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Home International Organisations Archive for category "Security Council"

The Security Council and Climate Change – Too Hot to Handle?

Published on April 26, 2018        Author: 
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Introduction

The Security Council, the only body of the United Nations that can adopt binding coercive measures, has so far been reluctant to train its sight at climate change. As the consequences of climate change become ever more severe, an important question is therefore whether the Security Council will address the security implications of climate change.

Article 24 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council’s classic domain has been interstate armed conflict. Starting in the early 90s, the Council began to show a greater willingness to prescribe measures also in internal situations of humanitarian emergency, thereby articulating a new approach to what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (clearly described in Presidential Statement S/23500, 31 January 1992).

The purpose of this post is to examine whether we can expect a similar evolution when it comes to climate change. In doing so, we must distinguish between three different ways in which the Council can address climate change.

First, the Council can address climate change as part of its general response to conflict situations. Ongoing hostilities in Libya, South Sudan, Yemen and Syria were all catalyzed by extraordinary droughts, storms and extreme flooding, which caused economic and political turmoil and instability. Yet, all these conflicts are recurring items on the Security Council’s agenda. Seen this way, the Council has already shown its aptitude to deal with the immediate security implications of climate change as part of its conflict management agenda.

Second, the Council can proscribe targeted measures to prevent climate change as an independent driver of conflict. This is arguably very different than merely tackling the violent effects of climate change without addressing climate directly. Third, the Council can address security implications of climate change occurring outside of conflict. This is an especially acute problem for most of the so-called Small Island Developing States (SIDS), whose very existence are threatened by sea-level rise, hurricanes and dwindling natural resources. Their remote geographical location and small populations suggest that the situation in those states could gradually deteriorate without causing much conflict or international instability.

The focus of the remainder of the post will be on the Council’s ability to address climate change directly, both as an independent driver of or unrelated to conflict. Read the rest of this entry…

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Unlawful Reprisals to the Rescue against Chemical Attacks?

Published on April 12, 2018        Author: 
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Donald Trump has threatened Syria with a ‘big price to pay’ for an alleged chemical attack on 7 April in a Damascus suburb. Last year, in similar circumstances, Trump authorized an attack of 59 Tomahawk missiles that reportedly killed 9, including 4 children. The French and German governments responded with a joint press release finding it a ‘just and proportionate’ response. They did not say ‘lawful’–nor could they.

Armed reprisals are uses of military force that follow an incident, usually to punish or in retaliation or revenge and which do not fit the exception to the prohibition on the use of force for self-defence. See the same conclusion here  and here. Reprisals need Security Council authorization to be lawful. The Security Council has never authorized a reprisal and will not in the case of Syria.

In 1970, the General Assembly stated clearly in its Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States that among the fundamental rights and duties of states, is the ‘duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force’ against other States. The International Court of Justice found in its 1994 advisory opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that ‘armed reprisals in time of peace […] are considered to be unlawful.’ In the Oil Platforms case, it further held that US attacks on Iranian sites were not lawful acts of self-defense because of their retaliatory nature.

Thus, unauthorized reprisals are always unlawful Read the rest of this entry…

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African Union v International Criminal Court: episode MLXIII (?)

Published on March 23, 2018        Author: 
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It never gets boring. At the latest African Union (AU) summit, which wrapped up recently in Addis Ababa, the AU-ICC controversy went into its next round; this time, however, with a rather constructive proposal for easing the tensions that had built up over the past decade or so as a result of the uneven application of international criminal justice. In this post I will reflect upon the implications of the recent summit decision for the future of international criminal justice, including the debate about immunities, the consequences of potential arrest warrants for high-ranking Burundian officials, as well as the debate about an African mass withdrawal. 

Previous AU responses to what was being perceived as neo-colonial interference on the part of the International Criminal Court had not been very constructive – ranging from issuing shrill statements calling the Court “a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans“, threatening mass withdrawal, blocking the opening of the ICC Liaison Office in Addis, and announcing non-cooperation in the arrest of suspects. This time, by contrast, the AU opted for a more constructive, de-escalatory approach, using the tools of international law – instead of international politics – to make its voice heard: It announced that it would seek, through the UN General Assembly, an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the question of immunity. The AU also decided that it would seek an interpretative declaration from the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) on how Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which removes immunity for state officials, and Article 98, which addresses cooperation with respect to a waiver of immunity and consent to surrender relate to one another, and the related question of how a Security Council referral affects the enjoyment of immunities of officials of non-state parties. The proposal to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ was first made several years ago. It is not clear why this proposal was shelved in the meantime. Perhaps the AU feared the ICJ would find in favor of the ICC’s position. Read the rest of this entry…

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Security Council Resolutions as Evidence of Customary International Law

Published on March 1, 2018        Author: 
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In 2012 the International Law Commission began to address one of the last major uncodified areas of public international law: how norms of customary law (CIL) are to be identified.  The exercise at the ILC has not been an easy one.  States commenting in 2016 on the Commission’s “draft conclusions” expressed concerns on a variety of issues.  One of the most contentious was the role of international organizations (IOs) in the creation of custom. 

