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Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 2)

Self-Appointment in International Arbitration

Published on June 7, 2017        Author: 

At first glance, paragraph 14 of the UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal’s Order on Provisional Measures in Enrica Lexie (Italy v. India) appears quite mundane. It states in relevant part that “on 30 September 2015, the President of ITLOS appointed … H.E. Judge Vladimir Golitsyn as arbitrator and President of the Arbitral Tribunal” (para. 14). It becomes much more interesting, however, when one realizes that on 30 September 2015, the President of ITLOS was none other than Judge Golitsyn himself.

A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred in another high-profile UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration: Ukraine v. Russia. On 23 December 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine revealed that Judge Boualem Bouguetaia would be a member of the tribunal, “express[ing] its gratitude to the Vice-President of [ITLOS] for rapid formation of the tribunal”. The Ministry failed to note, however, that on 23 December 2016 the Vice-President of ITLOS was none other than Judge Bouguetaia himself.

If it is true that Judges Golitsyn and Bouguetaia appointed themselves to the tribunals, they should not necessarily be reprimanded. After all, these self-appointments would be in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS. Article 3 of Annex VII provides that the parties shall appoint three of the five members of the tribunal by agreement, but if they are unable to agree, the appointments shall be made by the President of ITLOS or, if he or she is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the next most senior member of ITLOS. In Enrica Lexie, this power fell on President Golitsyn. And in Ukraine v. Russia, since President Golitsyn is a national of Russia, this power fell on Vice-President Bouguetaia. Nothing in Article 3 prohibits the appointing authority from appointing him or herself to the arbitral tribunal.

Three Concerns

Nevertheless, an appointing authority’s self-appointment as an arbitrator, as a general matter in international arbitration, is subject to three potential concerns. Read the rest of this entry…

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Back to Old Tricks? Italian Responsibility for Returning People to Libya

Published on June 6, 2017        Author: 

On 10/11 May 2017 various news outlets reported a maritime operation by the Libyan authorities, in coordination with the Italian Search and Rescue Authority, in which 500 individuals were intercepted in international waters and returned to Libya. This operation amounted to refoulment in breach of customary international law and several treaties (including the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights), and an internationally wrongful act is one for which Italy bears international legal responsibility.

According to reports, the migrant and refugee boat called the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCCC) whilst it was still in Libyan territorial waters. MRCC contacted both the Libyan coastguard and an NGO vessel (Sea Watch-2) with the latter sighting the boat after it had left Libyan waters and was in international waters. During preparations for the rescue, the NGO boat was informed by the Italian authorities that the Libyan coastguard boat which was approaching had “on scene command” of the rescue operation. Attempts by the NGO vessel to contact the Libyan authorities were not picked up. The Coastguard proceeded instead to cut the way of the Sea Watch 2 at high speed and chase its rescue boat. It then stopped the refugees and migrant boat. Reports indicate that the Libyan coastguard captain threatened the refugees and migrants with a gun and then proceeded to take over the migrant boat. Read the rest of this entry…

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Reflections on the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement

Published on June 5, 2017        Author: 

Ending months of fevered speculation, President Donald Trump fulfilled his campaign promise and announced US withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement last week. He did so because in his opinion the Paris Agreement inflicts ‘severe energy restrictions’ on the United States and ‘punishes’ the United States ‘while imposing no meaningful obligations on the world’s leading polluters.’ This post seeks to examine the merits of the US’ stated rationale for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and then offers some reflections on next steps for the US in the international climate change regime.

How Valid are Trump’s Criticisms?

President Trump’s remarks reveal a fundamentally flawed understanding of the Paris Agreement. First, his remarks suggest that the Paris Agreement is a prescriptive instrument that ‘inflicts’ restrictions and ‘imposes’ obligations on states. This is not the case. Read the rest of this entry…

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Macron’s Threat of Reprisals and the Jus ad Bellum

Published on June 2, 2017        Author: 

A few days ago, French President Macron reportedly said that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would cross a “red line” for France and result in reprisals. Macron’s statement comes less than two months after the United States conducted airstrikes against Syria for its use of chemical weapons. The vast majority of states that spoke about the U.S. operation supported or were non-committal about it. Very few states condemned it as unlawful. By contrast, most commentators contended that the operation was unlawful. (See the blog posts collected here.) The operation was inconsistent with the longstanding interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and not covered by either of the Charter exceptions. Moreover, though there is an ongoing debate about whether the jus ad bellum contains a third exception for humanitarian interventions, the majority view is that it does not. The reason for this view is that, even when states (as a group) appear to condone particular operations that might be characterized as unilateral humanitarian interventions, states decline to articulate the opinio juris that is necessary to establish a new, generally applicable exception to Article 2(4). And in any event, the U.S. operation in April seemed more like a reprisal than like a humanitarian intervention.

