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Home Archive for category "Treaty Law"

Palestine v United States: Why the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state

Published on November 22, 2018        Author: 
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Palestine’s institution of proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has already drawn much attention on this blog (see here and here) and elsewhere. A great deal has already been said on Monetary Gold and admissibility. My post will focus on the Article 34(1) ICJ Statute requirement that ‘[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court’. Contrary to some arguments that have been made on this blog and elsewhere, I will argue that for the purposes of Article 34(1) the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state, let alone weigh the Montevideo criteria. An entity may be a ‘state’ for the functional purposes of certain treaties and procedures created by those treaties, but such procedures have no implications for the substantive legal status of the entity under general international law. I will also argue that Palestine’s access to these procedural treaty mechanisms is UNESCO membership and not the status of a non-member observer state in the UN.

When a treaty uses the word ‘state’

The ICJ proceedings are only open to states. But this does not mean that the legal status of an entity can be determined as a side-effect of the ICJ’s procedural rules. The logic of such an argument would go as follows: the ICJ can only hear cases between states, so if the ICJ exercises its jurisdiction, the parties in the proceedings must be states. This would be an implicit reading of the requirement contained in an international treaty that an entity be a state. Such implicit readings are not uncommon in international legal scholarship.  We indeed often read in leading textbooks that since UN membership is only open to states, this is the ultimate confirmation that a UN member indeed is a state. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Global Compact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?

Published on November 21, 2018        Author: 
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The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (final draft of 13 July 2018) is scheduled for adoption at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakesh in December 2018. But in the run-up to this conference, several states, beginning with the United States already in 2017, now followed by Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others, have announced that they will  not sign the text. Will refusal to sign be relevant in terms of international law? What is the juridical quality of the Compact, which legal consequences does it have, and which normative “ripples” might it deploy in the future? The controversy over the Compact sheds light on the legitimacy of international law-making processes and on the precarious normative power of international law.

A Brief Glance at the Contents

The Compact consists of four parts. Following the preamble, the first part contains, “Vision and Guiding Principles”. The second part, “Objectives and Commitments” contains 23 objectives, proceeded by a part on “Implementation” and the final section “Follow-up and Review”. The Compact purports to set out “a common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding migration” (para. 9). The purpose is mainly to secure that migration “works for all” (para. 13).

The Compact’s “guiding principles” are, inter alia, people-centeredness, international cooperation, national sovereignty, rule of law and due process, and sustainable development (para. 15). These are well-established and to a large extent also legally entrenched principles. The 23 “objectives” are partly generally recognised such as saving lives (objective 8), respond to smuggling (objective 9), or eradicate trafficking (objective 10). Some mainly correspond to interests of states of origin (such as promoting transfer of remittances, objective 20), others basically satisfy interests of receiving states (such as facilitating return and readmission (objective 21). In substance, the Compact partly repeats international law as it stands or refers to existing instruments (see notably preamble para. 2), partly contains platitudes, and partly contains novel ideas. Read the rest of this entry…

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Lost in Space? Gaps in the International Space Object Registration Regime

Published on November 19, 2018        Author: 
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Despite having been operational for over 15 years, the satellites NSS-6 and NSS-7 are missing from the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space (‘International Register’). Just as we do not accept unregistered cars on our roads, we should not accept unregistered space objects in orbit. Registration ensures that the state responsible for a specific space object can be readily identified, and, if necessary, presented with a claim under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.

For this reason, under the international space object registration regime, all space objects must be registered by a state. So which state is shirking their duty to submit NSS-6 and NSS-7 to the International Register?

The two satellites were built by Lockheed Martin Commercial Space Systems (‘Lockheed Martin’), a United States-based corporation, for New Skies International NV (‘New Skies’), a Dutch corporation. Launch services were provided by Arianespace SA (‘Arianespace’), a French corporation. Both launches took place from French territory. Once in orbit, ownership of the satellites was transferred from Lockheed Martin to New Skies. So at least three states are involved – and the question is which of these states should register NSS-6 and NSS-7 (spoiler alert: I think it’s the Netherlands). This episode is used as a case study to illustrate the ambiguities and gaps that exist in the international space object registration regime. I conclude the post by making a proposal which seeks to find a way to close these gaps. Read the rest of this entry…

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Does the ICC Statute Remove Immunities of State Officials in National Proceedings? Some Observations from the Drafting History of Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute

Published on November 12, 2018        Author:  and
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Following oral hearings held in September, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently deliberating in Jordan’s Appeal of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision holding that it had failed to cooperate with the ICC by refusing to arrest and surrender Sudan’s President, Omar Al-Bashir, when he visited Jordan. Central to the determination of whether Jordan, a party to the ICC Statute, failed to comply with its obligations of cooperation under the Statute is the issue of whether Jordan was obliged to respect the immunity ratione personae that the Sudanese President would ordinarily be entitled to as a serving head of state.

