Reflections on the Identification of Jus Cogens by the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Israel’s Occupation of Palestinian Territories: Taking into Account the ILC Draft Conclusions on Jus Cogens

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In the groundbreaking advisory opinion recently delivered by the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (see here), there are many issues that merit discussion (see e.g. here). This post will mainly focus on the jus cogens identified by the Court. In the last sentence of paragraph 233 of  this Opinion, the Court identifies the right to self-determination as a peremptory norm, namely jus cogens, in a very straightforward manner as follows:

“The Court considers that, in cases of foreign occupation such as the present case, the right to self-determination constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.”

Frankly speaking, it’s very surprising to have witnessed this identification happening in such a sudden, especially when considering “the historical reluctance of the Court to refer to peremptory norms” (Declaration of Judge Tladi, para.15). Several judges also pay special attention to this identification in their individual opinions (see Declaration of Judge Xue, paras.2-5; Separate Opinion of Judge Gómez Robledo, paras.18-28; Separate Opinion of Judge Cleveland, paras.31-35; Declaration of Judge Tladi, paras.14-35).

Only five years ago, in the 2019 advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, the Court reiterated, “respect for the right to self-determination is an obligation erga omnes” (para.180), but refrained from referring to jus cogens in this regard. As a matter of fact, since Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) officially defined jus cogens for the first time, the Court has rarely discussed jus cogens, and to date only a small number of jus cogens have been identified in its decisions. The criteria for the identification of jus cogens has always been one of the most controversial issues under international law.

Against this background, How does the Court identify the right to self-determination as jus cogens in this Opinion? What are the considerations behind that, if there exists any? In response, this post is going to discuss two specific issues in turn: (1) Does the identification of jus cogens in the present case satisfy the criteria set out by the International Law Commission (ILC)? (2) Does the non-exhaustive list of jus cogens of the ILC have an effect on the identification of jus cogens in this Opinion?

Does the Identification of Jus Cogens in the Present Case Satisfy the Criteria Set Out by the ILC?

In 2015, the ILC decided to include the topic “Jus cogens” in its programme of work and to appoint Mr. Dire Tladi, who has become Judge Tladi of the Court since 2024, as Special Rapporteur (see ILC Report A/70/10, 2015, para.286). After five reports (A/CN.4/693, A/CN.4/706, A/CN.4/714+Corr.1, A/CN.4/727, A/CN.4/747, respectively) submitted by the Special Rapporteur, the ILC adopted Draft conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), with commentaries, on second reading in 2022. Particularly, Conclusion 4 sets out the criteria for the identification of jus cogens, which are drawn from the definition of jus cogens contained in Article 53 of the VCLT, and reads as follows:

“To identify a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens), it is necessary to establish that the norm in question meets the following criteria:

(a) it is a norm of general international law; and

(b) it is accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”

The commentaries to Conclusion 4 make it very clear, it’s not sufficient to point to the importance or the role of a norm in order to show its peremptory character, rather, it’s necessary to establish the existence of the criteria enumerated in Conclusion 4. First, the norm in question must be general international law. Second, the norm must be accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a norm having the same character. These two criteria are cumulative, which means a two-step approach is employed to identify jus cogens.

Obviously, the two-step approach set out by the ILC is a very high standard. Looking back at history, the Court seemed to employ this approach in very few cases. In its 1986 judgment on the merits of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court firstly identified the principle of the prohibition of the use of force as customary international law, and then “elevated” this customary rule to “a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law” (para.190). The reasoning logic here appeared to follow the two-step approach, and the Court invoked the outcomes of the ILC to reinforce its identification as well. However, when taking another closer look, no detailed evidence could be found to support the testament of each step. In that case, was the two-step approach really employed by the Court? At least it was not a rigorous application of the two-step approach, was it? Almost the same logic was also employed in other cases (see here, here and here). Besides employing the two-step approach non-rigorously and sometimes referring to the ILC’s outcomes or its own decisions, the Court also asserted jus cogens without any reasoning occasionally (see here, here, here and here).

Accordingly, it’s hard to draw a conclusion that the Court employed the two-step approach to identify jus cogens before 2022. The reasons why the Court did so might be complicated, but let’s leave them aside in this post, and focus on the Court’s practice after 2022, namely the identification of the right to self-determination as jus cogens in this Opinion, when the ILC has already set out the two-step approach.

