No, Recognizing Palestine Would Not Be Contrary to International Law

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A group of British peers, among them several distinguished lawyers, yesterday sent a letter to the Attorney-General, Lord Hermer, asking him to advise the UK Government that its announced forthcoming recognition of the state of Palestine would be contrary to international law. (Report in The Times, report in The Independent; the letter itself is here.) I have to say that the letter – whatever its political purpose or effects might be – is underwhelming, to put it mildly. The authors argue that Palestine fails to fulfill the Montevideo effectiveness criteria for statehood (a topic discussed ad nauseam in the literature). To say that they do this without any nuance would be an understatement (e.g. in the first paragraph they just assert that Hermer ‘must know’ that Palestine does not meet the criteria for recognition, as if this was somehow an uncontroversial proposition). 

It can reasonably be argued that Palestine does not meet the Montevideo criteria, and that it does not currently exist as a state. But it can also reasonably be argued otherwise. This is not an obvious issue – this is why, for example, both the ICC and the ICJ have (so far) avoided pronouncing on Palestine’s statehood under general international law, one way or the other. Yet it is crystal clear that the Palestinian people have the right to establish their own state, by virtue of their right to self-determination, which has twice been authoritatively reaffirmed by the ICJ. Curiously, this is a right that the letter authors do not even mention. It is also clear that the international community, especially states acting collectively, can compensate for any defects in effectiveness (this is how, for example, entities such as the Holy See or the Sovereign Order of Malta have been endowed with legal personality, or how the statehood of micro-states is uncontested, or how many states emerged into being through decolonization despite having very weak governments, weak territorial control or contested borders). With the passage of time, and through the gradual increase in recognition, the statehood of Palestine has become increasingly clearer. When James Crawford wrote 35 years ago in EJIL that it was ‘too soon’ to say that Palestine was already a state, this is likely not what he would write today, if he was still with us.

What really boggles the mind when it comes to the letter is not that it presents the question of the statehood of Palestine as one on which the answer is obviously in the negative. Rather, it is the bald assertion that any recognition of Palestine by the UK would be contrary to international law, rather than simply being ineffective. Let me get this straight – so the 3/4 of all states in the world that have so far recognized Palestine as a state have somehow done this in violation of international law? And if France, the UK and Canada do the same, they too would violate international law? This is just plainly incorrect.

Recognition is precisely a device through which contested claims to statehood can gradually be resolved. Yes, there are some cases in which the act of recognition can violate international law. When Russia recognized the statehood of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics in February 2022, that act of recognition alone (regardless of the invasion that followed it) was a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and an intervention in its internal affairs. Indeed, the UK Prime Minister at the time acknowledged this illegality, saying that the recognition was ‘plainly in breach of international law. It is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine.’ This was not simply because recognition was extended to entities that legally did not qualify as states, but because these entities existed on the territory of another state, Ukraine, whose rights were directly affected.

This is simply not the case with Palestine and Israel. Recognizing Palestine would in no way violate any rights of Israel. On the contrary, it is precisely Israel which, as established by the ICJ, through its continued illegal occupation of Palestinian territories is preventing Palestine from fulfilling the Montevideo effectiveness criteria. It is Israel whose government and parliament have repeatedly rejected any attempt to establish a Palestinian state, despite the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. It is Israel which is manifestly pursuing annexationist policies. In such circumstances, I simply fail to see how any British recognition of Palestine would be ‘contrary to international law.’ It might be a good idea or not; it might actually achieve something or not. But any such recognition would be perfectly lawful – and I’m sure the letter authors ‘must know’ that.

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Rod MacKenna says

July 31, 2025

In addition much international diplomacy has been expended precisely to eventually bring about a Palestinian state... Madrid... Oslo etc. The very phrase 'two state solution' sums up the aspirational objectives, as stated variously in oft repeated foreign policy aims and objectives by various UN member states including the US. An embryonic Palestine alongside an already formed Israel

Guy S Goodwin-Gill says

July 31, 2025

Well said, Marko! The first problem is that very few practising barristers in the UK have ever studied international law and do not know what questions to ask. Whose obligations would be violated by the UK's recognition of Palestine, for example? Of course, a political question is also involved, much as it is, sadly, in deciding whether to prosecute the indidviduals who engage in genocide and the architects who faciltitate its commission.