The topic has been the subject of academic conferences at the University of Manchester, the University of Michigan and elsewhere, as well as a growing volume of law review commentary (see here, here, here, here and here).  And in early January, the United States submitted comments on the draft conclusions that were, to put it mildly, opposed to any role for IOs.  Closer to home, Kristen Boon, Isaac Jenkins and I have just published an article on the role of the Security Council in generating evidence of custom related to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), an area of intense Council involvement. In this post I’ll describe the ILC’s view of IOs, the United States’ response, and then our affirmative arguments specific to the Security Council. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Immunity of al-Bashir: The Latest Turn in the Jurisprudence of the ICC

Published on November 15, 2017        Author: 
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On 6 July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued a new decision in the case of Omar al-Bashir. The Chamber ruled that South Africa failed to comply with its obligation to arrest the President of Sudan by welcoming him for a summit of the African Union two years earlier. This decision did not come as a surprise because the Court had repeatedly ruled before that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity from arrest and that all states parties have an obligation to arrest him. What makes the decision curious, however, is that the Chamber again adopted a new position on the immunity of al-Bashir:

  • In 2011, the Chamber found that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity because of an exception under customary international law for the prosecution of international crimes by an international court like the ICC. According to the Chad and Malawi decisions, no sitting Head of State could ever claim immunity before the ICC (for reactions see: here and here).
  • In 2014, the Chamber revised its position and concluded that the Security Council implicitly waived his immunity in Resolution 1593. Al-Bashir would not enjoy immunity because the Council issued a binding decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter obliging Sudan ‘to cooperate fully with … the Court’ (for reactions to the DRC decision see: here and here).
  • In it most recent decision of 6 July 2017, the Chamber found that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity because the Security Council’s referral placed Sudan in a similar position as a state party. Al-Bashir would not possess immunity from arrest because of Article 27(2) of the Statute which provides that immunities ‘… shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction’.

In this post I examine the Chamber’s most recent decision on the case of al-Bashir and make a number of critical observations. Read the rest of this entry…

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Repressing Migrant Smuggling by the UN Security Council and EU Naval Military Operation Sophia: Some Reflections on Jurisdiction and Human Rights

Published on November 3, 2017        Author: 
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On 5 October 2017, the UN Security Council through S/RES/2380 (2017) renewed for the second time the enforcement powers that S/RES/2240 (2015) granted to states in order to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking off the coast of Libya.

In a previous blog post that I wrote here in October 2015, I concluded by wondering what the effects will be of S/RES/2240 (2015) and by questioning, from several standpoints, the use of military action against migrant smugglers and human traffickers and in the overall management of the migrant crisis.

These UN Security Council resolutions provide the legal basis for the EU naval operation mandated with the task of disrupting the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the Southern Central Mediterranean: EU NAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. Established in 2015 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778, its mandate has been renewed until 31 December 2018.

Criticisms of Operation Sophia are widespread and concerns over its failure to meet its objectives and its human rights implications are no secret (see among others Meijers Committee and Not so Humanitarian after All). On the occasion of the second renewal of the S/RES/2240 (2015), it’s time to take a closer look at Operation Sophia’s results, at the legal shortcomings of the web of legal instruments regulating its actions, and the various consequences these have had. Read the rest of this entry…

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Extradition: English Court refuses to extradite alleged génocidaires to Rwanda–will a domestic prosecution follow?

Published on October 2, 2017        Author: 
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The Divisional Court of England and Wales has dismissed the appeal of the Government of Rwanda in the high-profile extradition proceedings against five alleged génocidaires in the case of Rwanda v Nteziryayo and ors. The men will not be extradited to Rwanda to stand trial for genocide and it now appears that, if they are to be tried at all, it must be in the UK.

The judgment of the Divisional Court affirmed the decision of District Judge Emma Arbuthnot on 22 December 2015 to discharge the extradition requests on two grounds: double jeopardy–one of the requested persons had been tried in a domestic ‘Gacaca’ court—and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Judge accepted the evidence of the requested persons that there was a real risk they might suffer a flagrant breach of their rights to a fair trial if extradited to Rwanda.

