Indus Waters Treaty Suspension: A First Case for the Paris Agreement’s Compliance Committee?

On 23 April 2025 India announced that it was “suspending” its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty (“IWT”); a move that Pakistan contends could imperil the predictable river-flow regime that supplies about 90 % of its irrigated agriculture and roughly one-third of its hydropower capacity. While commentary has focused on whether such a suspension is even permissible under treaty law, an equally pressing issue lies in its climate-law ramifications: could irregular Indus flows prevent Pakistan from honouring the mitigation and adaptation targets in its Nationally Determined Contribution (“NDC”) under the Paris Agreement?

This post explores whether irregular Indus flows following India’s announced suspension of the IWT could furnish a test case for the Paris Agreement’s Implementation and Compliance Committee (“PAICC”). It assesses Pakistan’s possible legal footing, the PAICC’s procedural reach, and the wider relevance for states facing comparable transboundary river-flow challenges.

Indus-flow predictability as a variable in Pakistan’s NDC implementation

Under the Paris Agreement, every Party must file an NDC that explains how it will cut greenhouse-gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts in order to keep global warming to 1.5 °C. These pledges must be updated on a five-year cycle, each time “progressing” in ambition and reflecting the country’s evolving capacity. Pakistan has submitted two NDCs to date – its initial submission in 2016 and an updated version in 2021 – both anchor Pakistan’s mitigation and adaptation actions on the premise of stable, predictable flows from the Indus River system.

In 2016, Pakistan pledged to “optimise the energy mix of oil, gas, hydro, coal, nuclear, solar, wind and biomass” (P. 6). While the 2016 NDC never spells out river hydrology outright, the plan to ease Pakistan’s chronic power deficit with hydropower implicitly presumes an Indus flow regime that is both seasonally dependable and politically uncontested. The document also identifies Pakistan as a “lower-riparian state situated in a semi-arid region” (P. 5) that must stay “watchful of the implications of its water-stressed situation,” (P. 5) ranking river-flow variability alongside floods and heatwaves as front-line climate risks (P. 14). Notably, the document prioritises adaptation finance toward “strengthening and fortifying flood infrastructure, including water reservoirs and water channels” (P. 4) – a priority which presumably only makes sense if that infrastructure can rely on predictable Indus flows.

Five years later, the 2021 NDC set a target of sourcing 60 % of electricity from renewables, “including hydropower” (P. 62) by 2030 as part of a broader goal to cut economy-wide emissions by 50 % (P. 62). This translates to the specific mitigation target in which hydro supplies roughly 42 % of installed electricity generation capacity because dammed water can “even out the volatility” (P. 28) of wind and solar output. The NDC argues achieving that mix could require about USD 50 billion in hydro projects and grid upgrades (P. 64).

On the adaptation side, the 2021 NDC foregrounds water management. Its flagship “Recharge Pakistan” programme (a Green Climate Fund project) aims to reduce flood risk and recharge aquifers at six Indus-basin sites, “building resilience of ten million people” (P. 63) by 2030. Agriculture, which already consumes about 90 % of freshwater withdrawals, is singled out for efficient-irrigation upgrades because both food security and economic stability (P. 38) could face heightened risks if flows become irregular. The 2021 NDC indicates that Pakistan’s adaptation narrative now rests on the very same hydrological certainty that underpins its mitigation pathway.

Taken together, the two NDCs show an increasing dependence on predictable Indus flows; disruption may therefore challenge Pakistan’s ability to deliver its Paris commitments.

Treaty jurisprudence on minimum and predictable flows under the IWT

The IWT already contains an expectation that downstream flows will remain stable and foreseeable – an expectation confirmed by the Court of Arbitration in the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) when Pakistan challenged India’s Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Project. In its 2013 Partial Award, the Court ruled that India must “maintain a minimum flow of water … in the Kishenganga/Neelum River,” (P. 201) a duty it traced in part to Annex D, paragraph 15(iii) of the Treaty (para. 446). Crucially, the Court stressed that “stability and predictability in the availability of the waters … are vitally important” (para. 457) for each Party’s treaty-protected uses. In other words, predictable flow is a legal baseline built into the Treaty’s operation. In the Final Award issued ten months later, the Court reiterated that “stability and predictability” (para. 118) underpin the IWT’s implementation.

