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Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 2)

The Human Cost of Using Informers in Conflict and the Ambivalence of International Law

Published on October 17, 2019        Author: 

In early October, the Guardian reported that former members of the IRA and British Army commanders may face criminal charges arising from serious offences connected with the use of informers for the purpose of gathering intelligence during the conflict in Northern Ireland. As part of the police inquiry ‘Operation Kenova’, files have been sent to the Public Prosecution Service in Belfast providing evidence of crimes of “murder, kidnap, torture, malfeasance in a public office and perverting the course of justice” associated with the activities of alleged former head of internal security for the IRA and British army agent Freddie Scappaticci.

Scappaticci is said to be linked directly to some 18 murders of IRA members accused of being informers. The families of a number of those killed have made formal complaints to the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland claiming that his military intelligence handlers failed to prevent those killings. Even more than the trial of “Soldier F” for two murders arising from Bloody Sunday in 1972, such proceedings could shine an uncomfortable light on how the dirty war was waged by state authorities in Northern Ireland. It also prompts the question of how law addresses the practice of using informers during conflict. 

The use of informers within non-state armed groups by British military, police and security forces was a common practice during the conflict in Northern Ireland. It is estimated that the IRA executed around 85 individuals accused of being informers during the course of the Troubles. Such practices are not unprecedented, as the recruitment and deployment of informers has been a perennial feature of armed conflicts, not to mention the frequently brutal treatment that has usually been meted out to such collaborators. As has been the case with the Scappaticci affair, authorities have at times gone to great lengths to secure and retain the services of high-level informers, including by tolerating or acquiescing in their involvement in criminal activities.

In terms of the law applicable to the use of informers, very often there has been limited or no national legislation governing the use of so-called covert human intelligence sources. The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland George Hamilton has acknowledged that in the context of the Troubles, “[t]here were no rules. There was no regulatory framework for handling of informants at that time”. Given the regularity of the practice during situations of armed conflict, it is appropriate to consider how applicable international law might be addressed to the deployment of informers, as well as its consequences.

On its face, international law applicable to armed conflict, including both international humanitarian law and international human rights law, has little to say about the use of informers. Read the rest of this entry…

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Could International Law Stop a No-Deal Brexit?

Published on October 16, 2019        Author: 

At the time of writing – less than 3 weeks until the current ‘Brexit day’ of 31 October 2019 –  all options relating to the UK’s departure from the European Union appear to be on the table. Leaving with a deal, ‘crashing out’, not leaving at all, or anything in between seem equally possible. Much attention has been paid to the UK’s constitutional requirements governing the executive’s actions in relation to Brexit, as well as the domestic legal consequences of flouting them. The possibility of Prime Minister Johnson going to jail for violating these requirements has even been considered. However, not much has been said about the potential international law consequences. Here I explore whether international law could prevent a No-Deal Brexit – or, more precisely, whether a failure to comply with domestic constitutional requirements may prevent the UK’s withdrawal from the EU from taking effect in international law. This discussion draws on my recent work exploring the role of domestic law in the international legal validity of treaty withdrawal more generally.

The starting point for this discussion is Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – by now, likely the most famous treaty exit clause in legal history. Art 50 states, in part:

  1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

  2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. …

  3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

For our purposes,  Art 50(1) is the key provision. This, unusually, makes the triggering of withdrawal from the EU explicitly contingent on compliance with the State’s domestic constitutional requirements.  Thus, in principle, if there is a failure to comply with those constitutional requirements, the decision to withdraw is invalid according to the TEU. In the 2018 Wightman decision, the ECJ affirmed that “the decision to withdraw is for that Member State alone to take, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, and therefore depends solely on its sovereign choice” (at para. 50).

While a full dissection of the UK’s constitutional requirements for leaving the EU is not possible here, there are two clear domestic law limitations constraining the UK executive’s prerogative in relation to Art 50. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Collective Failure to Prevent Turkey’s Operation ‘Peace Spring’ and NATO’s Silence on International Law

Published on October 14, 2019        Author: 

Since last week Turkey has been using massive military force in Syria. Turkey has decided to call her military operation ‘Peace Spring’. ‘Peace Spring’ seems to be even more extensive than ‘Olive Branch’, Turkey’s preceding invasion of Syria. ‘Peace Spring’ has already resulted in the flight of tens of thousands of civilians. Worldwide, observers fear that ‘Peace Spring’ could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, a country whose people have been suffering from unspeakable pain for many years now. There is also widespread fear that the so-called ‘Islamic State’ could benefit from ‘Peace Spring’ as the use of force is being directed against precisely those Kurdish forces that had helped keeping the ‘Islamic State’ at bay. It thus appears that a depressingly large number of indications suggest that the name ‘Peace Spring’ is a cynical euphemism for a brutal military course of action possibly ending in a bloody disaster.     

