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S.A.S. v France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?

Published on July 7, 2014        Author: 

On 1 July, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered, in a public hearing, its judgment in the case of S.A.S. v France. This case is a challenge of the French legislation prohibiting the wearing of face-covering clothing in all public spaces. In a post on this blog, Stephanie Berry discusses the case and points out a number of positive developments, including the balanced and well-reasoned nature of the judgment, the rejection of the gender equality and human dignity arguments for the burqaban, as she refers to the French law, and the consideration that this ban was not necessary for public safety in the absence of concrete evidence. However, Berry criticises the ECtHR for accepting that the ban pursues the legitimate aim of ‘living together’ under the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. Berry points out that this concept pursues a distinctly assimilationist agenda. I agree with Berry that this is a worrying development. In this post, I examine this concept of ‘living together’ in more detail and explain why this is such a worrying development. I will not discuss other aspects of the judgment.

First of all, what does this concept mean? The ECtHR mentions that the ‘Report on the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory’ criticises the wearing of the full-face veil as ‘a practice at odds with the values of the Republic’ and as ‘a denial of fraternity, constituting a negation of contact with others and a flagrant infringement of the French principle of living together’ (para. 17). It also refers to the explanatory memorandum to the relevant law, which states that ‘the wearing of the full veil is the sectarian manifestation of a rejection of the values of the Republic’; that ‘the voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of “living together” in French society’; and, that it ‘falls short of the minimum requirement of civility necessary for social interaction’ (para. 25). The French Government stated that one of the aims of the law was the observance of the minimum requirements of life in society because the face plays a significant role in human interaction, and the effect of concealing one’s face in public places is to break the social tie and to manifest a refusal of the principle of ‘living together’ (para 82, and for a similar argument from the Belgian government: para. 87).

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SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?

Published on July 2, 2014        Author: 

Niqab23The finding by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in SAS v France that the so-called ‘French burqa ban’ did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will not surprise many in the field of human rights. However, the judgment itself contains a number of developments and departures from the Court’s previous jurisprudence that warrant further consideration. In particular, the conclusion that the right to manifest religion may be restricted on the ground of ‘living together’ presents a worrying development, if this right is to have any practical meaning. (photo credit)

In SAS v France, the applicant challenged the French Loi no 2010–1192 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public of 11 October 2010, JO 12 October 2010 (herein after the ‘burqa ban’), which prohibits the covering of the face in public. The case differs from previous cases concerning the right of Muslim women to manifest religion by wearing religious attire, as the law imposed a blanket ban which extended to the social sphere. The applicant argued that by preventing her from wearing the burqa the ban violated her rights under articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR. The ECtHR completely dismissed her claims under articles 3, 10 and 11 ECHR, and focused its attention on articles 8, 9 and 14 ECHR, with a notable emphasis on article 9, the right to freedom of religion or belief.

The ECtHR’s judgment in SAS v France, for the most part, is balanced, well-reasoned and provides a thorough consideration of the French government’s justifications for the restriction of the applicant’s right to manifest her religion: public safety and ‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society’. The latter category comprises three separate elements: gender equality, human dignity and ‘respect for the minimum requirements of life in society’ or ‘living together’. Whilst public safety is found within articles 8(2) and 9(2) ECHR, as noted by the ECtHR,  ‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society’ does not correspond with any of the permissible limitations on article 8 and 9 ECHR (paras 116-7). Consequently, the ECtHR interpreted this justification as falling with the broad ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (para 117).

While the ECtHR established that the ‘burqa ban’ was prescribed by law (para 112), it did not accept that the ban pursued the ‘legitimate aims’ of gender equality and human dignity (paras 119-120). Specifically, in the context of gender equality, the ECtHR took ‘the view, … that a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women – such as the applicant – in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions’ (para 119). This marks a significant departure from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the hijab cases. InDahlab v Switzerlandthe ECtHR had held that the hijab ‘appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which … is hard to square with the principle of gender equality’ . However, this approach was the subject of criticism, most notably by Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion in Leyla Şahın v Turkey:

It is not the Court’s role to make an appraisal of this type – in this instance a unilateral and negative one – of a religion or religious practice, just as it is not its role to determine in a general and abstract way the signification of wearing the headscarf or to impose its viewpoint on the applicant. (para 12)

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The Iranian Charter of Citizens’ Rights

Published on December 10, 2013        Author: 

 Nazila Ghanea teaches international human rights law at the University of Oxford.