As is well known, when the ICC seeks to exercise its jurisdiction over a state official who ordinarily possesses immunity under international law from foreign criminal jurisdiction, the question of immunity may, potentially, arise at two levels. First, the issue of international law immunity with respect to the ICC may possibly arise at the so-called ‘vertical level’, i.e in the relations between the ICC, on the one hand, and the accused person and his or her state, on the other. The question that arises here is whether the accused person (as a state official entitled to international law immunities) or his or her state, may plead those immunities before the ICC itself, such as to prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over him or her. Second, and more commonly, the issue of immunity will arise at the so-called ‘horizontal level’, i.e in the relations between a state that is requested by the ICC to effect an arrest or surrender, on the one hand, and the state of the accused person, on the other. Here, the question is whether a state that is requested by the ICC, to arrest or surrender the official of another state, may do so, where to do so would require the requested state to violate the immunities that the foreign state official ordinarily possesses under international law. In particular, the question at this horizontal level is whether there is something about the ICC’s request for cooperation that would mean that the obligations which a state ordinarily owes to another to consider inviolable the person of a serving foreign head of state no longer apply. This is the main question that the Appeals Chamber is called upon to resolve in the Bashir case. In this post, we do not propose to examine the range of arguments put to the Chamber on this question. Rather this post will consider one specific question that is critical to the Court’s assessment and to the more general question of how the ICC Statute affects the immunity of state officials.

The post considers whether the provision of the Rome Statute that removes immunity – Art. 27(2) – only removes immunity at the ‘vertical level’ (before the Court itself) or whether it does so at the ‘horizontal level’ (before national authorities) as well. In particular, the post throws new light on this question through an examination of the drafting history of that provision. Consideration of the drafting history shows that the drafters of the provision considered, throughout the period of elaboration of the Statute, that what would become Art. 27 was to have effect not just in proceedings before the ICC itself but also in national proceedings related to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction. Read the rest of this entry…

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The ICJ’s Provisional Measures Order in Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty (Iran v United States)

Published on October 3, 2018        Author: 
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The ICJ this morning issued its Order regarding Iran’s request for the indication of provisional measures in Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v United States). This post is intended as a brief summary of the reasoning of the Court. After a short introduction, I will outline the Court’s approach to the three core elements required for an indication of provisional measures: prima facie jurisdiction, plausibility of rights and nexus with provisional measures requested, and risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency.

The facts of the case, including the hearings on the request for provisional measures, are covered in an earlier post. In brief, Iran claims that the re-introduction by the United States of sanctions against it following the latter’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 violates the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the two States. In its request for the indication of provisional measures, Iran sought the Court’s order that the US shall, inter alia, suspend its reintroduction of the sanctions, as well as allow transactions already licensed to be implemented.

In its Order of this morning, Iran, in part, prevailed, with the Court indicating some of the provisional measures requested by Iran. Thus, the Court required that the US ‘remove, by means of its choosing, any impediments arising from the measures announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran of (i) medicines and medical devices; (ii) foodstuffs and agricultural commodities; and (iii) spare parts, equipment and associated services (including warranty, maintenance, repair services and inspections) necessary for the safety of civil aviation’. The Court also ordered that the US must ‘ensure that licenses and necessary authorizations are granted and that payments and other transfers of funds are not subject to any restriction’ where they relate to the goods and services noted above, and that both parties ‘refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.’

It is interesting to note that the provisional measures in this case were adopted by the Court unanimously, and thus with the support of the US Judge ad hoc Charles Brower. This is, by no means, the first time a US judge has supported a Court ruling against the US, but it is nevertheless interesting (particularly from a judge ad hoc). Judge Thomas Buergenthal supported judgments of the Court against the US in a number of previous cases, including the Oil Platforms merits judgment (after Judge Schwebel had dissented from the Court’s 1996 finding of jurisdiction in that same case).