So, what should we make of Macron’s statement? When news of it broke, I tweeted this comment:

Several people objected to my tweet. I am continuing the conversation here because I thought it might be of interest to a broader audience, and because its implications go far beyond Macron’s statement. It has to do with how we understand and assess the jus ad bellum. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Talk! Book Discussion: Djemila Carron’s Response

Published on June 2, 2017        Author: 

This post is part of our book discussion on Djemila Carron’s “L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international“.

Introduction

I am grateful to the editors of EJIL: Talk! for organizing this discussion – the first one around a book in French! I also would like to warmly thank Professor Julia Grignon and Doctor Tristan Ferraro – whose articles, books and reflections were very important while writing L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international – for their thoughtful comments on my work. In this contribution, I consider some of the questions they raise in each of their pieces, mainly on the capture of a soldier as a triggering act of an IAC (response to Julia Grignon) and on the classification of transnational armed conflict (response to Tristan Ferraro).

Animus belligerendi

I will not respond in detail to Julia Grignon’s development of my rejection of a criteria of animus belligerendi for the existence of an IAC (Part II, Question VI). She perfectly summed up my main arguments. The intent of a State to be in an IAC or in a state of war has no influence on the existence of an IAC. Once again, to exclude subjective elements from the definition of an IAC was one of the key reason for the shift in 1949 from the notion of war to the one of IAC. This said, as explained in the book, for such a conflict to take place, a State must nevertheless have the intent to use force against another one. I propose to defend this element through the objective requirements on the origin of an IAC (Part II, Question IV). In other words, if a State uses force against another one through its organs, acting in their capacity, following instructions and not mistakenly, the animus to use force is considered fulfilled. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Talk! Book Discussion: The Act that Triggers an International Armed Conflict

Published on June 1, 2017        Author: 

This post is part of our book discussion on Djemila Carron’s “L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international“.

While giving an interpretation of Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions, in order to define the notion of international armed conflict, Djemila Carron touches upon a profusion of subsequent questions. This is one of the interests of this book. This is also what makes this present contribution challenging. Indeed, reading Djemila Carron’s reflection on the act that triggers an international armed conflict makes one, me at least, want to write a ten page contribution on each specific topic. And this is not only because of the proximity between the subject analyzed in her book and my own area of interest in research in international humanitarian law. In my view, in addition to the overall depth and quality of Djemila Carron’s rationale, there are two reasons that explain that feeling when reading her book. First, the prism through which she has decided to deliver the results of her research, that is an analysis under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and second the choice that she has made to answer six (plus one) specific questions in order to reach her own conclusions. Not only does a rigorous interpretation that follows the methodology of the Vienna Convention offer a new perspective for the exercise of classification of conflicts, but it also gives a broad overview which is enriched, at the same time, with numerous and often thought-provoking details. In parallel, the structure of the work, built around specific questions, gives the opportunity to open a dialogue. An opportunity that I seize in the following lines.

In the present contribution I have arbitrarily, but purposely, chosen to focus on two of the many issues that the author explores in order to analyze the act triggering an international armed conflict, namely the capture as an act that may trigger an international armed conflict and the necessity, or not, of identifying an animus belligerendi in order to classify a situation as international armed conflict. Within the structure of the book, the first is a sub-question of Question II regarding the nature of the triggering act and the second is a Question in such, namely Question VI regarding the necessity of an animus belligerendi. This choice has been made on purpose, since these two topics are among those with which I have dealt in my own research, but through a different prism, that is the temporal scope of applicability of international humanitarian law. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Talk! Book Discussion: Some Considerations on Intervention Against Non-state Actors in Foreign Territory

Published on May 31, 2017        Author: 

This post is part of our book discussion on Djemila Carron’s “L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international“.

Dr. Djemila Carron has penned a significant book devoted to international armed conflicts. The great merit of Djemila Carron is to have exclusively focused on the notion of international armed conflict while nowadays most of the publications tend to examine mainly the concept of non-international armed conflict. In the recent years, legal literature has paid little attention to international armed conflicts. Dr. Carron rectifies this trend and brings back to the forefront of the legal discussion the notion of international armed conflict. This is all the more important as contemporary belligerency shows that, more and more, current situations are characterized by the intervention of third states, multinational forces or coalition of states in pre-existing armed conflicts. This inevitably raises questions about their characterization for the purposes of IHL.

Many issues covered by Djemila Carron’s book could have been the subject of legal discussions but within the framework of this brief post (which cannot do justice to the numerous legal issues raised in the book), I would like to focus on one particular aspect of the analysis conducted in this deep and thorough research: transnational armed conflicts against non-state armed groups and their potential classification as international armed conflicts.

