Revival of Environmental Justice: A Climate Complaint Under the EU-NZ Free Trade Agreement

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In August, New Zealand amended its Climate Change Response Act 2002 (CCRA) to bar tort liability for “emissions-related climate change effects”, thus interfering with the pending case of Smith v Fonterra. In a previous post, I suggested this tort liability shield may be inconsistent with New Zealand’s obligations in respect of climate change, human rights, and trade agreements, including a non-regression clause under Article 19.2.4 of the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (EU-NZ FTA): “A Party shall not weaken or reduce the levels of protection afforded in its environmental […] law in order to encourage trade or investment.” Several MPs cautioned that this FTA contains “enforceable commitments relating to climate change”, including “mechanisms through which parties may raise concerns about measures that undermine those commitments.”

A month later, Dutch NGO Both ENDS invoked those mechanisms in the first formal complaint to the European Commission in respect of a trading partner’s failure to perform its climate obligations. In this post, I map the range of measures that have allegedly violated the FTA’s non-regression and implementation obligations. Then I interpret the key elements of each obligation, concluding there is a case to be answered that the Commission should take seriously. The strongest allegation may be New Zealand’s regression contrary to Article 19.2.4. It may also have violated its obligation under Article 19.6.2 to “effectively implement the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, including commitments with regard to nationally determined contributions [NDCs]”, having regard to the 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 

However, if this complaint proceeded to dispute settlement, a panel would have to find that New Zealand’s conduct “materially defeats” the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement (Article 19.6.3) before the EU could request compensation or suspend trade benefits to induce compliance (Article 26.16.2). The same high threshold applies for the EU to take unilateral measures (Article 27.4.3). It is unlikely New Zealand has crossed that threshold, reducing the risk that this complaint could “cost NZ exporters billions”. The true stakes are to test the fidelity of both New Zealand and the EU to the rule of international law in the face of climate backsliding.

Process and problems

The process for Both ENDS to submit its complaint was established by EU law. The Commission’s Single Entry Point can receive complaints from domestic stakeholders that a trading partner has violated its sustainability obligations. After a preliminary assessment, the Commission’s response “may vary from diplomatic means to international monitoring/supervision or formal dispute settlement (at the WTO, or bilaterally) or to unilateral measures”. 

Both ENDS asked the EU to put its complaint before the FTA’s Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development then to seek compliance from New Zealand via dispute settlement. Under Chapter 26, a party may submit a dispute for settlement by consultation then initiate a panel procedure, which covers Chapter 19 on Trade and Sustainable Development. A party “shall take any measure necessary to comply promptly with the findings and recommendations” in a panel’s report (Article 26.13.1). For example, the panel report in a dispute brought by the EU against Korea was followed by the latter’s ratification of International Labour Organization conventions.

The complaint is supported by New Zealand partners, notably the plaintiff in Smith v Fonterra. The interference with Mike Smith’s case is one of many actions and omissions that allegedly violated the FTA, including other amendments to the CCRA: the weakening of a 2050 target for biogenic methane, mainly sourced from agricultural livestock; the removal of a requirement that New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) must align with its NDC; and the removal of a backstop that agricultural emissions would enter the ETS if an alternative pricing scheme had not been developed. 

Beyond the CCRA, the complaint points to reversal of a 2018 ban on offshore oil and gas exploration under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA) and the Government’s financial support for production and potential importation of gas. The complaint also identifies flaws in successive NDCs: the failure to develop a plan to obtain the necessary units of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs, known as “offshore mitigation” in New Zealand) to close an abatement gap in its first NDC; and the lack of progressive ambition in its second NDC due to changes in emissions accounting methodology.

Such measures are said to violate New Zealand’s obligations of non-regression (Article 19.2.4) and effective implementation (Article 19.6.2), including the obligation not to materially defeat the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement (Article 19.6.3). Next I address some interpretive problems that may be confronted by the Commission and in any consultation or panel procedure. 

Non-regression from environmental protection

There are three key elements in Article 19.2.4. First, what is meant by “environmental law”? The term is given near-identical definitions in other FTAs of each party: any legislation or regulation, or provision thereof, the “purpose of which is the protection of the environment” (CETA, Article 24.1; CPTPP, Article 20.1; NZ-UK FTA, Article 22.1). Assuming a similar definition, it would encompass the CCRA and the ETS and extend to provisions of the CMA that banned offshore oil and gas exploration, enacted “in line with the country’s international [climate] commitments.” 

