magnify
Home Archive for category "International Economic Law"

Hegemonic Cooperation or Succession? The United States’ Emerging ‘Abandonment’, and China’s Rising ‘Defense’, of the Global Order

Published on March 21, 2017        Author: 

Many international lawyers all over the world will doubtless have experienced a surge of surrealism over the past weeks, witnessing dramatic contrasts emerging between American and Chinese foreign policies seeking to redefine the global order – with the latter veering towards deepening strategic international cooperation around the world, and the former emphatic about the insularity of its ‘America First’ policy (read: ‘walls’ could be literal and figurative). In January 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a rousing defense of economic globalization at Davos, pointing to the inevitability and irreversibility of the global economy, where for China, “the right thing to do is to seize every opportunity, jointly meet challenges and chart the right course for economic globalization.” A month later, American President Donald Trump delivered his Address to the US Congress stridently pronouncing the country’s shift towards a “direct, robust, and meaningful engagement with the world…American leadership that is based on vital security interests…[where] partners must meet their financial obligations…[and where] America is willing to find new friends, and to forge new partnerships, where shared interests align.”  The historic first meeting this week between US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Chinese President Xi Jinping was the first high-level commitment towards greater joint cooperation between the United States and China, possibly suggestive of softening stances between the established hegemon and the rising world power in containing shared threats, such as North Korea’s demonstrable nuclear ambitions.

The United States’ emerging abandonment of the same postwar multilateral architecture it largely created – in favor of much thicker versions of protectionism, bilateralism, and unilateralism – is ironically taking place at a time when China is gaining confidence in rising to defend the global order and the enduring value of international institutions. It is nothing less than a sharp reversal of the “New Great Game” dynamics I observed four years ago, characterizing the United States as the “unipolar hegemon that incorporates international law justification as part of its operational code in international relations”, and China as the “rising power whose operational code in international relations remains facially deeply sovereigntist but latently appears to be shifting towards some instrumental internationalism – quite consistent with the ideological hybridity bred by ‘socialist modernization’ or what Ronald Coase [described as] ‘Chinese capitalism’.” (at p. 370).

Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

The Constitutional Frontiers of International Economic Law

Published on March 9, 2017        Author: 

The End of Mega-Regionalism?

The future of ‘mega-regionals’, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), has become doubtful since President Trump took office. Through decisions, such as the withdrawal from TPP, he is putting his rhetoric to ‘Make America Great Again’ in action. Yet, the idea to put national values first is not, I argue in a recent issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade, so different from opposition to mega-regionals elsewhere. Both the ‘new America’ and opponents to mega-regionals in Europe speak in favor of disengaging from mega-regionals and replacing them with action by the nation state. At the same time, rejecting mega-regionals will result in sticking with the existing international institutional infrastructure that is widely regarded as insufficient to effectively regulate globalization for the better.

Despite similarities in their effects, there are important differences across the Atlantic. In the European Union, opposition most vocally comes from the left, not from the right. It also does not come from an elected executive, but from large numbers of citizens and opposition parties, as well as a smaller number of Member States, or even sub-divisions of Member States – think of Wallonia. And it is couched in entirely different vocabulary: Rather than speaking the language of nationalism and protectionism, opposition in the EU invokes constitutional values and rights – namely democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights – which are leveraged against mega-regionals and the institutions they come with, notably investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and regulatory cooperation.

Increasing Involvement of Constitutional Courts

Couching opposition to mega-regionals in constitutional language has important consequences: It brings in a different set of actors, namely constitutional courts. Following earlier examples in Latin America, the 13 October 2016 ruling of the German Constitutional Court on an application for an injunction against the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) brought by some 120,000 individuals is likely just the first of many court rulings in which international economic law encounters its constitutional frontiers head-on. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

The Impact of Austerity Policies on International and European Courts and their Jurisprudence

Published on March 3, 2017        Author: 

This post is part of the ESIL Interest Group on International Human Rights Law blog symposium on ‘The Place of International Human Rights Law in Times of Crisis’.

Many countries have been hit by deepening economic depression induced by the economic crisis of 2008. While there is no doubt that the crisis had its origins in unregulated financial speculation, by bailing out and recapitalising the broken banking system (see Bieling 2014), national governments were blamed for the financial slump and were asked by some international institutions, to adopt a policy of austerity (see Blyth 2013). This policy involved draconian cuts in government budgets and spending, the privatisation of public-sector organisations and administrations, and reduction of wages and prices to rescue financial and banking institutions that were deemed “too big to fail”. The main effects of these austerity policies have been described, studied and analysed in terms of the decline of welfare states, breaches of social rights, unemployment, and rising social inequalities between the rich and the poor (see Contiades and Fotiadou 2012; Kilpatrick and De Witte 2014 ; Vettori 2011).

