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Home Archive for category "States and Statehood"

ICJ Delivers Chagos Advisory Opinion, UK Loses Badly

Published on February 25, 2019        Author: 
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Earlier this afternoon the ICJ delivered its Chagos advisory opinion. Briefly, the Court found that the separation of the Chagos archipelago from the British colony of Mauritius was contrary to the right to self-determination and that accordingly the decolonization of Mauritius was not completed in conformity with international law. As a consequence, the Court found that the UK’s continuing administration of the archipelago, which includes the largest US naval base in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, is a continuing internationally wrongful act, which the UK was under an obligation to cease as soon as possible. The Court was almost unanimous – its decision not to exercise discretion and decline giving an opinion was made by 12 votes to 1, while its findings on the merits were made by 13 votes to 1 (Judge Donoghue dissenting). The AO and the various separate opinions is available here.

Here are some key takeaways.

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To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States – An Introduction

Published on January 9, 2019        Author: 
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How have international organizations been able to expand their governance powers so significantly over the past century? What has been the role of international law in making this extraordinary expansion of powers seem possible and legitimate? And what does this tell us about international law itself?

My book, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States (Oxford University Press, 2017), explores these questions by examining the expansion of legal powers exercised by international organizations through informal processes of discourse, practice, and (re)interpretation (‘IO expansion’ for short), rather than by the formal amendment of an organization’s constituent instrument. The book argues that IO expansion has been imagined, understood, and carried out as necessary to a process of making and remaking modern states, based on a broadly Western model. It also argues that international law plays a central, protean role in that process. It would be overly simplistic, therefore, to contend that IO expansion has resulted only in a loss of sovereignty by states. To the contrary, my argument is that IO expansion is intimately bound up with the creation of states, the construction of state powers, and the very constitution of modern statehood.

The book develops these arguments through detailed accounts of three episodes of IO expansion. The first involves the beginnings of technical assistance in the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the interwar period. The second concerns the emergence of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in the two decades following World War II. And the third encompasses the World Bank’s ‘turn to governance’, which reached a high point in the 1990s. By examining three very different international organizations, spanning different periods in the 20th century, the book is able to identify broad themes in how international law has evolved and works in the world.

The research that led to the book began from the commonplace observation that international organizations have become some of the most significant actors in global governance. Today, hundreds of these entities, both regional and global in scope, intervene in myriad areas of activity, including international peace and security, social and economic development, trade and finance, and environmental protection. The powers exercised by international organizations now impact directly and indirectly on the lives of millions of people around the world. Some of these activities involve relatively mundane (though far-reaching) matters of international standard-setting and coordination, while others are more spectacular, including military, financial, and other forms of intervention. Read the rest of this entry…

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Announcement: Book Discussion on Guy Fiti Sinclair’s “To Reform the World”

Published on January 9, 2019        Author: 
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The blog is happy to announce that over the next week, we will host a discussion of Guy Fiti Sinclair’s book, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States. Guy Fiti Sinclair  is a Senior Lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington Law School. His principal area of research and teaching is public international law, with a focus on international organisations law, the history and theory of international law, and international economic law. 

Guy will open the discussion this morning with an introduction to the text. This will be followed by posts from Jan Klabbers,  Megan Donaldson, Devika Hovell and Edouard Fromageau. Guy will close the symposium with a reply to the discussants.

We are grateful to all of the participants for agreeing to have this discussion here. Readers are invited to join in – comments will of course be open on all posts.

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The Kerch Strait Incident: Law of the Sea or Law of Naval Warfare?

Published on December 3, 2018        Author: 
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On Sunday 25 November 2018 Russian coast guard patrol boats, including the Don and the 630-ton Izumrud, first intercepted and later fired on three Ukrainian naval ships near the entrance to the Kerch Strait. Two Ukrainian sailors were injured, the Ukrainian ships seized and the crews arrested. The attack has been roundly condemned in the United States and around the world.

The Russian ships intercepted two Ukrainian Gyurza-M-class artillery boats, Berdyansk and Nikopol and a tugboat, Yany Kapu, as they sailed toward the Ukrainian port of Mariupol. Russian forces seized the vessels and arrested 24 crew members. The Don twice rammed the tugboat and the Russian vessels opened fire on the two smaller Ukrainian warships. The incident occurred in the territorial sea along the approaches to the Kerch Strait, which is bordered in the east by Russia and in the west by Russian-occupied Ukrainian Crimea. The Russian government stated that its forces fired only after the Ukrainian ships violated articles 19 and 21 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning innocent passage in the territorial sea.

Exploring the legal circumstances of the incident requires selection between peacetime rules of the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare, which applies to international armed conflicts. This post concludes that the actual incident on the water is part of a continuing aggression by Russia against Ukraine, in violation of the UN Charter. While unlawful as a matter of the jus ad bellum, the incident would be a lawful in bello use of force by Russia in accordance with the law of naval warfare, notwithstanding Russia’s unlawful invasion of Crimea in 2014 or subsequent unlawful treatment of the Ukrainian sailors as common criminals rather than prisoners of war. In this case the law of naval warfare is lex specialis and supplants mutatis mutandis the peacetime rules of the international law of the sea for Russia and the Ukraine.