Second, what does it mean to “weaken or reduce the levels of protection afforded”? This element is most in need of interpretive clarification by a competent panel or by the parties themselves via the Trade Committee (Article 24.2.2(e)). The notion of a party’s levels of protection is peppered throughout the FTA, including references in Article 6.6 to a party’s “appropriate level of protection” (ALOP) in respect of sanitary and phytosanitary measures under the WTO law. This context suggests an interpreter would have regard to how that notion is ordinarily understood (Article 26.22). Indeed the EU and the UK relied on WTO jurisprudence regarding ALOP in the Sandeel Arbitration to interpret environmental provisions in their Trade and Cooperation Agreement (paras 170, 194, 432). 

In general, a “level of protection” is one deemed appropriate to fulfil a regulatory objective, which is distinct from both the measure chosen to implement that objective and the international standards that discipline such measure (Australia – Salmon, paras 199–201). Yet the word “afforded” might imply that Article 19.2.4 is concerned with how domestic law was applied to achieve protection (cf. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 27–29). To “weaken or reduce” such levels may call for closer attention to how the CCRA, ETS, and CMA were applied before and after each amendment, thus requiring the EU to show how an impugned measure altered the level of protection afforded by the original law. For example, the CCRA’s amendment to overturn a Supreme Court judgment reduced the level of protection afforded in the original CCRA, which left open the right to sue GHG emitters. 

Third, were the impugned measures “in order to encourage trade or investment”? A complaint against Guatemala failed because the CAFTA-DR required the US to show that labour laws were not enforced “in a manner affecting trade”. However, Article 19.2.4 of the EU-NZ FTA requires a party to demonstrate “an intention of encouraging trade (or investment), rather than an actual effect”. New Zealand’s intentions have been explicit in several policy statements: the tort liability shield was intended to “attract[] overseas investment”, whilst amendment of the CMA was intended to “reinvigorate investment in petroleum exploration”. Although States often adopt measures for mixed purposes, these statements may show that the weakening or reduction of protection was designed to encourage investment (cf. Whaling in the Antarctic, para. 97; Devas v India, para. 354). It is telling that the Government was advised that a reversal of the offshore oil and gas ban would “likely be inconsistent” with non-regression obligations and “could be perceived” as failing to meet its NDC.

Effective implementation of the Paris Agreement

What does it mean for New Zealand to “effectively implement” the Paris Agreement under Article 19.6.2? I have previously interpreted these words as “an unequivocal obligation that must be evidenced by actual practice and cannot be satisfied by mere formality”. In similar terms, the ICJ’s advisory opinion provided guidance on a party’s implementation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement: “the mere formal preparation, communication and maintenance of successive NDCs” is not enough (paras 208, 236). Rather, “parties are obliged to exercise due diligence and ensure that their NDCs fulfil their obligations under the Paris Agreement and thus, when taken together, are capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”; and “to act with due diligence in taking necessary measures to achieve the objectives set out in their successive NDCs” (paras 230–54). Such measures “must regulate the conduct of public and private operators” with “effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation” (para. 282). Conversely, “the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies” were singled out as measures that may give rise to State responsibility (para. 427). 

The ICJ recognised that relevant rules on climate change may be found in trade and investment law (para. 173). In Mainstream v Germany, an investment tribunal reaffirmed that the advisory opinion may inform “cases dealing with State measures to mitigate climate change” (para. 867). Likewise, a panel established under the FTA to determine whether New Zealand has effectively implemented the Paris Agreement may have regard to the persuasiveness of the ICJ’s advisory opinion and thus apply a stringent duty of due diligence in view of New Zealand’s capabilities, national circumstances, and contribution to climate change. The reversal of its ban on offshore oil and gas exploration is particularly difficult to reconcile with the ICJ’s guidance on fossil fuel licensing. 