100 days into his presidency, Iranian President Hassan Rohani delivered a partial result on the nuclear issue (see EJIL:Talk! discussion by Dan Joyner)and released his draft Charter of Citizens’ Rights (henceforth ‘the Charter’) on 26 November 2013. Though the Presidential website offers content in 7 languages including English, the draft Charter has only been made available in Persian.

It is reported that the President consulted religious elites, experts, activists and academics within Iran with regard to this draft Charter, but not the Iranian judiciary. Academics, thinkers, universities and others have been asked to send their comments on the draft Charter to the legal deputy of the Iranian President within a month so that it can be revised and a final version released. So what feedback can one give the President’s office on the draft Charter? What does the Charter add and which rights does it guarantee? Does it fulfill the President’s aim (see here) that citizens’ rights make “all Iranians feel they are part of one nation, one identity, under one umbrella they can feel proud of”?

The Charter itself announces that it will not have an effect on existing rights, laws and obligations or on international conventions (article 1.1). The Charter states that it declares the most important citizenship rights and the direction of the government’s human rights policy, but that it does not intend to create new rights or obligations (article 1.6). The importance of the Charter, therefore, lies in the fact that it is declaratory of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s understanding of the most important citizens’ rights that it will henceforth prioritise in its activities. Though it should not impact existing UN human rights obligations according to article 1.1, this ‘prioritisation’ suggests that there will be a notable impact on Iran’s future human rights compliance. This is underscored in the follow-up suggested within the Charter, for example that there will be three-monthly updates to the Presidency regarding activities concerned with advancing Charter rights (article 15). Such Charter activities may well overshadow action on other human rights obligations binding upon Iran and on recommendations stemming from international human bodies. Read the rest of this entry…

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Freedom of Religion and Religious Symbols: Same Right – Different Interpretation?

Published on October 10, 2013        Author: 

stephanie berryStephanie E. Berry is Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Sussex.

As the debate over the wearing of religious attire in State institutions in Western Europe has reignited over previous weeks, it is pertinent to consider the protection provided under international law to those who wish to exercise this element of freedom of religion. As has been well documented, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been willing to accept restrictions on the right to manifest religion by wearing religious attire under article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ (specifically gender equality, pluralism and tolerance and State neutrality) (see, for example, Dahlab v Switzerland; Şahin v Turkey) and public order and safety (Phull v France; El-Morsli v France). However, the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States and the failure of the ECtHR to probe whether restrictions on the right to manifest religion are proportionate have been the subject of criticism.

Until recently the right to manifest religion by wearing religious attire under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) had rarely been considered by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) (see Singh Bhinder v Canada and Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan). Notably, however, the HRC does not recognise that States have a margin of appreciation. Thus, in two recent cases concerning the right to manifest the Sikh religion by wearing religious attire, a significant divergence between the approach of the HRC and the ECtHR can be observed.

800px-Sikhs_on_the_move!In Mann Singh v France and Ranjit Singh v France the ECtHR and HRC, respectively, considered the right of a Sikh man to manifest his religion by wearing a turban on a photograph affixed to an identification document. In Mann Singh v France, the ECtHR acknowledged that the requirement that the applicant appear without his turban in the photograph affixed to his driving license constituted an interference with the right to manifest religion. However, the ECtHR accepted that the restriction was justified on the grounds of ‘public safety’ and ‘public order’ under article 9(2) ECHR. Notably, the ECtHR deferred to the discretion of the State and, thus, did not examine the legitimacy of the State’s assertion that the removal of the turban was necessary to allow the identification of the driver and to avoid fraud. (photo credit)

