Opting Out of Accountability: The United States and the Implications of Withdrawal from the Universal Periodic Review

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On 28th August 2025, the United States of America (USA) took the step of withdrawing from the UN’s human rights monitoring process, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The peer review process, through which states evaluate one another’s human rights records, has seen near-universal engagement since the first UPR cycle commenced in 2008. The USA’s decision to withdraw, however, undermines this foundational universality and stymies both domestic and international accountability efforts. In this piece, we argue that the USA’s withdrawal from the UPR is (1) an unprecedented step that risks contributing to further regression in global human rights protections, and (2) supresses civil society organisations’ (CSOs) ability to hold the USA to account both domestically and internationally.

The USA’s Relationship with the Human Rights Council 

In 2006, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights, which was disbanded amid widespread criticism of its politicisation and selective scrutiny of states. The vision for the new HRC was set out by former-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s In Larger Freedom report, which called for the creation of a stronger, more credible body to address the shortcomings of the Commission. Annan also set out his intention for the HRC to have ‘an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer review…to evaluate the fulfilment by all States of all their human rights obligations’. This led to the creation of the UPR, aiming to ensure equal treatment of all states through regular, peer-based assessments of their human rights records.

Designed to be universal and non-selective, the UPR reviews every UN Member State’s human rights situation every four-and-a-half years, regardless of geopolitical standing, promoting fairness and mutual accountability. The review takes the form of an interactive dialogue between a state and their peers on the fulfilment of their international human rights obligations. At the start of the dialogue, the state under review presents its national report which includes an overview of the human rights situation and an appraisal of its progress since the last review. Other states can then intervene to make comments and recommendations. Reviews are televised and can be watched back on UN Web TV. The USA’s most recent review from 2020 provides an example of how these dialogues proceed.

The USA’s fourth cycle review is due to take place on 7th November 2025, yet the government failed to submit its National Report by the August deadline. At the USA’s UPR Pre-session on 28th August 2025, the Chief of the OHCHR’s UPR Branch, Juliette de Rivero, announced that the USA has withdrawn its engagement with the UPR. This decision followed the USA’s withdrawal from the HRC earlier this year, just as it did in 2018 under the previous Trump administration. Indeed, the relationship between the USA and the HRC has always been difficult. In 2006, the Bush administration voted against the HRC’s creation, arguing that it ‘lacked mechanisms for maintaining credible membership’. Since then, the USA’s engagement has been marked by periods of participation but also boycott, justified on grounds ranging from political bias within the HRC to a belief in the sufficiency of domestic safeguards. 

However, this is the first time the USA would be withdrawing from the UPR specifically. Even when the Trump administration denounced the HRC in 2018, it still participated in the third UPR cycle both in its own review and that of other states. In August 2025, US State Department representative told Reuters that ‘[e]ngagement in UPRs implies endorsement of the [Human Rights] Council’s mandate and activities and ignores its persistent failure to condemn the most egregious human rights violators’. The HRC is certainly not free from critique, as the academic literature shows, but the USA’s reasoning rings hollow in the context of the UPR which is designed to combat allegations of bias and selectivity. 

This move also reflects a broader domestic trend of dismantling key accountability structures within the USA. The Trump Administration’s second term in office has accelerated the erosion of federal oversight, for example, by significantly reducing the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s staff and narrowing its focus on key enforcement areas. This inward shift has been mirrored internationally. Although a founding member of the UN, the USA has often positioned itself as exceptional, reluctant to submit to the same scrutiny applied to others. In this respect, the USA’s withdrawal is disappointing but not surprising. 

Full Withdrawal is Unprecedented

The primary implication of the USA’s withdrawal is that it is an unprecedented event which undermines the value of the UPR and its ability to protect human rights globally. For those unfamiliar with the UPR, the idea that the USA (or indeed any country) should fail to engage with such a process might appear unremarkable. For example, at the time of writing, 152 states (79%) have overdue reports pending submission to the UN Treaty Bodies (UNTBs). In comparison, the UPR has seen almost 100% participation since the first cycle in 2008. That is ‘almost’ 100% because there have been isolated examples of partial or temporary disengagement. For example, Cabo Verde did not submit its First Cycle national report on time in 2008, owing to capacity issues, and Israel’s Second Cycle review was postponed in 2013, as Israel had initially boycotted all HRC mechanisms. In 2025, Nicaragua attended its review but failed to attend the HRC adoption of its UPR report and so did not provide responses to member state recommendations. 