However, the ICJ offered no explicit guidance as to how parties should address agricultural emissions, which represent nearly half of New Zealand’s GHG emissions but have long been underregulated. Further, the ICJ did not address the use of ITMOs under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement as a cooperative approach in achieving a party’s NDC. It is hard to see how New Zealand can be said to have effectively implemented the Paris Agreement when its NDC depends on offshore mitigation but the Government seemingly intends not to acquire the necessary carbon credits. A reasoned panel report may help to clarify the obligations of New Zealand and similarly situated parties to the Paris Agreement in respect of agricultural emissions and their use of ITMOs to meet NDCs.

Materially defeating the object and purpose

The implementation clause “includes the obligation to refrain from any action or omission that materially defeats the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement” (Article 19.6.3), which is the trigger for the EU to request compensation or suspend trade benefits in the event of New Zealand’s non-compliance with a panel’s report (Article 26.16.2). The ICJ reaffirmed that the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement is reflected in Article 2.1, namely to “strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change” in accordance with the treaty’s mitigation, adaptation, and finance goals (para. 223). What would it take to “materially defeat” that object and purpose?

There are two helpful lines of analogy, which together support an interpretation of “materially defeat” whereby a party must refrain from either repudiating the Paris Agreement or violating any provision essential to the accomplishment of its object and purpose. First, the customary obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the ICJ held that “the object and purpose [was] the effective implementation of friendship” in the fields of commerce and navigation, which was defeated by acts of the US – attacking ports, terminating trade – that “undermine[d] the whole spirit” of its agreement with Nicaragua (paras 272–76). 

The second line of analogy is with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), specifically the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (Article 18) and the rules on termination or suspension of a treaty as a consequence of its material breach (Article 60). While there is limited practice on Article 18, Klabbers argues that an object and purpose would be defeated by “manifest intent”, namely conduct that is “morally obnoxious in light of what the agreement itself represents”. Once a treaty enters into force, a “material breach” is an unsanctioned “repudiation of the treaty” or “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty” (Article 60(3)). In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ confirmed that a material breach of one treaty cannot allow a party to suspend or terminate another treaty (para. 106). 

But the FTA refines these general rules. In addition to the possible suspension of obligations under Article 26.16.2, Article 27.4.3 provides that a party may unilaterally take “appropriate measures [in accordance with Article 54 of the EU-NZ Partnership Agreement] in the event of an act or omission that materially defeats the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement”, which includes suspension or termination of the FTA in the unlikely event such a measure would be the least-disruptive “proportionate” response. The arguable effect of these provisions is to transform a material breach of the Paris Agreement into one of the FTA itself, thus creating special rights to suspend or terminate the FTA that would not arise under the general law of treaties.

Hence the threshold set by Article 19.6.3 must be high. Some have suggested that a refusal to communicate or achieve NDCs would cross that threshold (Marín Durán; Leonelli). So too might New Zealand’s denunciation of the Paris Agreement, which is reportedly desired by some Government ministers. A panel could clarify when a wider pattern of conduct manifests a party’s intent to materially defeat the treaty’s object and purpose (cf. Glamis Gold v USA, para. 826; Application of CERD, para. 58).

Towards systemic integrity

The EU-NZ FTA is a signal achievement of what McLachlan calls the “legislative function” of systemic integration: “how States, through the creation and application of treaties, manage the relation between treaty rules”, namely between the FTA and the Paris Agreement. I have shown how relevant rules of economic and environmental law and the general law of treaties may likewise inform the interpretation of the FTA’s non-regression and implementation obligations (VCLT, Article 31(3)(c)). 

A panel may find that New Zealand breached its non-regression and implementation obligations. But it is unlikely to have materially defeated the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement. For now the costs are more reputational than financial, though New Zealand would have to take measures to comply with the findings of any panel report. “If you want to uphold the rules-based system,” recalled the Prime Minister, “you have to respect the rules-based system.”

The complaint is equally a test of the EU’s fidelity to the rule of international law: will the Commission act on these allegations of climate backsliding? Whatever the answer, the abiding result of this complaint could be to strengthen several pillars of a sustainable economy: the capacity of both New Zealand and the EU to make credible commitments, a level playing field in trade and investment relations, and access to environmental justice at both ends of the planet. 

* The author provided comments on the draft complaint but the views expressed in this post are in a strictly academic capacity. The author used generative AI (Claude) for suggestions on how to reduce the post’s word count. 

 

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