Read the rest of this entry…

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The Iranian Suit against the US Sanctions and the 1955 Treaty of Amity: Brilliant Plan or Aberration?

Published on September 7, 2018        Author: 
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The Iranian economy is already feeling the effects of the United States economic sanctions that are successively being reinstated following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 8 May 2018. In an attempt to save what can be saved, Iran seized the International Court of Justice in July requesting the latter to order and declare that the 8 May and subsequent sanctions are unlawful; that the United States shall stop its threats with respect to the further announced sanctions and that it shall compensate Iran. The claim is accompanied by a request for provisional measures by which Iran seeks to obtain, in particular, the immediate suspension of the sanctions and the non-implementation of the sanctions announced. Last week, both parties met in court for the hearings on the provisional measures request.

Iran has not claimed a violation of the JCPOA but alleges breaches of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights signed by Iran and the United States in 1955. The reason is simple: neither Iran nor the United States accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, both states having withdrawn their optional clause declarations. A compromis not being in sight, Iran can only ground the ICJ’s jurisdiction on a compromissory clause. While the JCPOA does not contain such a clause, the Treaty of Amity stipulates in its Article XXI (2) that “[a]ny dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.”

The case, and the provisional measures request, raises many interesting questions, including  for example, whether the mainly economic damages alleged by Iran are irreparable as is required for the indication of such measures, and whether the request could possibly pre-empt the decision on the merits. However, this post is uniquely concerned with whether the idea to rely on the Treaty of Amity helps overcome the hurdle of jurisdiction. While the existence of jurisdiction need only be proved prima facie in the provisional measures phase, the Court will at a later stage have to take a definite decision (assuming the case is not dismissed for manifest lack of jurisdiction at the provisional measures stage). One of the most problematic issues is whether the dispute is about the interpretation or application of the Treaty of Amity despite the existence of the JCPOA. If this is the case, invoking the Treaty of Amity was a smart move by Iran.

The Iranian idea can potentially be attacked in two places: the actual scope of the application and the request, as well as the potential inapplicability of the Treaty of Amity. Read the rest of this entry…

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Is the International Law Commission Elevating Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice?

Published on August 30, 2018        Author: 
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At its most recent (70th) session, the International Law Commission adopted two important sets of “restatements” on two important sources of international law on second reading, namely the Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law and the Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties (see the ILC’s 2018 Report (UN Doc A/73/10) here). This post concerns the second of these restatements, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice (see Chapter IV of the Report).  In particular, this post expresses a concern about an apparent, almost surreptitious, attempt by the Commission to elevate subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as tools of interpretation to the same level as the more objective tools outlined in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. The concern may seem like a storm in a cup – and I hope that is the case.  However,  there is a real possibility – a possibility which could risk the stability of treaties – that the ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty could give way to ever-changing moods of States expressed through subsequent agreements and subsequent practice. If states don’t like the terms of the treaties they have adopted, they should amend it through the means provided for in the treaty or in the customary rules on amendments of treaties. Amendment through interpretation, a real likelihood if subsequent agreements and subsequent practice were elevated to an independent status of equal value – perhaps some day even greater – to ordinary meaning, in context and in light of the object and purpose, would be a dangerous course.  It is hoped that this implicit suggestion in the work of the Commission is not taken up the practice of courts in the application of article 31.

I should begin by two caveats.  First, this post, like the draft conclusions themselves, concerns only subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation.  Thus, what is said here does not affect the role that subsequent agreements or subsequent practice might have, say for modification of treaties in general. Second, there is, admittedly, nothing in the draft conclusions themselves that can be interpreted as the elevation of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice.  The (attempted) elevation comes in the commentaries to a number of provisions in the set of draft conclusions.  I should note, in connection with the last-mentioned caveat, that the commentaries themselves seem to have been elevated to a higher position than before – not quite on par with the draft conclusions but certainly approaching that level.  While in the past, it has been understood that the draft texts adopted by the Commission were to be read with commentaries, during the 70thsession, the Commission inserted language as the first paragraph in the general commentary of both second reading topics to emphasise this point, which had not been emphasised in this manner before. Read the rest of this entry…

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Global Pact for the Environment: Defragging international law?

