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Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 5)

UNCLOS, CITES and the IWC – A Tailored International Duty to Cooperate?

Published on November 26, 2018        Author: 
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In October 2018, the Standing Committee (SC) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITESconcluded that Japan had failed to comply with certain CITES provisions regarding the trade in Appendix I species (namely, sei whales). This blog post seeks to evaluate the relationship that such a conclusion could have on Japan’s duty to cooperate regarding the conservation of marine mammals (as required under Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)), and the duty to cooperate with non-binding resolutions made by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) – especially in light of the findings in the Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) Case.

The Whaling Case

In 2014, Australia took Japan to the ICJ, alleging that Japan’s Southern Ocean scientific whaling programme (JARPAII) was inconsistent with Article VIII of the ICRW. The Court concluded that JARPAII involved activities that, broadly speaking, could be scientific research but that JARPAII’s design and implementation was not ‘for purposes of scientific research’ as required by Article VIII (para. 227). In arriving at this conclusion, the Court held that Japan has a ‘duty to cooperate’ with the IWC and the Scientific Committee (para. 83). As stated by Meguro, the ICJ effectively shaped the duty to cooperate as a mechanism to bind Member States – who do not support a particular resolution – to the standards/recommendations under IWC resolutions (which, by nature, are non-binding).

Japan’s Recent Relationship with the IWC

In September 2014, the IWC (having regard to the findings in the Whaling Case) adopted a resolution indicating that no further special whaling permits be issued until they had been reviewed by the Scientific Committee and had received recommendations by the IWC. In November 2014, Japan submitted a proposal for NEWREP-A (a new research whaling programme in the Southern Ocean) in which Japan acknowledged that it had ‘taken seriously the Court’s finding that the decision to grant special permits under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the ICRW, “cannot depend simply on that State’s perception”’. Read the rest of this entry…

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Activating the Third Pillar of the UNGPs on Access to an Effective Remedy

Published on November 23, 2018        Author: 
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The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (known as the UNGPs or Ruggie Principles) were developed in 2008 by the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, John Ruggie, and endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011. Comprised of three pillars to ‘protect, respect and remedy’ human rights violations, the third pillar on remedy has often been referred to as the ‘forgotten’ pillar. However, it is now garnering much greater attention.

While momentum around the third pillar is critical to the realisation of the UNGPs, a number of issues still need to be ironed out. One central question relates to Principle 27 which requires states to make ‘effective and appropriate non-judicial grievance mechanisms’ available. In this post, I suggest that non-judicial grievance mechanisms can contribute to access to an effective remedy but they also carry significant risks which are potentially accentuated in the context of businesses. I argue that much greater clarification is needed on when such mechanisms can be used and the standards of justice required of them, if they are to form part of a ‘bouquet’ of effective remedies foreseen by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis
 

Palestine v United States: Why the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state

Published on November 22, 2018        Author: 
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Palestine’s institution of proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has already drawn much attention on this blog (see here and here) and elsewhere. A great deal has already been said on Monetary Gold and admissibility. My post will focus on the Article 34(1) ICJ Statute requirement that ‘[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court’. Contrary to some arguments that have been made on this blog and elsewhere, I will argue that for the purposes of Article 34(1) the ICJ does not need to decide whether Palestine is a state, let alone weigh the Montevideo criteria. An entity may be a ‘state’ for the functional purposes of certain treaties and procedures created by those treaties, but such procedures have no implications for the substantive legal status of the entity under general international law. I will also argue that Palestine’s access to these procedural treaty mechanisms is UNESCO membership and not the status of a non-member observer state in the UN.

When a treaty uses the word ‘state’

The ICJ proceedings are only open to states. But this does not mean that the legal status of an entity can be determined as a side-effect of the ICJ’s procedural rules. The logic of such an argument would go as follows: the ICJ can only hear cases between states, so if the ICJ exercises its jurisdiction, the parties in the proceedings must be states. This would be an implicit reading of the requirement contained in an international treaty that an entity be a state. Such implicit readings are not uncommon in international legal scholarship.  We indeed often read in leading textbooks that since UN membership is only open to states, this is the ultimate confirmation that a UN member indeed is a state. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Global Compact for Migration: to sign or not to sign?

Published on November 21, 2018        Author: 
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The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (final draft of 13 July 2018) is scheduled for adoption at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakesh in December 2018. But in the run-up to this conference, several states, beginning with the United States already in 2017, now followed by Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others, have announced that they will  not sign the text. Will refusal to sign be relevant in terms of international law? What is the juridical quality of the Compact, which legal consequences does it have, and which normative “ripples” might it deploy in the future? The controversy over the Compact sheds light on the legitimacy of international law-making processes and on the precarious normative power of international law.

A Brief Glance at the Contents

The Compact consists of four parts. Following the preamble, the first part contains, “Vision and Guiding Principles”. The second part, “Objectives and Commitments” contains 23 objectives, proceeded by a part on “Implementation” and the final section “Follow-up and Review”. The Compact purports to set out “a common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding migration” (para. 9). The purpose is mainly to secure that migration “works for all” (para. 13).