In her letter to the United Nations, Turkey invokes her right of self-defence, as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, ‘to counter’ an ‘imminent terrorist threat’. The ‘facts’ that Turkey refers to in this letter are essentially those:

‘In particular, PKK/PYD/YPG units close to Turkish borders in the north-east of Syria, continue to be a source of direct and imminent threat as they opened harassment fire on Turkish border posts, by also using snipers and advanced weaponry such as anti-tank guided missiles.’

Under international law, the right of self-defence exists if an armed attack against another State occurs. In such a case, cross-border defensive forcible action is permissible to the extent that the action is necessary and proportional to counter the attack. The existence of a right of anticipatory self-defence has long been controversial. An arguable case can be made that such a right exists if an armed attack against a State is imminent. It is also a matter of fierce debate whether a right of self-defence exists in case of a non-State armed attack and whether it may justify forcible defensive action on the territory of another State. An arguable case can be made that such a right exists where a State is either unwilling or unable to prevent a non-State group from conducting a large-scale cross-border armed attack from the territory of that State – under strict conditions of proportionality.

Even on the basis of such a broad understanding of the right of self-defence, which is being fiercely rejected by a significant number of States and by a significant number of highly respected international lawyers as being unduly permissive, it is impossible to see how Operation ‘Peace Spring’ could be justified under international law. Read the rest of this entry…

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“Sustainable Self-Defense”? How the German Government justifies continuing its fight against ISIL in Syria

Published on October 2, 2019        Author: 

“We have defeated ISIS in Syria”, US President Trump, tweeted on 19 December 2018. “We just took over 100% caliphate. That means the area of the land.”, he added in March 2019. Nonetheless, until to date, the global coalition against the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) continues its military operations in Iraq and Syria. May States in Syria still use armed force against ISIL, now deprived of territorial control, under the right of (collective) self-defense?

The German Government answered this question in the affirmative. On 18 September 2019, the Government formally requested the German Parliament to extend the (national) mandate “for German armed forces to safeguard the stabilization of Iraq and Syria, to promote their reconciliation, and to prevent ISIL’s regaining of strength in those regions” (all translations by the author). The Parliament is currently debating the issue. With the governing parties endorsing the request, Parliament is expected to agree despite critique on the operation’s legality by opposition parties.

In its formal request, the Government details the legal basis for the continuation of operations against ISIL. As a matter of principle, it does not significantly depart from its previous justifications. It bases the use of armed forces in Iraq on the “Iraqi government’s continuously valid request and continued consent”. For its operations in Syria, the Government continues to invoke collective self-defense on behalf and on request of Iraq against attacks from ISIL, “in connection with” Security Council resolution 2249 (2015).

But importantly, the Government has also updated its justification in light of ISIL’s loss of territorial control. This, in short, would not affect the coalition’s right to continue military operations against ISIL in Syria. This updated justification is worth discussing in regard to three aspects of self-defense: whether it can be used against non-State actors, its endorsement by the Security Council, and the question of continuing armed attacks.

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France Speaks Out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part II

Published on October 1, 2019        Author: 

In the first part of this post I discussed the position paper’s articulation of the views of France on the applicability of IHL to cyber operations, on the classification of armed conflicts, and on their geographical scope in the cyber context. In this part I will examine the position paper’s views on the concept of “attack,” on the conduct of hostilities and on data as an object.

The Meaning of the Term “Attack”

The issue of the meaning of the term “attack” has occupied center stage from the very inception of legal thinking about cyber operations during an armed conflict. It is a critical one because most key IHL “conduct of hostilities” rules are framed in terms of attacks – it is prohibited to direct “attacks” against civilians or civilian objects (distinction), an “attack” expected to cause collateral damage that is excessive to the anticipated military advantage is prohibited (proportionality), parties must take precautions in “attack” to minimize harm to civilians (precautions in attack), etc.  These prohibitions, limitations, and requirements beg the question of when a cyber operation qualifies as an “attack” such that the rules govern it.

