magnify
Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 2)

Public International Law and the 2018-2019 Ebola Outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Published on August 1, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

On 17 July, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Director-General declared, under Article 12 of the International Health Regulations (IHR), that the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). The declaration took place after an Emergency Committee issued its advice in the same sense.

The aftermath of the PHEIC declaration has given way to questions about what exactly its implications –legal and otherwise– are. Some of the general features of PHEICs are described elsewhere. In turn, this post provides a closer look at the underlying legal regime of the IHR, with an emphasis on provisions related to the declaration of a PHEIC. Afterwards, a brief account of the current situation in the DRC Ebola outbreak is provided. Lastly, some of the potential consequences, legal and otherwise, of a PHEIC declaration are discussed.  

The Legal Regime of PHEICs

The IHR were approved at the 58th World Health Assembly in 2005, in accordance with Article 21 of the Constitution of the WHO. This provision gives the World Health Assembly the authority to issue regulations, inter alia, in the subject of “procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease”. Notably, the IHR do not require further ratification by states to enter into force, rather only a two-thirds majority vote in the World Health Assembly (Article 60a Constitution of the WHO). Regulations adopted under this procedure become binding for all WHO Member States, with the exception of those which explicitly “opt out”. The IHR entered into force in 2007, and are currently binding for all 194 WHO Member States and Liechtenstein. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
Filed under: EJIL Analysis
 

The Colombian Constitutional Court Judgment C-252/19: A new frontier for reform in international investment law

Published on July 29, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

On 6 June 2019, the Colombian Constitutional Court announced its long-awaited decision (made public 2 July 2019) regarding the constitutionality of the 2014 Colombia – France Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Using an innovative line of reasoning, the Colombian Court did not only rule on whether or not this text was constitutional. It further declared the BIT to be “conditionally constitutional” [condicionalmente exequible], requiring the issue of a joint interpretative note that would clarify the meaning of several standards of treatment contained in the BIT.  

This is not the first time that a constitutional adjudicator has analyzed international investment agreements. In Europe, for instance, resistance to International Investment Agreements (IIAs), such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (CETA), has been framed in constitutional terms. However, there are several factors which point to the importance of this judgement not only for the two countries involved but also, more broadly, for the way multilateralism is understood.

The Court decision and the remedy of ‘conditioned constitutionality’

On 10 July 2014, France and Colombia signed a BIT in order to establish a legal framework for foreign investment. In line with updates to other investment agreements in recent years, the revised Colombia – France BIT incorporates a series of features that aim to protect the regulatory space of states. However, the treaty also contains clauses that have been criticized (see here) for not protecting the interests of a developing state such as Colombia.

After a detailed analysis of all the provisions in the BIT and the arguments for and against the declaration of constitutionality, the Court decided that the treaty was compatible with the Colombian Constitution. However, for some clauses of the BIT, it made the declaration of constitutionality conditional on the implementation of a future interpretative declaration of the two countries that would clarify the meaning of the words used to draft substantive standards of treatment.  The Court sketched its methodology in the following way: Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

An International Investment Advisory Center: Beyond the WTO Model

Published on July 26, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

Establishing an international investment advisory center is now a priority for many states.  UNCITRAL Working Group III has put the issue at the top of its agenda for ISDS reform.  The European Commission is considering an advisory center for its proposed Multilateral Investment Court.  The Netherlands government has commissioned a feasibility study.

Thinking about an international investment advisory center naturally starts with the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).  Established in 2001, the ACWL is the “first true center for legal aid within the international legal system.”  It seeks to level the playing field by giving developing states the same in-house capacity that developed states enjoy.  The ACWL provides developing states with training, confidential advice on WTO law, and assistance or financial support during WTO dispute-settlement proceedings.  The center receives funding from developed and developing states, including voluntary contributions and (below-market) fees from dispute-settlement proceedings.  Two decades on, the ACWL has established itself as an integral part of the WTO dispute settlement system, playing “a crucial role in maintaining a viable and credible rules-based multilateral trading system.” 

