Opening the Door to Collective Enforcement: Council of Europe Proposals to Secure Payment of ECtHR Awards Against Russia

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On 30 September 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 2678 (2026) and Recommendation 2315 (2026) that seek to finally move ahead with the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments against Russia. For the first time in Council of Europe history, these documents endorse concrete proposals to ensure enforcement of ECtHR monetary (“just satisfaction”) awards against a state that is unwilling to pay. This is also a remarkable development for international justice more broadly, as the implementation of international court judgments ordinarily relies on voluntary compliance or political pressure.

More than four years after Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe in March 2022 over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the country’s total ECtHR debt exceeds €3,3 billion, including default interest. Russia owes that amount under more than 1,700 final judgments to more than 50,000 individual victims, including about 30,000 Georgian nationals under three Georgia v. Russia inter-state cases, about 2,000 Moldovan nationals in Transnistria-related cases, and about 18,000 Russian applicants. These figures do not yet include any claims arising from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Court continues to adjudicate four inter-state cases brought by Ukraine and the Netherlands as well as about 5,700 individual applications relating to the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia. PACE estimates that “any [future] awards could potentially amount to billions, tens of billions, or hundreds of billions of euros” (Resolution, §8).

Russia has expressly refused to abide by any of the Court’s judgments and adopted domestic legislation to that effect. Yet the response by the Committee of Ministers, which supervises the execution of ECtHR judgments, has so far been rather muted. On just satisfaction, it has largely been limited to stocktaking. PACE has now made clear that this is “not sufficient” (Resolution, §5). The accompanying report by PACE rapporteur Tony Vaughan argues that “we cannot sit back and wait” but instead “must pursue novel measures to implement the judgments now” (§16), given that Russian assets held in Europe provide European countries with the leverage to make Russia pay.

Building on the earlier work by the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI), PACE has outlined two main pathways for enforcing ECtHR just satisfaction awards against Russia: the establishment of an ad hoc funding mechanism, and domestic enforcement. This post argues that both proposals should be pursued, while identifying some of the legal and practical questions that remain to be resolved.

Creation of a Council of Europe funding mechanism

PACE proposes an ad hoc Council of Europe funding mechanism mandated to recover Russian state-owned assets and distribute them among successful ECtHR applicants (Recommendation, §2.1). While the original draft limited the scope of the mechanism to inter-state cases brought by Ukraine, a subsequent amendment extended it to all ECtHR cases against Russia.

Notably, PACE makes a compelling case for repurposing Russian Central Bank assets, some €260 billion of which have been immobilized since 2022. PACE proposes that those assets be earmarked for future ECtHR awards to Ukraine (Resolution, §13.1; Recommendation, §2.2). While there has been much debate about whether and how the principal amount of Russian Central Bank assets could lawfully be repurposed for Ukraine, the proposed approach arguably offers the strongest legal basis for doing so, as it would be grounded in judgments of an international court whose jurisdiction Russia has accepted. The ECtHR is currently the only forum on track to rule on war-related damage in Ukraine whose monetary awards would be legally binding on Russia.

The proposed ad hoc ECtHR funding mechanism would partially overlap with the emerging Council of Europe compensation mechanism for Ukraine, comprising the Register of Damage, the International Claims Commission, and a future compensation fund. While the latter currently covers damage since 24 February 2022, the ECtHR mechanism would extend to violations committed before Russia ceased to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022, thus also covering victims of Russia’s aggression between 2014 and 23 February 2022. PACE suggests that ECtHR awards to Ukraine could be funded through either mechanism (Recommendation, §2.2).

As for all other ECtHR awards against Russia, PACE envisages that they could be paid out of other Russian state-owned assets, should these become available. In practice, this would require extensive asset recovery efforts across domestic jurisdictions of Council of Europe member states. Although attempts to seize Russian assets have occasionally yielded results (see, most recently, the seizure of the Professor Molchanov vessel in Norway), the prospects of success remain uncertain to say the least, while the costs and complexity of such domestic enforcement proceedings would put them beyond the reach of most applicants.

Tens of thousands of victims must not be left alone in their efforts to obtain redress. Having already secured a Strasbourg judgment in their favour, they should not have to pursue further litigation to receive just satisfaction owed to them for established human rights violations. The institutional mechanism is needed precisely to take up the enforcement effort on behalf of the applicants (for example, by tracing the assets or bringing court proceedings). By proposing that the ad hoc funding mechanism be given the “mandate to recover Russian State-owned assets” (Recommendation, §2.1), PACE appears to contemplate a more proactive role for the mechanism in this regard.

Domestic enforcement

Since the Council of Europe itself does not hold any Russian assets, it would be up to the states where such assets are located to take enforcement action. Here, PACE calls for a comprehensive study of Council of Europe member states’ laws to identify opportunities and obstacles to domestic enforcement of ECtHR just satisfaction awards against Russia. It also urges member and observer states to enable such enforcement wherever legally possible and proposes that the Committee of Ministers issue a recommendation to that effect (Resolution, §13.2; Recommendation, §§2.3-2.4).

PACE’s proposal for domestic enforcement pushes the boundaries of the traditional approach to the execution of ECtHR judgments under Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While the Convention is silent on whether applicants may enforce Court judgments in third states, nowhere does it preclude such an option either. However, in practice, member states of the Council of Europe other than the respondent state have played no role in the execution process except through the Committee of Ministers (Article 46(2) of the Convention). Indeed, in the only known attempt to enforce ECtHR judgments against Russia, brought by three Russian nationals in 2024, a Lithuanian court took the view that the execution of such judgments fell within the remit of the Committee of Ministers and that Russia’s refusal to pay the awards was a matter exclusively between Russia and the applicants, over which Lithuania had no jurisdiction.

By contrast, the PACE report argues that “Article 46, properly interpreted, does not preclude member States from taking steps at a domestic level to enforce ECHR just satisfaction awards against other States – particularly non-member States” (§38). Such an interpretation is, I would argue, consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention; at least where it is applied exceptionally vis-à-vis a state that has ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe and has expressly refused to abide by the Court’s judgments.

As per its Preamble, the Convention is premised on the idea of “collective enforcement” of rights, and the Court has repeatedly emphasised its character as a “collective enforcement treaty”. The Council of Europe now faces an openly defiant expelled state against which the traditional mechanisms of institutional supervision and pressure, such as infringement proceedings (Article 46(4) of the Convention), suspension of voting rights or outright expulsion from the organisation (Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s Statute), are no longer available or effective. In this extraordinary situation, Council of Europe member states may and should pursue domestic enforcement of the Court’s awards against Russian state assets in order to close this implementation gap for the benefit of the victims. Otherwise, the Convention’s notion of “collective enforcement” would be rendered meaningless.

Obviously, the question of jurisdiction does not exhaust the legal issues surrounding domestic enforcement of ECtHR judgments. One major issue is sovereign immunity. The PACE report identifies several possible ways to overcome it but develops only one: countermeasures for cases brought by Ukraine (§§49-51). Other questions, including whether immunity applies at all to proceedings for the enforcement of ECtHR judgments, merit further examination.

What comes next

The PACE documents call for action but do not decide the enforcement of ECtHR judgments against Russia or the fate of Russian assets. The matter now goes to the Committee of Ministers which is due to reconsider its Russia strategy at its next human rights meeting in December 2026 and reply to PACE.

In their 2023 Reykjavik Declaration, leaders of Council of Europe member states pledged to make “every effort” to ensure the execution of the Court’s judgments against Russia. Yet, three years on, no concrete steps have been taken to make Russia pay. It is long overdue that this commitment be translated into action.

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