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France Speaks Out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part I

Published on September 30, 2019        Author: 

The French Ministry of the Armies (formerly the Ministry of Defense) has recently released Droit International Appliqué aux Opérations dans le Cyberspace (International Law Applicable to Operations in Cyberspace), the most comprehensive statement on the applicability of international law (IHL) to cyber operations by any State to date.  The position paper dealt definitively with many of the current unsettled issues at the forefront of governmental and scholarly discussions.

This two-part post builds on an earlier post at Just Security in which I examined the position paper’s treatment of the relationship between peacetime international law, including that set forth in the UN Charter regarding uses of force, and hostile cyber operations. The focus here, by contrast, is on France’s views as to how IHL applies in the cyber context. Key topics addressed in the paper include the applicability of IHL in cyberspace; classification and geography of cyber conflict; the meaning of the term “attack” in the cyber context; the legal nature of data during an armed conflict; and other significant IHL prohibitions, limitations, and requirements on cyber operations.

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Does the European Court of Human Rights Have to Decide on Sovereignty over Crimea? Part II: Issues Lurking on the Merits

Published on September 24, 2019        Author: 

In my previous post I explained how the European Court’s Article 1 jurisprudence allows it to avoid the question of sovereignty over Crimea, since it can ground Russia’s jurisdiction over the territory, and thus the applicability of the ECHR, simply on the fact of its control and need not say anything else. But there are at least two issues on the merits of the Ukraine v. Russia re Crimea case that could directly engage the question of sovereignty over the territory. As a preliminary matter, I now need to say that I have not had the benefit of reading the pleadings of either party in the case – the Court has an inexplicable policy of not putting the pleadings online, but only allowing them to be consulted in its building in Strasbourg. That said, I am reasonably certain that the two issues I examine here are properly raised in the case. I will therefore now turn to the first of these, the mass imposition of Russian citizenship on the people of Crimea.

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Does the European Court of Human Rights Have to Decide on Sovereignty over Crimea? Part I: Jurisdiction in Article 1 ECHR

Published on September 23, 2019        Author: 

On 11 September the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held oral hearings on the admissibility of the interstate claim Ukraine brought against Russia regarding Crimea (no. 20958/14). The webcast of the hearing is available here. There are many different admissibility issues that the case raises, some of them heavily factual (e.g. the existence of an administrative practice on the part of Russia that makes individual recourse to domestic remedies impossible). The case may well flounder on one of them. But the one issue that concerns me here is simply this: should the European Court make any pronouncements on whether it is Ukraine or Russia who is the rightful sovereign of Crimea?

To be clear, sovereignty over Crimea is not to my mind a legally difficult question – Russia’s annexation of Crimea was as clearly illegal as anything can be. But there is wider, much more fraught, question of principle and prudence: should international human rights bodies pronounce on issues which, while capable of legal determination, are not part of their central mission of human rights protection and may negatively affect that mission? This is especially the case in situations in which it is entirely predictable that, in the political context, any such pronouncement would provoke intense backlash, even possibly leading to Russia’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe.

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UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Agenda-Widening and Paradigm-Shifting

Published on September 20, 2019        Author:  and

On 17 July 2019, South Africa made its submission to UNCITRAL on investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform in which it seeks a “paradigm-shift” in investment law. In keeping with our description of South Africa as a “widener” in the UNCITRAL debates, the submission brings a wide-angle lens to the negotiations, first placing ISDS in a broader context and then discussing a multitude of possible reforms, several of which have not been on the UNCITRAL agenda so far. Time will tell whether South Africa seeks to get other states to rally around its cause, but for now its submission represents an important anchor in the incremental/structural/paradigmatic reform dynamics.

  1. Toward a New Paradigm for Investment Treaties and ISDS

The South African submission starts from first principles, by describing the ideological foundations on which investment treaties rest. It highlights that investment treaties were tied to a narrow vision of development that prioritized “economic growth through the free market, individual property and free flow of capital” and limited the role of a state to “securing property rights to optimize market development.” Read the rest of this entry…

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