But is the ACWL the right model for an international investment advisory center?  Unlike the WTO regime, the international investment regime is decentralized.  There is no global treaty on investment protection, no global forum for addressing all investment-related issues, and no global institution to help states avoid, manage, and resolve investment disputes efficiently and effectively.  Instead, each State—developing and developed—must devise its own approach to foreign investment and devote the human and financial resources necessary to comprehend, navigate, and develop that regime.

The decentralized nature of the international investment regime has important consequences.  States often struggle to comprehend and comply with their international investment commitments across all levels of government, making it difficult to avoid or settle investment disputes.  Many states lack significant expertise with investment arbitration, making it difficult to defend themselves effectively, or proactively shape the development of international investment law.  States’ frequent reliance on external counsel may hinder the development of in-house government legal capacity essential to establishing coherent and consistent national treaty practice. A cycle of uncertainty, inexperience, and incapacity has bred discontent with the current regime, threatening its legitimacy.  Viewed from that perspective, an international investment advisory center focused primarily on helping developing-state respondents in investment arbitration may fail to address underlying needs and broader concerns.

Broad Participation, Maximum Impact, Minimum Cost

A successful advisory center could help fill six gaps in the international investment regime: Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 
Tags: ,

Look before you leap: the 2019 extradition bill amendments in light of Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations

Published on July 25, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

On the first day of July, Hong Kong celebrates Establishment Day, which commemorates the 1997 transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China. Establishment Day for Hongkongers is customarily accompanied by political protests. The widely reported 2019 protests are the direct result of a proposed amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (‘FOO’). The proposed amendment, if passed, would open up the possibility of extradition to mainland China.  Although the proposed amendment was declared “dead” by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, there is real possibility that, at one point or another, the bill will be reincarnated since under Hong Kong law a bill can be suspended or withdrawn and it is not clear that the declaration declaring it dead does either of these. As a result, people have kept pouring into the streets calling for Carrie Lam to step down, making the issue of continuing relevance.

One major point of contention of the proposal concerns the protection of human rights of those subject to transfer to China. NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch point out China’s deplorable human rights protection. While the PRC’s poor human rights track record has been documented extensively, in this contribution I wish to clarify how the amendment bill could result in a situation in which Hong Kong incurs responsibility under international human rights law – in particular article 7 ICCPR – when extraditing persons to the PRC. I do so by first discussing the proposed amendments to the FOO. Second, by explaining the international human rights standards that govern extradition and by which Hong Kong is bound (mainly the torture prohibition), I show how the proposal lacks the safeguards necessary to ensure adequate protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

Proposed amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance

The government’s justification for tabling the FOO amendment proposal lies in a brutal 2018 murder case in which a Hong Kong man killed his girlfriend while vacationing in Taiwan and fled back to Hong Kong. The Taiwanese authorities, quick to connect the dots, issued an extradition request to Hong Kong, but received no reply. The absence of action on the part Hong Kong can be explained by two alleged loopholes in the FOO: Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

A Disappointing End of the Road for the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation in the Netherlands

Published on July 23, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

On Friday, the Dutch Supreme Court issued its final decision in the Mothers of Srebrenica litigation regarding the acts and omissions of the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) of U.N. peacekeepers at Srebrenica in July 1995 (English translation). I’ve written previously on these pages about a pair of earlier, narrower cases (Nuhanović and Mustafić-Mujić) related to the Netherlands’ responsibility for Dutchbat’s failures during the genocide  (see here, here,  and here). Friday’s ruling marks the end of an extraordinarily lengthy process regarding the more comprehensive litigation effort led by the Mothers of Srebrenica organization. The litigation went up to the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of U.N. immunity (which was upheld), before turning to the responsibility of the Netherlands.

In this post, I discuss four issues arising in the Supreme Court’s decision

  • the Court’s apportionment of responsibility to the Netherlands for Bosnian Serb forces’ killings of the 350 Bosnian Muslim men who had been in Dutchbat’s compound;
  • the theory of attribution adopted by the Court, and how it compares to the approach adopted in earlier Srebrenica cases;
  • the Court’s approach to Dutch responsibility for those outside the compound;
  • and the justiciability of the duty to prevent genocide.

