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Home International Tribunals Archive for category "Investor-State Arbitration Tribunals" (Page 5)

Philip Morris v Uruguay: an affirmation of ‘Police Powers’ and ‘Regulatory Power in the Public Interest’ in International Investment Law

Published on July 28, 2016        Author: 

In recent years there has been criticism that international investment treaties and investor-State arbitration conducted under those treaties increasingly, and unacceptably, have encroached upon the legitimate uses of States’ regulatory power. These concerns have not only been expressed in scholarship, but have also been at the forefront of State negotiations in recent multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements (see, for example, the recent discussion by Anthea Roberts and Richard Braddock here on the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement). The concerns have led to policy proposals from States and international organisations for greater safeguards for States to be able to enact measures in the public interest without attracting liability under investment treaties.

Investor-State arbitration tribunals appear to be alive to these concerns. On 8 July 2016, a tribunal (constituted by Professor Piero Bernardini, Mr Gary Born and Judge James Crawford) convened pursuant to the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’) delivered an award which, by majority, upheld the legality of two tobacco-control measures enacted by the Uruguayan government for the purpose of protecting public health. The award contains an extensive analysis of the interaction between States’ regulatory powers to enact laws in the public interest and States’ obligations to protect and promote foreign investment within their territory. This post will focus on two aspects of the award that considered this interaction: the claim pursuant to Article 5 of the BIT (expropriation) and the claim pursuant to Article 3(2) (fair and equitable treatment or FET).

The challenged measures

The claim, brought by the Philip Morris group of tobacco companies against Uruguay, challenged two legislative measures. First, the claimants challenged a law that mandated a ‘single presentation requirement’ on cigarette packaging, such that different packaging or variants of cigarettes were prohibited.

Secondly, the claimants challenged a law that mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packaging from 50 to 80% of the lower part of each of the main sides of a cigarette package (‘the 80/80 requirement’). As the the amicus brief submitted by the WHO and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (‘FCTC’) Secretariat noted, large graphic and text health warnings are increasingly common on tobacco packaging globally and a number of States have enacted (or are considering enacting) laws with the aim of preventing misleading tobacco packaging, as is required of States parties to the FCTC (including Uruguay). Read the rest of this entry…

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Arbitral Controls and Policing the Gates to Investment Treaty Claims against States in Transglobal Green Energy v. Panama and Philip Morris v. Australia

Published on June 22, 2016        Author: 

Investor-State arbitral tribunals are increasingly policing the gates to investment treaty claims against States. The initiation of investment treaty claims against States remains subject to a high threshold of good faith against possible abuse of process by investors, as recently stressed by arbitrators Dr. Andres Rigo Sureda (President), Professor Christoph Schreuer, and Professor Jan Paulsson, in their 2 June 2016 Award in Transglobal Green Energy LLC and Transglobal Green Panama S.A. v. Republic of Panama. The Tribunal upheld Panama’s objection to jurisdiction on the ground of “abuse by Claimants of the investment treaty system by attempting to create artificial international jurisdiction over a pre-existing domestic dispute.” (Transglobal Award, para. 118). The Transglobal Award was issued six months after another tribunal in Philip Morris International v. Australia [composed of arbitrators Professor Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel (President), Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, and Professor Donald M. McRae] issued its landmark 17 December 2015 Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, declaring that: “the commencement of treaty-based investor-State arbitration constitutes an abuse of right (or abuse of process) when an investor has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a point in time where a dispute was foreseeable. A dispute is foreseeable when there is a reasonable prospect that a measure that may give rise to a treaty claim will materialize.” (Philip Morris Award, para. 585.) While to date there is scarcely any doctrinal unanimity over what comprises abuse of process, abuse of rights, or bad faith institution of investor-State claims [see for example Eric De Brabandere, Good Faith, Abuse of Process, and the Initiation of Investment Treaty Claims, 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 3, pp. 1-28 (2012), these recent arbitral decisions provide concrete guidance of factors that tribunals have taken into account to determine whether investor-claimants instituted investment treaty arbitration proceedings in good faith.

