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EJIL Debate. Thirlway’s Rejoinder

Published on January 19, 2018        Author: 
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I am grateful to Professor d’Aspremont for his interesting and courteous response to my somewhat critical piece. I think we agree . . . that there is plenty on which we agree to differ! However, may I mention a few points?

A minor linguistic matter: the terms ‘the logic of sources’ and ‘the logic of interpretation’ seem to me unfortunate. I trust that Prof. d’Aspremont will agree that the rules of logic, or if you like of logical argument, are surely identical whatever the subject under discussion. The postulates and the facts are unique to the context and the problem examined, but to arrive at an intellectually correct result, the reasoning processes must follow the universal rules of logic; the expressions quoted seem to undermine this universality.

Prof. d’Aspremont does not find my use of the concept of opposability helpful. Maybe my point will be clearer if expressed in this way: in the relevant part of the ICJ Whaling judgment, the Court was, in his view engaged in a process of interpretation, but applied to it the intellectual approach appropriate to a problem of sources.  But was it a process of interpretation? Before the Court could enquire into what exactly were the obligations of Japan under the Whaling Convention as interpreted by the challenged resolution – a matter of interpretation – it had to decide whether the resolution was relevant at all – a question of sources (consent to a treaty-instrument). If the resolution was relevant, its effect on the reading of the Convention would be a matter of interpretation; but that stage was never reached.

Prof. d’Aspremont denies that he is ‘thinking from the Bench’; but surely whenever a scholar criticises a judicial decision, he is in effect saying ‘This is what the Court ought to have said: this is what my dissenting opinion would have said had I been among the judges?’ And to my mind this is so whether the critic is saying ‘The Court was wrong on its own premises’, or contending that ‘The matter should have been approached in a different way, viz. .  . .’

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EJIL Debate. The Whaling case and the Duty to Cooperate: Responding to Professors Thirlway and d’Aspremont

Published on January 17, 2018        Author: 
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I am puzzled by the very terms of the debate between Professors Thirlway and d’Aspremont for several reasons. First, there is a considerable ambiguity in both Japan’s argument and the Court’s position as to the legal effects yielded by the IWC resolutions. Hence, it is inevitable to have a variation of interpretations. Second, I believe that the determination of the implications of the judgment should not be made dependent on an “objectivised” subjective intention of the Parties or the Court — a task which is no work for legal scholars anyway.

Yet, my main source of puzzlement lies elsewhere. While the focus of Thirlway and d’Aspremont’s debate is on the Court’s position on Article 31 of the VCLT with regards to Japan’s non-assertion to the resolution, I submit that the most ground-breaking part of the judgment is that the Court brought back the legal effect of the resolutions from the backdoor, that is via the concept of ‘the duty to cooperate’. In this post, I would like to draw the attention of the readers to the unique characteristic of the duty to cooperate referred to in the Whaling case, and the possible necessity for a new conceptual framework. In particular, I argue, neither the logic of sources nor the logic of interpretation can sufficiently explain what the Court did with the duty of to cooperate. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Debate. A Reply to Thirlway: I am not Thinking From the Bench

Published on January 16, 2018        Author: 
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Being the object of a public rebuttal in an highly visible on-line blog platform by a prominent author like Professor Thirlway probably constitutes the most generous reward one can receive for “burning the midnight oil“. This also provides a fate for one’s work that is much better than the oblivion and indifference to which most of scholarly outputs are condemned in today’s academic pathologically prolific scene. This is why I could not be more grateful to Professor Thirlway for his comments on my article. Our repeated public debates these last years (for another example, see here) remind me that we share many areas of interest (sources, international dispute settlement, responsibility, etc) but also confirm that our views are simply — and thankfully — irreconcilable. In this short reaction, I want to respectfully show that our views diverge on the structure of legal argumentation related to sources and interpretation (1) as well as on the purpose of international legal scholarship (2).

