First Among Equals: The Election for the ICJ’s Presidency

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Congratulations to Rena Lee, François Alabrune, Dapo Akande, Mahmoud Hmoud, and Phoebe Okowa on their election to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)! These elections have captivated international law enthusiasts worldwide and were among the most interesting in the Court’s history. However, the election season is not quite over yet.

In accordance with Articles 2 and 10(2) of the Court’s Rules, the ICJ will elect a new President and Vice-President in February 2027, as the terms of Yuji Iwasawa and Julia Sebutinde in the Court’s Presidency come to an end (though not their terms as judges). The function of the Presidency is underappreciated because it involves not one role but two. This post examines how considerations for each role should inform the choice.

The two roles of the presidency

Per Article 12 of the Court’s Rules, “[t]he President shall preside at all meetings of the Court, direct the work and supervise the administration of the Court.” Accordingly, the late Shabtai Rosenne has characterized the “two distinct capacities” of the President (and, when absent, the Vice-President) as “President of the Court” and “President of the Bench” (p. 409).

The former, “directing the work of the Court as a whole,” includes the President’s administrative capacities, such as ex officio membership, alongside the Vice-President, on the Budgetary and Administrative Committee; approving new Registry staff members and receiving their declarations (Article 25 of Rules); and approving the agenda on administrative questions (Article 5 of Registry Instructions). The President also represents the ICJ externally. Traditionally, the President delivers an annual report and speech at the UN General Assembly and addresses other legal bodies (Sixth Committee and International Law Commission). The President takes priority in the order of  diplomatic corps.

As for the latter, the President exercises authorities as “a member of the Bench.” Accordingly, the hearings are conducted under the President’s control (Article 45 of Statute). Minutes, judgments, orders, and advisory opinions are signed and authenticated by the President (Articles 47 and 58 of Statute). The President deals with the composition of the bench when an issue (such as a conflict of interest) arises (Articles 32 to 37 of Rules). Procedurally, the President is responsible for ascertaining the parties’ views and may summon their agents (Article 31 of Rules), and is also delegated additional procedural powers when the Court is not sitting. 

The President’s most sensitive role is within the Court’s private deliberations (Article 54 of Statute). As detailed in the Resolution Concerning the Internal Judicial Practice, this includes organizing the deliberative process, guiding discussion, and serving ex officio on the drafting committee, except when dissenting. The President also holds a casting vote when necessary (Article 55 of Statute).

The election procedure

Replicating the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Article 21(1) of the Statute states that the ICJ “shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years; they may be re-elected.” The Presidency election aligns with the general election of ICJ judges, both occurring in synced three-year cycles. General elections are staggered, with one-third of the bench elected every three years to serve nine-year terms (Article 13 of Statute). The newly elected judges assume their role in February following their election (Article 2(1) of Rules). The Presidency elections occur on the day the new judges assume office, or shortly thereafter (Article 10(2) of Rules), electing the President and Vice-President for three-year terms.

Procedurally, the bench elects the President by secret ballot from among its members. There is no formal nomination process. Instead, the judges vote for their peers (Article 11(2) of Rules). Previously, a simple majority of those present was required. For legitimacy reasons, an absolute majority of the bench is now required. Elections for the Vice-President follow the same procedure and can occur at the same time as, or after, the President’s election (Article 11(3) of Rules). 

Practice and patterns

Past practice, though non-binding, can provide insight into election patterns.

Regarding timing, judges tend to be elected as Presidents later in their judicial careers. Most Presidents were not elected to the position during their first term as judges: fifteen were elected during their second judicial term, and two during their third. Among the minority of judges elected President during their first judicial term, most were elected near the end of those terms. Nine were elected as Presidents within the last three years of that judicial term, while only two were elected before then: Guerrero and Basdevant alternated in the Presidency during the Court’s first years, following the PCIJ’s practice (between 1937 and 1939). Guerrero, the ICJ’s inaugural President, was also the last PCIJ President.  

In contrast, it is far more common for judges to have been elected as Vice-Presidents earlier in their judicial careers, though usually not within the first three years of their initial election as judges. Sixteen judges have been elected Vice-Presidents during their first judicial terms, two of whom were elected Vice-President twice during those terms. Of them, only two were elected to the role within the first three years of a judicial term: Basdevant, who served as the first Vice-President, and Alfaro, who was elected two years after assuming a casual vacancy, for the remainder of that term. Most, nine (including Alfaro), to be exact, served as Vice-Presidents only in the last three years of their first judicial term.

