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Home Archive for category "International Tribunals"

Populist International Law? The Suspended Independence and the Normative Value of the Referendum on Catalonia

Published on October 12, 2017        Author: 

In his speech before the Catalan regional parliament on 10 October 2017, the Catalan President Carles Puigdemont suspended a declaration of independence but stated that the referendum of 1st October gave the Catalans a mandate for creating a sovereign state. This post examines whether this assertion is borne out by international law. I submit that neither the Catalans and their leaders nor the central government act in an international law-free zone.

A declaration of independence would not violate international law

The International Court of Justice, in its Kosovo opinion of 2010, found that a unilateral declaration of independence does “not violate general international law” (para. 122) ─ if such a declaration is not “connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (para. 81; see also paras 84, 119-121 on non-violation). The ICJ in that Opinion inverted the legal question placed before it (which had been whether the declaration of independence was “in accordance with international law” (para. 1)). The Court had also shied away from saying anything meaningful on secession (as opposed to the speech act of declaring independence). In result, the Advisory Opinion came out as a parsimonious if not meagre restatement of the law.

Disproportionate use of force (police and military) is prohibited by international law

However meek, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is relevant for Catalonia also with regard to the prohibition on the use of force. The Court here said that “unlawful use of force” would taint a declaration of independence and make it violative of international law (para. 81), but did not say when such resort to force would indeed be “unlawful”. Also, the ICJ did not say whose use of force although it probably had the separatists themselves in mind. Read the rest of this entry…

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(Non-)Recognition of De Facto Regimes in Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights: Implications for Cases Involving Crimea and Eastern Ukraine

Published on October 9, 2017        Author: 

In an increasing number of cases, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’, ‘the Court’) has been dealing with the question of the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’, ‘Convention’) on territories which are outside the control of the state to which they belong. Such lack of control is either because of the occupation by a foreign state or because of the control by a separatist movement, as a rule, established and/or existing with the aid of a foreign state. One of the issues that arises in this context is the (non-)recognition of the regime that exercises control over such territory (the de facto regime).

This blog post looks at the Court’s existing approaches to the (non-)recognition of de facto regimes. It then discusses the implication of this approach for cases involving Eastern Ukraine and Crimea that may come before the Court and require it to deal with the question of (non-)recognition.

Existing approaches

The issue of (non-)recognition becomes particularly relevant when the Court is called on to assess proceedings conducted by the courts of a de facto regime in the light of the Convention. The Court has dealt with the issue of (non-)recognition when deciding on the exhaustion of domestic remedies at the admissibility stage, and on claims relating to freedom from arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial at the merits stage. Read the rest of this entry…

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Extradition: English Court refuses to extradite alleged génocidaires to Rwanda–will a domestic prosecution follow?

Published on October 2, 2017        Author: 

The Divisional Court of England and Wales has dismissed the appeal of the Government of Rwanda in the high-profile extradition proceedings against five alleged génocidaires in the case of Rwanda v Nteziryayo and ors. The men will not be extradited to Rwanda to stand trial for genocide and it now appears that, if they are to be tried at all, it must be in the UK.

The judgment of the Divisional Court affirmed the decision of District Judge Emma Arbuthnot on 22 December 2015 to discharge the extradition requests on two grounds: double jeopardy–one of the requested persons had been tried in a domestic ‘Gacaca’ court—and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Judge accepted the evidence of the requested persons that there was a real risk they might suffer a flagrant breach of their rights to a fair trial if extradited to Rwanda.

The background to this latest decision reveals the evolving measures employed by the international community to promote justice and end impunity for international crimes. 

Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which was intended to bring to trial those most responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of law perpetrated in Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 1824, passed on July 2008, called for the completion of the work of the ICTR by 2010. Read the rest of this entry…

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The scope of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression: a different perspective

Published on September 29, 2017        Author: 

In his post of 26 June 2017 Dapo Akande asks:

“Are nationals of states that do not ratify or accept the Kampala amendments, and which also do not opt out of ICC jurisdiction as provided for in those amendments, subject to ICC jurisdiction over aggression in cases where the situation is referred to the Court by a state, or the prosecutor takes up the matter proprio motu?”

Why does the answer to this question matter? “No” means that an ICC state party that has ratified the amendments will enjoy the Court’s judicial protection only if it falls victim to aggression by one of the other (currently) 33 ratifying states. It would be an opt-in regime for potential aggressor states, and in fact, they could at any time later opt-out again (opt-in-opt-out). “Yes” means that such protection extends to aggression committed by any of the 123 other ICC states parties – of course with the significant caveat they can still opt out. That would be an opt-out regime. All of this of course only in the absence of a referral by the UN Security Council, which would make state consent a moot point.