The Percentage of Dutch Responsibility

The headlines have focused on the Netherlands’ share of liability. The Court of Appeal held the state liable for 30% of the damages associated with the killings of the 350 men whom Dutchbat had evicted from its Potočari compound and into the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) (paras. 68-69.1). The Supreme Court reduced this share to 10% (para 4.7.9). Both courts appear to have applied a form of proportionate responsibility to Dutchbat with respect to the VRS killings, while applying joint and several responsibility to the Netherlands with respect to the actions of Dutchbat. In other words, the Netherlands is to be held fully responsible for the 10% apportioned to Dutchbat, even though Dutchbat’s conduct is potentially also attributable to the U.N. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

The International Court of Justice renders its judgment in the Jadhav case (India v. Pakistan)

Published on July 18, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

On 8 May 2017, India instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Pakistan, accusing the latter of ‘egregious violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’ (VCCR) (p. 4). The dispute concerns the treatment of an Indian national, Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, who was detained, tried and sentenced to death by a military court in Pakistan.

In this post, I will give a brief overview of the background of the case and the claims submitted by India, followed by the provisional measures decision and the judgment on jurisdiction, admissibility and merits, pronounced in open court on 17 July 2019.

Application instituting proceedings

In its Application, India claimed that, on 3 March 2016, Mr. Jadhav was ‘kidnapped from Iran, where he was carrying on business after retiring from the Indian Navy, and was then shown to have been arrested in Baluchistan’ (para. 13) on suspicion of espionage and sabotage activities.  India stated that it was not informed of Mr. Jadhav’s detention until 22 days after his arrest and Pakistan failed to inform Mr. Jadhav of his rights under the VCCR. Allegedly, the Pakistani authorities refused to give India consular access to Mr. Jadhav, despite repeated requests. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

The Ituri Conundrum: Qualifying Conflicts between an Occupying Power and an Autonomous Non-State Actor

Published on July 15, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

Last week, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued the long-awaited judgment in the Ntaganda case. The judges found the defendant guilty on all 18 counts, including the ICC’s first ever conviction for sexual slavery. Although the Chamber is yet to resolve matters related to sentencing and reparations, the decision marks an important milestone in the proceedings, which began with an arrest warrant issued back in August 2006 (Mr Ntaganda surrendered himself to the ICC in March 2013).

Readers of this blog will be familiar with the case as well as with some of the controversies surrounding its progress. In brief, Bosco Ntaganda was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), the armed wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). The UPC/FPLC was one of the armed groups involved in the so-called Ituri conflict, which took place between 1999 and 2003 in the Ituri region in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Before the ICC, Mr Ntaganda was charged with 13 counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity, all allegedly committed in Ituri between 2002 and 2003.

The judgment, which fills over 500 pages, no doubt deserves careful scrutiny before any general pronouncements can be made as to its overall quality and rigour. Instead of analysing the judgment as a whole, this post focuses on a narrow question related to the Chamber’s legal qualification of the conflict in Ituri at the material time (discussed in paras 699–730 of the judgment). In particular, I am going to look at how international humanitarian law (IHL) qualifies conflicts between an occupying power and an autonomous non-State actor. The analysis builds on my research into complex conflict situations, which was published as part of my recent book on Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law (OUP 2018, especially chapter 3).

The situation in Ituri between 2002 and 2003 was notoriously convoluted, Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

Why Arbitrate Business and Human Rights Disputes? Public Consultation Period Open for the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration

Published on July 12, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

In June 2019, the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration (hereafter, “Draft BHR Arbitration Rules”) was released for global online public consultation, with the consultation period set to end by 25 August 2019.  Judge Bruno Simma chairs the global Drafting Team that has collaborated in developing the draft rules, since the Drafting Team started its work in January 2018 with the support of the City of the Hague.  (Drafting Team Members and Working Group Members all listed here.) The final version of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration will be published on 10 December 2019.  Before the release of the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules, the Working Group had produced a 2017 concept paper on business and human rights arbitration.  This was followed by the creation and first meetings of the Drafting Team in January 2018; the Drafting Team’s production of its Elements for Consideration in Draft Rules, Model Clauses, and Other Aspects of the Arbitral Process in time for the November 2018 Online Consultation Procedure; the April 2019 meetings of the Drafting Team and the June 2019 publication of the Summary of the Sounding Board Consultationsup to the June 2019 release of the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules.  