The timing of running for a Presidency position within a judicial term may also be strategic. Some may consider running for such a role near the end of a judicial term. There are two possible rationales for doing so: it may be the final act for a judge on the Court, marking the peak of their judicial career; or it may be pre-positioning for the next election, either as a judge or for a “promotion,” as such positions enjoy greater prestige and resources (Article 32(2) of the Statute).  

Interestingly, sixteen judges were elected Presidents during the third period of a nine-year judicial term.  For twelve of them, this was their final act on the Court, while for the other five, it potentially provided momentum for re-election to another term on the bench. Similarly, among Vice-Presidents, nine of those who served in the last period of a term were successfully re-elected for another consecutive judicial term, four of whom became Presidents immediately thereafter. For one (Khan), it marked a short break before later re-election. Nine other Vice-Presidents concluded their judicial positions in this role.

Other judges may consider running for a Presidency role shortly after their judicial re-election, thereby capitalizing on it. Seven Presidents were elected shortly after their judicial re-election: five after re-election to a second judicial term; Schwebel after re-election to a third term; and Guerrero after election to the ICJ from the PCIJ. 

Surprisingly, most Presidents did not previously serve as Vice-Presidents. Only eight “progressed” from the Vice-President role, six of whom did so consecutively, while two others had a “break” between terms. Only Guerrero went in the “opposite” direction, becoming Vice-President.

Lastly, regarding “repeat players”: just like at the PCIJ before it, at the ICJ no President has been elected to the position twice. However, three judges have been elected Vice-Presidents twice, all of them consecutively.

Electoral considerations

Beyond the strategic interests of individual judges seeking Presidency positions, the responsibilities of the President and Vice-President raise broader questions about the criteria that should guide their election. Although the Statute’s drafters warned that it “would be dangerous to make the Presidency of the Court too important a post” (p. 456), the ICJ’s Presidency now plays an important role in navigating unique challenges as international law is under strain, international courts are under scrutiny, and the Court is busier than ever, with an increasingly complex and sensitive docket.  

The capacity of representing the Court requires strong character, as “guardian[s] of the strictly judicial tradition of the Court.” Rosenne has said the role requires the “highest qualities of diplomatic skill” (p. 420), given political sensitivities. For example, he stated that when practicing the tie-breaking role, the President “should take into account the likely reaction of the international community to [such] decision” (p. 420). A lesser consideration relating to external representation may be geographic or gender diversity. One might argue that a recent practice has emerged since 2018, under which the President and Vice President are elected from different genders in each term. Similarly, since the Court’s inception, and with only one exception, the President and Vice President have come from different regional groups.

The aforementioned strong character and diplomatic skills are also relevant to the Court’s internal functioning. For example, Rosenne has also discussed their need in the context of the Court’s “interlocutory powers,” which “may appear as matters of routine,” as the ICJ is “a small cohesive body of highly competent individuals, each with his own personality, [which] cannot be compared to […] large […], impersonal and highly political [organization]” (p. 422). Given the increasing volume and complexity of cases, administrative and managerial abilities, along with intimate knowledge of the Court’s work, are more than ever required and align with the clear pattern of not electing Presidents at the beginning of their judicial careers.

Lastly, regarding the possibility of re-electing a former President, it is explicitly permitted by the Statute, but has pros and cons. On the one hand, the purpose of the non-repetition practice is “to ensure that no judge shall for too long occupy a position in which he is able to exercise his considerable powers over the work of the Court” (p. 15). Beyond the risk of concentrated power, it could antagonize judges and negatively affect diversity. On the other hand, experienced, successful Presidents may benefit the Court’s work by helping it navigate these challenges. Where a long time has passed since the tenure as President, and virtually all the bench has since been replaced, or where a term would follow a shorter casual-vacancy presidential term (as was with Mbaye as Vice-President), some of these concerns may be mitigated. Accordingly, while it should remain a rare exception, in special circumstances and where the benefits would outweigh the risks, this option may be more justifiable.

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Paul de Vineuil says

November 4, 2026

Thank you for this very interesting post. It may be useful to note that Judge Nagendra Singh was no longer President at the time of his death in December 1988: Judge Ruda had been elected President (and Judge Mbaye Vice-President) on 24 February 1988. As the post rightly points out, re-election to the vice-presidency (including that of Judge Mbaye) is not unheard of -- although, perhaps ironically, his was the last instance of this happening.

Noam Morris says

November 4, 2026

Dear Åke Hammarskjöld 😉
You are, of course, correct. Thank you for the engagement and for pointing that out!