However, full withdrawal from the UPR is entirely new territory. This means no national report, no appearance at the review, and presumably no response to the host of issues raised by civil society in their stakeholder submissions. A primary concern is that the USA is setting a dangerous precedent. Near-universal participation at the UPR has been achievable in part because of its cooperative and non-confrontational approach. The fact that ‘everyone is in it together’ is an incentive for states to cooperate and to have their say on each other’s human rights records. It is now convention (perhaps even customary) for each UN member state to be reviewed at the UPR. As each cycle passes, this convention – that all states should account to their peers for their human rights records – has fortified. The USA’s wholesale disengagement from the UPR undermines this globally accepted practice and risks normalising non-cooperation. At best, withdrawal will make the USA an outlier. At worst, and given its influence on world affairs, withdrawal sets a precedent that will embolden other states, particularly the USA’s allies, to follow suit. This would weaken the value of the UPR and undermine attempts to monitor the global human rights situation. 

The Impact on Civil Society

The second implication of the USA’s withdrawal from the UPR is the restriction of CSOs’ voice. CSOs are vital to the success of the UPR, acting as “stakeholders” throughout the process and contribute to the mechanism in various ways. They can submit “stakeholder reports” in advance of a state’s UPR, regarding the human rights situation on the ground. Acting as the UPR’s Secretariat, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), compiles stakeholder submissions into a ten-page Summary Report, one of the three core documents underpinning every review. The state under review is also expected to engage in broad consultations with CSOs during preparation of the National Report.

Beyond these formal contributions, CSOs can participate in domestic and international advocacy, for example, taking part in the UPR Pre-sessions, organised by UPR Info, to brief member state delegations ahead of the review and help shape the recommendations they make to the state under review. CSOs can also support with implementing UPR recommendations at the national level.

Arguably, the most harmful effects of the USA’s actions will be felt among its domestic civil society. Though it is a state-led exercise, the UPR is a valuable platform for American civil society to appeal to the USA’s peers and have their concerns raised and legitimised at the UN. For citizens, advocates and activists, withdrawal from the UPR marks a further shrinking of civil society and means yet another avenue to pursue accountability is barred. 

It is important that other international actors and stakeholders rally to condemn the USA’s actions and support domestic CSOs. To date, 61 CSOs and academics from around the world have signed a Joint Statement calling upon the USA to re-engage with the UPR. International organisations can also support CSOs in the USA through holding independent ‘shadow’ reviews of human rights practices in the USA; while operating outside of official UN processes, shadow reviews can still serve the same watchdog and pressure-building function by comparing US practices to international human rights norms. For example, Amnesty International publishes an annual report which includes a review of the USA’s human rights record. Additional support includes keeping media attention focused on human rights accountability in the USA and providing training and networking opportunities between domestic and international organisations.

Next Steps for the HRC

We can expect the HRC to react as it did after Israel’s postponement in 2013 which was to express regret and reschedule the review for a later session, and Israel subsequently resumed its cooperation. However, the same approach is unlikely to work here. The fourth UPR cycle will finish (in February 2027) before the end of the current Trump administration’s term, which is very likely to remain steadfast in its decision to withdraw. 

There are alternative approaches the HRC could consider. Lawrence Moss has suggested that the convening of a special session of the HRC would ‘help maintain international attention [on the US]’ and ‘discourage other countries’ from withdrawing from the UPR. This would certainly assert the Council’s position, but considerable advocacy would be needed to secure sufficient interest from the necessary one-third of HRC member states. Alternatively, the Council could hold an urgent debate on the matter as it did for the USA in 2020 on the issues of systemic racism in the police. In any event, this will be a critical test for the HRC and will require it to rethink the approach to non-cooperation.

The authors are grateful for the comments of the editors on earlier versions of this piece. Any errors remain their own.

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