Saving the Court through opposability

The reading of the judgment of the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ or the Court) in the Whaling in the Antarctic case which I have articulated in the European Journal of International Law and with which Professor Thirlway takes issue can be summarized as follows: the Court blurred the lines between the doctrine of sources and the doctrine of interpretation (and the modes of legal argumentation associated with each of them) by calibrating the interpretive value of IWC resolutions for the sake of interpreting the notion of ‘scientific approach’ in Article VIII of the Whaling Convention on the basis of Japan’s assent to those resolutions. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Debate: A whale or a weasel? The Antarctic Whaling case, and a reply to Professor d’Aspremont (Part II)

Published on January 16, 2018        Author: 
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Part II of a two-part post in the discussion of Jean d’Aspermont’s article, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation‘.

 

What did Japan say – and what did it not say? [Cont.]

[…]

What then does this single reference given tell us? What was Japan’s argument?  The text preceding the footnote states that in its Counter-Memorial Japan argues that resolutions of the kind under consideration ‘are not binding, and, therefore, irrelevant for the interpretation of Article VIII’ (d’Aspremont, p.1016). The Chapter of the Counter-Memorial quoted is however more limited: it is addressed to refutation of Australia’s argument that the resolutions rank as ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent practice of the parties’ for purposes of Article 12 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (an argument which was, as already noted, to be rejected by the Court). Japan’s argument on the point is in no way novel; and the question of Japan’s consent is not central, and not stressed. It is merely present in the reference to the need, under the terms of Article VI of the Whaling Convention, for consensus, if a resolution is to be anything more than a non-binding recommendation. It is hard to see any invocation of the doctrine of sources here.

Nor is there anything recognisable as reliance on sources in the oral argument of Japan, or even any emphasis on the lack of Japan’s lack of assent. In that argument the IWC resolutions were first dismissed (rather casually), not on the basis of lack of assent, but on the grounds that they were obsolete or superseded (see Boyle in CR 2013/15, pp. 54-55). Emphasis was laid on the freedom of a State to disregard resolutions of international bodies that merely recommend (see Pellet in CR 2013/16, pp.53-54, citing Judge Lauterpacht in Voting Procedure [1955] ICJ Rep 114-115), but with no reference to the lack of Japan’s consent as the reason for purely recommendatory status. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Debate: A whale or a weasel? The Antarctic Whaling case, and a reply to Professor d’Aspremont (Part I)

Published on January 15, 2018        Author: 
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Part I of a two-part post opening the discussion of Jean d’Aspermont’s article, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation‘.

The article by Professor Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation‘, is directed to the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand intervening) but is, in a number of ways, an unexpected commentary on that decision. The author concentrates his attention on what would seem to be a rather minor aspect of the controversy between the parties, and leaves aside all other elements of the case. He then builds on that point, an analysis of the parties’ arguments, and of the Court’s conclusions on the point, which, one suspects, both the parties and the Court would have great difficulty in recognizing as their own. The result is that Professor d’Aspremont appears to be criticising a wholly suppositious thesis, a chimera of his own construction, rather than the judgment actually delivered.

This criticism centres around what in the title of the article is called a ‘blurring of the lines between sources and interpretation’. In fuller terms, the distinction is between, in the first place, the ‘doctrine of sources’, which is ‘what allows norms and standards to be formally anchored in a legal order and generate therein the highest form of legal effect – that is, bindingness’ (p.1028). Against this, Professor d’Aspremont identifies a ‘doctrine of interpretation’: ‘legal relations between subjects of an international order can also be affected by interpretative effects’, which result from ‘an act of interpretation that is constrained not by the doctrine of sources but rather a doctrine of interpretation’(ibid.). This formulation, apparently unobjectionable, subsequently proves, however, to generate unnecessary problems, to be examined below. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Debate: Jean d’Aspremont’s Article on the Blurring of Interpretation and Sources in the ICJ Case on Whaling in the Antarctic