To sum it up in a few sentences, Djemila Carron establishes first a presumption according to which the unconsented-to armed intervention of a state in the territory of another constitutes an international armed conflict but qualifies this presumption as rebuttable. She then argues that the presumption can be rebutted in three distinct circumstances, one of them being when resort to armed force by the intervening state is exclusively carried against a non-state organized armed group in the territory of another State. In such scenario, and in the absence of direct confrontation between the armed forces of the intervening State and those of the territorial State, the situation would only qualify as a non-international armed conflict according to Djemila Carron even when the territorial State has not consented to the third State’s military intervention. In this regard, Djemila Carron’s position echoes those recently put forward by Terry Gill, Kenneth Watkin and Sean Watts. Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Talk! Book Discussion: L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international – Introductory Post

Published on May 30, 2017        Author: 

This post is part of our book discussion on Djemila Carron’s “L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international“.

Introduction

During the night of Thursday April 6 and Friday April 7 2017, the United States carried out airstrikes on a Syrian military base that had allegedly been used by the Syrian authorities to launch a chemical attack against its own population. As those airstrikes were, to the best of my knowledge, the first ones conducted by the United States that directly and deliberately targeted Syrian positions in Syria, the question that arose for many scholars, humanitarian actors and members of the military was the following: are the United States and Syria in an international armed conflict (IAC)? Or were they already engaged in such a conflict since the United States had been using force on the territory of Syria against the Islamic State since 2014? If there was no previous IAC between the United States and Syria on April 6, did those attacks add an IAC to the preexisting non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the United States and the Islamic State? Did they transform (‘internationalize’) this preexisting NIAC into a IAC? Or should the attacks of April 6 and 7 fall outside the scope of international humanitarian law (IHL)?

Answering these questions, and more generally classifying hostilities, is crucial in international law. Indeed, rules applicable to an IAC – including the Geneva Conventions (GC), the first Additional Protocol (AP I), other treaties and provisions of international (and national) law and rules of customary law – create a legal framework significantly different from the one applicable in a NIAC or in the absence of a conflict. L’acte déclencheur d’un conflit armé international explores what act or acts might trigger an IAC. It uses Article 2 common to the GC as its starting point since this provision states that each of the four GC:

“shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”.

The notion of IAC being the main entry point for the application of the core treaties of IHL, and the concept of NIAC being closely linked to the one of IAC, means that understanding the triggering act of such a conflict is a preliminary question to almost any application of IHL. Read the rest of this entry…

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Facts, Alternative Facts, and International Law

Published on May 29, 2017        Author: 

On October 3, 2015, at 2:08a.m., a U.S. Special Operations AC-130 gunship attacked a Doctors Without Borders [Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF] hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, with heavy fire. Forty-two people were killed, mostly patients and hospital staff members. Dozens of others were injured, and the hospital building was severely damaged and subsequently closed. When the dust finally settled, the question that pre-occupied the press and most pundits was whether this was a war crime.

Attempts to answer this question prompted discussions about the relevant laws and their proper interpretation, which, in turn, fueled disputes about specific facts relevant to these laws. Recent news stories about the Trump administration’s plan to relax some of the battlefield rules further intensified the legal controversies. Unfortunately this focus on questions of law, guilt, and blame divert attention from the more basic questions of what actually happened, why it happened, and what might be done to prevent similar incidents in the future.

The attack on the Kunduz hospital and the controversy that followed it exemplify a broader phenomenon. Legal fact-finding reports set to resolve factual disputes often trigger more controversies, and are poorly equipped to mobilize domestic sanctioning and condemnation of war criminals by their societies. People are motivated to believe what they already know, and to reject facts that are inconsistent with their prior beliefs and political ideology. Legal fact-finding reports are susceptible to social biases just as any other source of information. Therefore, they often fail to create a shared understanding of ‘what happened’ or to combat denialism of crimes. They also lack the emotional appeal, participatory value, and social cues that moral expressions or other types of social truth-telling entail. Read the rest of this entry…

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, War Crimes
 
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Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Unlawful Death Gets a New Life

Published on May 26, 2017        Author: 

The Revised Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death has just been published. It sets out the international human rights and criminal justice standards applicable to national investigations into alleged summary executions and other suspicious deaths, while also providing detailed advice on crime scene investigation and forensic methodology.

The document is highly relevant for human rights lawyers and criminal justice practitioners.  As I also discuss here [pp. 204ff], human rights cases dealing with suspicious killings regularly turn on the quality of the national criminal investigation into the crime. If the investigation was done properly, international human rights mechanisms will typically defer to its findings; if not, they will find a procedural violation of the right to life, even if state responsibility for the killing itself cannot be proven.

The original Minnesota Protocol was prepared in 1991 by a small group of lawyers from that icy state and later published by the United Nations Secretariat. Formally also known as the United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, the document has been cited with approval by the Inter-American and European human rights courts.

The just published version of the Minnesota Protocol/U.N. Manual maintains the established brand names. But the text has been completely overhauled by the drafting team around outgoing U.N.  Special Rapporteur on Summary Executions, Christof Heyns (note: the author was not involved). A biopsy of the old and new versions of the Minnesota Protocol goes to show how far human rights law has advanced over the last quarter century. Read the rest of this entry…

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