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Protecting Public Welfare Regulation Through Joint Treaty Party Control: A ChAFTA Innovation

Published on June 21, 2016        Author: 

Anthea%20Roberts%20PhotoIf countries wish to protect legitimate and non-discriminatory public welfare regulation from investor-state claims, what options do they have? This post highlights an innovative feature in the recent China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) that goes well beyond existing safeguards for protecting the regulatory autonomy of states by providing a mechanism for joint treaty party control. In doing so, ChAFTA evidences a new and controversial step in efforts to recalibrate interpretive authority between arbitral tribunals and the treaty parties acting collectively.

Richard BraddockNewer-style investment treaties often seek to protect countries’ regulatory autonomy by reaffirming the importance of public welfare regulation in the preamble; refining and clarifying core investment protections; and sometimes including general exceptions clauses. These approaches are useful but have limits. Preambular provisions are non-binding. Substantive clauses are binding, but states may not wish to allow arbitral tribunals to second-guess the permissibility of sensitive public welfare measures. Even if respondent states ultimately prevail, they are likely to expend considerable resources in time and money in defending claims.

Faced with these concerns, China and Australia broke new ground in ChAFTA by including a mechanism that protects public welfare measures through joint treaty party control. ChAFTA provides that, “Measures of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order shall not be the subject of a claim” by an investor (Article 9.11.4). If an investor challenges a regulatory measure, the respondent state is permitted to issue a “public welfare notice” specifying why it believes that the measure falls within this exception. The arbitration proceedings are then suspended and a 90-day consultation period with the other treaty party is triggered (Article 9.11.5-9.11.6).

If the treaty parties agree that the challenged measure fits within the scope of the carve-out, the decision is binding on any investor-state tribunal and any decision or award issued by such a tribunal must be consistent with that decision (Article 9.18.3). Read the rest of this entry…

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The Empire Strikes Back: Yukos-Russia, 1-1

Published on May 26, 2016        Author: 

In the latest chapter to the ever fascinating Yukos dispute, Russia recently secured a victory in the District Court of The Hague, which set aside the US $ 50 billion awards issued two years ago by an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The crucial issue was whether Russia was bound to arbitrate under the ECT’s provisional application clause. The arbitral tribunal, comprised of Y. Fortier, C. Poncet, and S. Schwebel, said ‘yes’; three Judges of The Hague District Court, D. Aarts, I.A.M. Kroft and H.F.M. Hofhuis, said ‘no’. It will be argued here that the District Court put too much emphasis on the domestic constitutional legality of the ECT’s provisional application, at the expense of investors who were entitled to believe that Russia had agreed to such provisional application.

Earlier Episodes of the Dispute

The dispute between the now defunct oil company Yukos and Russia has grown into a protracted legal battle, involving a number of investment arbitration tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights, and domestic courts in various jurisdictions. At one point the largest oil company in Russia, Yukos was liquidated in 2006 by the Russian authorities in the process of enforcing tax reassessments, which allegedly demonstrated that Yukos had engaged in large-scale tax evasion. According to Yukos and many international observers, the tax reassessments were a pretext for regaining control over the Yukos imperium and bringing down its influential CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Foreign shareholders of Yukos have brought investment arbitration claims against Russia under various treaties, including the 1989 UK-Russia BIT (award), the 1991 Spain-Russia BIT (award), and the ECT. The investors have been largely successful, obtaining their biggest win on 18 July 2014, when a tribunal constituted under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued three awards granting a total of US $ 50 billion to the claimants, on the ground that Russia had breached the expropriation provision of the ECT (Article 13). These awards have now been set aside by The Hague District Court (some reactions here and an analysis of the consequences here).

Provisional Application

Whereas previous battles focused on whether the Russian tax reassessments and subsequent enforcement measures were mala fide, the crucial issue at the current stage is whether the arbitration clause of the ECT (Article 26) was actually applicable with regard to Russia, which signed but never ratified the treaty, and withdrew from it in 2009 (not the only Member State to do so).