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How Trump’s Migration Policy Erodes National and International Standards of Protection for Migrants and Asylum Seekers

Published on November 28, 2018        Author: 
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Early this month, 5,600 US soldiers were deployed to the southern border as a response to an approaching migrant caravan consisting of several thousand Central Americans. U.S. President Donald Trump called the advancing group in official statements a foreign “invasion” that warrants deploying up to 15,000 army members to support the border patrol. He further publicly warned that “nobody is coming in” and once more clarified his stance on migration stating that “immigration is a very, very big and very dangerous, a really dangerous topic”. The latest footage of U.S. officers firing tear gas at migrants of the caravan-including at children- that tried to enter the country, is the disturbing result of Trump’s sketched horror scenario of a violent invasion of Central Americans.

This strict stance on migration is just the most recent example, the tip of an iceberg of the Trump administration’s aim to establish, step by step, a migration policy that erodes national and international standards of protection.

The comprehensive new migration strategy seemingly builds on a set of immediate, as well as long-term measures aiming at those who attempt to enter the United States as well as at those who are already within the state’s territory. For example, last month a new immigration policy was introduced that aimed at restricting immigrants from using public benefits, or else they may be illegible for permanent residency later on. This is just one of numerous examples of how the Trump administration severely restricted or just completely abandoned given standards such as the abolishment of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, the prevention of dreamers from living and working in the U.S.A., as well as the abrogation of the temporary protective status programs. These turnovers of existing standards affected more than two million regularly residing migrants in the U.S.A. and fostered sentiments of fear, nationalism and division.

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Palestine v United States: Why the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state

Published on November 22, 2018        Author: 
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Palestine’s institution of proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has already drawn much attention on this blog (see here and here) and elsewhere. A great deal has already been said on Monetary Gold and admissibility. My post will focus on the Article 34(1) ICJ Statute requirement that ‘[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court’. Contrary to some arguments that have been made on this blog and elsewhere, I will argue that for the purposes of Article 34(1) the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state, let alone weigh the Montevideo criteria. An entity may be a ‘state’ for the functional purposes of certain treaties and procedures created by those treaties, but such procedures have no implications for the substantive legal status of the entity under general international law. I will also argue that Palestine’s access to these procedural treaty mechanisms is UNESCO membership and not the status of a non-member observer state in the UN.

When a treaty uses the word ‘state’

The ICJ proceedings are only open to states. But this does not mean that the legal status of an entity can be determined as a side-effect of the ICJ’s procedural rules. The logic of such an argument would go as follows: the ICJ can only hear cases between states, so if the ICJ exercises its jurisdiction, the parties in the proceedings must be states. This would be an implicit reading of the requirement contained in an international treaty that an entity be a state. Such implicit readings are not uncommon in international legal scholarship.  We indeed often read in leading textbooks that since UN membership is only open to states, this is the ultimate confirmation that a UN member indeed is a state. Read the rest of this entry…

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Reforming Land Restitution – A Concerted Effort to Derail Colombia’s Transitional Justice System?

Published on November 2, 2018        Author: 
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Recently, Kai Ambos alerted readers of two attempts to weaken Colombia’s transitional justice system (see here and here). A third development fortifies suspicions that the country’s newly elected government intends to derail it. This time, a legislative proposal threatens Colombia’s land restitution process. Changes in the treatment of secondary occupants of reclaimed land could especially frustrate this integral part of the elaborate reparation efforts.  

Land Restitution in Colombia

The struggle over land has long been at the core of the Colombian conflict. With 7.7 million people, Colombia hosts the world’s largest population of internally displaced persons. IDPs constitute the vast majority of the 8.7 million registered survivors of the armed conflict. Studies estimate that displacement has affected 11.4 million hectares of land. Accordingly, former President Santos included land restitution as a central element in the 2011 Law on Victims and Land Restitution – the largest reparation program in the world. To manage the massive caseload, a newly created entity, the Land Restitution Unit (Unidad de Restitución de Tierras, URT) administers a special three-phase restitution process. In the first administrative phase, the URT decides on a survivor’s request to have his or her land entered into the Register of Evacuated or Forcibly Abandoned Land (Registro de Tierras Despojadas y Abandonadas Forzosamente). The URT collects evidence and evaluates whether the survivor convincingly demonstrates his or her displacement and a legal relationship to the land they seek to reclaim. Once registered, the survivor proceeds to the judicial phase, in which a specialized judge decides the claim with finality. A positive sentence constitutes a legal title to the land. The judge can further order any measures necessary to guarantee an effective return to the restituted land in conditions respectful to the survivor’s human rights. Among these measures are debt relief, and technical and financial assistance for economic projects. In the post-sentence phase, the judge remains seized and can issue further orders if the survivor encounters problems in the return process.

