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Home Archive for category "Syria" (Page 5)

German Parliament decides to send troops to combat ISIS − based on collective self-defense “in conjunction with” SC Res. 2249

Published on December 8, 2015        Author: 

On 4th December 2015, after a parliamentary debate on 2d December, the German Parliament decided, with 445 positive votes (146 negative votes and seven abstentions), to honour the German’s Government’s formal request (BT Drucksache 18/6866 of 1st Dec. 2015 ) to send up to 1200 troops to combat ISIS. A formal parliamentary decision to deploy military abroad is required by the German Constitution (Basic Law) and a German 2005 law (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) which codifies prior constitutional case law.

The international legal basis for the deployment decision, as officially claimed by the Government, is “Art. 51 of the UN Charter in conjunction with Art. 42(7) TEU as well as resolutions 2170 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2249 (2015) of the Security Council.” In its request to Parliament, the Government explained that action against IS (by the US, Australia, the UK, and France) “in exercise of collectives self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter is covered by resolution 2249 (2015).” (BT Drs. 18/1866, p. 3). The EU-assistance clause as invoked by France on 13th November, to which all EU member States responded on 17th November with the promise for assistance, has been analysed here by Carolyn Moser. The substance of the IS resolution 2249 has been analysed on EJIL talk! by Marc Weller, by Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic.

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How the Ambiguity of Resolution 2249 Does Its Work

Published on December 3, 2015        Author: 

Yesterday, after 10 hours of debate, the UK Parliament approved the use of UK armed forces against ISIS on the territory of Syria; the German Bundestag also debated the use of force and will vote on the involvement of Germany in the coalition operation tomorrow. I found it particularly interesting to observe how the constructive ambiguity of the Security Council’s resolution 2249 (2015), that Dapo and I extensively addressed in our previous post, was used by the MPs during their debate.

When it comes to the UK Government’s official legal position on the use of force in Syria, they have been very careful not to rely on the resolution as a separate source of authority, but as a (unanimous) reaffirmation of the legal authority they already thought they had. That position is articulated most clearly in this memorandum from the Prime Minister to Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, at pp. 15-17, and the legal bases for the use of force set out there are (1) the collective self-defence of Iraq and (2) the individual self-defence of the UK against ISIS, both pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. The resolution is used to buttress these two claims, for example with the memorandum stating that: “Resolution 2249 (2015) both condemns the ISIL’s horrendous attacks that have taken place and notes ISIL’s intent and capability to carry out further attacks. It then calls upon States to take lawful action to prevent such attacks.”

Similarly, in his statement to the House of Commons on 26 November regarding that memorandum, the Prime Minister stated that:

It is a long-standing constitutional convention that we don’t publish our formal legal advice. But the document I have published today shows in some detail the clear legal basis for military action against ISIL in Syria. It is founded on the right of self-defence as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The right of self‑defence may be exercised individually where it is necessary to the UK’s own defence… …and of course collectively in the defence of our friends and allies. Mr Speaker, the main basis of the global coalition’s actions against ISIL in Syria is the collective self-defence of Iraq. Iraq has a legitimate government, one that we support and help. There is a solid basis of evidence on which to conclude, firstly, that there is a direct link between the presence and activities of ISIL in Syria, and their ongoing attack in Iraq… ….and, secondly, that the Assad regime is unwilling and/or unable to take action necessary to prevent ISIL’s continuing attack on Iraq – or indeed attacks on us. It is also clear that ISIL’s campaign against the UK and our allies has reached the level of an ‘armed attack’ such that force may lawfully be used in self-defence to prevent further atrocities being committed by ISIL.

And this is further underscored by the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2249. We should be clear about what this resolution means and what it says. The whole world came together – including all 5 members of the Security Council – to agree this resolution unanimously. The resolution states that ISIL, and I quote: “constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security.” It calls for member states, and again I quote: to take “all necessary measures” to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL… …and crucially is says that we should, and again I quote: “eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.”