The background to this latest decision reveals the evolving measures employed by the international community to promote justice and end impunity for international crimes. 

Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which was intended to bring to trial those most responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of law perpetrated in Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 1824, passed on July 2008, called for the completion of the work of the ICTR by 2010. Read the rest of this entry…

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Why the ICC won’t get it right – The Legal Nature of UN Security Council Referrals and Al-Bashir Immunities

Published on July 24, 2017        Author: 
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As readers of this blog probably know, the issue of personal immunities of Sudanese President Al-Bashir is highly controversial (see here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here). In particular, previous rulings by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chambers have been criticized for their incorrect, inadequate and/or inconsistent reasoning for concluding that personal immunities do not apply in case of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir.

On 6 July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued yet another set of arguments for the same conclusion (here), while Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut issued a minority opinion disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning (here). In essence, the PTC II, by majority, held that

because the rights and obligations as provided for in the Statute, including article 27(2), are applicable to Sudan (by imposition of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the immunities of Omar Al-Bashir as Head of State do not bar States Parties to the Rome Statute from executing the Court’s request of his arrest and surrender (para 107)

Disagreeing with the majority decision, Judge Brichambaut found that “the current state of the law does not allow a definite answer to be reached in relation to the question of whether this resolution removes the immunities of Omar Al Bashir” (para 83). However, Judge Brichambaut finds that

The combined effect of a literal and contextual interpretation of article IV of the Genocide Convention, in conjunction with an assessment of the object and purpose of this treaty, lead to the conclusion that Omar Al-Bashir does not enjoy personal immunity, having been “charged” with genocide within the meaning of article VI of the Genocide Convention. (para 100)

In this blog post, I am not addressing the decision or the minority opinion specifically (as I am sure others will do so shortly). Rather, I wish to present a theory of the legal nature of SC referrals, without which, the ICC will not get the issues surrounding Bashir’s immunities right. Read the rest of this entry…

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Forcible Humanitarian Action in International Law- part II

Published on May 18, 2017        Author: 
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Part II of a Two-Part Post

Interpreting Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter

According to the concept of representation noted in Part I, forcible humanitarian action is not intervention or a prima facie unlawful use of force, given the actual or implied consent of the true sovereign. However, even if forcible humanitarian action is considered an instance of the use of force that requires justification, it is still lawful.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter precludes the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The reach of that obligation has been debated since the inception of the Charter. Some argue that Article 2(4) did not affect pre-existing customary law, which permitted forcible humanitarian action, much like Article 51 of Charter on self-defence has not overturned the conditions for the exercise of that right expressed in the Caroline formula of 1841/2.

Others claim that Article 2(4) was meant to impose a blanket prohibition of the use of force, save for self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is countered, however, with reference to the fact that Chapter VII never came into full operation, at least during the Cold War years.

Even after the termination of the Cold War, collective action has often been precluded by the particular interest of the one or other permanent member of the Council holding a veto. This would leave populations without the protection of international action which was assumed to be available when Article 2(4) was drafted. It would be manifestly unreasonable to leave them exposed to destruction merely due to the peculiar interest of the one or other powerful state exercising a capricious veto. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Precedent Set by the US Reprisal Against the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria

Published on May 1, 2017        Author: 
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In his recent post on the United States’ missile strike against a Syrian airbase, on 6 April 2017, Marko Milanovic focused primarily on the unlawfulness of that action (here). While I agree with that view, in this post, I wish to focus on the nature of the precedent which the US reprisal has set. Moreover, I argue that this instance of use of a forcible countermeasure by a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) should serve to refocus attention on a dysfunctional UNSC.

Three remarks at the outset: (a) This post concerns only “forcible countermeasures” or “reprisals”; (b) I characterise the US missile strikes as a reprisal against Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Although other characterisations have been proffered (for instance, humanitarian intervention or providing assistance in a counter-insurgency), the US administration has framed its actions primarily in terms of a forcible response to the use of chemical weapons (see below); and (c) I rely on the assumption, tendered by the US but disputed by Russia, that Syria was responsible for the chemical attack.

The Legal Framework

A useful starting point for this discussion are the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001, which have been said to present “a combination of codification and progressive development” (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, p. 422). Article 49(1) of the Draft Articles states that “An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations…” Thus, while the Draft Articles envisage the lawfulness of countermeasures in certain circumstances, it is important to clarify briefly: (1) which countermeasures are envisaged; and (2) which party may undertake them. Read the rest of this entry…

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