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Home Archive for category "European Union"

A Second Brexit Referendum – What Makes You Think They Will Have You Back?

Published on November 26, 2018        Author: 
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The call for a second Brexit Referendum is still alive, some say more than ever. It is probably unlikely and, even if it were to take place, there is no certainty that the Remain camp would win. But it is somehow based on the assumption that if such a referendum were held, and the Remainers would win (probably a narrow victory) and that if, as a result, the UK Parliament were to change its mind and elect to remain, that on the basis of this unilateral decision of the UK the status quo ante would be restored and British membership of the Union would continue unabated.

This is very unlikely to be the case.

First there is the legal issue regarding such a unilateral withdrawal of the Article 50 notice.

As is well known, a Preliminary Reference from Scotland will be decided this month in an expedited procedure and before a plenary forum of the ECJ, trying to clarify the legal parameters of a British change of mind whether through a referendum or otherwise.

The Reference definitely has some elements of an Affaire Bidon but I predict the ECJ will not opt for inadmissibility in this case. On the merits it is likely that it will  reject the two ‘bookend’ arguments and instead go for the centre. It is most unlikely that it will hold that once Article 50 notice has been served the process is irreversible and that the only way back, even before the deadline for formal exit arrived, is an Article 49 admission procedure. It is, in my view, equally or even more unlikely that it would hold that the UK could unilaterally withdraw its notice and that, with no more, its Membership would continue unabated. The UK drives everyone crazy for close to three years and then, oops, just as the Clock Strikes One, the Mouse is to run down as if nothing happened?

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UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options … the Politics

Published on November 8, 2018        Author: 
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In the last blog, I provided an update on the UNCITRAL process, including the consensus decision from Vienna last week to move forward to consider possible reforms of investor-state arbitration. This decision is very significant. But to get a sense of how this decision was reached and where the process might be heading, I thought it would be helpful to provide my sense of the politics of the process as well as some projections about how it might move forward.

As stated previously, I am a member of the Australian delegation but I am included in that delegation in my independent academic capacity, so nothing in my writings or talks should be taken to reflect Australia’s views. My academic views are exactly that: mine and academic. Nevertheless, I hope that these views are informed. These blogs are based on official interventions during the UNCITRAL plenary sessions as well as discussions with a diverse range of actors from the process.

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UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options … the Process

Published on November 7, 2018        Author: 
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Last week has been described as a watershed moment for ISDS reform. During a meeting in Vienna, states decided by consensus on the desirability of developing reforms in UNCITRAL with respect to investor-state arbitration. States now have an opportunity to make proposals for a work plan about what reforms to consider and how to go about considering them. To the extent that the tide has turned on traditional investor-state arbitration, it is now up to states to tell us where they want to sail.

As you might imagine, reaching a decision like this involved quite a process, along with a lot of politics. In this blog, I set out the process in terms of what was decided in Vienna, what was not decided, and what the next steps will be for moving forward in 2019. In the next blog, I will provide some context to this development, giving some insights into the politics of the process as well as some projections about how this process might develop.

This reform process will be long and its ultimate outcome remains unknowable. But the momentum for and direction of reforms are becoming increasingly clear. The calls for systemic reform are rising, though different states may mean different things by “systemic.”

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The Spectre of Trexit: Proposal to Reintroduce the Death Penalty in Turkey

Published on October 10, 2018        Author: 
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On 1 October 2018, just ten days before the European and World Day against the Death Penalty, the only elected member of parliament of the BBP – a Turkish ultra nationalist party – submitted a draft legislation proposal to Parliament asking for the reintroduction of the death penalty in Turkey. The proposal reintroduces the death penalty for the murder of children and women through sexual means and for killings carried out as part of individual or organised acts of terrorism.

In its justification for the proposal, Burhan Ekinci, the MP in question, highlights the need to restore justice for victims of these hideous crimes, and the need to enhance the trust of the Turkish public in the fairness of the Turkish criminal justice system.  In his proposal, Ekinci argues there is no death penalty in Turkey because of ‘international agreements’ (in quotation marks) and what he labels ‘domestic dynamics’. Ekinci also expresses his disgust for the dishonesty of so-called humanism which, he claims, puts the rights of perpetrators above those of the victims of the most serious crimes. 

This proposal, of course, may not find support in the Turkish Parliament and fade away. Evidence, however, shows that the proposal should not be taken lightly. If it does succeed, it can be Turkey’s Trexit, ending Turkey’s long standing relationship with European institutions.