Ori Pomson says

July 31, 2025

Thank you for this post. I do agree with your conclusion that recognition would not as such violate international law (though certain acts based on such recognition could violate international law) but I am curious by the statement regarding the late James Crawford that “this is likely not what he would write today, if he was still with us”. Indeed, Crawford seems to have remained sceptical of Palestinian statehood in his 2006 edition of the Creation of States and I am wondering which facts on the ground (which were generally the main obstacle to Palestinian statehood, as opposed to recognition) have since changed so that Palestinian effective government has now been achieved.

Marko Milanovic says

July 31, 2025

Many thanks to everyone for their comments. Ori, good to see you agree with my basic argument. As for Crawford, I'm not sure why you're perplexed. It is true that in the past 2 or 3 decades little has changed on the ground in terms of the effectiveness of the Palestinian government. I didn't say it has. But there has been a substantial change not just in terms of recognition by individual states, but also in Palestine's participation in various international organizations etc - all of which is an indicator of what states think about Palestine's status. (And all of which btw disproves the strange counterfactual assertion in the letter that Palestine has been unable to engage in relations with other states). So, I'm sure that Crawford would very much have taken all that into account, and that he would not have thought that the question of Palestine's statehood was today as easy as it was to him 20 or 30 years ago.

Marko Milanovic says

July 31, 2025

Just to add - and let Crawford speak for himself - here are his concluding paragraphs on Palestine from his book. Note the yet! And note also the ICJ findings about the occupation's illegality in the 2024 AO, which would be relevant for an ex injuria jus non oritur argument.

"Nonetheless this may not be the whole story. There may come a point where international law may be justified in regarding as done that which ought to have been done, if the reason it has not been done is the serious default of one party and if the consequence of its not being done is serious prejudice to another. The principle that a State cannot rely on its own wrongful conduct to avoid the consequences of its international obligations is capable of novel applications, and circumstances can be imagined where the international community would be entitled to treat a new State as existing on a given territory, notwithstanding the facts.

However, it seems clear that this possibility does not yet apply in the case of Palestine. In agreements welcomed by the General Assembly, the PLO has expressly accepted that an important agenda of issues remains to be resolved through permanent status negotiations. For its part, the General Assembly has stated that it has ‘a permanent responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy.’283 Both parties have agreed that unilateral action must not be taken in the meantime to change the status quo;284 this is equally the position reached by the International Court in the Wall Advisory Opinion.285 But the point is to change the status quo in favour of a comprehensive settlement accepted by all parties concerned—a situation that seems as remote as ever"

John B. Quigley says

July 31, 2025

Marko is correct for a more basic reason. The Montevideo Convention was not written to require that any particular criteria before an entity can be recognized as a state. Rather, it was written to say that if an entity meets those criteria, it should not be the object of external interference. The Montevideo Convention was written to stop the USA from interfering in domestic politics in the Western Hemisphere. It was not written to define what is necessary for statehood. The practice of recognition shows that states do not use the so-called Montevideo criteria. They recognize entities that do not qualify. They decline to recognize entities that do qualify.

Ori Pomson says

July 31, 2025

Thank you, Marko, for engaging. Yes, I find the prohibition on intervention (the main ground raised in literature for a prohibition on premature recognition) a very weak basis for arguing illegality. On Crawford, it is interesting he makes those pronouncements while referring to the parties' agreed framework for final status negotiations, which could suggest that something along the lines of Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu's joint opinion would be the starting point for assessing "if the reason it has not been done is the serious default of one party".

Andreas von arnauld says

July 31, 2025

Thank you, Marko, for yet another crystal-clear analysis! I could not agree more.
As to the rather moot point what James Crawford would say if he were still among us, I was intrigued by the following section from the quote: "Both parties have agreed that unilateral action must not be taken in the meantime to change the status quo... But the point is to change the status quo in favour of a comprehensive settlement accepted by all parties concerned—a situation that seems as remote as ever". As the ICJ has made abundantly clear in the OPT Opinion of July 2024, one party, in fact, has taken massive unilateral action to change the status quo and to make the prospect of "a comprehensive settlement accepted by all parties" seem so remote. If James was even considering remedial secession, in the rather different case of Palestine this should all the more be reason to rebut a policy that, through illegal settlements, disenfranchisment and worse, aims at undermining the two-state solution solidly grounded in international law.
There are excellent reasons why Shimon Peres was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1994, there are equally excellent reasons why Benjamin Netanyahu will never receive it. And there are excellent reasons, as you lay out, why it is legally absurd to argue that the recognition of Palestinian statehood would be in violation of international law. So again, thank you, Marko!