The negative effects of austerity on fundamental rights protection have been monitored and denounced by several European institutions, including those responsible for protecting fundamental rights (see here and here). However, scant academic attention has been paid to the way international and regional courts are dealing with some of the policies within the economic crisis as human rights violations (see Salomon 2015). The austerity cases that have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have faced the hurdles of admissibility and scope.

The European monitoring of the consequences of the economic crisis

Regarding the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR], in a number of cases the Court has rejected applications (as it found them inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded) relating to austerity, notably in the field of wages and pensions. Here, the Court relied on the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, and the limited and temporary nature of austerity measures (see Khoniakina v Georgia, Bakradze v Georgia, Frimu and Other v. Romania, Da Conceição Mateus v. Portugal, Santos Januário v. Portugal and Da Silva Carvahlo Rico v Portugal).

Equally, we could also point out a new sensitivity of the judges of the Court to economic and social rights affected by the economic crisis, austerity policies and public spending cuts. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

The Polisario case: Do EU fundamental rights matter for EU trade policies?

Published on February 3, 2017        Author: 

On 10 December 2015, the General Court of the European Union (GC) rendered a judgment in the Council v. Front Polisario case that was revolutionary in many regards: not only did a national liberalization movement successfully challenge an EU trade agreement, the Court also considered the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) applicable to non-EU citizens on a non EU-territory and in the context of trade policies (see previously, Geraldo Vidigal in EJILTalk).

A month ago and a year later, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) quashed the decision of the GC and denied legal standing for the Front Polisario. However, the door for a role of EU fundamental rights as a benchmark for EU trade policies is not yet closed. To the contrary, the ECJ’s conclusions brought to the fore an ugly truth that shows that the extraterritorial effects of EU trade policies are in urgent need of closer scrutiny.

Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

Economic Nationalism in a New Age for International Economic Law: Recalling Warnings of Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School

Published on January 30, 2017        Author: 

International economic law developments barely one month into 2017 have been nothing short of tectonic this side of the Atlantic. From US President Trump’s first executive action to withdraw the United States from the unratified Trans-Pacific Partnership; his subsequent announcement (later called mainly an option) to impose a 20% border tax on Mexican imports into the United States to finance a wall between the two countries; a declared initiative to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was signed under the administration of Republican President George Bush; unprecedented changes to the United States National Security Council removing the nation’s top military, intelligence, and security advisers to only permit regular attendance for White House chief strategist Steve Bannon and more limited attendance of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence; threats of punitive tariffs against China and accusations of illegal currency manipulation; to last Friday’s latest executive order announcing a travel ban against individuals from seven predominantly Muslim states (approximately 218 million persons) and the 4-month suspension of any refugee entry, as a possible first step to a broader ban – it is becoming all too clear that barely ten days into the new presidency, the United States will not be above reversing, abandoning, disregarding, or defecting from any of the established rules and institutions of international economic law, through extraordinary actions and reversals that have scarcely any or no inter-agency vetting and consultation, and significantly, with the new president declining to divest himself from all business interests or to introduce transparency and consultation measures even as these political-security-economic policy reversals continue to be formulated with relative opacity. The Dow Jones industrial averages and NASDAQ composite index both dropped with the sudden rush to sell off US equities, and American private companies have taken to hiring crisis management and communication firms for the new age of undisclosed and sudden economic policy reversals, reviewing operations and mergers against possible charges of being “Anti-American”.

Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

What Will a Trump Administration Mean for International Agreements with the United States?

Published on December 13, 2016        Author: 

On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump will become the 45th President of the United States. During the campaign, he spoke often about terminating landmark international agreements concluded by the Obama administration, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the normalization of relations with Cuba. Predicting what might actually happen in a Trump administration is difficult, because his statements as a private citizen, candidate and president-elect have been inconsistent. Should he wish to follow through on the campaign rhetoric to take immediate action on these issues, what can the president actually do unilaterally? Decisions to terminate these agreements raise questions under both international and domestic law. The United States is bound under international law when it becomes a party to an international agreement, and also has some limited obligations upon signature. Under US constitutional law, the presidency is at its most independent and powerful in dealing with foreign relations. While that power is not unlimited, soon-to-be President Trump could arguably fulfil all of those campaign promises without violating domestic or international law.

Paris Agreement on Climate Change

On 3 September 2016, the United States ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change which entered into force on 4 November 2016. The agreement was concluded under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) which was ratified by the United States in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The Paris Agreement establishes no binding financial commitments or emissions targets. The states party are bound only to formulate and publish national plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to hold the increase in the global average temperature to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to reduce the increase to 1.5°C. The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and its participation in the Paris Agreement was critical to bringing other states, particularly China, on board. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 
Tags: , ,
 Share on Facebook Share on Twitter
Comments Off on What Will a Trump Administration Mean for International Agreements with the United States?

