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Home Archive for category "International Organisations"

Why the ICC won’t get it right – The Legal Nature of UN Security Council Referrals and Al-Bashir Immunities

Published on July 24, 2017        Author: 

As readers of this blog probably know, the issue of personal immunities of Sudanese President Al-Bashir is highly controversial (see here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here). In particular, previous rulings by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chambers have been criticized for their incorrect, inadequate and/or inconsistent reasoning for concluding that personal immunities do not apply in case of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir.

On 6 July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued yet another set of arguments for the same conclusion (here), while Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut issued a minority opinion disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning (here). In essence, the PTC II, by majority, held that

because the rights and obligations as provided for in the Statute, including article 27(2), are applicable to Sudan (by imposition of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the immunities of Omar Al-Bashir as Head of State do not bar States Parties to the Rome Statute from executing the Court’s request of his arrest and surrender (para 107)

Disagreeing with the majority decision, Judge Brichambaut found that “the current state of the law does not allow a definite answer to be reached in relation to the question of whether this resolution removes the immunities of Omar Al Bashir” (para 83). However, Judge Brichambaut finds that

The combined effect of a literal and contextual interpretation of article IV of the Genocide Convention, in conjunction with an assessment of the object and purpose of this treaty, lead to the conclusion that Omar Al-Bashir does not enjoy personal immunity, having been “charged” with genocide within the meaning of article VI of the Genocide Convention. (para 100)

In this blog post, I am not addressing the decision or the minority opinion specifically (as I am sure others will do so shortly). Rather, I wish to present a theory of the legal nature of SC referrals, without which, the ICC will not get the issues surrounding Bashir’s immunities right. Read the rest of this entry…

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An Appraisal of the Council of Europe’s Draft European Rules on the Conditions of Administrative Detention of Migrants

Published on July 19, 2017        Author: 

In the last decade, a growing momentum has developed to end immigration detention. This momentum has two dimensions. First, that certain migrants, such as children, should never be detained as they are in a situation of particular vulnerability. Second, that even if a migrant is not deemed to be in a situation of ‘particular vulnerability’, alternatives to detention should be preferred and detention only used as a last resort when lawful, for a legitimate purpose, necessary and proportionate. The exceptionality of immigration detention is rooted in the recognition of the harmful physical and psychological effects of the administrative detention of persons who are not accused of a crime. The adverse impact of detention is magnified when accompanied by uncertainty about when the detention might end as well as the risk of ill-treatment, discrimination and poor detention conditions.

In addition to the work of NGOs such as the International Detention Coalition, international organisations have called on states to develop alternatives to immigration detention with some producing action plans to end immigration detention. Read the rest of this entry…

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ICJ Advisory Opinion Request on the Chagos Islands

Published on June 24, 2017        Author: 

Yesterday the UN General Assembly voted, by 94 to 15 with 65 states abstaining, to issue a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Chagos Islands. Readers will be familiar with the many legal disputes that have arisen from this leftover UK colonial possession in the Indian Ocean, ranging from the human tragedy of the Chagossians expelled en masse from the islands to make room for what is now a US military base of enormous size and importance, to the role that the Diego Garcia base played in the war on terror, to the applicability of human rights law to these issues, the designation of real or pretextual maritime protection areas, and the actual sovereignty dispute with Mauritius. Here’s a useful news item from the Guardian, and here is GA resolution itself, A/RES/71/292.  This is the operative part, i.e. the request that the Court will have to address:

(a)     “Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?”;

(b)     “What are the consequences under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?”.

The precise drafting of these questions can be enormously consequential, as shown most recently and most clearly with the Kosovo advisory opinion – I would refer interested readers in that regard to the volume edited by Michael Wood and myself on The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (OUP, 2015), particularly chapters 3, 6 and 7 which deal with various aspects of the ‘question question.’ At first glance, the drafting of the Chagos request is not only interesting, but also quite intelligent, especially regarding the (a) part.

Why? Well, one almost ritualistic aspect of these advisory opinions are the objections made to the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of its exercise by states who opposed the issuance of the AO request in the first place. These objections almost never work, but the good fight is nonetheless always fought. And there are cases, like the Kosovo one, in which a particular objection (there regarding the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA) could find significantly more purchase than could otherwise be expected. In the Chagos case in particular, one could expect the UK to make the objection that the AO request is trying to circumvent the consent requirement for contentious ICJ jurisdiction, and is in effect litigating a bilateral dispute (see e.g. the Wall AO, para. 43-50). And in fact there clearly is a set of bilateral disputes on Chagos between Mauritius and the UK.