Similarly, in Ranjit Singh v France the HRC considered the requirement that Sikhs remove their turbans in photographs affixed to residents permits, (paras 2.12-2.2) a requirement again justified by France on the grounds of public order and public safety (para 5.3) under article 18(3) ICCPR. Although the HRC recognised that the aim of the restriction was legitimate, (para 8.4), in direct contrast to the ECtHR, the HRC found:

 [T]hat the State party has not explained why the wearing of a Sikh turban covering the top of the head and a portion of the forehead but leaving the rest of the face clearly visible would make it more difficult to identify the author than if he were to appear bareheaded, since he wears his turban at all times. Nor has the State party explained how, specifically, identity photographs in which people appear bareheaded help to avert the risk of fraud or falsification of residence permits. (para 8.4)

The HRC continued to consider the potential for this interference to result in continuing violations of the applicant’s rights ‘because he would always appear without his religious head covering in the identity photograph and could therefore be compelled to remove his turban during identity checks’ (para 8.4). By exercising a higher level of scrutiny of the justifications given by the State for the restriction of the right to manifest religion, than the ECtHR in Mann Singh v France, the HRC was able to assess the proportionality of the interference and found a violation of freedom of religion. Read the rest of this entry…

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CERD and Hate Speech

Published on April 19, 2013        Author: 

An important case on hate speech was recently decided by the CERD Committee, TBB v. Germany, dealing with the intersection or conflict between the prohibition of racial discrimination and the freedom of expression (thanks to Marty Lederman for the pointer). The case concerned an interview given by a Mr Sarrazin in a journal that contained derogatory and offensive statements against the Turkish population in Germany; the statements were however given in the context of at least a superficially reasoned discussion dealing mainly with the economy. The TBB, a Turkish association in Germany, wanted Mr Sarrazin to be prosecuted for hate speech; the German prosecutors refused to do so, finding that while some of S’s statements were offensive, a prosecution would under the circumstances run afoul of the freedom of expression.

Article 4 CERD explicitly requires states parties to ‘declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred’; however when doing so they must give ‘due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ including the freedom of expression. The Convention itself thus even at the purely textual level creates a potential conflict between the duty to incriminate hate speech and the freedom of expression, without providing much guidance as to how this conflict can be resolved. Text aside, the same set of issues is of course raised under other human rights treaties, such as the ECHR and the ICCPR, or in the domestic context.

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The Innocence of Satirists: Will Caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad Change the ECHR Approach to Hate Speech?

Published on September 26, 2012        Author: 

Dr David Keane is Senior Lecturer in Law at Middlesex University.

The global reaction to the trailer for the film The Innocence of Muslims has prompted the banning of the video-sharing website Youtube in three States, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, with Council of Europe member Russia mooting such a move. Similarly the publication of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in France, and the resulting international protests, appear to reignite questions of religious defamation and freedom of expression generated by Jyllands-Posten in 2006. To a certain extent the arguments appear unchanged, but there are elements to these recent controversies worth exploring.

Charlie Hebdo has already been in the French courts, in 2007, but was acquitted, while the Danish Public Prosecutor decided not to pursue criminal proceedings against Jyllands-Posten. Yet the debate this time around seems less strident in terms of freedom of expression. The BBC points to a somewhat divided French press, albeit one that emphasises freedom of expression within the parameters of the law, with one paper asking whether these are “some cartoons too many”. This is significant given that newspapers of all political colours are the frontline on freedom of expression. Guy Birenbaum on the Huffington Post (only available in French) writes: “Come on Charlie, just between ourselves, you don’t have the feeling that this is old hat? Already seen, already read? Where is the subversion, the insolence, and most of all, the humour?” He concludes that mocking Islam has become something of a national sport in France and as a result has lost its subversive value. In this atmosphere, a prosecution appears a little more possible.

Such a prosecution would almost certainly be challenged before the European Court of Human Rights. Article 10 of the European Convention reads:  “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression… without interference by public authority … 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society… for the protection of the reputation or rights of others (…)”

In order to uphold the cartoonists’ rights under Article 10(1), the Court would have to go against its past jurisprudence and rule the interference unnecessary under Article 10(2). That would mark a new departure in terms of the European approach to hate speech, which has, perhaps understandably, been marked by the World War II experience and consistently upheld convictions for speech which attacks racial, ethnic or religious groups, or denies wartime atrocities.