Published on January 15, 2018        Author: 
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The blog is happy to announce that over the next few days, we will host a discussion of Jean d’Aspremont’s article, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the Lines between Sources and Interpretation‘. The debate will open this afternoon with Professor Hugh Thirlway’s reaction to  d’Aspremont’s article. We will continue the discussion tomorrow with Jean d’Aspremont’s response. On Wednesday, Maiko Meguro will bring the debate to a close with her reaction to the argumentative framework of ‘logic of interpretation’ and ‘logic of sources’ put forward by Professor d’Aspremont in his EJIL article and discussed by Hugh Thirlway in his rebuttal.

d’Aspremont’s article, which was published in the European Journal of International Law in November 2017, argues that the idea that the doctrine of sources enjoys a monopoly on the tracing of bindingness and does not directly constrain the interpretation of those standards and norms that it validates has been seriously eroded by the International Court of Justice in its 31 March 2014 judgment concerning Whaling in the Antarctic. d’Aspremont contends that the Court comes very close to calibrating the interpretive effects of the resolutions of the International Whaling Commission through the doctrine of sources. He explains, how this blurring between sources and interpretation is most unsettling given the efforts that the Court had invested, over the years, in consolidating two distinct doctrines – the doctrine of sources and the doctrine of interpretation.

We are grateful to all of the participants for agreeing to have this discussion here. Readers are invited to join in- comments will of course be open on all posts.

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New EJIL: Live! Interview with Merris Amos on her Article “The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom”

Published on December 7, 2017        Author: 
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In this episode of EJIL: Live! the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, Professor Joseph Weiler, speaks with Professor Merris Amos of Queen Mary University of London, whose article “The Value of the European Court of Human Rights to the United Kingdom” appears as the first piece in the “Focus” section on Human Rights and the ECHR in issue 3 of volume 28 of the Journal.

Professor Amos takes up the challenge of articulating the value that the ECtHR adds to the objective of protecting human rights. Moving the focus from legitimacy, Professor Amos presents three different levels where the ECtHR adds value: individual, global and national. This serves as a framework for the discussion on the rise of negative sentiment towards the Council of Europe in the United Kingdom and introduces—as well as debating—the three levels of value added to the United Kingdom by the ECtHR. This conversation accompanies and expands on the article, including conjectures about the future of the European Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom.

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A Path towards the Moral Sophistication of International Law? Some Remarks on Miles Jackson’s “Complicity in International Law”

Published on April 13, 2017        Author: 
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This post is part of our book discussion on Miles Jackson’s “Complicity in International Law“.

It is a great pleasure to contribute to this mini-symposium on Miles Jackson’s monograph on the notion of complicity in international law. The book is a further testament to the growing importance of questions of ‘shared responsibility’ in international law, ie the harmful cooperation of several actors.

In his elegantly written book, Miles Jackson makes several important contributions. In particular, he has brought a comparative approach to questions of complicity in international law. Whereas most existing books on complicity focus either on state responsibility or international criminal law, Jackson aims to transcend this boundary and develop an overarching framework for complicity in international law. While Jackson is of course mindful of the structural differences between the two areas, his comparative approach nonetheless calls for some further discussion.

A second most original aspect of the book is its move beyond an inter-state focus in its treatment of state complicity. Jackson analyses if and to what extent international law imposes state responsibility for complicity with non-state actors. In this latter regard, he convincingly argues against an approach based on attribution. Read the rest of this entry…

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International Law in the Asian Century: Conclusion to Opinio Juris and EJIL:Talk! Mini-Symposium

Published on January 19, 2017        Author: 
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Editor’s Note: This post is the final part of a symposium being run by EJIL:Talk! and Opinio Juris in relation to Simon Chesterman’s article “Asia’s Ambivalence About International Law & Institutions: Past, Present, and Futures“, which is available here in draft form, the final version appearing later this month in EJIL. We thank all of those who have contributed to  this symposium.

An academic learns most through errors and omissions. Far better to be criticized in text than footnoted in passing — both, of course, are preferable to being ignored. I am therefore enormously grateful that such esteemed scholars and practitioners were willing to take part in this joint Opinio Juris and EJIL:Talk! symposium and offer their responses to arguments put forward in my article for the current issue of EJIL, giving me and other readers refinements and additions that will enrich the larger conversation of which this symposium is a part.