Marek Linha says

August 1, 2025

If I may, I would like to bring into attention a related issue concerning the status of Palestinians as stateless under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Recognition of Palestine as a state should not be automatically viewed as altering this status, as the primary legal aspect of the statelessness definition concerns the domestic citizenship legislation of the supposed state in question. Despite past drafting attempts, Palestine still lacks a nationality law. Furthermore, the purpose of the Convention was to alleviate precisely the type of difficulties that many Palestinians face today, stemming from Palestine’s lack of an independent, sovereign authority to issue travel documents, allow entry to its territory or provide sufficient consular assistance.

Norway represents an example of poor practice in this regard. After recently recognising Palestine as a state, the Norwegian government rushed to instruct the immigration authorities to consider Palestinians registered with a Palestinian ID-number in the West-Bank, Gaza or East Jerusalem as citizens of Palestine. Never mind that the practice concerning population registration in Palestine and issuance of an ID-number is subject to Israeli control and does not purport to regulate citizenship.

As a result of Norway’s current practice, several rules facilitating naturalisation of stateless persons in Norway – as well as a whole series of safeguards against statelessness – no longer apply to a large group of Palestinians. This includes crucial safeguards that otherwise apply to children born stateless in Norway required under the 1964 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. I hope other states, when recognising Palestine as a state, pay more serious attention to these issues and do not automatically assume that Palestinians lose all their protections under statelessness conventions.

Greg Fox says

August 1, 2025

An excellent and forceful post, Marko. I would just add that Israel itself is the poster child for a state coming into existence via recognition without having fulfilled all the Montevideo criteria.

Thomas D. Grant says

August 8, 2025

Professor Milanovic compares recognizing a Palestinian entity with recognizing the Holy See. The comparison is unconvincing. Mass atrocities, propaganda for genocide, and declarations of the non-existence of a neighbouring State do not belong to the modern repertory of the Holy See (or of the Vatican). Judging from their conduct, these are the raison d’être of those who seized control of Gaza in 2007.

Milanovic insists that Russia’s recognition of “Donetsk” and “Luhansk” is unlike the recognition of “Palestine.” He says,

“Recognizing Palestine would in no way violate any rights of Israel. On the contrary, it is precisely Israel which, as established by the ICJ, through its continued illegal occupation of Palestinian territories is preventing Palestine from fulfilling the
Montevideo effectiveness criteria.”

Even leaving aside the serious flaws in the ICJ’s advisory opinions on Israel, this statement invites critique. First, it starts with a false premise — namely, that recognition “would in no way violate any rights of Israel.” The territories concerned here, in particular Gaza, serve as the platform from which armed formations have prosecuted a decades-long assault on Israel. Without root-and-branch transformation of the societies and political organizations they contain, the territories will continue in the same way. Recognizing an entity as a State, as Milanovic observes, tends to consolidate the status of the entity. No State would view the consolidation of a next door war platform to be consistent with the State’s rights under international law.

Second, the logic of Milanovic’s statement is doubtful. Why would breaches by State A of the rights of Entity B mean that State C would “in no way violate any rights of [State A]” if it (State C) recognized Entity B? Milanovic's conclusion does not follow.

The conduct of State C is the immediate concern here. Thus, it is a peculiar feature of this not-so-great debate over recognition that the posture of State C — i.e., the State recognizing “Palestine” — has drawn little remark. Recognition, it is true, remains largely an act of sovereign discretion which each State decides on its own judgment of the facts and law. But it also remains a legal institution — at least in the sense that recognition is an act intended to have effects in law — in regard to the status of the entity being recognized. Here, many, if not most, of the declarations on “Palestine” — the acts of State C — are addressed not as expressions of a judgment about “Palestine”. They are, instead, a judgment about Israel. As such, they are not steps in an accretive process by which States in some cases have taken time to emerge, but, instead, are a sanction. Israel is the sanction’s target. As Professor Milanovic has acknowledged, not every sanction is legal. It is to be suggested that a State that imposes a sanction to impel another State to refrain from exercising self-defense against an entity that aims to destroy it is a breach of international law against that State.