As described in the Draft BHR Arbitration Rules:

“The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration provide a set of procedures for the arbitration of disputes related to the impact of business activities on human rights.  The Hague Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with modifications needed to address certain issues likely to arise in business and human rights disputes.  As with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the scope of the Hague Rules is not limited by the type of claimant(s) or respondent(s) or the type of subject-matter of the dispute and extends to any disputes that the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to resolve by arbitration under the Hague Rules.  Parties could thus include business entities, individuals, labor unions and organizations, States and State entities and civil society organizations. Equally, the Hague Rules purposefully do not define the terms “business”, “human rights”, or “business and human rights.” For the purposes of the Hague Rules, such terms should be thus understood at least as broadly as the meaning such terms have under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, in the vast majority of cases, no definition of these terms should be necessary at all.

Like the UNCITRAL Rules, the Hague Rules do not address the modalities by which the parties to the arbitration may consent to it nor the content of that consent, which are matters for the parties. Consent remains the cornerstone of business and human rights arbitration, as with all arbitration, and it can be established before a dispute arises, e.g. in contractual clauses, or after a dispute arises, e.g. in a submission agreement (compromis). Model Clauses may provide potential parties with options for expressing their consent to arbitration. In addition, like the UNCITRAL Rules, the Hague Rules do not address enforcement of arbitral awards made under these Rules, which are governed by national law and various treaty obligations, including in most cases the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. While these Rules have been conceived as a uniform set of rules, we acknowledge that the parties remain entitled to exercise their discretion in opting out of certain provisions that do not respond to their specific needs as arising out the dispute at issue. Certain other Model Clauses are being developed in this respect.” (Emphasis added.)

I have served in the Drafting Team under Judge Simma’s leadership since January 2018. My colleagues Martin Doe, Steve Ratner, and Katerina Yiannibas have helpfully crystallized elsewhere several of the main points of innovation contained in the Draft Rules, such as:

“1. provisions on facilitating settlement and mediation, and emphasizing the complementarity of arbitration to such procedures as the OECD National Contact Points system (Articles 1(6), 17(3), 42, and 51)

2. provisions to address the inequality of arms which may arise in such disputes (inter alia, Articles 5(2), 20(4), 24, 27(2), and 27(4));

3. the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the default appointing authority, given its intergovernmental nature and experience in business and human rights disputes (Article 6);

4. procedures for multiparty claims and joinder by third parties (Article 17-bis);

5. a procedure for the early dismissal of claims manifestly without merit, developed on the basis of similar procedures in the ICSID, SIAC, SCC, and HKIAC Rules (as well as the proposed new ICSID Rules) (Article 23-bis);

6. provisions making the arbitral tribunal’s power over interim measures more robust, and at the same time more flexible (Article 26);

7. an emergency arbitrator mechanism elaborated on the basis of the ICC and SCC Rules (Article 26-bis);

8. specialized evidentiary procedures drawn up on the basis, inter alia, of the IBA Rules and Rules of the International Criminal Court, among others (Articles 27, 28, and 30(3));

9. measures to protect the identity of parties, counsel, and witnesses where such protections are warranted by the circumstances of the case, while ensuring due process is maintained for all parties (Articles 17(5), 28(3), and 37(5));

10. provisions on transparency and third-party participation (Articles 24-bis and 33-38);

11. tailored provisions on remedies in the business and human rights context (Article 40);

12. rules on applicable law that enhance flexibility and party autonomy (Article 41);

13. rules to protect the public interest in the case of confidential settlements (Article 42(1));

14. nuanced rules in respect of costs and deposits that encourage the tribunal to sensitive to the interests of access to justice (Articles 46-49);

15. an expedited arbitration procedure for small claims (Article 52); and

16. a Code of Conduct that reflects the highest standards for independence and impartiality in international dispute resolution (Annex).”