Note, however, the clever drafting of part (a) of the request: it doesn’t directly speak of whether Mauritius has sovereignty over the Islands, but asks whether the process of decolonization of Mauritius was lawfully completed because of the separation of the Chagos Islands from its territory. It also makes links to numerous GA resolutions, in order to reinforce the view that this is a multilateral issue, raising broader questions of principle which the GA has been dealing with for decades.

When it comes to part (b) of the request, what’s particularly notable is that it doesn’t simply ask what the consequences would be if the Court found that the UK acted unlawfully in part (a). Rather, the consequences are those arising from the UK’s continued administration of the Chagos Islands. This would allow the Court to deal with various questions that not directly related to sovereignty or any faults with the decolonization process, like the plight of the Chagossians. On the other hand, the drafting of part (b) is also such that it could allow the Court to ‘properly interpret’ it in such a way as to avoid some of the more controversial issues, as it in fact did in the Kosovo AO. We shall, of course, have to wait and see what happens – but watch this space.

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Revising the Treaty of Guarantee for a Cyprus Settlement

Published on June 21, 2017        Author: 

On June 28th, 2017, the UN-sponsored international conference in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, will attempt to comprehensively settle the Cyprus Issue. The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot delegations will be joined by the delegations of the three ‘Guarantor Powers’ (Greece, Turkey and the UK), and one from the EU as an observer, in order to discuss the issue of security and guarantees – an issue that appears to be the major stumbling block for an agreement. The existing Treaty of Guarantee (1960) has failed in so many respects. It has been violated by the Greek side, which suspended basic articles of the Constitution under the doctrine of necessity in the 1960s and sought to unite the island with Greece following the junta-led military coup in 1974. It has also been violated by the Turkish side, which used it to militarily intervene in 1974, without seeking to reestablish the state of affairs created in 1960 and instead opting to partition the island.

The current position of the Greek side is that guarantees should be abolished altogether, whereas the Turkish side considers that they have provided effective security and should be maintained in some form or another. In public discourse, both sides selectively interpret the notion of guarantee and what it is meant to serve so as to support their positions. If not treated as a political cover but in a legal sense, however, a guarantee refers to ‘any legally binding commitment to secure [an] object’ (Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1, 9th edition, p. 1323). Creating binding commitments is the gist of the matter that should concern us. Read the rest of this entry…

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Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Unlawful Death Gets a New Life

Published on May 26, 2017        Author: 

The Revised Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death has just been published. It sets out the international human rights and criminal justice standards applicable to national investigations into alleged summary executions and other suspicious deaths, while also providing detailed advice on crime scene investigation and forensic methodology.

The document is highly relevant for human rights lawyers and criminal justice practitioners.  As I also discuss here [pp. 204ff], human rights cases dealing with suspicious killings regularly turn on the quality of the national criminal investigation into the crime. If the investigation was done properly, international human rights mechanisms will typically defer to its findings; if not, they will find a procedural violation of the right to life, even if state responsibility for the killing itself cannot be proven.

The original Minnesota Protocol was prepared in 1991 by a small group of lawyers from that icy state and later published by the United Nations Secretariat. Formally also known as the United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, the document has been cited with approval by the Inter-American and European human rights courts.

The just published version of the Minnesota Protocol/U.N. Manual maintains the established brand names. But the text has been completely overhauled by the drafting team around outgoing U.N.  Special Rapporteur on Summary Executions, Christof Heyns (note: the author was not involved). A biopsy of the old and new versions of the Minnesota Protocol goes to show how far human rights law has advanced over the last quarter century. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Turning of the Tide against ISDS?

Published on May 19, 2017        Author: 

The Court of Justice for the European Union fired a significant shot at investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) this week, and the result is likely to be much more than just a flesh wound. In deciding that the European Union did not have exclusive competence to enter into agreements including ISDS clauses, the Court made it significantly more likely that the EU would jettison these clauses from its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and seek to conclude separate, parallel agreements dealing with dispute resolution. Along with a series of other developments, this may mark a turning of the tide against the inclusion of ISDS clauses in trade and investment agreements.

Background to the European Court’s Opinion

This week’s landmark case concerned the European Union’s competence to enter into the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. This is a newer style FTA that, in addition to covering classic trade issues, like reductions in customs duties, includes provisions on a range of other trade-related matters, such as intellectual property protection, investment, public procurement, competition and sustainable development. This FTA also included investor-state arbitration.

The question that the Court had to grapple with was whether the European Union had exclusive competence to enter into such agreements, or whether this competence was shared between the EU and the Member States (or even fell within the exclusive competence of the Member States), at least with respect to certain issues. The European Commission and Parliament wanted EU exclusive competence, but this received pushback from many of the Member States.