Secondary Occupants

Of course, the process is not perfect. Read the rest of this entry…

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Palestine’s Application the ICJ, neither Groundless nor Hopeless. A Reply to Marko Milanovic

Published on October 8, 2018        Author: 
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On Friday 30 September 2018, Palestine introduced an Application before the ICJ against the United States of America for violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), on account of the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This is yet another judicial episode of David vs Goliath, like the Military and Paramilitary Activities case (Nicaragua v. US) or the South China Seaarbitration (Philippines v. China) were. But this time the David seems even more fragile, since the Goliath disputes the statehood of Palestine and consequently the many rights attached to it – among them, recognition and respect of sovereign equality in the first place.

The seisin of the ICJ has taken international lawyers aback: the reactions went from enthusiastic excitement to sheer incredulity or scepticism. This is not surprising: the case, whether it is decided on the merits or not, has the potential of becoming one of the great cases of international law, those which will be studied for decades by international law students, which will give guidance on highly debated issues, like statehood and erga omnes obligations. It is not every day that the Court is offered such an occasion.

Now, of course, it is certain that the US will challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. The only question is whether they will formally introduce preliminary objections or opt for non-appearance (like China or Russia have lately done). Non-appearance having rarely served the cause of the recalcitrant State, the US would be well advised not to follow that path; all the more if their case on jurisdiction is as strong as Marko Milanovic considers it to be in his post of 30 Sept. 2018. Non-appearance is generally an epidermal reaction by a super-power to legal challenges against its policy. The US’ infuriated announcement of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the VCDR, made on 3 Oct 2018, denotes this attitude. But it has no effect on Palestinian proceedings, which were introduced before the denunciation could become effective. 

One may wonder instead why the United States have not made this move earlier. After all, Palestine did warn them, through a verbal note of 4 July 2018, of the dispute on the VCDR. And on the same day, Palestine deposited with the Secretary General a declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional Protocol (both texts are available as annexes to Palestine’s Application). Maybe no one in Washington considered that Palestine’s notifications should be taken seriously. Be that as it may, the Application was made on time and the consensual basis of jurisdiction will be difficult to challenge. Read the rest of this entry…

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Palestine Sues the United States in the ICJ re Jerusalem Embassy

Published on September 30, 2018        Author: 
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On Friday Palestine instituted proceedings against the United States of America before the International Court of Justice, claiming that the US violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations by moving its embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The application is here, the ICJ’s press release here; this is how the press release summarizes Palestine’s claim:

It is recalled in the Application that, on 6 December 2017, the President of the United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced the relocation of the American Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The American Embassy in Jerusalem was then inaugurated on 14 May 2018.

Palestine contends that it flows from the Vienna Convention that the diplomatic mission of a sending State must be established on the territory of the receiving State. According to Palestine, in view of the special status of Jerusalem, “[t]he relocation of the United States Embassy in Israel to . . . Jerusalem constitutes a breach of the Vienna Convention”.

As basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, the Applicant invokes Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. It notes that Palestine acceded to the Vienna Convention on 2 April 2014 and to the Optional Protocol on 22 March 2018, whereas the United States of America is a party to both these instruments since 13 November 1972.

In brief, Palestine argues that various articles of the VCDR, especially Article 3 thereof, require that the functions of the diplomatic mission be performed ‘in the receiving state,’ which means that the mission must be established in the receiving state. Jerusalem is not Israeli territory, and therefore moving the embassy there meant that it was not established in the receiving state. Ergo, there was a violation of the VCDR.

This case raises numerous issues, some obvious, some not. There are many objections that the US could raise, and will inevitably raise.

Read the rest of this entry…

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Part II: The Partition of the Chagos Archipelago and the Haunting Spectre of the South West Africa Cases

Published on September 21, 2018        Author: 
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[Part II of a two-part post]

When consent has been vitiated

One of the most challenging aspects of partition is proving that its representatives’ consent was vitiated due to duress. In nearly all cases of partition duress, coercion, and even fraud has been alleged by one of the parties. In other words, their consent to the loss of territory was not freely given.

In Ireland, it was argued that the threat of force was employed during the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 to ensure the Irish delegation accepted the option of dominion status against that of a republic (A. Carty, Was Ireland Conquered, 1996, p. 84). It was also alleged that the delegation’s consent to the partition was brought about by deceit because of assurances given to them that primary importance would be given by a Boundary Commission to the ‘wishes of the inhabitants’ in the redrawing of the boundary between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State when, in fact, the UK never had any intention of interfering with the integrity of the six counties (A. Carty, Was Ireland Conquered, 1996, pp. 135-140).

In British India, it was argued that Mountbatten held a ‘metaphorical gun’ to Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s head when he ‘consented’ to a ‘moth-eaten Pakistan’ that he had spent his whole career opposing. Mountbatten even admitted that he ‘drove the old man quite mad’ by insisting that the logic of partition, if applied to India, must equally apply to the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal (quoted in M. Zafrulla Khan, The Agony of Pakistan, 1974, p. 47). Nehru agreed with Sardar Patel that ‘it might be possible to frighten Mr. Jinnah into cooperation because of the shortness of time available before partition must be completed’ (M. Zafrulla Khan, The Agony of Pakistan, 1974, p. 47). Read the rest of this entry…

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