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Home Archive for category "International Environmental Law" (Page 3)

Environmental Damages, Environmental Reparations, and the Right to a Healthy Environment: The ICJ Compensation Judgment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and the IACtHR Advisory Opinion on Marine Protection for the Greater Caribbean

Published on February 14, 2018        Author: 

On 2 February 2018, the International Court of Justice issued a landmark judgment on compensation for environmental damages in Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa RicaThe ICJ’s decision was followed shortly thereafter on 9 February 2018 by a significant Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), declaring the fundamental importance of the right to a healthy environment to human existence and States’ corollary obligations to protect human rights through marine environmental protection in the Greater Caribbean region (summary report of the Advisory Opinion in English found here, while the full text of Colombia’s request for advisory opinion on this question can be found here). The 2 February 2018 ICJ Compensation Judgment follows its 16 December 2015 Judgment declaring Nicaragua liable for activities in Costa Rican territory, such as the excavation of three caños and establishment of military presence in said territory (see my previous comments on evidentiary approaches in this 2015 Merits Judgment here.)

While both the 2 February 2018 ICJ judgment on compensation and the 9 February 2018 IACtHR Advisory Opinion signify the central importance of international environmental norms to international human rights law, the methodological approaches taken by the World Court and the regional human rights court for Latin America reveal some sharp differences between these tribunals.  In adjudging compensation for environmental damages caused by Nicaragua to Costa Rica, the ICJ took a rather ‘incrementalist’ approach to quantification and empirical proof for every head of damage asserted – a methodologically ambiguous and context-sensitive approach which is not easily replicable for future environmental cases, given the complex nature of environmental damages in any given dispute.  The ICJ did not adopt Costa Rica’s theory of an “ecosystem approach” to damage assessment, and neither did it adopt Nicaragua’s position that “replacement costs” be used to estimate environmental damages.  Unlike the IACtHR Advisory Opinion’s broad acceptance of States’ continuing individual obligations towards preventing transboundary harm that could ensue from infrastructure projects in the Greater Caribbean, the ICJ Judgment carefully reduced Costa Rica’s claim of compensation by delineating between Nicaragua’s compensatory duties as part of environmental reparations, and Costa Rica’s own environmental mitigation duties in the presence of foreseeable environmental damage.  These recent developments suggest that, while it is recognized that all States share responsibilities towards environmental protection especially under the precautionary principle, the precise allocation of environmental reparations owed through compensation will not always lie strictly on the side of the State that is the environmental tortfeasor, at least where the ICJ is concerned.

The following subsections summarize the 2 February 2018 ICJ Judgment reasoning on compensation, the 9 February 2018 IACtHR Advisory Opinion, and conclude with some comments on methodologies used for damages assessment and environmental reparations, especially in the thorny form of lump-sum upfront compensation for environmental damage impacting present and future generations.

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Protecting the Environment at the World Trade Organization: the Eventual ‘Greening’ of Trade?

Published on June 20, 2017        Author: 

This post is the result of work conducted for the ILA Committee on Sustainable Development and the Green Economy in International Trade Law.

In a recent post, Diane Desierto discussed the Port State Measures Agreement (‘PSMA’) and its role in attempting to combat illegal, unregulated, and unreported (‘IUU’) fishing. Aside from the numerous interesting aspects of the PSMA identified in that post, the Agreement is also expected to play a key role in regulating IUU fishing beyond the law of the sea. At the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’), members are currently in negotiations to prohibit the use of subsidies which contribute to IUU fishing, as well as those that contribute to overfishing or overcapacity. While the elimination of fisheries subsidies which contribute to IUU fishing have been on the agenda of WTO members since the Doha Declaration in 2001, little progress has been made. The adoption of Agenda 2030 and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’) in 2015 has changed this, giving new energy to the international community to achieve a specific set targets. Of most relevance here is SDG 14.6 which requires

‘by 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing, and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiation.’

The objectives of SDG14.6 extend beyond subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing to include those that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Disciplining such subsidies raises a number of challenges for the WTO. While the regulation of subsidies is a standard feature of world trade law, fisheries subsidies present unique challenges. For example, where a member considers a subsidy to harm their interests, they have two options under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM): through direct challenge under the WTO’s dispute settlement system, or through the imposition of countervailing duties as a self-help remedy which seeks to counteract the effect of the subsidy. In each instance, the rules on subsidies seek to avoid harm to members’ interests, understood (inter alia) as injury to domestic industry, lost opportunities in third markets, or nullification or impairments of benefits.

