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Home Archive for category "International Tribunals"

Whither the Aspirational ICC, Welcome the ‘Practical’ Court?

Published on May 22, 2019        Author: 
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What is the promise of the International Criminal Court (ICC)? What do we, as observers, scholars, and constructive critics of the Court, believe that the ICC should do in a world of populism, altered balances of power, and persistent atrocity? Why has the Court been able to achieve so little and what would be required, in terms of new strategies and reforms, to build a better ICC? What do we believe that the institution should look like in the future? What is our vision of the ICC?

Over the past few weeks, EJIL:Talk! has hosted a number of thoughtful and thought-provoking essays seeking to answer some of these questions. With this piece, I want to ask admittedly less than legal questions: is the ICC becoming a less aspirational institution and can we balance the aspirations of ICC justice with the need to deliver meaningful accountability?

The Shadow of Expectations

It is now conventional wisdom that, for the majority of its existence, the ICC and its backers promised too much to too many. As is often pointed out, the Court and its most fervent champions set expectations that the ICC could never meet. They insisted that the Court would end impunity for international crimes, put victims front and center in all of its work, transcend global power relations, deter mass atrocities, hold the most powerful to account, promote reconciliation… you name it. It’s a laundry list of things that the ICC didn’t achieve because it couldn’t achieve them. It should never have been asked to.

The ICC hasn’t been a panacea for political ills such as violent political conflict or social challenges such as reconciliation. Unmet expectations have thus left many proponents privately regretful of having espoused unrealistic expectations about the Court and worrying about the disappointment that ensued. Now, the aim of many – both inside and outside of the ICC – is to focus on being realistic and on what the Court can realistically achieve. But there may be a cost to bending too far towards practicality: the loss of an institution that is meaningfully aspirational. The goal must be to strike a balance practicality and aspiration. Read the rest of this entry…

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Clarification and Conflation: Obligations Erga Omnes in the Chagos Opinion

Published on May 21, 2019        Author:  and
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The recent ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning the Chagos Islands has, understandably, received a great deal of attention. The controversies surrounding the more political elements of the decision have dominated headlines. However, in this blog post, we want to focus on one particular aspect of the Court’s decision. Tucked away at the end of the opinion, paragraph 180 recognises the erga omnes character of the obligation to respect self-determination and finds that there exists an obligation, binding on all states, to cooperate with the UN to complete the decolonisation of Mauritius:

‘180. Since respect for the right to self-determination is an obligation erga omnes, all States have a legal interest in protecting that right […]. The Court considers that, while it is for the General Assembly to pronounce on the modalities required to ensure the completion of the decolonization of Mauritius, all Member States must co-operate with the United Nations to put those modalities into effect. As recalled in the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

“Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle” […].’ (emphasis added).

This is followed by confirmation in paragraph 182 and in operative paragraph 5 (with only Judge Donoghue dissenting, on unrelated grounds), that ‘all Member States must co-operate with the United Nations to complete the decolonization of Mauritius.’

Since its recognition in 1970 (Barcelona Traction [33]-[34]), the concept of erga omnes has been the subject of heated academic debate and has surfaced a handful of times in ICJ judgments, opinions, and arguments before the Court (e.g. here [29], here [64], and here [15]). However, the notion of erga omnes remains surrounded by a considerable lack of conceptual clarity. There is frequent conflation, even at the level of the ICJ, between this and other international legal concepts. Paragraph 180 of the Chagos opinion provides both a well-needed clarification and a potential source of confusion in this regard. Read the rest of this entry…

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Application of the CERD Convention (Qatar v UAE) and “Parallel Proceedings” before the CERD Committee and the ICJ

Published on May 17, 2019        Author: 
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Last week, the International Court of Justice held hearings to consider the United Arab Emirates request for provisional measures in the Case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. UAE).  The UAE’s requests are unusual in at least two ways. First these requests constitute the second request for provisional measures in the case, with the first requests considered by the Court last year. Second, and more unusually, this is a rare instance of the respondent state (and one which challenges the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case) requesting provisional measures. 