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Content-based Speech Restrictions in the European Court

Published on July 17, 2012        Author: 

Last week the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered a major judgment in the case of Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland, no. 16354/06. This will certainly prove to be a leading European case with regard to content and viewpoint based restrictions on the freedom of expression in a public space. It is also notable because the Court was very severely split – 9 to 8 – which is not only a rarity, but highlights the controversial nature of the case and its uncertain precedential value for the future.

Very briefly, these were the facts: the Raelian movement is an organization that claims that aliens have visited the Earth, leaving us a message or two; that science (well, their science) should replace religion; and that the best form of government is a ‘geniocracy’, i.e. rule by the highly intelligent over the masses of the mediocre. The organization has been labeled a cult by many due to the demands it makes of its members; it has also been the subject of several child abuse scandals, since the organization’s founder apparently thought that children should be sexualized, and some of the organization’s leaders practiced what he preached. Today, however, the organization disavows that earlier part of their doctrine.

Here’s the Court’s own description of the particular facts of the case:

14.  On 7 March 2001 the applicant association requested authorisation from the police administration for the city of Neuchâtel (the “police administration”) to conduct a poster campaign in the period between 2 and 13 April 2001. The poster in question, measuring 97 cm by 69 cm, featured in the upper part the following wording in large yellow characters on a dark blue background: “The Message from Extraterrestrials”; in the lower part of the poster, in characters of the same size but in bolder type, the address of the Raelian Movement’s website, together with a telephone number in France, could be seen; at the very bottom was the phrase “Science at last replaces religion”. The middle of the poster was taken up by pictures of extraterrestrials’ faces and a pyramid, together with a flying saucer and the Earth.

15.  On 29 March 2001 the police administration denied authorisation, referring to two previous refusals. It had been indicated in a French parliamentary report on sects, dating from 1995, and in a judgment of the president of the Civil Court for the district of La Sarine (Canton of Fribourg), that the Raelian Movement engaged in activities that were contrary to public order (ordre public) and immoral.

16.  In a decision of 19 December 2001 the municipal council of the city of Neuchâtel dismissed an appeal from the applicant association, finding that it could not rely on the protection of religious freedom because it was to be regarded as a dangerous sect. The interference with freedom of expression had been based on Article 19 of the Administrative Regulations for the City of Neuchâtel (the “Regulations”); its purpose was to protect the public interest and it was proportionate, since the organisation advocated, among other things, human cloning, “geniocracy” and “sensual meditation”.

The decision was later upheld by the Swiss courts, essentially on the same grounds.

The question that the European Court was to answer was thus whether this ban was in accordance with the freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. Notably, the restriction on expression was based on both the content and the viewpoint of the message, seen not only as the pretty anodyne poster, but as the poster taken together with the content of the website to which it refers. However, the restriction on expression was not total, but was confined to the organization’s use of a dedicated public space, to which individuals do not have unconditional or unlimited access.

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Council of Europe Ministers adopt declaration to address libel tourism

Published on July 11, 2012        Author: 

For those interested in matters of jurisdiction and cross-border litigation, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has now adopted a declaratory text alerting its 47 member states to what it termed the “serious threat to freedom of expression and information” posed by the practice of libel tourism – a practice where one chooses a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction in which to bring a libel suit against a journalist, publisher, or academic. In calling for the reform of defamation laws in Europe to prevent libel tourism, the Committee of Ministers is also calling for some uniformity of standards.

For those unfamiliar with the organs of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers is the Council’s executive body, consisting of all Foreign Ministers from the Council’s 47 member states or their deputies. The declaration adopted last week, while not a legally binding text, serves to add the voice of a weighty regional group of states to the claim that libel tourism and forum shopping in defamation cases can produce a chilling effect on expression and the availability of information. A copy of the declaration, entitled the “Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the Desirability of International Standards dealing with Forum Shopping in respect of Defamation, “Libel Tourism”, to Ensure Freedom of Expression,” can be found here.

