milieudefensie v. Shell), when the court is expected to set a timetable for the parties’ written submissions and, possibly, further hearings.

During this next phase, the court will assess whether the revised vigilance measures are ‘reasonable, concrete and consistent’. Its assessment of the applicable standard of vigilance may progressively narrow the range of measures available to comply with those obligations, thereby indirectly constraining TotalEnergies’ future choices.

Significantly, the court retains the power to order specific measures against TotalEnergies under the Ecological Damage Law, if TotalEnergies’ new vigilance plan is found inadequate to address climate risks [254].

Key legal questions remain, including the applicable standard of review and the intensity of judicial scrutiny, given the discretion left to companies in designing their vigilance plans. Common industry defences are also likely to re-emerge, particularly arguments concerning the effectiveness and proportionality of the remedies.

Image credit: Mondo 79 CC BY 2.0

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