Pursuant to Article 45 ECT, a signatory State agrees to apply the treaty provisionally ‘pending its entry into force’, ‘to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations’ (para. 1) and if that State had not objected to provisional application at the moment of signing (para. 2(a)). Given the fact that Russia had not issued such an objection (unlike Norway, Iceland and Australia), the dispute focused on whether a provisional application of the ECT was consistent with Russian law.

Consistency of What: the Piecemeal v. the All-or-Nothing Approach

In spite of its apparently casual wording, Article 45(1) or ‘the Limitation Clause’ raises complicated questions of interpretation. A first point of disagreement between the arbitral tribunal and the Hague District Court is what exactly needs to be consistent with Russian law: the idea of provisional treaty application as such, or the provisional application of specific treaty provisions. According to the court (5.18), the issue of consistency should be assessed separately for any treaty provision to be applied provisionally (‘piecemeal approach’), and not for the entire treaty as a whole (‘all-or-nothing approach’), as the tribunal had found (like the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia). While the tribunal and the court emphasized different textual elements of Article 45(1), their conclusions also demonstrate different preoccupations. According to the tribunal, the piecemeal approach would ‘create unacceptable uncertainty in international affairs’, allowing a State to opt out of provisional application at any time, in particular after a dispute had arisen (para. 315 Interim Awards). The court, on the other hand, emphasized that Article 45(1) serves to avoid conflicts between domestic law and international obligations (5.19). The provision might indeed cause some uncertainty, but this was the choice of the States party to the ECT and apparently justified by the wish to prevent inconsistencies between international and domestic law.

What Constitutes an Inconsistency?

On the basis of its piecemeal approach, the Hague District Court focused on whether the arbitration clause of the ECT was consistent with Russian law. In this context, the Yukos shareholders argued that an inconsistency between Article 26 and domestic law could only exist in the form of an explicit prohibition under Russian law. The court took a wider approach, ruling that a provisional application of the ECT’s arbitration clause would also be inconsistent with Russian law if there would be no legal basis for this type of dispute settlement. The court would also find an inconsistency if investor-state arbitration did ‘not harmonise with the legal system’ or if it were ‘irreconcilable with the starting points and principles that have been laid down in or can be derived from legislation’ (5.33).

Applying this framework of analysis, the court found that Russian law did not provide ‘a separate legal base’ for investor-State arbitration (5.58). It did not attach much weight to the fact that in 1996 the Russian government had stated that the provisions of the ECT were ‘consistent with Russian legislation’ (5.60). Instead, the court pointed at the history of the ratification of some other investment treaties, demonstrating a parliamentary concern that Russian law did not contain a legal basis for investment arbitration (5.64).

State Sovereignty v. the Legitimate Expectations of the Investor

Provisional application is an exception to the normal rules on how treaties enter into force (reports of the ILC’s Special Rapporteur here). Whereas the period between signing and ratifying normally allows States to reconsider the matter and verify whether domestic law needs to be adapted, a provisional application provision purports to bind States already while these assessments are being made. This is a serious intrusion into State sovereignty, which explains why the ECT contains a Limitation Clause and why it allows signatories to opt out by means of a declaration.

State sovereignty, however, is not the only interest at stake in the context of provisional application, and needs to be balanced against the legitimate expectations of other parties and, in the case of the ECT, investors. When Russia signed the ECT without making a declaration under Article 45(2), it might be thought that it created a presumption of compatibility between the ECT and domestic law. Neither the tribunal nor the court followed the shareholders’ argument that the absence of a declaration under Article 45(2) precluded Russia from invoking the Limitation Clause. However, Russia’s choice not to signal any objections to provisional application but to wait until a claim was filed, sheds doubts on the credibility of the defence. This is even more problematic because the alleged inconsistency concerns ambiguous provisions that seem to allow for legitimate disagreement as to whether they allow investor-State arbitration.