Remaking Globalization for the Local: The Real Search for Equality and Diversity in International Law

Published on November 9, 2016        Author: 

From Western liberal democracies in the United States and the European Union, to historically democratic developing countries such as the Philippines, ignored, disenfranchised, and disempowered local communities emphatically made themselves heard in elections and referenda around the world.  For better or for worse, the international economic order will be remade, somehow.  It would be specious and condescending to merely say that this is the rise of “populism” without truly understanding the concerns of local communities who have driven electorates all over the world to reject any form of the “establishment” – whether they be traditional politicians and parties, State apparatuses, international organizations, mainstream media, or multinational corporations.

The supranationalist structures of modern international law’s prominent institutions – the United Nations (UN), the Washington Consensus behemoths such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), among others – are premised on deepening inter-State cooperation while still ensuring full respect for the basic UN Charter of the “principle of sovereign equality” of all States. However, the actual power and felt impact of these global institutions on the daily modern lives of individuals, groups, and local communities reveals serious fissures that expose an obvious imbalance between the terms of international cooperation and States’ sovereign equality – from the micromanagement of Greek agencies by EU fiscal managers and inspectors during the worst nadir of the EU’s financial crisis; the enforced austerity and structural adjustment programs of World Bank technocrats harnessing the leverage of the Bank’s conditionality lending to developing countries; the loss of jobs and social dislocations caused to communities throughout manufacturing states in the United States of America when multinational corporations move operations offshore to China or Mexico; as well as the drastically increased competition for resources and the rise in challenges to religious, social, ideological and group identity posed by cleavages within multicultural societies emerging from formerly hermetic communities now overrun by refugees and other immigrants fleeing political persecution, climate change-related natural disasters, and other humanitarian crises.

Restive “Westphalian” political elites push back against the seeming tyranny of the international system and its global institutions, in order to increasingly assert the sovereign prerogative of states and their supposed ‘independence’ from any form of international governance that ultimately erodes any of these elites’ real bases of power. The recent rise of populist, anti-establishment, anti-trade, and anti-internationalist leaders throughout established democracies – from France’s Marine Le Pen, the United States’ Donald Trump and (to a certain extent) Bernie Sanders, the United Kingdom’s Nigel Farage, the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, among others – is no coincidence. ‘Silent’, faceless, and individually powerless, electoral majorities are clearly voting for leaders who project themselves as best able to roll back the worst excesses of inequality, insecurity, and uncertainty faced by households from an (actual or imagined) unrestrained international order. The rise of an unstable, deep populism throughout liberal democracies around the world does not only express what IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde calls “a groundswell of discontent” against globalization, but rather, a return to a much harder ‘Westphalian’ version of State sovereignty insulated from the common interests and shared concerns of this century’s community of nations forged and united in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars.

Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 

Quasi-Judicial Dialogue for the Coherent Development of International Law

Multilateral Development Banks have established international accountability mechanisms over the last 25 years in order to offer private individuals or groups a process through which they can demand the redress of grievances caused by the banks’ projects. Accountability mechanisms are often composed of experts appointed by each bank’s Board of Directors. The mechanisms generally have a compliance review function, with or without a problem-solving function. With their different mandates, these quasi-judicial bodies have, just like judicial bodies, proliferated in a process that can be deemed “quasi-anarchic“. This post explores a recent project in Kenya presented simultaneously before two accountability mechanisms, and argues that accountability mechanisms’ “quasi-judicial dialogue” can constitute a source of inspiration for the coherent development of international law.

Two Accountability Mechanisms, Two Mandates

As judicial and quasi-judicial bodies participate in the development of international law, there is a risk of incoherence in their decisions with consequences such as unpredictability, inequalities or forum-shopping, which would endanger the international legal system (see Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?). Incoherence may become even more acute for Multilateral Development Banks’ accountability mechanisms as they confront very similar factual scenarios, especially in the case of co-financing where parties affected by an investment may seize more than one accountability mechanism, just like in the Kenya Electricity Expansion Project presented before the World Bank and the European Investment Bank’s accountability mechanisms.

Indeed, there are four important differences between the mandates of the World Bank Inspection Panel (hereinafter the Panel) and the European Investment Bank’s Complaints Mechanism. In all four aspects, the World Bank’s policy is more restrictive than the European Investment Bank’s (hereinafter EIB). Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly
 
 Share on Facebook Share on Twitter
Comments Off on Quasi-Judicial Dialogue for the Coherent Development of International Law