The issue is currently discussed by ICC states parties in view of the activation decision to be taken in December 2017. I am therefore happy to explain why I think the answer is “yes”, even though Dapo gave a thoughtful argument for “no”. Read the rest of this entry…

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Barbulescu v Romania: Why There is no Room for Complacency When it Comes to Privacy Rights in the Workplace

Published on September 26, 2017        Author: 

For some privacy advocates, the decision earlier this month of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Barbulescu v Romania was another milestone in the pursuit of greater protection for employee privacy. Reversing a decision of the Fourth Section last year, the Court held that the monitoring of an employee’s Yahoo Messenger account breached his right to respect for private life in Article 8. While it would be churlish to contradict such claims, this is no time for complacency.

Mr. Barbulescu was a sales engineer working for a private company in Romania. The company in question prohibited the use of its equipment (including the internet) for personal use – a policy it robustly enforced with dismissals for transgressors – facts which Mr. Barbulescu was made aware of. At his employer’s request, Mr. Barbulescu opened a Yahoo Messenger Account in order to communicate with customers. He was subsequently told that this account had been monitored, revealing that it had been used for personal purposes. When Mr. Barbulescu denied this claim, he was presented with a transcript of the content of his messages. These included exchanges with his brother and his fiancé, some of which were of an intimate nature. Mr. Barbulescu was fired. He challenged his dismissal in the domestic courts alleging that it breached his right to private life. Those claims were dismissed and Mr. Barbulescu brought his case to Strasbourg. Read the rest of this entry…

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Twenty Years of the ECHR in Ukraine

Published on September 18, 2017        Author:  and

Twenty years ago, in September 1997, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) entered into force for Ukraine. By ratifying the Convention, Ukraine recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). While Ukraine had been a party to a number of the international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, long before the ECHR, joining the ECHR had a special significance. It symbolised a European choice of Ukraine, a final breakaway from the Soviet past, and (at least on paper) the acceptance of the European values of democracy and respect for human rights. Making the determination to join the Council of Europe (CoE) and its fundamental legal instruments, however, was easier than to maintain Ukraine’s international obligations in practice. In fact, there had been times when the CoE seriously considered to terminate the membership of Ukraine altogether (in 1999, for example, for the failure to abolish the death penalty).

This post will not cover all the intricacies of the complex (and at times turbulent) relationship between Ukraine and the CoE. We will start with a brief review of the statistics regarding the current situation, in particular the ECtHR case law concerning Ukraine. Then, we will focus on the reasons why Ukraine is still one of the laggard states in terms of the numbers of applications and violations to the ECtHR. Further, we will discuss Read the rest of this entry…

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A Commentary on the Maritime Delimitation Issues in the Croatia v. Slovenia Final Award

Published on September 15, 2017        Author: 

I. Introduction

An arbitral tribunal, constituted under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, issued its final and unanimous award in the Croatia v. Slovenia case on 29 June 2017. The arbitration concerned a territorial and maritime dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. This post will focus on the maritime delimitation issues. The present post will deal with the Arbitration Agreement of 2009 (“AA”) (II), the Junction Area (III), and the maritime boundary (IV) in turn. The questions of contamination of the proceedings and the annulment of inter-state arbitral awards have caused a series of controversies. These fall outside the scope of this post and have already been dealt with by Alison Ross and Peter Tzeng respectively. These issues were determined by the reconstituted arbitral tribunal in its partial award rendered on 30 June 2016.

II. The Arbitration Agreement of 4 November 2009

The dispute between the Parties was submitted to arbitration in accordance with an Arbitration Agreement signed by the parties on 4 November 2009 in Stockholm (Annex HRLA-75, Final Award), and witnessed by the then Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, since Sweden then held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (“EU”). The Arbitration Agreement is unique because it is the first intra-state arbitration agreement of its kind to be drafted under the auspices of the EU, despite the fact that this is not the first occasion where an international organisation was involved in such a task. [See for example the signature for specific purposes of the World Bank of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960, between India and Pakistan, although that treaty is much more complex and not just a simple arbitration agreement (see Article IX and Annexure G). See also for example the involvement of the African Union, the UN and a few EU member states in the drafting of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005, which was witnessed by the Minister of Development Co-operation of the Netherlands on behalf of the EU, paving the way for the drafting of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement 2008, which was eventually signed by the government of Sudan and the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement Army only. Brooks Daly has written more on the procedural aspects of the Abyei arbitration.]

The brokering of the Arbitration Agreement by the EU is reflected in Article 9, which requires Slovenia to “lift its reservations as regards the opening and closing of negotiation chapters where the obstacle is related to the dispute”. This was an important provision for Croatia’s accession to the EU. It is to be noted that Slovenia had already been a member of the EU for approximately 5 years at the date of signature of the arbitration agreement, as it had acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004. On the other hand, on the date of signature of the Arbitration Agreement, Croatia was on the path to accession, which was to last for another 4 years, as it eventually became an EU member state on 1 July 2013.