Note how despite saying that “we should be clear about what this resolution means and what it says” the Prime Minister only proceeds to quote the resolution’s language, without explaining in any way whatsover (let alone clearly so) what it means and what it says. (By the way, isn’t that just wonderful howe he did that?)

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Was the Downing of the Russian Jet by Turkey Illegal?

Published on November 26, 2015        Author: 

There has been much talk of improvement of the relationship between Russia and the West following the deadly terrorist attacks in Paris two weeks ago. Whatever gains have been made on that front will risk being reversed following Tuesday’s incident involving the Russian and Turkish air forces. Although the exact facts are—and likely will remain—disputed, the essence of the incident is known: a Russian fighter jet was shot down in the morning of 24 November by the Turkish military near the Turkish-Syrian border. This post weighs the international law considerations raised by the incident and suggests that on the basis of the available facts, the question from the title should likely be answered in affirmative.

The Russian SU-24 jet was in the region as part of the recent military offensive conducted by the Russian forces with the consent of the government of Syria against a number of armed groups on the Syrian territory, including the notorious Islamic State. The central contested fact is, of course, whether the aircraft had crossed over the border into the Turkish airspace. The Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu emphatically claimed that it had; the Russian president Vladimir Putin denied it in equally strong words. An unnamed US official was reported as having said ‘that the Russian incursion into Turkish airspace lasted a matter of seconds’. Later, a Turkish letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (and duly leaked online) stated the incursion had lasted for exactly 17 seconds.

The legal analysis under international law is reasonably clear if the Russian version of the events is taken as factually accurate. The shooting down of another State’s military aircraft amounts to a use of force against that State. The recognized exceptions of the use of force in self-defence and under the authorization of the Security Council being inapplicable on the facts, the destruction of the jet would be caught by the general prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and thus unlawful.

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The new enemy of mankind: The Jurisdiction of the ICC over members of “Islamic State”

Published on November 26, 2015        Author: 

President Obama has called the recent Paris terror attacks an “attack on all of humanity”. In doing so, he has touched upon the core of so-called crimes against humanity. Due to their quantitative and qualitative dimensions and their utter disregard for fundamental values, such crimes are directed not only against individual persons, but against humanity as a whole. The link to a State was abandoned in the Statutes of the UN Ad Hoc Tribunals in 1993 (ICTY) and 1994 (ICTR) and then, with a universal claim,  in 1998 with the definition adopted in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Since then, it has been possible for crimes against humanity to be committed by non-state actors. Their traditional State-based rationale – punishing the representatives of the morally perverted State that uses its power against its own citizens without restraint – can be transferred to non-state actors. When these actors, like the so-called Islamic State (IS), send suicide assassins into a concert hall to execute innocent civilians, this reveals a level of moral perversion that is typical of crimes against humanity. That the perpetrators invoke God when doing so makes the matter even worse. Religiously motivated perpetrators of crimes against humanity not only deny their victims’ right to exist, but in doing so place themselves above us “unbelievers” as part of a supposedly divine mission; in fact, they act in the same manner as the crusaders they claim to be fighting against.

A perpetrator of a crime against humanity is “hostis humani generis”, an enemy of mankind. The concept was used to refer to pirates long before crimes against humanity existed. The IS is far worse than pirates, and its acts carry all of the hallmarks of crimes against humanity. While this may have been doubted before Paris, after the attacks these doubts are gone with the wind. In the dry technical language of the so-called context element of crimes against humanity, the attacks represent a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population. The attack targeted a large number of civilians and had been planned in a premeditated fashion. The intentional killing of more than 100 people constitutes the required single act of ‘murder’. As a consequence, the ICC has jurisdiction ratione materiae, without any need for recourse to war crimes. This makes the matter simpler, as it is highly controversial – despite the unambiguous language of the French President Hollande (“acte de guerre”) – whether an armed conflict can actually exist between a transnational non-state actor and a State under current International Humanitarian Law.