The Compact’s “guiding principles” are, inter alia, people-centeredness, international cooperation, national sovereignty, rule of law and due process, and sustainable development (para. 15). These are well-established and to a large extent also legally entrenched principles. The 23 “objectives” are partly generally recognised such as saving lives (objective 8), respond to smuggling (objective 9), or eradicate trafficking (objective 10). Some mainly correspond to interests of states of origin (such as promoting transfer of remittances, objective 20), others basically satisfy interests of receiving states (such as facilitating return and readmission (objective 21). In substance, the Compact partly repeats international law as it stands or refers to existing instruments (see notably preamble para. 2), partly contains platitudes, and partly contains novel ideas. Read the rest of this entry…

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Lost in Space? Gaps in the International Space Object Registration Regime

Published on November 19, 2018        Author: 
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Despite having been operational for over 15 years, the satellites NSS-6 and NSS-7 are missing from the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space (‘International Register’). Just as we do not accept unregistered cars on our roads, we should not accept unregistered space objects in orbit. Registration ensures that the state responsible for a specific space object can be readily identified, and, if necessary, presented with a claim under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.

For this reason, under the international space object registration regime, all space objects must be registered by a state. So which state is shirking their duty to submit NSS-6 and NSS-7 to the International Register?

The two satellites were built by Lockheed Martin Commercial Space Systems (‘Lockheed Martin’), a United States-based corporation, for New Skies International NV (‘New Skies’), a Dutch corporation. Launch services were provided by Arianespace SA (‘Arianespace’), a French corporation. Both launches took place from French territory. Once in orbit, ownership of the satellites was transferred from Lockheed Martin to New Skies. So at least three states are involved – and the question is which of these states should register NSS-6 and NSS-7 (spoiler alert: I think it’s the Netherlands). This episode is used as a case study to illustrate the ambiguities and gaps that exist in the international space object registration regime. I conclude the post by making a proposal which seeks to find a way to close these gaps. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Road Less Traveled: How Corporate Directors Could be Held Individually Liable in Sweden for Corporate Atrocity Crimes Abroad

Published on November 13, 2018        Author:  and
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On 18 October 2018, the Swedish Government authorized the Swedish Prosecution Authority to proceed to prosecution in a case regarding activities of two corporate directors within Swedish oil company Lundin Oil, and later within Lundin Petroleum, in Sudan (now South Sudan) between 1998 and 2003. The company’s chief executive and chairman could be charged with aiding and abetting gross crimes against international law in accordance with Chapter 22, Section 6 of the Swedish Penal Code. Charges of such kind carry a sentence of up to ten years or life imprisonment. The case has the potential of furthering accountability of corporate actors for their involvement in international crimes abroad.

Lundin’s alleged involvement in international crimes in South Sudan

Sudan was ravaged by a non-international armed conflict which lasted from 1983 until 2005, between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – as well as a variety of other armed groups. Meanwhile, beginning with the signing of contracts in 1997, Lundin formed a consortium which carried out oil exploration and production in an oil concession area located south of Bentiu on the West Bank of the White Nile in Western Upper Nile/Unity State called Block 5A in the southern part of the country. According to a report by the European Commission on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), the oil exploration brought exacerbated conditions while setting off a battle for control of the disputed region, leading to thousands of deaths and the forced displacement of local populations – with the Nuer people being the most affected. Additionally, reported crimes against civilians by the Sudanese army as well as associated militias of both parties, include indiscriminate attacks, unlawful killing, rape, enslavement, torture, pillage and the recruitment of child soldiers. The consortium’s interaction with local counterparts has come under criminal investigation after the ECOS report was submitted to Swedish prosecutors in 2010. The long time span of the investigation is at least in part due to on-going conflict in the region in 2013, when the International Office of the Prosecutor had scheduled its visit to South Sudan. Furthermore, the case came with some political connotations since Carl Bildt, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, had served as a member of the Board of Directors of Lundin from 2000 to 2006.

In the United States, a case comprised of a similar set of facts was brought by the Presbyterian Church of Sudan against the Republic of Sudan and Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian oil company, which commenced its activities in the area one year after Lundin. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in a judgment of 2 October 2009 that the claimants had failed to establish that Talisman “acted with the purpose to support the Government’s offences”. Under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) the plaintiffs needed to show that “Talisman acted with the – purpose – (one could argue that such mens rea standard had been set unreasonably high) to advance the Government’s human rights abuses”. On 15 April 2010, the plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, supported by an amicus curiae submitted by Earth Rights International on 20 May 2010, asking to revert the decision of the Second Circuit. On October 2010 the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari and respectively to hear the appeal in this case. In contrast to the rather broad universal and extraterritorial jurisdiction provided for in the Swedish Penal Code, the Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co. remarkably restricted the application of the ACTA in cases involving allegations of abuse – outside – the United States by finding that presumptively it does not apply extraterritorially. Read the rest of this entry…

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Dulce et Decorum Est

Published on November 11, 2018        Author: 
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Wilfred Owen (18 March 1893 – 4 November 1918)
 
Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs,
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots,
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of gas-shells dropping softly behind.
 