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The Commission’s Proposals to Correct EU-Morocco Relations and the EU’s Obligation Not to Recognise as Lawful the ‘Illegal Situation’ in Western Sahara

Published on July 13, 2018        Author:  and
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On 11 June 2018, the EU Commission adopted two proposals (here and here) for Council Decisions to amend the EU-Morocco Association Agreement so that “[p]roducts originating in Western Sahara subject to controls by the Moroccan customs authorities shall benefit from the same trade preferences” as products from Morocco (Annex of the Proposals, para 1). The proposals come on the back of the judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that challenged the de facto extension of EU-Morocco agreements to Western Sahara over the last few years (covered here and here). Yet, they concern the trade liberalisation agreement and not the EU’s fishing rights, which is a matter to be addressed separately. Their purpose is to provide cover for the extension of the agreements on three grounds: consultation with “interested parties”; positive indirect impact on human rights; and, a contribution to Western Sahara’s economic development.

Whereas the Commission’s proposals do not engage with any relevant questions of international law, in this post, we consider whether the Commission’s recent proposals accord with international law, with particular reference to the obligation not to recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm (Article 42(2) DARIO and Article 41(2) ARSIWA). We argue that the proposals violate the EU and its Member States’ obligation of non-recognition of Morocco’s jus cogens breaches: the right to self-determination of people, the prohibition on aggression (acquisition of territory by force), and some of the intransgressible rules’ of international humanitarian law (IHL); insofar as the latter are a part of jus cogens (Wall AO, para. 157; Nuclear Weapons AO, para. 79). We further consider whether wrongfulness can be precluded by the consultation or consent of the Sahrawi people as a third party to the agreement, and whether the benefit provided under the agreements justifies an exception to third parties’ obligation of non-recognition. We conclude that neither of the exceptions apply and that the EU is precluded from extending the agreements to Western Sahara as a matter of international law. Read the rest of this entry…

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Excessive Multilingualism in EU Trade Agreements

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The legal protection of multilingualism is an important principle and an indispensable guarantee for the functioning of the institutions of the European Union (EU) as well as for their relationships with EU citizens. This is not only evidenced by Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which obligates the Union to respect linguistic diversity. Beyond that, legally protecting multilingualism is, as the European Parliament stated, “not a matter of communication only, but also a question of democratic legitimacy towards citizens and respect for the cultural diversity of the Member States. It affects the way in which EU legislation is drafted and interpreted”.

Multilingualism is also well established in the EU Treaties themselves, concluded between the Member States in 24 equally authentic languages (Article 55 TEU), which can be interpreted authoritatively by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) whenever necessary.

The practice of the European Union is quite similar with regard to treaties concluded with non-Member States. In particular, several free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded or negotiated with such states have been drawn up in no less than 23 or 24 equally authentic languages. Read the rest of this entry…

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United in Mixity? The Future of the EU Common Commercial Policy in light of the CJEU’s recent case law

Published on February 2, 2018        Author:  and
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The post-Lisbon Common Commercial Policy in the field of foreign investment policy

The Lisbon Treaty for the first time expressly attributed exclusive competence to the EU in the area of foreign investment by adding foreign direct investment (FDI) to the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The European Commission took not long to put these newly-won competences into use by designing its new European international investment policy. This new investment policy revealed the Commission’s broad interpretation of the competences conferred by the Lisbon Treaty. According to the Commission, the EU’s new common international investment policy should address both direct investment – i.e. investment made “with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting economic links” – and indirect investment, namely all those transactions involving debt or equity securities that do not establish a lasting economic link. Moreover, the common investment policy, as envisaged by the Commission, should cover both the pre-establishment and post-establishment phase.

The EU-Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) was the first trade agreement to rely on the EU’s competence in the field of common commercial policy as expanded post-Lisbon. This agreement embraces a wide range of fields, including trade in goods and services, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and investment liberalization and protection. All too predictably, the composite content of the agreement and, particularly, the inclusion of a chapter specifically dealing with investment protection and investment dispute settlement soon prompted the question of whether the EU’s new exclusive competence could be interpreted as encompassing both direct and indirect investment as well as investor-State dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). Needless to say, the answer to this question has important practical implications. If the above policy fields and all other matters contained in the FTA were to fall within the scope of exclusive competence of the EU, then such agreements can be concluded as “EU-only” agreements. If these competences are shared, the agreement can be concluded either by the EU alone or as a mixed agreement, namely a treaty to which both the Member States and the Union are parties. Commentators usually distinguish this type of mixity (facultative mixity) from compulsory mixity, which applies when the agreement in question covers both matters falling within the exclusive competence of the European Union and matters falling within the exclusive competence of the Member States.