In fact, before the Court speaks out jus cogens in the last sentence of paragraph 233, it takes several paragraphs (paras.230-233) to demonstrate the importance of the right to self-determination, by reference to the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations General Assembly resolutions, its own decisions, human rights treaties and General Comment from the Human Rights Committee, etc., using or invoking some expressions such as “basic principles of international law”, “one of the essential principles of contemporary international law”, “the obligation to respect to right to self-determination is owed erga omnes”, “the centrality of the right to self-determination in international law”, “a fundamental human right”, an “inalienable right” in the context of decolonization, “there is no alternative to the principle of self-determination” in the process of decolonization, etc.

Throughout these relevant paragraphs, assuming the Court has identified the right to self-determination as general international law, which has satisfied the criteria contained in the first step (although whether the evidence has been demonstrated sufficiently may still merit discussion), what about the second step, namely, this general international law “must be accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole” as jus cogens? Obviously the Court still keeps silence on the second step. Under such circumstances, how could we conclude the identification of jus cogens in this Opinion has satisfied the criteria set out by the ILC?

In the view of Judge Tladi, that the Court doesn’t provide evidence for the peremptory character of the right to self-determination, is consistent with the Court’s practice. Nonetheless, Judge Tladi tries to make a comparatively more detailed observation to prove its peremptory status, and comes to a conclusion as follows (see Declaration of Judge Tladi, paras.22-27):

“Thus, in my view, the Court was correct to identify explicitly the right of self-determination as a peremptory norm in its present Advisory Opinion. Should some point to the scant evidence put forward in the Opinion to support the peremptory character of self-determination; I can only say that it is not the practice of the Court to engage in a rambling exercise to support its conclusion about the status of particular rules of international law, and there is no reason why an exception should be made for self-determination.” (para.27)

Let’s leave aside whether the observation made by Judge Tladi is an effective rebuttal of the doubts or rejections regarding the peremptory status of the right to self-determination in the context of the two-step approach. The point this post aims at emphasizing is that, given the existence of the ILC criteria since 2022, shouldn’t the Court take into account the ILC criteria when it explicitly identifies the right to self-determination as jus cogens in 2024? Even if “it is not the practice of the Court to engage in a rambling exercise to support its conclusion about the status of particular rules of international law”, considering the legal consequences of jus cogens and its unique status in international legal system, shouldn’t the Court provide some essential evidence and sort out the judicial reasoning to support its testament for each of the two steps (with at least one paragraph rather than one sentence)? Nevertheless, the Court still directly, to some extent, asserts the right to self-determination has acquired the status of jus cogens in this Opinion. Put differently, the Court “ignores” the criteria set out by the ILC?!

Someone may ask, why should the Court “listen to” the ILC? Of course, the outcomes of the ILC have no binding force upon the Court, which means it’s not necessary for the Court to identify jus cogens in line with the criteria set out by the ILC. The Court may choose to employ the ILC criteria, or choose not to. However, considering the actual influence of the ILC as the “international law-maker”, as well as the  frequent interaction between the Court and the ILC (see e.g. here), it would be disputable for the Court not to employ, or, even to “ignore” the ILC criteria. In that case, what’s the significance of the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens? This phenomenon and the potential considerations or problems behind that still merit more reflections.

Does the Non-exhaustive List of Jus Cogens Contained in Conclusion 23 Have an Effect on the Identification of jus cogens in the Present Case?

In the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens, Conclusion 23 contains a non-exhaustive list of jus cogens, which provides that:

“Without prejudice to the existence or subsequent emergence of other peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), a not-exhaustive list of norms that the International Law Commission has previously referred to as having that status is to be found in the annex to the present draft conclusions.”

The annex includes eight norms, namely, the prohibition of aggression, the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of crimes against humanity, the basic rules of international humanitarian law, the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of torture, the right to self-determination.

Hence, the right to self-determination has been included in the non-exhaustive list. As observed above, the Court hadn’t recognized the jus cogens status of the right to self-determination before 2022, but it “suddenly” makes an identification in the Opinion just after the adoption of the second reading on the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens. Accordingly, does the non-exhaustive list have an effect on the identification in the present case? In another word, does the Court identify explicitly the right to self-determination as jus cogens because of the existence of this non-exhaustive list?