Milanovic’s conclusion — “the letter authors ‘must know’” that recognition of “Palestine” is not illegal — is too easy. We do not yet know the repercussions of the recognition now afoot. Whether the States embarking on this course on their own terms succeed or fail, however, the recognition of “Palestine” is not merely imprudent. It is illegal.

Marko Milanovic says

August 8, 2025

Hi Tom,

Thanks for your comment. So, just to clarify this a bit further, when Yugoslavia as it then was, or Serbia, or South Africa, or the UK, France and Canada in the future, recognize Palestine, what specific rule of international law are they violating? What exactly does that rule say? Where exactly is that rule to be found? In what treaty, in what state practice or opinio juris? Has any other state ever said that recognizing Palestine is illegal, i.e. a violation of a specific rule of international law?

Again, I can understand the argument that recognizing Palestine would be ineffective, in the sense that, the recognition notwithstanding, Palestine would still not be a state. What I don't understand is the argument that recognition is illegal.

The argument you seem to be making is that the demand the UK has made is a form of coercion of Israel, and thus a violation of the principle of non-intervention. That's a logic I can follow - but with the greatest respect, it is hardly one borne out by the facts. Whether Israel has a right to self-defence with regard to Gaza is a very complicated matter, but even if it does its current behaviour, including the documented starvation of the Palestinian population, to say nothing else, could not comply with the necessity and proportionality criteria of lawful self-defence. Asking Israel to stop the war - even sanctioning it quite severely - could be coercive, but it would not transgress on Israel's rights and would thus not constitute intervention in its internal or external affairs.

Marty Lederman says

August 8, 2025

A handful of reactions here:

https://www.justsecurity.org/118655/reactions-debate-palestinian-statehood/

Eric Fripp says

August 13, 2025

I am grateful to the authors of various posts relating to the contemplated UK recognition of Palestine as a state. On the issues concerning the Montevideo Convention and the consistency of the comtemplated recognition I have entered a comment after Professor Verdirame's post.

However I would like to gratefully take up the issue raised by Marek Linha, in his comment above, regarding potential effects of recognition on the question of whether Palestinians (without any other nationality) are stateless for purposes of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954. And I would like to extend that to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951.

Under article 1 of the 1954 Convention, 'the term “stateless person” means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.' So as Mr Linha emphasises, for someone to be excluded from the 1954 Convention definition, there must be (i) a State; (ii) a law by which that state defines who is a national; and (iii) the consideration of the state that that individual is its national under the oepration of its law.

The absence of a nationality law in an entity seeking recognition as a state, or even a newly recognised state, is not unique- it is perhaps an apt example that for the first four years after its establishment in 1948, Israel had no citizenship law and technically had no citizens. So a Palestinian without any other nationality will not become stateless through recognition of Palestine as a state by Norway or the United Kingdom or any other country. This can be said without even considering other complex questions- to what extent recognition may be constitutive or indicative of a state in any given case, and what may be said to be general requirements for statehood.

The reservation expressed by Mr Linha regarding Norwegian official practice, as he describes it, is bolstered further by the relative exclusivity to each state of the creation of its nationality law- hence articles 1 ('It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
nationals....') and 2 ('Any question
as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State.') in the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which likely represent customary international law on the origination of nationality. It follows that no other state or organisation can create and impose an assumed nationality law upon a state from without.

On the 1951 Convention, the refugee definition at article 1A(2) employs the phrase 'not having a nationality' rather than 'stateless', probably because the latter term was not yet authoritatively established as having the meaning adopted in the 1954 Convention as above, rather than a broader one including persons with a nationality in law but 'effectively stateless'. A person without a nationality must, to be a refugee, be 'outside the country of [his or her] former habitual residence' and 'unable to return to it' due to well-founded fear of persecution for a relevant reason. Here the 'country of former habitual residence' may be but need not be a state. And Mr Linha's point regarding the error of attributing nationality to a Palestinian by reason of recognition of a Palestinian state would also apply in the refugee context. Recognition would not, without more, end the individual situation of 'not having a nationality' for purposes of article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention.

Other issues of course may arise, such as potential disapplication of the 1951 Convention from persons'at present receiving from organs of agencies of the United Nations, other than [UNHCR] protection and assistance' per article 1D, but that would take this comment further from the point originally raised by Mr Linha, which seems to me to find strong support in the relevant body of international law.