However, does the ICC also have formal jurisdiction over acts committed by members of Islamic State? Read the rest of this entry…

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Permanent Imminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution 2249 (2015) and the Right to Self Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups

Published on November 25, 2015        Author: 

On 14 November, a day after the terrorist atrocity in Paris, a number of key states, including the US and Russia, met in Vienna. The delegates assembled there committed themselves to work towards a comprehensive cease-fire in Syria by the New Year. However, even if peace can be made between government and opposition in Syria, the meeting was united in its determination to carry on the fight against ISIL in Syria until the end.

Mixed Message

This determination was carried over into the adoption of Resolution 2249 (2015) by the UN Security Council the following week. Indeed, in the Resolution the Council called upon member states that have the capacity to do so to take ‘all necessary measures’ to redouble and coordinate their efforts to eradicate the safe haven established by ISIL in significant parts of Iraq and Syria.

The resolution employs language that would ordinarily be UN code for a collective security authorization to use force (‘all necessary measures’). It also determines that situations involving terrorism, and this one in particular, constitute ‘a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security’. This finding according to Article 39 of the Charter would ordinarily open up the way towards Chapter VII enforcement action.

But confusingly, despite the wording used in the text, Resolution 2249 (2015) does not purport to add to the legal authority already claimed by the states using force in Iraq (see the previous post by Dapo and Marko).

Effect of non-binding Resolutions

That might have been the end of the matter, it being understood that this is not a Chapter VII resolution. While it is true to say that, under the rationale in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, a resolution adopted outside of Chapter VII can be binding, it is equally true that such a resolution cannot authorize the use of force beyond that which is already permitted by virtue of general international law. Yet, if a resolution adopted outside of Chapter VII cannot generate authority for the use of force on its own, it can have an important function in relation to general international law as it applies to the issue at hand. In particular, a resolution of this kind can clarify the underlying position in general international law.

This phenomenon may apply also in relation to factual determinations of relevance for the application of the right to self-defence. Read the rest of this entry…

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Russia’s Intervention in Syria

Published on November 25, 2015        Author: 

Previous posts on Syria (see for example here and here) have commented on the air strikes by the US-led coalition, but the Russian air strikes on Syrian territory (as reported here and here) have been largely left undiscussed. This post will analyse the legality of Russia’s actions. Russia has been acting upon the request of President Assad (see here and here), which means that the international legal basis for Russia’s use of force is intervention by invitation. First, the concept of intervention by invitation itself needs to be addressed. Second, it is contested whether an intervention is even allowed during a civil war.

Intervention by Invitation

There is no explicit reference to intervention by invitation in the UN Charter nor is it covered by article 2(4). Pursuant to that article, states shall refrain from using force “in their international relations”. Using force upon an invitation, however, is not using force in international relations as no force is used by one state against another, but the two states are working together, using the force on one side. This falls outside the scope of article 2(4). Therefore no prohibition comes into play and this type of force is allowed. The importance of valid consent (the invitation) was addressed by the ICJ in the case DRC v. Uganda. The Court dealt with the situation after the consent had been withdrawn by the DRC, thereby emphasising the importance of valid consent, yet also indirectly making clear that before the withdrawal no violation of international law occurred. Thus, intervention by invitation falls outside the scope of article 2(4), as long as the consent is valid.

Intervention in a Civil War?