Throughout the text of the Opinion, the Court doesn’t make any reference to the non-exhaustive list or the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens. Only in the individual opinions of two judges can we find some relevant reference. For example, Judge Tladi invokes the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens when he refers to the criteria for the identification of jus cogens (para.24), and further provides relevant information to illustrate that only a few States have questioned the jus cogens status of self-determination (paras.25-26), which also refers to the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens as follows:

“in 2022, out of a total of 86 States commenting on the ILC Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms, the text of which included self-determination as an example of a peremptory norm, only Israel, the United States, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and Morocco, questioned the peremptory status of the right of self-determination.” (para.25)

Judge Gómez Robledo makes special reference to the non-exhaustive list of jus cogens in his separate opinion:

“…it may be recalled that, in its Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law (jus cogens)…The ILC also recognized the peremptory nature of the right to self-determination by including it in its non-exhaustive list of peremptory norms of general international law in the annex to conclusion 23 of its above-mentioned Draft Conclusions.” (para.24)

Can these references made by the Judge’s individual opinions strengthen the argument that the non-exhaustive list of jus cogens has an effect on the identification of the right to self-determination in the present case?

As a matter of fact, this non-exhaustive list of jus cogens has aroused many controversies since the very beginning. In his first report, the Special Rapporteur recalled one of the themes that Member States had raised in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly concerned the question of whether the ILC should draft an illustrative list of jus cogens, and pointed out that some States supported the idea but a number of other States had raised serious questions. (See ILC Report, A/71/10, 2016, paras.102-103, 131-132.) In his fifth report, the Special Rapporteur examined the comments and observations received from Governments on the draft conclusions as adopted on first reading. He admitted that, among the views that the draft conclusion should not include a non-exhaustive list of jus cogens, some States believed that there were certain norms on the list that did not meet the criteria for jus cogens developed by the ILC, some States pointed out that having a list would go against the methodological nature of the topic, some States questioned the manner in which the particular norms were identified, some States criticized the inclusion of a list based solely on what the ILC had previously identified would not add much value. (See A/CN.4/747, paras.6-7, 218.) In spite of the doubt and dissenting voices raised by these States, the ILC adopted the text of the draft conclusions and annex on second reading in 2022. But the controversies surrounding the non-exhaustive list of jus cogens still continue…

Under such circumstances, also considering the actual influence of the ILC as the “international law-maker” as noted above, despite so many controversies, even an explicitly non-exhaustive list of jus cogens implies the risk of being applied as exhaustive in practice, and this list may also be regarded as a codification of existing jus cogens, which means it would be “convenient” for the Court to assert the jus cogens norms therein when the Court sees it fit. Because the list is just there, and already there. Further, because the right to self-determination has been included in the list,  can the Court recognize its status as jus cogens without any hesitation? Can we apply this reasoning to explain such a sudden identification in the present case? Phrased differently, no matter how controversial it is, this non-exhaustive list of jus cogens is still the product of the ILC, and it’s no wonder the list will be/has been having an effect on the identification of jus cogens?

It is precisely at this point that we should not only reflect on the influence and limits of international law-making by the ILC, but also on the manner how the Court treats the product of the ILC. It’s a thought-provoking observation that, the Court doesn’t employ the ILC criteria to identify the right to self-determination as jus cogens, while it seems to have been affected by the non-exhaustive list of jus cogens…Is it something like a la carte? The Court chooses whatever it sees fit, without any justification? If further considering the ILC’s frequently invoking the decisions of the Court as well, including in the research of the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens, the problem becomes more complicated. Since it’s the first time for the Court in this Opinion to identify jus cogens after the second reading of the ILC Draft Conclusions on jus cogens, it may offer us an unique opportunity and angle to reflect on the issues aforementioned. Anyhow, in the view of this post, there is one point that should never be blurred, it is neither the Court nor the ILC that makes the final decision on jus cogens, but States, the real legislator for international law.

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Nicolas Boeglin says

August 27, 2024

Dear Professor Deng

Many thanks for this extremely interesting post.

With regard to your very last sentence, an the referrence to States, I would like to recall the result of UNGA resolution on the Right To Self Determination of Palestinian People (A/Res/78/192) voted on Dec.19, 2023:

Text:

https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F78%2F192&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

Vote registered:

172 votes in favour, 4 against and 10 abstentions.

The votes against: Israel, United States, Micronesia and Nauru.

It seems to me that, concerning US position, this vote is in contradiction with recent statements made by top US officials on the right of self determination of Palestinian People.

If I'm not wrong (but our dear EJIl colleagues can surely help me), this vote of Dec. 2023 is one of the worst obtained in history at UNGA by the so called pro Israel "coalition" at UNGA (only 4 votes against obtained).

Yours sincerely

Nicolas Boeglin