The Hague District Court put a strong emphasis on the importance of the domestic separation of powers. Noting that only the Russian Parliament possesses legislative powers, the court concluded that parliamentary approval was necessary for the creation of a form of dispute resolution which did not have a legal basis in Russian law (5.93). This argument seems to revert back to the question of whether the principle of provisional application is acceptable as such. One could reply that the choice to adopt a provisional application provision in a treaty already means that the signatory States temporarily circumvent the domestic separation of powers, and that they may have good reasons to do so.

Tribunals v. Courts

It is tempting to consider other, more fundamental reasons why the Hague District Court might have decided to set aside the awards. First, since Article 45(1) makes provisional application conditional on domestic law, the court may have felt a need to defer to Russia’s interpretation of its own laws and to follow its argument of inconsistency. Second, it is probable that a court in the Netherlands – with its strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty – is relatively susceptible to Russia’s arguments concerning the domestic separation of powers. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is striking that the arbitral tribunal on the one hand and the District Court on the other seem to approach the State in a different manner. The court appears well-disposed towards the State, sharing Russia’s alleged concern over the domestic constitutionality of the provisional application of the ECT, whereas the tribunal is more critical, suggesting doubts as to whether Russia’s invocation of Article 45(1) is sincere and credible. Arguably, the different approaches demonstrate differences between the preoccupations of arbitral tribunals and courts (not only within host states) and the ways in which they balance State sovereignty against investor interests.

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CETA’s New Domestic Law Clause

Published on March 17, 2016        Author: 

The recent, widely-reported ‘legal scrub’ of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has drawn attention for its endorsement of a radical shift away from the model of investor-state dispute settlement that has prevailed in investment agreements to date. The new text indicates that Canada has agreed to the EU’s proposals on an investment court system, with a permanent roster of arbitrators appointed by Canada and the EU, rather than ad hoc tribunals whose members are appointed by the disputing parties themselves. In another innovation, CETA will also include an appeals mechanism, which will have power to review the merits of first-instance rulings, going beyond the limited grounds for annulment of awards in the existing ICSID system.

Alongside these revolutions, the new CETA text also contains another change from the earlier text. Under the heading of ‘Applicable law and interpretation’, Article 8.31(2) of the new text provides:

The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure, alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of the disputing Party. For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of the disputing Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.

Although the provision is new in CETA, it has also recently appeared in the EU-Vietnam FTA and in similar language in the EU’s November 2015 TTIP proposals. While this might suggest that the provision is a recent invention of the EU, its inspiration in CETA could equally have come from Canada, which included a similar provision in its 2008 FTA with Colombia. In fact, Colombia itself appears to have first spearheaded the provision, including language on domestic law broadly similar to the provision’s first sentence in its 2007 Model BIT and in agreements signed as far back as 2006 with Japan, the UK, India, Belgium, China, Peru and Switzerland. Read the rest of this entry…

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Claims by Dual Nationals under Investment Treaties: A New Form of Treaty Abuse?

Published on December 9, 2015        Author: 

The issue of treaty abuse (or ‘treaty shopping’) has received heightened attention recently in the context of the on-going negotiations for the conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In a public consultation on the potential inclusion of an investor-State arbitration clause in TTIP, the European Commission (EC) has raised concerns regarding the investors’ manipulation of corporate nationality through the so-called “shell” or “mailbox” companies in order to take advantage of the protection afforded by investment treaties (See Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, Question 1, p. 18). In line with the contributions made by many of the participants involved in the consultation process, the EC has stated that these companies should be excluded from the scope of TTIP. Accordingly, the EC has proposed to narrow the definition of the term ‘investor’ by requiring that a juridical person must have ‘substantial business activities’ in the territory of a signatory State (See Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, Question 1, pg. 18).