The UAE has made requests under four grounds, but I would like to focus on the first, that: ‘(i) Qatar immediately withdraw its Communication submitted to the CERD Committee [the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination] pursuant to Article 11 of the CERD on 8 March 2018 against the UAE’. The request raises the question of whether international law has developed a principle of lis pendens such that parallel proceedings before different international bodies should be disallowed. It also engages the issue in previous caselaw of whether the preconditions of Article 22 are alternative or cumulative.

Two mechanisms for inter-state disputes under the CERD

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Convention) contains two mechanisms for inter-state “complaints”. First, Articles 11-13 provide for inter-state communications whereby one state party, considering that another state party is not giving effect to the provisions of the Convention, may bring the matter to the attention of the CERD Committee. Second, Article 22 provides that any dispute between two or more states parties with respect to the interpretation or application of the Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in the Convention, can be referred to the ICJ for decision. Read the rest of this entry…

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Symposium on the Genocide Convention: Is the Duty to Prevent Genocide an Obligation of Result or an Obligation of Conduct according to the ICJ?

Published on May 16, 2019        Author: 
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Editor’s note: This is the final post in our blog symposium arising out of the Nottingham International Law and Security Centre conference to mark the 70th Anniversary of the Genocide Convention. Read the other posts in this symposium here and here.

This post questions the findings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 2007 Bosnia v. Serbia case, according to which the duty to prevent a genocide is an obligation of conduct that can be assessed only after the occurrence of a genocide. The post first briefly explores the distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result on the basis of the International Law Commission (ILC)’s works and judicial practice. The post moves on to emphasise some inconsistencies in the ICJ’s reasoning in relation to the occurrence of a genocide as a prerequisite for the violation of the duty to prevent genocide. Finally, the post advances some possible explanations of the role of the event ‘genocide’ in relation to the duty to prevent genocide.

The 2007 ICJ’s Decision

In the 2007 Bosnia v. Serbia case, the Court for the first time declared that an autonomous obligation of diligent conduct to prevent genocide exists under Article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention (see my reflections here). According to the Court:

It is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due diligence”, which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. (para 430, emphasis added)

The Court went on to affirm that a breach of the duty to prevent genocide can be assessed only after a genocide has occurred. The Court took the view that:

a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed. It is at the time when commission of the prohibited act (genocide or any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention) begins that the breach of an obligation of prevention occurs. […] If neither genocide nor any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention are ultimately carried out, then a State that omitted to act when it could have done so cannot be held responsible a posteriori, since the event did not happen. (para 431, emphasis added)

However, the view that a genocide must occur before a State’s compliance with the duty to prevent genocide can be assessed ignores the fact that this duty is a due diligence obligation of conduct. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the evolution of the notion of obligations of conduct. Read the rest of this entry…

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To be a Party or not to be a Party: Malaysia’s envisaged ‘withdrawal’ from its (pending) accession to the Rome Statute

Published on May 14, 2019        Author:  and
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As inter alia confirmed by its recent judgments concerning the Afghanistan situation and the Al Bashir case, the ICC currently finds itself in truly turbulent times. What is more, is that the Rome Statute has turned out to be a real treasure trove when it comes to the international law of treaties. This includes, inter alia, the ratification of the Rome Statute by Palestine and the ensuing question as to whether the accession by Palestine ought to be counted towards the quorum of 30 ratifications of the Kampala Amendment so as to provide for its entry into force (see here), as well as other intriguing questions of treaty law raised by the Kampala compromise on the crime of aggression and the way in which to eventually amend the Rome Statute (see here). The withdrawals by Gambia and South Africa, which both later, albeit for different reasons, ‘withdrew from their respective withdrawals’ before they even became effective (see here and here), as well as Burundi’s withdrawal in October 2017 (see here), and most recently that by the Phillipines, again raised various issues of treaty law. 