In this post, I do not aim to provide an authoritative commentary on the Draft Rules (which is exactly what our global online consultation procedure is for).  Rather, and notwithstanding the explicit caveat drawn by the Drafting Team above on leaving the modalities and content of consent to arbitration to the parties, I instead offer my personal observations to examine the essence of main criticisms (see public comments of the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment here as well as a few questions and comments I received at Harvard Law School in April 2019), directed against having the BHR Arbitration Rules in the first place: 1) whether companies and human rights victims would even consent to arbitration; and 2) if they do consent, whether one should view that consent with skepticism as to the authenticity of arbitration as a mode of access to justice for human rights victims.  The gist of my argument is this: while the BHR Arbitration Rules will never purport to be the exclusively prescribed mechanism for human rights victims of transnational business conduct and neither does it presume to displace State-based judicial or non-judicial remedies, against the realities of a continuing limited universe of legally binding human rights recourse against the impacts of private transnational activities, we cannot afford to close off the arbitral option either. As human rights practitioners well know, no single dispute resolution mechanism for human rights disputes against transnational business is perfect, and even recent national court victories in Lungowe v. Vedanta (as spearheaded by my BHR Drafting Team colleague Richard Meeran of Leigh Day) depend on the jurisdictional openness of a State’s judicial system to transnational tort claims.  The question, in my view, thus has to be reframed away from “why international arbitration?“, to “why not also international arbitration?“.

Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

Deep Seabed Mining in the Area: is international investment law relevant?

Published on July 10, 2019        Author: 
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

The last decade has seen a renewed interest in the commercial exploitation of deep seabed minerals located beyond national jurisdiction. However, the respective responsibilities of deep sea miners and of their sponsoring states in this process have not been clarified fully. This short piece argues that international investment law is part of the legal framework applicable to the relationship between the deep sea miner and the state sponsoring it. More specifically, it attempts to demonstrate that deep sea mining operations can constitute a foreign-owned investment within the territory of a host state. Thus, when accepting to sponsor deep sea mining activities, states need to be mindful of the additional disciplines imposed by international investment law. 

The seabed beyond national jurisdiction (named as the “Area” by UNCLOS) is known to contain valuable mineral resources including copper, nickel, zinc and rare earth metals which have become particularly valuable because of recent technological innovations. The International Seabed Authority has awarded twenty-nine exploration contracts to a variety of state and private corporate bodies for vast zones in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Foreign capital has become increasingly involved in this economic activity. Thus, Nauru Ocean Resources, a Nauruan entity which was granted an exploration contract in 2011, is a subsidiary of the Australian corporation Deepgreen Mineral Corp. UK Seabed Mineral Resources is a subsidiary of the well-known Lockheed Martin. However these activities are controversial and there exist glaring gaps in the scientific knowledge of the ecosystems where deep sea mining is supposed to take place. Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email
 

Has the ECtHR in Mammadov 46(4) opened the door to findings of  ‘bad faith’ in trials?

Published on July 4, 2019        Author:  and
Twitter
Facebook
Google+
LinkedIn
Follow by Email

In the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in Ilgar Mammadov v Azerbaijan  (Mammadov 46(4)) examined under Article 46(4) infringement proceedings, the Grand Chamber found that Azerbaijan had failed to comply with the Court’s original judgment in Ilgar Mammadov (Mammadov No.1) by refusing to release political activist Ilgar Mammadov, who was arrested on politically motivated charges (in violation of a right to liberty and security under Articles 5 and the  prohibition to restrict rights for purposes other than those prescribed by the Convention under Article 18 of the Convention).

This case is not only novel in being the first to be considered under infringement proceedings (see blogs by Başak Çali and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou), but is also highly significant for the Court’s approach to the implications of politically motivated proceedings.  Until now the Court has been reluctant to clarify its position on whether trials and convictions can be explicitly held to be in ‘bad faith’ under Article 18 of the Convention. We argue in this blog that the Grand Chamber in this case (relating to Mr Mammadov’s arrest and pre-trial detention), went substantially further than the Chamber in the second case of the same applicant, Mammadov No. 2 (relating to his trial and conviction), and has paved the way for the Court to finally open the door to the applicability of Article 18 to a right to fair trial under Article 6, or risk incoherence. 

The Court’s approach so far to Article 18

Article 18 of the Convention provides that ‘The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.’ There is debate about whether the wording of the provision limits its applicability to ‘restricted’ rights under Articles 5 and 8-11 of the Convention (see below). Read the rest of this entry…

Print Friendly, PDF & Email