In many ways, the Court handed a significant victory to the European Union on these issues. Going further than had been suggested by the Advocate General’s Opinion in that case, the Court found that the European Union had exclusive competence over almost all aspects of the EU-Singapore FTA, which paves the way for them to enter into such agreements without requiring the approval of all of the Member States. But this general ruling was subject to two notable exceptions. Read the rest of this entry…

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Forcible Humanitarian Action in International Law- part II

Published on May 18, 2017        Author: 

Part II of a Two-Part Post

Interpreting Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter

According to the concept of representation noted in Part I, forcible humanitarian action is not intervention or a prima facie unlawful use of force, given the actual or implied consent of the true sovereign. However, even if forcible humanitarian action is considered an instance of the use of force that requires justification, it is still lawful.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter precludes the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The reach of that obligation has been debated since the inception of the Charter. Some argue that Article 2(4) did not affect pre-existing customary law, which permitted forcible humanitarian action, much like Article 51 of Charter on self-defence has not overturned the conditions for the exercise of that right expressed in the Caroline formula of 1841/2.

Others claim that Article 2(4) was meant to impose a blanket prohibition of the use of force, save for self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is countered, however, with reference to the fact that Chapter VII never came into full operation, at least during the Cold War years.

Even after the termination of the Cold War, collective action has often been precluded by the particular interest of the one or other permanent member of the Council holding a veto. This would leave populations without the protection of international action which was assumed to be available when Article 2(4) was drafted. It would be manifestly unreasonable to leave them exposed to destruction merely due to the peculiar interest of the one or other powerful state exercising a capricious veto. Read the rest of this entry…

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Non-UN Financial Sanctions against Central Banks and Heads of State: in breach of international immunity law?

Published on May 12, 2017        Author: 

Conventional Wisdom Challenged?

Recent years have seen a wide range of non-UN financial sanctions being adopted against States and their instrumentalities, including central banks, as well as against high-level State officials. Prominent examples include the EU and US sanctions against the central banks of Syria and Iran, and the asset freezes against the serving Presidents of Zimbabwe and Syria. In spite of the EU’s firm assertion that its ‘restrictive measures’ “are fully compliant with obligations under international law”, one might be inclined, intuitively, to regard such sanctions as a prima facie breach of international immunity rules (whether or not they qualify as (third-party?) countermeasures is a different story altogether – one which the present post will not touch upon). Thus, given the lack of a general exemption in respect of activities de jure imperii, Castellarin argues that the EU’s financial sanctions against central banks are contrary to State immunity law – a position which is also subscribed to by Thouvenin and Dupont. Others have arrived at the same conclusion in respect of asset freezes targeting Heads of State (see e.g. Pillitu). When discussing the matter with fellow scholars, it seems that the applicability of, and incompatibility with, immunity rules is often taken for granted.

Yet, is this conventional wisdom (if that is what it is) justified? It is quite remarkable to see how, on the one hand, the EU goes to some lengths to insert tailor-made exemptions to asset freezes in order to enable payments to or from diplomatic or consular posts (or exceptions to travel bans to allow officials to participate in international conferences) – even if the practice seems far from consistent –, while at the same time seeing no problems in the imposition of financial sanctions on Syria’s central bank and Head of State. Equally remarkable Read the rest of this entry…

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Trivia: International Organizations Headquartered in Non-Member States

Published on May 5, 2017        Author: 

Michael Waibel’s post of yesterday highlighted one of the significant issues that will need to be sorted out in the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU. Another issue, though of less significance, that will need to be resolved is the (re)location of a couple of EU agencies that currently have their headquarters in London: the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA). It has been reported that the EU, understandably, wishes to move these agencies out of London once Britain leaves the EU and apparently a number of cities are competing to have these agencies relocated to them (see here and here). However, it has also been reported that Britain would like to keep these agencies located in the UK even after Brexit.

“David Davis, Brexit secretary, does not accept that the two agencies and roughly 1,000 staff will have to move from London’s Canary Wharf, even though the EU is about to run a competition to relocate them. A UK Brexit department spokesman said: ‘No decisions have been taken about the location of the European Banking Authority or the European Medicines Agency — these will be subject to the exit negotiations.’

The government has left open the possibility of keeping part of some EU agencies, at least in the short term, but the idea of the UK hosting key institutions after Brexit is unacceptable in Brussels.”

While the idea that EU institutions may remain based or even headquartered in the UK after the UK remains in the EU might, at first sight, seem unrealistic, it should be remembered that Geneva was the “European headquarters” for many decades when Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002, over 50 years after the UN was formed and had based its major European office there.

From time to time I have posed trivia questions on the blog, but usually related to international tribunals. This time I have a question that relates to international organizations.

My question is this: Which international organizations have their headquarters or main offices located in a non-member state?

Read the rest of this entry…

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