Skipping Steps at the ICJ: Pragmatism and Judicial Economy in the 12 September Order in Equatorial Guinea v. France (Return of Property)

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In the aftermath of Sudan v. United Arab Emirates, debate has flared about the use of judicial economy by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). By rejecting Sudan’s request for interim protection and striking the case from the General List in one breath, the Court seemed to privilege docket discipline and efficiency over a fuller airing of arguments. Critics, including several judges in dissent, warned of the costs: a truncated right to be heard, a missed opportunity to develop international law, and the risk of undermining the Court’s legitimacy (see notably here, here, and here).

The Court’s Order of 12 September 2025 in Request relating to the Return of Property Confiscated in Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France) should be read against this backdrop. At issue was the confiscation of a mansion at 42 avenue Foch in Paris, purchased with misappropriated public funds according to French courts. Equatorial Guinea claimed the property as state-owned and sought its return under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (the Merida Convention). After withdrawing an initial request for interim protection in 2022, it returned in July 2025, asking the Court to stop France from selling the property and to guarantee access pending the merits stage.

By thirteen votes to two, the Court rejected the request. Instead of moving through the familiar catalogue of preconditions for interim relief—jurisdiction, plausibility, link, irreparable prejudice, urgency—it began and ended with plausibility. Interpreting Article 57(3)(c) of the Merida Convention, the Court held that the provision left France discretion on whether to prioritize asset return, and thus no plausible right to restitution could be inferred. Having found implausibility, the Court declined to examine the remaining steps.

Several judges voiced concern. Judge Yusuf faulted the Court for skipping prima facie jurisdiction and for interpreting Article 57(3)(c) in a way that prejudged the merits. Judge ad hoc Elias warned that the majority had set the plausibility bar too high, undermining the applicant’s right to be heard and noting that Equatorial Guinea had no opportunity to reply to France’s oral submissions. Judge Tladi, though joining the majority, lamented the arbitrariness of singling out plausibility alone and suggested the Court should either have adopted a holistic “circumstances” approach or accepted a lower plausibility threshold. Judge Tomka agreed with the outcome but stressed that urgency, not plausibility, should have been decisive, while also warning against curtailing adversarial exchange. Judge Nolte added that discretion under Article 57 could in some situations be limited by proportionality. Taken together, these opinions reveal significant unease with the Court’s abbreviated reasoning.

This is not an isolated episode. In recent years, the Court has increasingly economized its reasoning in provisional measures proceedings, albeit in different ways. In Mexico v. Ecuador (23 May 2024), the Court rejected Mexico’s request after Ecuador raided the Mexican Embassy in Quito. Leaning on Ecuador’s binding assurances, it confined itself to urgency, found no imminent risk of irreparable harm, and declined to consider the other preconditions. Judge Nolte criticized the shortcut, warning against ignoring prima facie jurisdiction; Judge Bhandari suggested that assurances might make other steps unnecessary. Either way, the structure was clear: a single-criterion dismissal.

In Nicaragua v. Germany (30 April 2024), the Court took the opposite tack. In only a handful of paragraphs, it concluded that “the circumstances [were] not such as to require” measures, without addressing the usual catalogue individually. Vice-President Sebutinde disagreed with the Court’s “strange” approach and “scanty” reasoning, as did Judge ad hoc Al-Khasawneh, while Judge Tladi defended the move as a return to the “golden rule” of Article 41 (see also here). Commentators likewise split: some saw pragmatism, a flexible attempt to avoid doctrinal straightjackets; others emphasized the sparseness of the reasoning and the heavy lifting done in individual opinions. That ruling remains ambiguous: was it pragmatism, or simply judicial economy by another name?

A third example is Azerbaijan v. Armenia (22 February 2023). This was Azerbaijan’s second request under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), filed as a fresh request under Article 75(3) of the Rules of Court based on alleged “new facts”. Azerbaijan sought demining-related measures. The Court went straight to plausibility and found CERD did not impose obligations of that kind. It rejected the request but reaffirmed that measures indicated in December 2021 “remain[ed] in effect” (para. 26). Here, too, the Court economized, notably by omitting the “situational change test” that the Rules and past practice appeared to require. (I explore the history and pitfalls of this underexplored but increasingly relevant requirement in greater depth in a forthcoming article.)