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Torture in Libya and Questions of EU Member State Complicity

Published on January 11, 2018        Author: 
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Amnesty International has reported that ‘tens of thousands’ of refugees and migrants are being subject to torture and other human rights abuses at the hands of Libyan state officials and non-state actors operating in, and out of, Libya (the full report can be accessed here). The publication of the report has led to allegations that the European Union (EU) is complicit in torture. One finding of the report is that ‘EU member states are and have been well aware of the widespread human rights violations and abuses suffered by refugees and migrants in Libya’ (p. 56). Amnesty International has claimed that EU states ‘are complicit’ in torture. Whether the complicity spoken of can trigger the responsibility of these states under international law is implied, but far from clear.

There are many tangents to questions of ‘European complicity’ in the torture of Libyan refugees and migrants. For example, issues regarding the obligation of non-refoulement (p. 53 of report), or the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations (pp. 54-56) (for insights on these particular matters see Gauci and Jackson respectively). The following post will briefly analyse the applicable secondary rules relating to how EU states could be held responsible for complicity in torture under general international law in light of the facts contained in the Amnesty report. Read the rest of this entry…

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New EJIL: Live! Interview with Merris Amos on her Article “The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom”

Published on December 7, 2017        Author: 
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In this episode of EJIL: Live! the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, Professor Joseph Weiler, speaks with Professor Merris Amos of Queen Mary University of London, whose article “The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom” appears as the first piece in the “Focus” section on Human Rights and the ECHR in issue 3 of volume 28 of the Journal.

Professor Amos takes up the challenge of articulating the value that the ECtHR adds to the objective of protecting human rights. Moving the focus from legitimacy, Professor Amos presents three different levels where the ECtHR adds value: individual, global and national. This serves as a framework for the discussion on the rise of negative sentiment towards the Council of Europe in the United Kingdom and introduces—as well as debating—the three levels of value added to the United Kingdom by the ECtHR. This conversation accompanies and expands on the article, including conjectures about the future of the European Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom.

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Those Who Live in Glass Houses….

Published on November 8, 2017        Author: 
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The European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Poland over measures affecting the judiciary a day after the publication in the Polish Official Journal of the Law on the Ordinary Courts Organization on 28 July 2017. Though the infringement procedure is formally distinct from the ongoing ‘Rule of Law Dialogue’ and the recommendations issued just a few days before commencement of such procedure, it comes under the latter’s penumbra; both form part and parcel of the Commission Press Release (IP-17-2205). If the concern was ‘The Rule of Law,’ at least in some respects there is more bang than buck. The President of Poland blocked the most controversial parts of the new judicial regime in Poland, so that the infringement procedure was left with just two violations.    

The first concerns a different retirement age for male and female judges. It is not clear if this distinction in the Polish law is by design or inertia but the infringement seems clear: what is sauce for Sabena (RIP) cabin attendant geese should be sauce for judicial ganders. But important as any form of gender discrimination is, this item in the Polish legislation does not directly concern the more troublesome aspects of political control over the judiciary and its independence. Should Poland not correct this anomaly, it should be an easy case for the Court.

The second item in the infringement procedure is far more serious. In the Letter of Formal Notice (the first stage in infringement procedures) the Commission raises concerns ‘…that by giving the Minister of Justice the discretionary power to prolong the mandate of judges who have reached retirement age, as well as dismiss and appoint Court Presidents, the independence of the Polish Courts will be undermined’ (id.), allegedly contravening a combination of Article 19(1) of the TEU and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – a legal basis which is creative but not specious.

If indeed the prolongation of the mandate of a judge reaching retirement age rests in the hands of a Minister, the government of which he or she is part and acts and/or legislation issuing from which might be subject to judicial scrutiny by said judge, it may well consciously or otherwise impact, for example, his or her conduct prior to retirement or, no less importantly, give the appearance of lack of independence. I think this is indeed a serious matter impinging on the independence and appearance of independence of the judiciary. It is one thing to have scrutiny and approval of judges by democratic bodies at the moment of appointment. But once appointed, the independence of the judge from political actors must be as absolute as possible, and this dependency described in the letter of intent clearly compromises such.

But there is an irony in this complaint; some might even think a ticking time bomb. At least on two occasions proposals were put to various Intergovernmental Conferences to amend the Treaties so that the appointment of Judges to the Court of Justice of the European Union should be for a fixed period of time – say nine years – as is undoubtedly the Best Practice in Europe among higher courts where appointments are not until the age of retirement. Ominously in my view, the proposals were rejected. So that now we live under a regime where the prolongation of Members of the Court(s) (Judges and Advocates General) rests in the hands of national politicians whose decisions and legislation may come before such judges. Read the rest of this entry…

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