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First Global Treaty Against Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Entry into Force

Published on June 9, 2017        Author: 

While the world reacted to the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on June 2, the first meeting of the parties to a landmark global marine environmental agreement was held three days later with the FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing [hereafter, “Port State Measures Agreement or PSMA”].  This first global treaty to combat IUU fishing recognizes that “measures to combat IUU fishing should build on the primary responsibility of flag States and use all available jurisdiction in accordance with international law, including port State measures, coastal State measures, market related measures, and measures to ensure that nationals do not support or engage in IUU fishing” (PSMA, Preamble, paragraph 3), and is designed “to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing through the implementation of effective port State measures, and thereby to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources and marine ecosystems.” (PSMA, Article 2).

IUU fishing endangers food security, community livelihoods, and marine environments in many developing countries around the world, particularly in hotspots in West Africa and the Asia-Pacific, causing annual estimated losses worldwide at around USD $23.5 billion to developed and developing coastal States, including the United States and the European Union. IUU fishing directly impoverishes local fishing communities, which in West Africa, for example, is estimated at around USD$ 1.3 billion a year. IUU fishing also exacerbates the problem of unsustainable fishing in the world, where 53% of the world’s fisheries are already fully exploited, and a further 32% are overexploited and depleted. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) cautioned in 2009 that the destructive impacts of IUU fishing include, among others, the “extinction (or high risk of extinction of the resource and/or the productive ecosystem and its biodiversity.” (p. 7 of FAO/UNEP Expert Report). The prevalence of IUU fishing in the world is illustrated in the map below (source here), where regional hotspots for IUU fishing are in the Eastern Pacific, the Northwest Pacific, West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Pacific Islands:

To date, not all States implicated in the key IUU hotspots are  parties to the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), which to date are only Australia, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, the European Union (as a member organization), Gabon, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Palau, Republic of Korea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga, the United States of America, Uruguay, and Vanuatu.  This post discusses some of the key features of the PSMA, which focus on harmonizing standards for States’ domestic control of their ports, and the coordinated enforcement of international rules to prevent and penalize IUU fishing.

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Reflections on the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement

Published on June 5, 2017        Author: 

Ending months of fevered speculation, President Donald Trump fulfilled his campaign promise and announced US withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement last week. He did so because in his opinion the Paris Agreement inflicts ‘severe energy restrictions’ on the United States and ‘punishes’ the United States ‘while imposing no meaningful obligations on the world’s leading polluters.’ This post seeks to examine the merits of the US’ stated rationale for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and then offers some reflections on next steps for the US in the international climate change regime.

How Valid are Trump’s Criticisms?

President Trump’s remarks reveal a fundamentally flawed understanding of the Paris Agreement. First, his remarks suggest that the Paris Agreement is a prescriptive instrument that ‘inflicts’ restrictions and ‘imposes’ obligations on states. This is not the case. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Proposal for a Multilateral Border Carbon Adjustment Scheme that is Consistent with International Trade Law if the Trump Administration withdraws from the Paris Agreement

Published on May 22, 2017        Author: 

On the campaign trail, President Trump repeatedly promised to “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of US tax dollars to UN global warming programs”. He had previously called global warming a “hoax” and a “con” numerous times, and “a concept created by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing non-competitive.” Although Trump quietly dropped his pledge to cancel the Paris Agreement from his 100-day “Contract with the American voter”, and has since said that he “has an open mind” on the Paris Agreement, there remains at present a fierce debate within his administration on whether to withdraw, with no final decision expected before the end of the G-7 summit on May 26 and 27.

The essential thesis of this blog post, which summarizes a longer paper available on SSRN, is that international trade law will permit border carbon adjustments (BCAs) on products from the US, if the Trump Administration withdraws from the Paris Agreement, so long as these schemes are well-designed to avoid the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibitions on arbitrary or unjustified discrimination and on disguised protectionism, as interpreted by the WTO’s Appellate Body in its US–Shrimp report and US–Shrimp 21.5 decision. This post proposes a multilateral border carbon adjustment scheme (MBCA) that other countries could agree to impose on the US should it withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

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The US and the Paris Agreement: In or Out and at What Cost?

Published on May 10, 2017        Author: 

Ever since President Donald Trump won the US elections, climate pundits have been playing the ‘will they, won’t they’ game in relation to US withdrawal from the hard-won and widely accepted 2015 Paris Agreement. The political need of the hour, it appears, is to keep the US in, and while that is certainly a desirable goal, it is time to ask, ‘at what cost’?