The foregoing requirement certainly responds to the criticisms of inappropriate treaty shopping, and it may be considered as a useful tool to prevent corporate investors from obtaining treaty protection by illegitimate means. Yet, the EC overlooks the fact that, in addition to corporations, investment treaties might also be subject to abuse by individual investors. In this context, a new type of BIT claim is now emerging in the field of investor-State arbitration, whereby investors who hold the nationality of both contracting parties to the treaty (i.e. dual nationals) make their own State a respondent before an international tribunal. Read the rest of this entry…

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Creating Conduits: Summary Report of the First Annual Oxford Investment Claims Summer Academy, St. Anne’s College (Oxford)

This July 13-14, Oxford University Press and Investment Claims convened the First Annual Oxford Investment Claims Summer Academy at St. Anne’s College, the University of Oxford. Co-chaired by Diane Desierto, Ian Laird, and Frederic Sourgens, the Academy brought together a select expert group of academic and practitioner delegates to discuss the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration in the context of continuous and often virulent political criticism. The method and structure of the Academy departed from a traditional presentation format. Instead, the Academy as the first gathering of experts of its kind acted as a laboratory for open and rapid discussion of frontier issues among all participants. As a result of this format, the Academy constructively explored both traditional text-based and context-sensitive solutions for these frontier issues. ICJ Judge James Crawford’s keynote address to the delegates aptly captured the spirit of the open and critical discussion when noting that while there is little in the way of feasible alternative to investor-state arbitration and much to lose by its abolition. Bench, bar, and ivory tower must find it in them to become better stewards of this mode of international dispute resolution. In particular, there is an urgent need to address weaknesses made visible by the first two decades of sustained arbitral and annulment jurisprudence. With the depth of engagement at the inaugural session, the co-chairs are planning to hold the Academy again in the summer of 2016.

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Revisiting ‘Interested Parties’ in Investor-State Arbitration: Ticaret Procedural Order No. 3’s Compelled Disclosure of Third-Party Funders

Published on August 3, 2015        Author: 

On 12 June 2015, the arbitral tribunal – composed of Professors Julian Lew, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Bernard Hanotiau – in Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti v. Turkmenistan [ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6] issued its landmark Procedural Order No. 3, ordering the claimant-investors therein to confirm:

 “whether its claims in this arbitration are being funded by a third-party funder, and if so, shall advise Respondent [Turkmenistan] and the Tribunal of the name or names and details of the third-party funder(s), and the nature of the arrangements concluded with the third-party funder(s), including whether and to what extent it/they shall share in any successes that Claimants may achieve in this arbitration.” (Tribunal’s Decision in Order, para. 13.)

Ticaret Procedural Order No. 3 is the first such order issued in the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) system that directly compels parties to disclose third-party funding arrangements in investor-State arbitration. Most importantly, it is the first publicly known arbitral order to confer (tacit) recognition to the critical role of third-party funders as part of the complex spectrum of interested parties in an investor-State arbitration. Apart from host States and investors, tribunals have thus far accepted that assignments of interest may be made by investor-claimants, without jeopardizing their standing in the dispute. In Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic [ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para. 32], held that, even in cases of assignments or subrogations of interest by investor-claimants, the “absence of beneficial ownership by a claimant in a claim or the transfer of the economic risk in the outcome of a dispute should not and has not been deemed to affect the standing of a claimant in an ICSID proceeding, regardless of whether or not the beneficial owner is a State Party or a private party.” The Ticaret Procedural Order No. 3 is the first instance that an investor-State tribunal openly conceded that a third-party funder’s financing arrangements with an investor-claimant could have a significant bearing on the substantive outcomes and procedural fairness of the arbitration. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Viability of Corruption Defenses in Investment Arbitration When the State Does Not Prosecute

Published on April 15, 2015        Author: 

Corruption has become a focal point in international investment arbitration, as investors and respondent States both have alleged corruption as the basis for claims and defenses in a number of recent investment arbitrations. Decisions in cases such as World Duty Free v. Kenya and Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan confirm that corruption is contrary to international public policy and the laws of nearly all nations. Accordingly, if an investment tribunal finds that the investor obtained its investment through corruption, the tribunal will conclude that it lacks jurisdiction over the dispute or that the investor’s claims are inadmissible.