Yet another question of treaty law relating to the Rome Statute is emerging. After having submitted its instrument of accession to the UN Secretary General on 4 March 2019 (see here), which in accordance with Art. 126 (2) of the Rome Statute means that Malaysia would have formally become a State Party on 1 June 2019, the Malaysian Prime Minister announced on 5 April 2019 the Malaysian government’s decision to, as he put it, ‘rescind its membership of the Statute’. Read the rest of this entry…

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An Analysis of the Use of ICJ Jurisprudence in Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Published on May 13, 2019        Author: 
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Last October 2018, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “the Court”) issued its merits judgment in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile). In a brief passage, the Court summarily dismissed Bolivia’s argument that the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” exists in general international law outside the context of fair and equitable treatment clauses. Despite the brevity of the Court’s analysis – and the minor importance of the legitimate expectations issue in that case – this finding drew attention from media outlets dedicated to investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”), including IAReporter. That the discussion of legitimate expectations in the Bolivia v. Chilejudgment was considered newsworthy in the ISDS sphere is a reflection of the importance that ISDS practitioners place on ICJ jurisprudence. As Professor Alain Pellet observed in a 2013 lecture, “[n]ot only do … investment tribunals… refer to the jurisprudence of the World Court, but they show a particular deference to it.”

There is some evidence, discussed below, to suggest that ISDS tribunals have referred to ICJ jurisprudence with increased frequency in recent years. Moreover, as ICJ President Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf highlighted in his October 2018 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, the Court today is particularly busy. There may thus be even more opportunities for jurisprudential cross-pollination in the near future. Now is an opportune time to consider why, when, and how investor-State tribunals refer to ICJ jurisprudence.

Read the rest of this entry…

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Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is it Time for the Assembly of State Parties to be the adults in the room?

Published on May 8, 2019        Author: 
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The self-inflicted misfortunes of the International Criminal Court continue. The recent Pre-Trial Chamber decision not to authorise the opening of an investigation in Afghanistan has already generated considerable controversy (see here, here, here, here and here). The rather surprising news that Judge Ozaki would be allowed to continue to serve part time on the Court while becoming Japan’s ambassador to Estonia has also drawn criticism. And, of course, on Monday the Al Bashir immunity decision was handed down. Amidst the hubbub, one other development has gone relatively unremarked. The first four presidents of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP) have released a joint op-ed through the Atlantic Council entitled “the International criminal court needs fixing”. For present purposes, it is enough to note several key points.

The op-ed calls for “an independent assessment of the court’s functioning by a small group of international experts”. This call appears triggered by the Afghanistan decision which they see as expressing “a lack of confidence that the Court could successfully carry out the job.” The rest of the piece pursues two central points – and a cluster of worrying claims. Read the rest of this entry…

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ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that Heads of State Have No Immunity Under Customary International Law Before International Tribunals

Published on May 6, 2019        Author: 
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The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, this morning, issued what seems to be an extremely controversial decision on Head of State Immunity. At the time of writing, the full written judgment is not yet available in the appeal by Jordan against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber referring that state to the UN Security Council for failing to arrest then President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir when he attended an Arab League Summit in March 2017.  However, in the oral and written summary of the judgment, delivered this morning by the President of the Court, Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, the Appeals Chamber appears to have held that under customary international law, heads of state have no immunity from criminal prosecution international criminal courts. The provision in Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute that “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person” , according to the summary of the judgment:

“represents more than a stipulation in treaty law. The provision also reflects the status of customary international law, as it concerns the jurisdiction that an international criminal court is properly entitled to exercise.”

In so holding, the Appeals Chamber, once again changes the basis on which the ICC has held that the Sudanese (now former) President was not immune from the arrest in ICC states parties that he visited (for a quick overview of the Court’s previous inconsistent decisions, see this AJIL Unbound piece). Indeed the Appeals Chamber appears to explicitly endorse the much criticised decision of Pre-Trial chamber I in the Malawi Decision. The Summary states that:

“39. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber is fully satisfied that the pronouncements made by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Malawi Referral Decision — and those made by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the case of Charles Taylor (who was indicted before that international court when he was the sitting President of Liberia) — have adequately and correctly confirmed the absence of a rule of customary international law recognising Head of State immunity before international courts in the exercise of proper jurisdiction. 
40. The effect of absence of a rule of customary law recognising Head of State immunity, in relation to international courts, is not readily avoided through the backdoor: by asserting immunity that operates in the horizontal relationship between States, in a manner that would effectively bar an international court from exercising its jurisdiction over the person whose arrest and surrender it has requested. The law does not readily condone something to be done through the backdoor, if the law has forbidden the thing to be done through the front door.”