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L’Affaire Weiler – A Brief Legal Assessment of the French Court’s Judgment

Published on March 21, 2011        Author: 

 Dr. Laurent Pech is Jean Monnet Lecturer in EU Public Law at the National University of Ireland, Galway. He has published extensively on freedom of expression and recently published “Liberté d’expression: Aperçus de droit comparé” in JurisClasseur Communication (Paris: LexisNexis, 2010) and “The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe” in L. Hennebel and T. Hochmann, Genocide Denials and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2011).

(Author’s disclosure: In March 2010, he produced a letter (“attestation”) in favor of Prof. Weiler, in which he argued that the French court lacked jurisdiction and should sanction the plaintiff for having artificially selected the French criminal system to pursue her defamation action)

According to Article 11 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 16 August 1789, the right to free expression of ideas and opinion is one of the most precious human rights. This is not to say, of course, that freedom of expression is an absolute right. Indeed, Article 11 also provides that everyone may “speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.”

This is exactly what happened in relation to the right to reputation. In 1881, the French Parliament accepted that freedom of expression may be restricted in order to protect reputation. According to Article 29 of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881, “It shall be defamatory to make any statement or allegation of a fact that impugns the honour or reputation of the person or body of whom the fact is alleged …” Whilst the French 1881 Act is criminal legislation, a person who makes a statement that is defamatory of private individuals can “only” be liable on conviction to a fine of 12,000 euro (prison sentences are still an option in some cases, for instance, defamatory statements motivated by racial hatred). Finally, it may be worth mentioning that the 1881 Act provides that alleged victims of defamatory allegations must first initiate legal proceedings against publication directors or publishers (in our present case, Prof. Weiler in his capacity as Editor in Chief of the European Journal of International Law and its associated Book Review website), before eventually suing the authors of the litigious statements, for offences committed via the press (or any other media according to a 1982 Act).

It would be difficult to deny that the French Freedom of the Press Act has had a bad name. In a few words, it is regularly criticized for being an archaic piece of legislation that fails to appropriately take into account the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on the right to freedom of expression (see e.g. Resolution 1577 (2007), Towards decriminalisation of defamation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, available here). It is also not unusual for the European Court of Human Rights to censure the French courts’ interpretation and application of the 1881 Act. The judgment of the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris in the defamation case brought against Prof. Weiler, as editor in chief of the EJIL and its associated book review website (see here) , by Dr. Calvo-Goller is unlikely, however, to disappoint those who feared an undue restriction of academic freedom and potential criminal prosecution in France for any publication made available online. I will spare readers of this blog an exposé of the facts at the origin of the plaintiff’s action (for the full text of the judgment and a summary see here), to focus on the jurisdictional issue. I hope readers will forgive me for spending some time discussing the principles governing the territorial applicability of French criminal law but it is important to do so in order to realize that that the French Court was able to hold itself territorially incompetent only because of a procedural error committed by the complainant. The judgment makes nevertheless clear that had the Court found itself competent, Dr. Calvo-Goller would not have been able to prevail on the merits. Indeed, when examining Prof. Weiler’s counterclaim that the plaintiff’s action amounts to a procedural abuse, the Court indicates that the bad faith of the plaintiff is established as it is evident, on the one hand, that Dr. Calvo-Goller engaged in “forum shopping,” and, on the other hand, that the litigious book review does not go beyond “the limits of academic criticism.” The Court’s explicit and unusually strong reliance on the notions of forum shopping and academic freedom clearly indicate that this judgment is intended to discourage anyone from ever lodging a similar complaint with a French criminal court. Read the rest of this entry…

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In the Dock, in Paris – The Judgment

Published on March 4, 2011        Author: 

UPDATE: The full text of the Judgment is now available below; some minor technical issues were fixed.

UPDATE 2: An unofficial translation of the Judgment into English is now available here.

On March 3, 2011, the Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris issued its decision in the Criminal Libel Case brought against me based on a complaint by Dr Karine Calvo-Goller. It would appear that the Court ruled in our favor on all issues.

