From Gaza to Lebanon: Forcible Displacement Dressed in Humanitarian Garb

In recent hostilities, first in the Gaza Strip and now in Lebanon, the Israeli military has adopted a new modus operandi: issuing blanket relocation directives instructing millions of people to indefinitely leave their places of residence (evacuation orders in Lebanon were discussed here). The apparent objective is to enable Israel to engage an enemy embedded in densely populated civilian areas while ostensibly respecting its obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), including the obligation to direct operations only against military objectives, to refrain from attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm, and to implement precautions in attack.

Pursuant to this modus operandi, almost a fifth of Lebanon’s population (more than one million people) has already been displaced. The ever-expanding ‘evacuation’ zone in the south and east of Lebanon now covers approximately 1,500 square kilometres, roughly 14% of the country’s territory. Affecting more than 100 towns and villages, the humanitarian consequences are devastating. In addition to the harm associated with being uprooted from one’s home and community, Israeli bombardment of infrastructure, including roads and bridges, has rendered relocation hazardous. Those who leave may have nothing to return to in view of Israel’s extensive destruction of civilian property. Overcrowding in collective shelters and lack of safe alternative accommodation exacerbate the risk of harm. A similar fate was inflicted on civilians in Gaza, where almost the entire population was repeatedly induced to displace.

Despite the significant humanitarian toll, Israel presents its relocation orders in humanitarian garb, as effective advance warnings meant to reduce civilian casualties in subsequent strikes. For example, on 2 March 2026, Israeli defence forces ordered residents of more than 50 villages in Lebanon to leave their homes ‘[f]or your safety’.

In our view, relocation orders that cause mass displacement and suffering of civilians as documented in Lebanon and Gaza cannot be regarded as a lawful method by which a party to a conflict can discharge its IHL obligations—even when it is engaging an adversary operating from a densely populated area. Rather, this emerging practice entails a misappropriation of humanitarian principles that threatens to undermine the integrity and normative force of IHL as a protective framework. While IHL in some cases permits or even requires a party to relocate civilians to protect them against the dangers of hostilities, the harm caused by involuntary displacement must also be accounted for when assessing the legality of the different courses of action available to parties to a conflict. Israel presents a deceptively binary choice: mass displacement or mass civilian casualties. Whereas faithful application of IHL in many cases permits neither and requires consideration of other, less harmful options.

This post is a siren call for countering misappropriation of humanitarian principles by improving the conceptual clarity of the prohibition of forcible displacement and its relationship with the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities (a more in-depth analysis is available here).

The prohibition of forcible displacement under ‘Geneva Law’

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (GCIV), reflecting customary international law, prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of protected persons from ‘occupied territory’ (with a strictly circumscribed exception, discussed below).  

The reference to ‘occupied territory’ suggests that the prohibition only applies when displacement occurs in or from territory that is ‘actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’ and only extends to territory ‘where such authority has been established and can be exercised’ (Article 42 Hague Regulations 1907).

Conditioning the prohibition of forcible displacement in international armed conflict on (often controversial) determinations of whether a State is an occupying power is difficult to justify. Indeed, commentators have expressed diverging views regarding the classification of the conflicts between Israel and, respectively, Hamas and Hezbollah (e.g., here, here and here).

There is no evident reason, based on the logic of IHL, why the prohibition of forcible displacement should only apply to a party in effective control of foreign territory. After all, capacity to cause (and prevent) forcible displacement is not contingent on territorial control. Indeed, recognition by international criminal tribunals that forcible displacement can be achieved by means of warfare—which do not presuppose territorial control—suggests that the applicability of the prohibition should not be conditioned on effective control over territory (see here, here, and here). Moreover, in non-international armed conflict, the treaty and customary IHL versions of the prohibition do not set any explicit requirement of effective control over territory or persons (Article 17 Additional Protocol II, customary international law r 129B), and the ICC has confirmed that territorial control is not necessary for a violation of the prohibition applicable in non-international armed conflict to materialise. The relevance of control over territory or persons was also downplayed by the ICTY in interpreting forcible displacement as a crime against humanity (see e.g., here).

As a matter of de lege ferenda, a functional test to determine the applicability of the prohibition of forcible displacement, based on a party’s capacity to cause the kind of harm that the prohibition seeks to protect against, would avoid the seeming arbitrariness of the same conduct being prohibited or permitted depending on, at times, disputed classifications of a conflict situation.

The prohibition of forcible displacement notwithstanding, during hostilities—such as in Lebanon—the removal of civilians from affected areas may be permitted or even required under the IHL rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, notably the principle of precautions. In this regard, it should be recalled that the prohibition of forcible displacement is not absolute: temporary evacuation of protected persons in case ‘the security of the population’ or ‘imperative military reasons’ so demand is permitted by its own terms (Article 49 GCIV, Article 17 Additional Protocol II, customary international law r 129).

It has been suggested that if a warning for civilians to leave an area is followed by an attack that places those in the area in danger, their relocation will necessarily be justified by reference to their security (e.g. Schmitt 2023). However, this would imply that a party can render displacement lawful simply by making it dangerous for civilians to stay in place. This interpretation would undermine the very essence of the prohibition and must be qualified.