The six commentators raise many issues, which I will address under three broad headings of power, history, and method. Each also brings to their paper a certain optimism or pessimism about what the future may hold, something to which I will return at the end.

1      Power

Judge Xue Hanqin puts at the forefront an argument about which I may have been too delicate. Asian states are not wary of delegating sovereignty because they are “ambivalent” about international law, she writes, but “because they do not believe that international law as … advocated and practiced would protect their fundamental rights and interests.” Similarly, regional integration is not primarily a matter of law, but of policy. The relative absence of regional institutions in Asia is not simply due to diversity and the other factors highlighted in the article; rather, it is attributable to geopolitical divisions within the region and in its various relations with other great powers.

This echoes a point made by Professor Eyal Benvenisti, who proposes that regional cooperation may be driven by external pressure as much as internal cohesion. The presence of an outside rival, for example, can encourage greater integration as the Soviet Union did for Europe and the United States did for Latin America. No such rival drove regional integration in Asia, though at the sub-regional level ASEAN has clearly been shaped by the ten member states’ relations with larger countries in East and South Asia as well as by their own identification as Southeast Asian. Read the rest of this entry…

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Asian States’ Participation in International Adjudication: Comments

Published on January 18, 2017        Author: 
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Editor’s Note: This post forms part of a symposium being run by EJIL:Talk! and Opinio Juris in relation to Simon Chesterman’s article “Asia’s Ambivalence About International Law & Institutions: Past, Present, and Futures“, which is available here in draft form, the final version appearing later this month in EJIL. Starting on Monday, the two blogs are publishing a number of posts discussing the article, and we thank all of those who have contributed to  this symposium.

Asia is a vast region and encompasses more States and a larger population than any other region in the world. Asia also presents historical, linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity, as well as wide-ranging stages of political evolution and economic development. Asia indeed defies an easy definition. It is therefore difficult to speak, in a general term, of Asia with respect to any subject. International law and institutions are no exception. There is a wide variation in Asian States’ engagement with international law and institutions. For example, many States in East Asia are actively participate in various international regimes and attach great importance to international cooperation. On the other hand, some Asian States still adhere to the unrealistic, outdated notion of sovereignty and refuse to engage with other States. It should also be pointed out that Asian States’ attitudes towards international law and institutions are not static but evolving. In this comment, I will confine myself to Asian States’ participation in international adjudication, which may be considered one of the most revealing yardsticks to measure their attitudes toward international law and institutions.

Much has been said about the Asian States’ passivity towards international law and institutions. Various explanations have been given for such reticence, ranging from the Asian culture and tradition which prefer virtue and harmony to law and adjudication to the prevailing distrust of the law and institutions which were essentially a product of the Western civilization (and thus perceived to be biased in favour of the West) and in whose creation and developments Asian states did not play significant roles.

At least in terms of the number of disputes submitted to international adjudication and their political and legal context, it would be difficult to characterize the attitude of Asian States toward international law and adjudication as positive. For example, there had been only three cases involving Asian states that had been referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice during its entire period of activities (S.S. Wimbledon, 1923; Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, 1928; Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, 1932). The picture was not much different in the subsequent early period of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), during which many Asian States obtained independence mostly from the Western colonial powers. Iran was the first Asian State to appear before the ICJ in 1952 in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case but Iran was taken to the Court by the United Kingdom. The Court eventually found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Then India was the next Asian State to appear before the Court in the case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory in 1955. However, India was also taken to the Court by Portugal. In 1959, Cambodia instituted the proceedings against Thailand in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, and that was the first case involving the two Asian States before the ICJ. Subsequently in the 1970s, India and Pakistan were involved in the two cases before the Court (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO (India v. Pakistan), 1972; Case concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), 1973). In the 1980s, Iran was involved in two disputes with the United States before the ICJ. However, those instances were rather exceptions than the rules (US Dipolmatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (USA v. Iran), 1980; Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. USA), 1989-1996 (discontinuance)).

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