Gas! GAS! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime.—
Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
 
In all my dreams before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
 
If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,—
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori
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Filed under: Armed Conflict, EJIL Analysis
 
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UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options … the Process

Published on November 7, 2018        Author: 
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Last week has been described as a watershed moment for ISDS reform. During a meeting in Vienna, states decided by consensus on the desirability of developing reforms in UNCITRAL with respect to investor-state arbitration. States now have an opportunity to make proposals for a work plan about what reforms to consider and how to go about considering them. To the extent that the tide has turned on traditional investor-state arbitration, it is now up to states to tell us where they want to sail.

As you might imagine, reaching a decision like this involved quite a process, along with a lot of politics. In this blog, I set out the process in terms of what was decided in Vienna, what was not decided, and what the next steps will be for moving forward in 2019. In the next blog, I will provide some context to this development, giving some insights into the politics of the process as well as some projections about how this process might develop.

This reform process will be long and its ultimate outcome remains unknowable. But the momentum for and direction of reforms are becoming increasingly clear. The calls for systemic reform are rising, though different states may mean different things by “systemic.”

Read the rest of this entry…

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Reforming Land Restitution – A Concerted Effort to Derail Colombia’s Transitional Justice System?

Published on November 2, 2018        Author: 
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Recently, Kai Ambos alerted readers of two attempts to weaken Colombia’s transitional justice system (see here and here). A third development fortifies suspicions that the country’s newly elected government intends to derail it. This time, a legislative proposal threatens Colombia’s land restitution process. Changes in the treatment of secondary occupants of reclaimed land could especially frustrate this integral part of the elaborate reparation efforts.  

Land Restitution in Colombia

The struggle over land has long been at the core of the Colombian conflict. With 7.7 million people, Colombia hosts the world’s largest population of internally displaced persons. IDPs constitute the vast majority of the 8.7 million registered survivors of the armed conflict. Studies estimate that displacement has affected 11.4 million hectares of land. Accordingly, former President Santos included land restitution as a central element in the 2011 Law on Victims and Land Restitution – the largest reparation program in the world. To manage the massive caseload, a newly created entity, the Land Restitution Unit (Unidad de Restitución de Tierras, URT) administers a special three-phase restitution process. In the first administrative phase, the URT decides on a survivor’s request to have his or her land entered into the Register of Evacuated or Forcibly Abandoned Land (Registro de Tierras Despojadas y Abandonadas Forzosamente). The URT collects evidence and evaluates whether the survivor convincingly demonstrates his or her displacement and a legal relationship to the land they seek to reclaim. Once registered, the survivor proceeds to the judicial phase, in which a specialized judge decides the claim with finality. A positive sentence constitutes a legal title to the land. The judge can further order any measures necessary to guarantee an effective return to the restituted land in conditions respectful to the survivor’s human rights. Among these measures are debt relief, and technical and financial assistance for economic projects. In the post-sentence phase, the judge remains seized and can issue further orders if the survivor encounters problems in the return process.

Secondary Occupants

Of course, the process is not perfect. Read the rest of this entry…

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Understanding the State Party Referral of the Situation in Venezuela

Published on November 1, 2018        Author: 
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Since 8 February 2018, the situation in Venezuela has been the subject of an ongoing preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. On Wednesday 26 September 2018, however, a coalition of States Parties to the Rome Statute composed of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru jointly submitted a referral of the situation in Venezuela to the Prosecutor. In this referral, it was requested that the Prosecutor open an investigation into the commission of crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Venezuela under the government of President Nicolás Maduro, beginning on February 12, 2014. This referral, the ninth referral received by the Prosecutor, is not only the first referral to be submitted by a “coalition” of States Parties, but also one (directly) concerning a situation occurring on the territory of another State Party.

Pursuant to article 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute, a referral by a State Party is one of the three triggering mechanisms under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. It represents a formal request by a State Party (or in this case States Parties) for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on crimes allegedly committed in a situation. Furthermore, it gives the referring State Party the opportunity to present supporting documentation regarding the situation in question. It does not, as explained by the Prosecutor in her response to the Venezuela referral, automatically lead to the opening of an investigation. Instead, as a triggering mechanism, it leads the Prosecutor to apply the statutory criteria to assess whether the referred situation warrants investigation. This process, otherwise referred to as a preliminary examination, entails an evaluation of the criteria set out in article 53(1) of the Statute. In the event that the Prosecutor decides to initiate an investigation on a situation referred to her by a State Party, she is not required to seek authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed.

The legal effect of a State Party referral is therefore limited to three key aspects: it can trigger a preliminary examination by the Prosecutor; it can act as a formal submission of new information vis-à-vis article 14(2); as well as allowing for the initiation of an investigation (if the Prosecutor decides so) without the need for judicial authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

In applying these aspects to the Venezuela referral, it appears that its legal effect is rather limited. Read the rest of this entry…

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