This is stunning and appears to be deeply misguided. It is also, in my opinion, a very dangerous and unwise move for the Court to make. This reasoning appears to assert that parties to the Rome Statute, have, by creating the Court, taken away the rights of non-party states under international law. Dangerous because this reasoning is likely to stiffen opposition to the Court by non-parties. The John Bolton’s of this world and many people far more reasonable will point to this ruling to set out precisely why it is important to oppose this court and other international criminal courts. As I stated here many years ago, the Malawi decision was a terrible one.  It was very poorly reasoned and roundly criticised by others as well (see Bill Schabas and Dov Jacobs). It is extremely disappointing to see it resurrected. Not least because the issue of the immunity of heads of state before international criminal courts is not what is at issue in these cases. What was is at issue is the immunity of heads of states from arrest by other states acting at the request of an international criminal court. That the head of state may not have immunity before the international criminal court does not, without more, say anything about whether he or she may have immunity before a foreign state.

Read the rest of this entry…

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Afghanistan and the ‘interests of justice’; an unwise exercise?

Published on April 26, 2019        Author: 
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It has been more than a week now that a reference to the ‘interests of justice’ has highjacked the international criminal law blogosphere. The recent decision by the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) to reject the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s request for authorization to open an investigation in the Afghanistan situation, solely on the basis of interests of justice, not only has triggered ‘outcry’, but it has also united various scholars and experts from very different backgrounds. Characteristically enough, this decision has been described as problematic for the legitimacy of the Court, especially in a period in which the Court needs a credibility boosting (see Vasiliev), as legally wrong, either due to the PTC’s review without prior invocation of interests of justice by the Prosecutor (see Jacobs ) or due to its de novo review (see Heller ), and as dangerous for the entire feasibility of the project, given the message it conveys in cases of no cooperation. In simple words, there is a striking consensus that this is a very bad decision (see De Vos and Kersten).

Several legal aspects of the decision have been already addressed by a series of commentators (see Jacobs and Akande and Labuda) and in the interests of  justice for the readers, I will refrain from repeating them. I have also suggested in the past the revision of the very narrow OTP policy paper (see JICJ) and recommended the consideration of the interests of justice via the angle of a fairness based theory of prosecutorial legitimacy (see EJIL). However, for the purposes of this very short intervention I would like solely to question the judicial wisdom, or mainly the lack thereof, to utilize this controversial tool in this particular moment of time.  In other words, was the invocation by the judges of this concept for the very first time a wise exercise of their judgment or not?  

Read the rest of this entry…

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The ICC and US Retaliatory Visa Measures: Can the UN Do More to Support the Privileges & Immunities of the Prosecutor?

Published on April 23, 2019        Author:  and
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On 12 April 2019, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II decided to reject the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan on the grounds that an investigation would not be “in the interests of justice,” though it found that the case otherwise satisfied the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility set forth in the Rome Statute (see recent posts here). The ruling came on the heels of the US revocation on 5 April of ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s visa for entry to the US, and prior US threats to take action against the ICC for examining the situations in Afghanistan and Palestine.

While the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) made no direct mention of recent US hostility towards the ICC, it appears to have implied, and others have suggested (here, here, and here), that such pressure played a role in the decision. As the PTC noted, “subsequent changes within the relevant political landscape both in Afghanistan and in key States (both Parties and non-Parties to the Statute), coupled with the complexity and volatility of the political climate still surrounding the Afghan scenario, make it extremely difficult to gauge the prospects of securing meaningful cooperation from relevant authorities for the future […]” (para. 94).

Senior US officials were quick to claim victory and take credit for the development, ostensibly linking US pressure to the outcome. Alluding to a potential appeal of the PTC decision, as well as the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine, President Trump menaced that US actions against the ICC could continue: “any attempt to target American, Israeli or allied personnel for prosecution will be met with a swift and vigorous response.”

This post considers how the United Nations can—and may be obliged to—play a bigger role in helping to protect the Prosecutor and her team from one form of this US hostility towards the Court: visa restrictions. Despite US obligations under the US-UN Headquarters Agreement to allow the transit of individuals conducting business at UN Headquarters, some ambiguity surrounds the question of when and under what conditions the US will allow the Prosecutor access to Headquarters now that her visa has been revoked. Read the rest of this entry…

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