The Kishenganga Awards confirm that stable, predictable Indus flows are a treaty-affirmed obligation rather than mere speculation. Accordingly, it appears that the flow regime on which Pakistan’s 2016 and 2021 NDC are built around is not speculative but legally recognised baseline – counting on hydropower for roughly 42 % of future installed capacity and anchoring flagship adaptation programmes such as Recharge Pakistan in a dependable river flow regime. If flows become irregular, Pakistan could argue that the legally acknowledged baseline underpinning its NDC is undermined.

The PAICC: mandate, modalities and constraints

The Paris Agreement’s Article 15 “implementation and compliance” mechanism takes the form of a 12-member expert-based, facilitative committee elected by the CMA to “function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive” (Art. 15). Its initial modalities and procedures were adopted at Katowice in 2018 (Decision 20/CMA.1); detailed Rules of Procedure covering agendas, quorum, remote decision-making and formal voting were finalised at Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 (Decision 24/CMA.4).

Any Party may file a written request asking the Committee to examine problems with its own implementation of the Paris Agreement (Modalities s. 20; Rules of Procedure r. 17). Once seized, the PAICC may open a facilitative dialogue, connect the Party with finance or technology bodies, recommend an action plan, or issue factual findings (Modalities ss. 29-30).

Importantly, when choosing those measures the Committee must “pay particular attention” to “situations of force majeure” (Modalities s. 28). Pakistan might invoke this clause to explain projected hydropower shortfalls and delayed adaptation projects due to irregular Indus flows. The PAICC therefore offers a forum where Pakistan can document the knock-on effects of irregular flows on its mitigation (approx. 42 percent hydro share) and adaptation programmes (Recharge Pakistan, irrigation efficiency), seek facilitative support or flexibility, and keep the issue on the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) radar.

Potential implications for the PAICC and transboundary-water governance

Bringing the Indus-flow crisis before the PAICC would move what is now a bilateral water dispute onto the multilateral climate stage. Once Pakistan files a Party-triggered request and the PAICC adopts any decision on the matter, that decision appears in the Committee’s annual report to the CMA (Rules of Procedure r. 14 (2)). These reports are circulated to the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies and feed into the information pool for the Global Stocktake. In practice, that means the knock-on effects of irregular Indus flows on Pakistan’s mitigation and adaptation pledges would enter the formal UN climate record.

Additionally, Pakistan could consider a PAICC referral for two practical benefits. First, by employing the “situations of force majeure” language in the PAICC modalities (Modalities s. 28), Pakistan can show that any hydropower shortfall – about 42 % of the planned 2030 generating fleet – and the knock-on delays to water-centred adaptation projects arise from an external shock, not domestic policy back-sliding. That framing could unlock the Committee’s facilitative toolkit: convening expert dialogue, tapping formal links to finance- and technology-mechanisms, and recommending action plans that steer funding toward substitute renewables, pumped-storage capacity and flood-defence works. Second, a PAICC decision would give investors and donors an authoritative record that any deviation from Pakistan’s individual NDC targets is traceable to India’s suspension of the IWT, preserving Pakistan’s credibility in the climate-finance arena.

If submitted, Pakistan’s referral would give the PAICC its first Party-initiated case, testing whether the Committee can handle physical-world implementation barriers. Whatever the outcome, the precedent would clarify how the Paris compliance system handles transboundary-water shocks; guidance likely watched by other downstream states on the Nile, Mekong and Tigris–Euphrates. Globally, the precedent would also inform the Green Climate Fund, the Loss-and-Damage Fund and other lenders that reliable river flows are integral to NDC delivery, opening the door to concessional finance for river-dependent clean-energy and resilience projects.

In conclusion, while a PAICC referral would not resolve the Indus dispute (jurisdiction for that remains with IWT mechanisms) it would place the Indus flow-variability issue on the UNFCCC’s multilateral agenda, testing the Committee’s facilitative mandate. It could also open avenues for additional climate-finance and technology support for Pakistan. At the same time, it would broaden the Paris regime’s lens, illustrating how transboundary water flows intersect with climate compliance and establishing a precedent other river-basin states may study.