The US decision on whether it will withdraw from the Paris Agreement is imminent, but in advance of this decision President Trump has begun the process of dismantling Obama-era domestic regulations designed to address US greenhouse gas emissions. In the circumstances, even if the US decides to remain in the Paris Agreement, it would need to either lower the ambition of its nationally determined contribution (NDC), or be ready to fall short of it. This is at the heart of the current controversy animating the climate world – can a state downgrade its NDC under the terms of the Paris Agreement? American legal advisors in an understandable bid to keep the US in the Paris Agreement, are arguing that it can. I would like to argue that a different interpretation, one more in keeping with the object, purpose and spirit of the Paris Agreement, is possible, and even desirable.

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Trumping International Law? Implications of the 2016 US presidential election for the international legal order

Published on January 3, 2017        Author: 

Any assumptions about the implications of the 2016 US presidential election for international law are premature and tentative. There is no proper foreign policy programme against which one could evaluate the future policy of the new administration. We know from Trump’s announcements and from a foreign policy speech of 27 April 2016 that he opposes the Paris Agreement, the WTO, NAFTA, TTP and TTIP as well as the nuclear deal with Iran. Thus, political analysts immediately described the election of Trump as ‘the beginning of a new and darker global order’ and announced the end of the post-World War II order. International lawyers assume that a post-human rights agenda lies ahead. Do we finally face the end of the liberal international order and globalization more generally?

Of course, there are also other voices: those who compare a possible withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement to its non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol; those who hold that globalization is anyway inevitable; those who stress that populism in Latin America, where opposition to globalization was very strong, is in decline again; those who compare Donald Trump with Ronald Reagan; and those who count on new technologies and the young generation. If it was just for the election of Trump I would probably share the idea that his policy may only represent a temporary slump in the overall progressive development of the international legal order. However, the symbolism of Trump’s election is not an isolated incident but fits into a more general pattern. Certain phenomena indicate that we currently observe a crisis of international law of unusual proportions which requires us to reassess the state and role of law in the global order Read the rest of this entry…

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What Will a Trump Administration Mean for International Agreements with the United States?

Published on December 13, 2016        Author: 

On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump will become the 45th President of the United States. During the campaign, he spoke often about terminating landmark international agreements concluded by the Obama administration, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the normalization of relations with Cuba. Predicting what might actually happen in a Trump administration is difficult, because his statements as a private citizen, candidate and president-elect have been inconsistent. Should he wish to follow through on the campaign rhetoric to take immediate action on these issues, what can the president actually do unilaterally? Decisions to terminate these agreements raise questions under both international and domestic law. The United States is bound under international law when it becomes a party to an international agreement, and also has some limited obligations upon signature. Under US constitutional law, the presidency is at its most independent and powerful in dealing with foreign relations. While that power is not unlimited, soon-to-be President Trump could arguably fulfil all of those campaign promises without violating domestic or international law.

Paris Agreement on Climate Change

On 3 September 2016, the United States ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change which entered into force on 4 November 2016. The agreement was concluded under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) which was ratified by the United States in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The Paris Agreement establishes no binding financial commitments or emissions targets. The states party are bound only to formulate and publish national plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to hold the increase in the global average temperature to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to reduce the increase to 1.5°C. The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and its participation in the Paris Agreement was critical to bringing other states, particularly China, on board. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Critical Assessment of Colombia’s Advisory Request before the IACtHR – and Why It Should Be Rejected

Published on October 25, 2016        Author: 

On 14 March 2016 Colombia filed an Advisory Opinion request before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The request poses three questions, which can be summarised as follows: The first question asks whether the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) entails extra-territorial obligations for a State when interpreted in light of a “treaty-based environmental protection system to which that State is a party [also],” and if it does, what are its incidences vis-à-vis the elements of state responsibility (attribution and breach).

The second question is a restatement of the first one, but zeroes in on conduct of states that might do “serious damage to the marine environment” and the implications thereof for inhabitants of “the coast and/or islands of another State party” under articles 4(1) (right to life) and 5(1) (personal integrity) ACHR; in other words, the question enquires whether, and if so how, IHRL might serve as vehicle for the extra-territorial application of IEL.

Building upon the ICJ’s environmental law developments in Pulp Mills, a final question enquires whether environmental obligations under articles 4(1) and 5(1) ACHR entail the duty to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIA). Read the rest of this entry…

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