Read together with Equatorial Guinea v. France, these cases show a Court experimenting with abbreviated reasoning. But what exactly is going on? One view is that these are instances of a new strand of judicial economy: cutting corners to save time, possibly at the expense of coherence and clarity. Judge Yusuf read the 12 September Order in just this way, describing it as a troubling judicial “innovation” and expressing the hope that it would prove nothing more than a “temporary glitch”. Another reading is that the Court is engaged in pragmatism, a kind of “work in progress” as it adapts its practice to a crowded docket and highly politicized disputes. Flexibility might allow the bench to avoid unnecessary doctrinal entanglement, preserve consensus, and respond quickly to fast-moving facts. The Court itself is aware of the stakes, as is shown by its remark in paragraph 36 of the September ruling that it “is not bound to follow any particular order when examining the conditions” for provisional measures. That remark, formally correct of course, signals that the Court knew its choice might invite scrutiny. If there were nothing unusual in skipping over jurisdiction or urgency, there would have been no need to say so. The Court itself seems to recognize that judicial economy in interim protection comes at the risk of a legitimacy cost.

On a best-case reading, the Court’s more fluid approach in recent cases reflects adaptability. It need not always plod through every criterion if a decisive issue is plain. Provisional measures are meant to move quickly, and the Court faces an increasingly full docket, with numerous states turning to interim protection as a first resort. The International Labour Organization’s “urgent” request for an advisory opinion—now almost two years old—is only one reminder of the mounting pressures on the Court’s calendar. Trimming its reasoning shortens orders and speeds delivery. Yet adaptability comes with risks and trade-offs.

The first risk is arbitrariness at the level of a single case. If the Court can pick whichever condition it wishes—plausibility one day, urgency the next, “circumstances as a whole” another—then neither states nor observers can predict how a future request will be handled. This undermines the discipline of cumulative preconditions the Court has elaborated, and in the specific case of consecutive requests, it clashes with the Rules’ requirement that “a change in the situation” be shown. As Judge Yusuf argued in dissent, and Judge Tladi in his separate opinion, a plausibility ruling that prejudges the merits illustrates the danger of reducing the test to a single pivot. It risks crossing the line the WTO Appellate Body famously drew between judicial economy and “false” judicial economy: the former saves time without distorting adjudication, the latter truncates reasoning at the expense of proper resolution (Australia – Salmon, para. 223).

The second, related risk is inconsistency across the Court’s case law. Skipping steps may save time, but it produces a patchwork. Variation makes it harder for litigants to plan their strategies and for observers to trace a coherent line of authority. It also sits uneasily with the Court’s role as a judicial body whose authority rests not only on its outcomes but on the reasons it provides. By way of contrast, in its 2011 preliminary objections judgment in Georgia v. Russia, the Court revisited the travaux préparatoires of CERD even though it “need[ed] not resort to supplementary means of interpretation,” having already interpreted the compromissory clause of Article 22 conclusively (para. 142). That episode shows the opposite instinct: a willingness to reason in depth even when not strictly necessary, underscoring the tension with the Court’s more abbreviated approach in recent provisional measures cases.

Overall, the importance of the Court’s 12 September Order is less about the result in this particular dispute and more about how it instantiates a concerning trend. Across recent cases, the ICJ appears to be feeling its way through how to manage repeat requests and an ever busier docket. Some shortcuts may reflect pragmatism rather than abdication. Still, if judicial economy is to become a permanent feature of interim protection, it must rest on consistent method and transparent reasons. Otherwise, docket discipline risks hardening into arbitrariness. Equatorial Guinea v. France is a reminder that even in the name of efficiency, the World Court cannot afford to sacrifice coherence for speed.

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Milosz Gapsa says

October 14, 2025

Dear Antoine,
Thank you for your post!
I agree that the lack of reasoning or the construction of decisions in different ways each time poses a problem for the Court.
I believe that this approach was predictable. In fact, Judge Abraham seems to suggest in already in the Qatar v. United Arab Emirates case (Sep Op §5).
The number of cases in general, and requests for provisional measures in particular, is overwhelming.

In my opinion, the "new approach” reveals the way in which the deliberation process is conducted. The judges do not analyse the premises in the manner and order in which they constructed "traditional” orders. They seem to first examine whether they should deny a request because one condition is not met, and then analyse the remaining conditions in a "standard" order.

Best regards,

PS I am also interested in the “situational change test”, which I’ve examined in an article recently published by LPICT.