Certain commentators have suggested, however, that respondent States should be required to prosecute the allegedly corrupt parties in order to raise defenses based on corruption. A threshold question thus is whether a State should be deemed to have acquiesced in the alleged corruption and thus be estopped from asserting any related defenses, if it failed to prosecute the allegedly responsible individuals.

As early as 2000, the tribunal in Wena Hotels v. Egypt remarked that it was “reluctant to immunize Egypt from liability in this arbitration,” because the government of Egypt had been aware of the consulting agreement that allegedly was used to conceal corrupt payments, and had “decided (for whatever reasons) not to prosecute” the consultant (para. 116). More recently, in the set-aside proceeding of Congo v. Commisimpex, the Paris Court of Appeal held that Congo’s mere allegations of a general climate of corruption within the government administration, without indicating the persons likely to be involved in the corruption or prosecuting the alleged beneficiaries of the corruption, were an insufficient basis to set aside the award against Congo. Notwithstanding the comments in these decisions regarding the State’s failure to prosecute, the State’s failure to prosecute was not dispositive in either case, because neither the Wena tribunal nor the Paris Court of Appeal was presented with persuasive evidence of corruption. As the Wena tribunal explained, Egypt bore “the burden of proving such an affirmative defense” of corruption, and had “failed to present any evidence that would refute Wena’s evidence that the [consulting agreement] was a legitimate agreement. . . .” (para. 117). Read the rest of this entry…

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The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: A Model for Investment Law Reform?

Published on April 8, 2015        Author: 

In the midst of heated debates on investor-State dispute settlement in Europe, on 10 December 2014 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. Prepared by UNCITRAL in the context of its recent revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Convention, also known as the ‘Mauritius Convention on Transparency’, was opened for signature on 17 March 2015 in Port Louis, Mauritius. Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Mauritius, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Convention at this occasion (see UN Press Release). In my Editorial in the latest issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade (which this blog reproduces), I interpret this Convention as a piece of constitutional reform of the international investment regime and ask to which extent it can serve as a model for international investment law reform more generally.

A Piece of Constitutional Reform of the International Investment Regime

The Mauritius Convention will extend the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, which so far have a very limited scope of application (only to UNCITRAL investor-State arbitrations that are based on treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014), potentially to the entire treaty-based international investment regime as it stood on 1 April 2014. Notably, it would make the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules applicable to all treaty-based investor-State arbitrations under ‘old’ treaties, independently of the applicable arbitration rules. Whether the arbitration in question is governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Convention, the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce – you name it – the Mauritius Convention would provide for transparency of submissions to arbitral tribunals, arbitration hearings, and decisions by arbitral tribunals, and give more room for third-party participation under a uniform set of rules. It could thus apply to some 3000+ investment treaty relations if both the respondent State and the investor’s home State are contracting parties or, alternatively, if the investor-claimant accepts the unilateral offer to apply the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules made by the respondent in signing the Convention (see Article 2 of the Mauritius Convention).

Provided it is signed and ratified by a sufficiently large number of States and regional economic integration organizations, such as the EU or ASEAN, the Mauritius Convention will bring about a paradigm shift in investor-State dispute settlement. Although possibilities for reservations, including subsequent ones, are broad (Articles 3 and 4 of the Mauritius Convention), and although ongoing arbitrations are excluded from its scope of application (Article 5 of the Mauritius Convention), the Convention will establish transparency as a general principle of international investment law.

This constitutes another step in the incremental adaptation of international investment law to the demands of a more democratic and accountable international public law system of private-public adjudication. The wide-spread application of transparency under the Convention would not only enhance the accountability of the underlying investor-State relations, but also enable better public control of the arbitral process. This turns the Mauritius Convention into an instrument with constitutional implications for the international investment regime. Read the rest of this entry…

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