The second issue, which is a contemporary topic of international law as evidenced here, questions the legality of an intervention by invitation in a civil war. Read the rest of this entry…

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Syria the Land of Impunity

Published on November 24, 2015        Author: 

FullSizeRenderThe Geneva Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria of 30 June 2012, which was endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013), identified key steps for a Syrian led political transition. The Communiqué problematized the “Syrian conflict” as one involving a challenge of security, safety and restoration of stability and calm. During the first half of 2015, Mr. Staffan De Mistura, the UN Special Envoy for Syria, carried out a series of consultations in Geneva with various local and international actors in the Syrian conflict, to explore views on how to “operationalize” the Geneva Communiqué. The consultations produced a proposal to set up four thematic intra-Syrian working groups, which would bring together Syrians from the government and the oppositions to discuss a range of transition topics, including a group on “safety and protection for all”. On 30 October 2015, all regional and international actors involved in the “Syrian conflict” met in Vienna and produced the Vienna Declaration, which promised to launch a “renewed political process” based on eight points of agreement. On 14 November 2015, the same group met again in Vienna and formed the International Syria Support Group (ISSG).  The ISSG pledged to bring the Syrian government and the opposition together to embark on a “political process pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué.”

Nowhere in the diplomatic literature produced so far can one find the word “impunity.” Indeed the political solution contemplated in the Geneva Communiqué, which is still at the core of the renewed political process, rests on the absence of this potentially explosive word. Instead, the Communiqué sets forth at point No. 10(d) that in order to achieve “safety, stability and calm” there needs to be a commitment to accountability for future crimes. As for accountability for acts committed during the present conflict, this must be addressed pursuant to a comprehensive package for transitional justice. The Communiqué stresses, in particular, “national reconciliation” and “forgiveness.”

The problematization of the “political process” as one involving a technocratic challenge to ensure “safety” is hugely shortsighted. The current diplomatic efforts are entirely geared towards bringing the local actors to the negotiation table. The language of “justice” and “rights” is seen as inadequate and unhelpful, as it is likely to subvert the political process. However, in the Syrian context this premise is both historically unwarranted and politically untenable. Indeed, the Syrian political process will have little chance of success if it does not address head-on the question of impunity, which is at the core of the Syrian conflict. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council’s ISIS Resolution

Published on November 21, 2015        Author: 
Security Council Adopts Resolution on Fighting ISIL

UN Photo/Loey Felipe

On Friday, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2249 (2015), condemning a series of recent terrorist attacks by Islamic State (IS, ISIS or ISIL). The text of the resolution, together with statements of Council members, is available here. This resolution was proposed by France and superseded two competing earlier drafts by Russia. The resolution determines that IS constitutes “a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security.”

But the resolution itself is, perhaps, an equally unprecedented measure by the Security Council. The resolution is clearly designed to provide legitimacy for the measures being taken, and to be taken, against IS by giving the Council’s imprimatur to such measures. In particular, the resolution is worded so as to suggest there is Security Council support for the use of force against IS. However, though the resolution, and the unanimity with which it was adopted, might confer a degree of legitimacy on actions against IS, the resolution does not actually authorize any actions against IS, nor does it provide a legal basis for the use of force against IS either in Syria or in Iraq.

The main operative paragraph of the resolution is para 5, in which the Council:

“5.   Calls upon Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL also known as Da’esh as well as ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the United Nations Security Council, and as may further be agreed by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and endorsed by the UN Security Council, pursuant to the statement of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) of 14 November, and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria;”

Before we attempt to decipher what this paragraph actually means, it is important to note that the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Or rather, the resolution does not use the “acting under Chapter VII” formula that is usually used to signal that the Security Council intends to take binding action, despite a couple of determinations in the preambular paragraphs about the existence of a threat to international peace and security, which (determinations) presumably are made under Article 39 of the Charter. In op. para. 1 of the resolution, the Council similarly “regards all such acts of [IS] terrorism as a threat to peace and security,” which again implicitly invokes Article 39. As the ICJ’s Namibia Advisory Opinion makes clear, the lack of reference to Chapter VII in a resolution does not mean that it is not to be regarded as binding nor does it mean that the resolution does not have operative legal effect. However, for the resolution to have those effects the Council must actually decide to do something or to authorize something.