As will be recalled, the case was brought in my capacity as Editor in Chief of the European Journal of International Law and its associated Book Review website www.GlobalLawBooks.org. It was brought as a result of my refusal to remove a Review, written by the distinguished German academic Thomas Weigend, critical of a book written by Dr Karin Calvo-Goller. Dr Calvo-Goller claimed the Review was libelous and demanded its suppression. I offered her a right-of-reply which was declined. Since I did not consider the Review libelous its removal in my view would have seriously compromised academic freedom and the intellectual integrity of EJIL and book reviewing generally. For full details see here.

The Trial took place in Paris on January 20th, 2011 – see here.

Represented by Maitre Thierry Marembert and Cécile Labarbe of the Paris Law Firm Kiejman & Marembert, we made two principal arguments in defense: First, that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction — the case being too remote from France; and second, that it should rule that in the circumstances of the case, initiating a criminal complaint amounted to an abuse of process by the Complainant.

In its Judgment, the Court upheld both claims. On the jurisdictional issue, a highly technical part of the Judgment, it seems to have ruled that although available on the internet, the Complainant did not prove to its satisfaction that the Review was actually accessed in France during the period within which a criminal complaint had to be filed. The full Judgment in French and a translation will be posted on the EJIL blog – www.EJILtalk.org in the next few days. [UPDATE: The full text of the Judgment in French is now available here.]

In ruling on the issue of abuse of process by the Complainant, the Court was able to address the merits of the case. The following are excerpts from the Judgment in unofficial translation.

“….As regards the choice made by the Complainant to invoke French criminal proceedings, though [Karine Calvo-Goller] holds dual French and Israeli nationality, she resides and works in Israel, the book which is the subject of proceedings was written in English, as was the Book Review; [it was] published on an American website, linked to an American university at which Joseph Weiler works; [the Complainant] explained to the Court that she chose to use the French rather than the American or Israeli systems for financial reasons –the cost of proceedings would have been more expensive for her- as well as for reasons of expediency, being of the view that only French law offered her a chance of success;

… Karine Calvo-Goller thus acknowledges having engaged in what one can call “forum shopping”, that is to say a worldwide search, for the legal system which seems the most favorable to the person initiating legal proceedings, and which places her opponent, as much for legal reasons as for practical reasons — geographical or cultural remoteness — in the least favorable situation….[T]he artificial choice in this case, of the French legal system, coupled with the choice of pursuing a criminal procedure by means of a complaint to an Investigating Judge resulting in both opprobrium and significant costs to the accused, characterizes the abuse of these proceedings;

… Karine Calvo-Goller failed to comprehend [respect] the scope of French Press law stating that the Review which was made the subject of the proceedings could be held to be defamatory…. [I]n effect, the Review of her book does not contain words damaging her honor or her reputation, and only expresses, what is more, in moderate terms, a scientific opinion on [her book] without ever exceeding the limits of free criticism to which all authors of intellectual works expose themselves;

… The bad faith of the Complainant –a lawyer, moreover one familiar with French law given her indication that she pursued her law studies in France- is therefore undeniably established;

….It is therefore with just cause, that Joseph Weiler believes that the [Complainant] has abused her right to bring legal proceedings, on the one hand by initiating an action for defamation in relation to words that do not go beyond the limits of academic criticism, an essential element of academic freedom and freedom of expression and, on the other hand, by artificially bringing proceedings through the French criminal justice system.”

Considering the resulting harm suffered by the accused, he will be justly compensated by judgment against the Complainant requiring her to pay to him the sum of €8,000.” [about US$ 11,000]

I hope this brings this sad saga to an end though it should be noted that the Complainant has a right of appeal.

Be that as it may, I would like to thank my legal team, the Dean and faculty of NYU School of Law for moral and material support, and the many letters of encouragement by friends and strangers from around the world. Naturally, any damages will be donated to a charitable cause. As for the Judgment, I will follow the wisdom of the Sages, “Whoever Adds, Detracts.”

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