Arguably, if the military operation or attack in relation to which the instruction to relocate is issued is unlawful, or would be unlawful were it not for the removal of the civilians—for example because it would be indiscriminate or cause excessive civilian harm—then the relocation cannot be justified by reference to the security of the affected persons. In this scenario, the danger that civilians seek to avoid by relocating is an unlawful attack that should be suspended or cancelled (Article 57(2)(b) Additional Protocol I, customary international law r 19). Moreover, warnings issued as an ultimatum to civilians, threatening harm unless they leave their home, could amount to ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population’, which are strictly prohibited under IHL (Article 51(2) Additional Protocol I, Article 13(2) Additional Protocol II, customary international law r 2).

This reading is consistent with the precautionary duty to give advance warnings, as that duty concerns attacks directed against specific and lawful targets. Issuing warnings cannot render an otherwise unlawful attack lawful under the rules on the conduct of hostilities and does not absolve the party of responsibility to ensure that the planned attack complies with the principles of distinction and proportionality. Civilians are under no obligation to heed a warning, and they remain protected against attack and excessive harm if they refuse to leave. An attack may therefore not be planned or carried out on the presumption that civilians will leave their homes, and protection must, in any event, also be afforded to civilian objects.

Lawful evacuations are subject to additional conditions under Article 49 GCIV and customary IHL. These conditions, which aim to ensure the safety and health of relocated persons, to avoid the separation of families, and prevent the relocation of persons outside the national or occupied territory, are no less relevant in situations of hostilities; as demonstrated by the acute protection needs generated by Israeli relocation orders in Lebanon and Gaza.

Restrictions derived from the rules on the conduct of hostilities

In addition to limitations arising from the prohibition on forcible displacement, the IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities also serve to restrict practices causing displacement. This additional normative restraint may serve to fill the apparent protection gap identified in cases where a party to an international armed conflict causes the displacement of civilians in the (non-occupied) territory of an opposing party.

In considering how the rules on the conduct of hostilities might address actions inducing civilians to displace, it should be recalled that these rules seek to attain a balance between military necessity and humanity, and should be interpreted and applied accordingly. Striking the right balance can be challenging, but not when one of the values is altogether missing from the equation: harming civilians when this does not have a legitimate military (or humanitarian) purpose is undoubtedly prohibited (see UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, para. 2.4). Accordingly, the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities preclude the displacement of civilians for an unlawful purpose, such as ethnic cleansing, annexation, to facilitate attacks on civilian objects, or to collectively punish or terrorise the civilian population.

In cases where there are legitimate military considerations at play, the rules establishing general protection from harm in ‘military operations’ as well as the more specific rules regulating ‘attacks’ are instructive.

‘Military operations’ encompass all ‘the movements, manoeuvres and other action taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting’ (2025 Commentary to GCIV, para 3370), a broad category which should be understood to include relocation directives issued in advance of attacks. The relevant rules provide that civilians shall enjoy ‘general protection against dangers arising from military operations’ and that ‘constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects’. Parties to a conflict conducting military operations are thus required ‘to constantly seek to mitigate feasibly avoidable harm or suffering to civilians’ (here at p. 230). This means that they must do more than simply seek out a less harmful alternative to their preferred course of action—such as warning civilians to relocate from the area they plan to attack—and must endeavour to further mitigate any feasibly avoidable harm which that alternative might cause. Accordingly, if a party can spare civilians from the harmful effects of displacement without compromising its military operations at all (including by limiting its scope and duration), then it must do so.

In the (likely) case that sparing civilians from such harmful effects would require the party to implement measures that come at a certain cost to military utility, the more detailed rules regulating ‘attacks’ are helpful either because they apply directly, or by way of analogy.

While it is highly doubtful that warnings and other measures inducing civilians to displace in hostilities constitute attacks in themselves, these measures are closely linked to attacks. Their harmful outcomes are likely to include serious civilian harm of the type that the rules on attack seek to mitigate, and they result directly and foreseeably from the displacements, which were intentionally brought about. There is therefore good reason to insist that the attacking party must endeavour to mitigate these foreseeable harms just as it is required to mitigate the incidental harmful effects of the related attacks.

Application of the rules regulating attack, including the foundational principles of distinction and proportionality and the duty to take precautions in attack, leads to the conclusion that the attacking party must assess whether the harm that the displacement can be expected to cause to civilians (along with the harm expected from the attacks themselves) is necessary to attain the legitimate military advantage being pursued or if, instead, the harm could be further mitigated without compromising the military advantage.

Unnecessary harm, meaning harm that exceeds the level necessary to attain the military advantage being pursued, must be avoided (as explained here, drawing on API Articles 57(2)(a)(ii) and 57(3) Additional Protocol Iand customary internationa llaw rr 17, 21). While effective advance warnings may go some way towards avoiding unnecessary harm even while causing displacement, if the same military advantage can be achieved through still less harmful means, such as implementing the conditions for lawful evacuation, these must be implemented.

Disproportionate harm too must be avoided. To that end, the attacking party must further ensure that the harm expected from the displacement (and the attacks themselves) is not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the attacks.

Implementing these requirements in the conditions that prevail during hostilities can be difficult. The point is not to suggest that belligerents must engage in an impossible or impractical exercise. Rather, we argue that the foreseeable harm that civilians are likely to incur when they are induced to displace from an area in advance of an attack is subject to limitations. In particular, it must be avoided when it is unnecessary, because the military advantage sought can feasibly be achieved through less harmful means, or when it is excessive in relation to the military advantage in question.