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From Passive Consent to Self-Defence after the Syrian Protest against the US-led Coalition

Published on October 23, 2015        Author: 

Since September 2014, the US and some Arab States have conducted air strikes against Islamic State (IS) in Syria. They have recently been joined by some Western States, including the UK, Canada, Australia and France. The justification given by those States and the US for their military operations in Syria is based on the right of self-defense, enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such justification has been contested by some scholars. Yet, this does not mean those air strikes should be considered unlawful. It is argued that they could be justified by the “passive consent” of Syria.

  1. The end of passive consent

Contrary to their reaction to air strikes conducted by States such as Turkey, Syrian authorities did not formally oppose air strikes by the US-led coalition after they occurred – although some limited objections have been formulated in the media. The Assad regime even seems to have welcomed this international effort to fight against IS and expressed its readiness to cooperate with such effort. As a result, although consent has never been expressly given by the Assad regime to the US-led coalition’s airstrikes, the absence of protest by this regime could be interpreted as “passive consent” thereto. Such interpretation could find some support in the DRC v. Uganda case (para. 46), in which the ICJ inferred the DRC’s consent to the presence of Uganda troops on its soil from the absence of any objection to such presence.

Yet, regardless whether “passive consent” is a valid legal basis for justifying the airstrikes conducted by the US-led coalition against IS in Syria, such legal basis seems now to be in great trouble. Read the rest of this entry…

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State Responsibility for Third Country Deployed / Embedded Military Personnel Engaged in Armed Conflict

Published on September 10, 2015        Author: 

Editor’s Notes: This post was written before the announcements earlier this week that the UK had conducted a drone strike against members of Islamic State in Syria in August, and, that the Australian government plans to conduct airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria.

Recent reports indicate that both the UK and Australian governments have agreed to some of their military personnel being involved in kinetic operations against ISIS/Daesh targets inside Syria. This is despite, in the case of the UK, a Parliamentary ‘no-go’ in the form of a rejected 2013 motion on joining proposed US strikes against Assad regime forces in the wake of the use of chemical weapons. In Australia’s case, this authorisation appears to have come before a settled Australian view on the legality of kinetic operations against Daesh inside Syria (as opposed to inside Iraq). The report on Royal Australian Air Force UAV operators deploying to conduct operations with their host US unit was dated 14 August; but reports as late as 23 August, and even 27 August, seem to indicate that the Australian Government has yet to conclude its own legal analysis on engaging in combat operations inside Syria, subsequent to a US invitation:

‘Foreign Minister Julie Bishop insists Australia has backing under international law for extending RAAF air strikes into Syria because the area occupied by Islamic State is a lawless ungoverned space. “The legal basis for the air strikes in Syria has been laid out by the United States some time ago in a letter to the United Nations.”

“The Coalition has been invited into Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Under the principle of collective self-defence of Iraq and its people, the Coalition has extended self-defence into Syria because the border between Syria and Iraq is no longer governed; neither the Assad regime nor the Abadi regime in Iraq has control over that border,” Ms Bishop said on Sunday.

Ms Bishop said the Abbott government was drafting its own legal advice but it appeared the US, Canada and Middle Eastern countries were satisfied the Syrian air strikes were part of the “collective self-defence of Iraq and the Iraqi people”.’

In a fascinating aside, the Australian Prime Minister was recently quoted as saying “when they [IS] don’t respect the border [between Syria and Iraq], why should we?” Good question; I think it has something to do with the rule of law and being a law abiding international citizen, and the answer perhaps saying more about us than about them. But I digress. These two reports indicate an interesting issue: How does law deal with the assignment or loan of military personnel to another State (sometimes called Third Country Deployments – TCDs), when that assignment is accompanied by what appears to be an acceptance that these TCD personnel may engage in armed conflict inside yet a different State, but in circumstances where the sending or parent State is yet to come to the necessary legal conclusions to support that authorisation? Read the rest of this entry…

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