Published on August 29, 2018        Author: 
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A ‘defrag’ computer program that consolidates fragmented files on a hard drive holds metaphorical attraction for international lawyers. Our encounters with international law often seem to be specific to particular legal regimes, which have a functional orientation and professional sensibility that, in the words of the International Law Commission, may be self-contained. International environmental law and human rights, for example, were developed at different times and are supported by different international and domestic institutions. Now, the United Nations is considering a proposal that promises to integrate various parts of international law, thereby improving its performance: the Global Pact for the Environment.

The draft preliminary text for the Global Pact for the Environment entrenches a right to an ecologically sound environment (Article 1), sets out a duty of states and other actors to take care of the environment (Article 2) and requires parties to integrate the requirements of environmental protection into their planning and implementation, especially to fight against climate change, and to help protect the ocean and maintain biodiversity (Article 3). These and other clauses provide a framework that follows the existing international human rights covenants – on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights – to promote a ‘third generation’ of fundamental rights. On 10 May 2018, a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly established an ad hoc open-ended working group to analyse possible gaps in international environmental law and, if deemed necessary, to consider the scope, parameters, and feasibility of an international instrument (which could include, but is not limited to, a legally binding agreement along the lines of the Global Pact). Two co-chairs were appointed the following month. An accompanying White Paper outlines the Pact’s antecedents, which include the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. In this short post, I consider three ways in which the Pact impacts upon the interaction between regimes and ‘defragments’ international law. Read the rest of this entry…

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Here Comes the Name Again: Treaty Making at the Epicenter of the Greek Debate over the agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Published on June 16, 2018        Author: 
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This week, the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reached agreement over the long running dispute regarding the name of the latter. After independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic continued to use the name it had used as an entity within Yugoslavia, namely the Republic of Macedonia. Greece objected strongly to the use of this name and over the last 25 years or so we have seen sanctions imposed, Security Council Resolutions with provisional designations, an Interim Accord in 1995 and a case before the ICJ which culminated in a 2011 decision finding a violation of that Accord on the part of Greece due to its objections to fYR Macedonia being invited to join NATO in late 2008.

The agreement provides for the use erga omnes of the name ‘Republic of North Macedonia’ as the name of fYR Macedonia, makes provision for other eventualities, such as adjectival uses, commercial brands and designations, and cooperation between the two states in various areas including defence, and seemed to have finally brought resolution to this bizarre dispute. Not so fast. In the last few days, provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and general international law regarding treaty making powers and the process of signature, ratification, and entry into force, have made their way to the epicenter of the Greek debate over the matter. In an article on 11 June 2018 in the Greek conservative daily Kathimerini[link in Greek], Georgios Gerapetritis, a Professor of Public Law at the University of Athens, argued that by signing the agreement, the Greek Prime Minister (or, as the case actually is, the Foreign Minister) would be binding Greece to the obligations under the Convention irrespective of its (domestic) ratification by the Greek Parliament, which only serves to introduce the treaty into domestic Greek law. This would expose Greece to international responsibility.

 

The argument is flawed. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Prudential, Policy-Based Approach to the Investigation of Nationals of Non-States Parties

Published on May 30, 2018        Author:  and
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On 22 May, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki submitted a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the situation in Palestine since 13 June 2014, with no end date.  This follows the Prosecutor’s statements on 8 April and 14 May responding to the situation on the Gaza border (which were themselves unusual, if not unique, examples of OTP practice).  As with the proposed investigation of US nationals in the Situation in Afghanistan, the Myanmar and Bangladesh issue that is under consideration and the investigation of Russian conduct in Georgia and Ukraine, the question of whether, and if so how, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties absent a Security Council referral is pressing once again.

By proceeding with investigation of Russian conduct in Georgia and Ukraine, Israeli conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, and American conduct in Afghanistan, legal issues which arise upon exercise of the Court’s enforcement jurisdiction will foreseeably give rise to challenges both before the ICC, as well as in national jurisdictions during surrender proceedings. This contribution suggests that a prudential, even cautious, policy-based approach to the investigation of nationals of non-states parties may help the OTP avoid pitfalls resulting from proceeding without sufficient regard to non-states parties’ jurisdictional objections. Read the rest of this entry…

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