There are two other points worth mentioning regarding the 2009 Arbitration Agreement. First, the applicable law as set out in Article 4 is unusual. The “rules and principles of international law” were applicable to determining the course of the maritime and land boundary (Article 3(1)(a)). International law, equity and “the principle of good neighbourly relations in order to achieve a fair and equitable result” were applicable to determining Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea and the regime for the use of the relevant maritime areas (Article 3(1)(b) and (c)). This is probably a rare instance of the principle of good neighbourly relations for the achievement of a “fair and just result” being encountered in a modern Arbitration Agreement. While it is doubtful whether such a principle could count as a “general principle of law recognised by civilized nations” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(C) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, it might be regarded as similar to a requirement to determine a case ex aequo et bono under Art. 38(2) of the ICJ Statute. The inclusion of this source of “applicable law” is a curious addition, which can probably be explained by the fact that it was a product of negotiations under the auspices of the EU.

The second point worth mentioning regarding the Arbitration Agreement is that one of the tasks of the arbitral tribunal, as per Article 3 (b)-(c), was to determine “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea” and “the regime for the use of the relevant maritime areas”. This is a peculiar insertion, and apparently led the arbitral tribunal to determine that starting point of the present arbitration was not whether Slovenia should have a junction to the high sea, but rather where the junction would be and what would be the package of rights given to Slovenia over that area. Read the rest of this entry…

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The MERCOSUR Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation: regionalizing an innovative approach to investment agreements

Published on September 12, 2017        Author:  and

The States Parties of the MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) signed in April 2017 the Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation (“MERCOSUR Protocol”).

As discussed in this post, the Protocol draws significantly on the Brazilian model investment agreement (the Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments – ACFI), which stands out for departing from the traditional design of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), particularly – but not only – by excluding the possibility of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS).

The emergence of the MERCOSUR Protocol has implications at the level of investment policy, as it represents a step towards the regionalization of the Brazilian model. It reflects the attempt to include in a single document the realities of four countries with important political, economic and investment policy differences, as expressed by the varying trajectories of Argentina and Brazil in the investment area.

It also raises interesting questions from an international law perspective. It highlights the legal challenges faced by Brazil, which not only joined the network of international investment agreements (IIAs) as a late-comer but also opted for embracing a particular approach to investment treaties. Accordingly, aside from provisions that innovate in investment law-making, the MERCOSUR Protocol incorporates provisions whose intention seems to be to insulate Brazil from applying protection standards often found in the over 3,000 treaties that now comprise the network of BITs, but which have been deliberately absent in the ACFI.

Read the rest of this entry…

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New EJIL:Live! Interview with Niels Petersen on his Article “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law”

Published on September 7, 2017        Author: 

In this latest episode of EJIL: Live! the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, Professor Joseph Weiler, speaks with Professor Niels Petersen of the University of Münster, whose article, “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law”, appears in Volume 28, Issue 2 of the journal.

In the article, Professor Petersen explores International Court of Justice decisions confirming the existence of customary international law.  The abstract of the article states that:

It is often observed in the literature on customary international law that the identification practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for customary norms deviates from the traditional definition of customary law in Article 38 (1) lit. b of the ICJ Statute. However, while there are many normative and descriptive accounts on customary law and the Court’s practice, few studies try to explain the jurisprudence of the ICJ. This study aims at closing this gap. I argue that the ICJ’s argumentation pattern is due to the institutional constraints that the Court faces. In order for its decisions to be accepted, it has to signal impartiality through its reasoning. However, the analysis of state practice necessarily entails the selection of particular instances of practice, which could tarnish the image of an impartial court. In contrast, if the Court resorts to the consent of the parties or widely accepted international documents, it signals impartiality.

The EJIL:Live! discussion focuses on the principal empirical findings of the article, and Petersen’s novel conceptualization of those arguments in terms of “judicial politics”, explicable by the institutional constraints that the Court faces. This conversation offers a reflection on how this assessment of the jurisprudence could alter scholars’ normative conceptions of the Court’s decisions, particularly in regards to customary international law.

 

Read the rest of this entry…

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Who is the victim of cultural heritage destruction? The Reparations Order in the case of the Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi

Published on August 25, 2017        Author: 

On 17 August 2017, Trial Chamber VIII of the ICC issued its Reparations Order in the Al Mahdi case. The Chamber found that Al Mahdi was liable for 2.7 million euros for (a) the damage caused by the attack of nine mosques and the Sidi Yahia Mosque door; (b) the economic loss caused to the individuals whose livelihoods depended upon the tourism and maintenance of these ‘Protected Buildings’ and to the community of Timbuktu as a whole; and (c) the moral harm caused by the attacks, as illustrated by one of the victims quoted in the order: “My faith is shattered. My family fled [.] […] I lost everything and all my faith” (at §85).

The Reparations Order builds upon the reparations principles established in Lubanga and Katanga. However, it is also one of the few opportunities public international law has had to pronounce upon appropriate reparations for heritage destruction—forming part of the string of ‘firsts’ involved in Al Mahdi thus far.

Who is a ‘relevant victim’ of cultural heritage destruction?

The Chamber identified three groups of victims: the inhabitants of Timbuktu, as the direct victims of the crime; the population of Mali; and, notably, the international community. The latter category is a new element in the reparations jurisprudence of the Court, and its inclusion in the present Order seems to be mostly a consequence of the particular category of crime the Chamber was dealing with. Read the rest of this entry…

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