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Home Archive for category "Armed Conflict" (Page 20)

Sorry Sir, We’re All Non-State Actors Now: A Reply to Hill-Cawthorne and Akande on the Authority to Kill and Detain in NIAC

Published on May 9, 2014        Author: 

The recent High Court judgment in the case of Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) has sparked a lively debate about the authority to detain individuals in the context of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). In response to a post by Kubo Mačák offering a critical perspective on Mohammed, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande have lent their support to the judgment in arguing that no legal basis for lethal targeting and detention exists in IHL.

Essentially, Lawrence and Dapo advocate an understanding of IHL which conceives it as a purely regulatory framework in the sense that its sole purpose is to impose constraints on how States and non-State actors conduct hostilities, without recognising or conferring any rights on them to engage in such hostilities in the first place. On this view, killing and detention is permissible in armed conflict not because it is authorized by the rules of IHL, but because, and only in so far as, it is not prohibited by other rules of international law. In this post, I intend to demonstrate why this ‘Lotus approach’ to IHL is not compelling.

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Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?

Published on May 7, 2014        Author: 

In their excellent posts on Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), both Kubo Mačák and Marko recognise the importance and hugely impressive analysis of Mr Justice Leggatt’s judgment. We will not reiterate the coverage of the judgment. Rather, we wish to focus on one part of it, that is, the question of whether international humanitarian law (IHL) provides a legal basis for detention in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Whilst Kubo also focuses on this issue in his post, we will take the opposite view to him, and thus will argue that Mr Justice Leggatt correctly concluded that IHL does not contain a legal basis to detain in NIACs. To be clear, our argument is not that detention in NIACs is necessarily unlawful. The argument is simply that authorization to detain in a NIAC cannot be found in IHL, but must rest elsewhere, principally in domestic law (either of the state that detains or of the state on whose territory the detention occurs). Exceptionally, the authorization to detain may arise out of other branches of international law, in particular, it may be contained in United Nations Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force.

It is worth spending a few moments considering why we are even asking the question whether IHL contains a legal basis for detention in NIACs. In the particular context of the Sedar Mohammed case – and other detention in armed conflict cases brought under the European human rights system – the question is relevant in considering whether Art 5 ECHR might be regarded as inapplicable in NIACs by virtue of the argument that more specific rules of IHL apply to regulate those detentions. More generally, international human rights law (IHRL) requires that any deprivation of liberty be both lawful and non-arbitrary and in the context of NIACs, it is natural to ask first whether the legal basis might be found in IHL, as it can for international armed conflicts (Arts 27(4), 42-3 and 78 GCIV; Art 21 GCIII).

In the Serdar Mohammed case, Mr Justice Leggatt provided a number of reasons for rejecting the MoD’s contention that IHL provides a sufficient legal basis for detention in the context of NIACs. We will address the key ones here. First, he considered that such a legal basis would have been made explicit in the relevant treaty provisions (common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II) had that been intended. This is a reasonable point – coercive powers should not too readily be read into applicable treaty rules without clear evidence that this is the collective intentions of the states parties. Read the rest of this entry…

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No Legal Basis under IHL for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts? A Comment on Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence

Published on May 5, 2014        Author: 

On any account of the events that transpired one early April morning four years ago in northern Helmand in Afghanistan, the plight of Mr Serdar Mohammed is not to be envied. For reasons that are still in dispute, he was captured by the UK armed forces close to his home. Shot at, bitten by a military dog, and finally caught, he was brought into UK custody on suspicion of being an insurgent, perhaps even a Taliban commander. In the end, he was detained on British military bases for over 100 days before being handed over to the Afghan authorities.

Mr Mohammed brought a claim before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales for unlawful detention, seeking compensation from the UK government. In Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), a judgment delivered last Friday, Mr Justice Leggatt decided that Mr Mohammed’s detention after the initial 96 hours violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and that he was therefore entitled to compensation.

The judge openly says at the outset of the ruling that it is ‘a long judgment which discusses many issues and arguments’ (para. 2). Unlike Marko’s excellent post, which provides a more comprehensive overview of the judgment, my text takes a closer look at one of the key issues in the judgment only. This is the question of lawfulness of detention of persons in non-international armed conflicts under international humanitarian law (IHL), summarised by Marko in section 5 of his post.

It is well known that while the law of international armed conflict (IAC) provides an express legal basis for the detention of civilians in Articles 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, there is no counterpart in the treaty norms regulating non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The MOD argued that a power to detain is nonetheless implicit in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Although Mr Justice Leggatt acknowledged academic opinion in support of the MOD view, quoting extensively from texts written by Jelena Pejić and Jann Kleffner (see para. 240), he eventually came down against it on the basis of five very articulate reasons (paras. 241–251).

I will not revisit the academic debate on this topic (for which, in addition to the texts quoted in the judgment, see, e.g., here, here, or here), but rather subject the specific reasons advanced by Mr Justice Leggatt to somewhat closer scrutiny. It appears to me that even though the reasons are very well made, there are strong considerations not reflected in the judgment, which militate in favour of the opposite view.

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High Court Rules that the UK Lacks IHL Detention Authority in Afghanistan

Published on May 3, 2014        Author: 

Yesterday the High Court of England and Wales, per Mr Justice Leggatt, delivered a comprehensive judgment in Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), holding that the United Kingdom lacks detention authority under international humanitarian law/law of armed conflict with regard to individuals it captures in the course of the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan, and that any detention of such individuals longer than 96 hours violates Article 5 ECHR, as well as relevant Afghan law. The judgment is on any account a heroic effort, with the single judge grappling with a host of complex, intertwined issues of international law and acquitting himself admirably in the process. Para. 6 contains a summary of the judgment for those who don’t want to read the whole thing.

Here are some of the highlights of the Court’s analysis:

(1) The ECHR applies extraterritorially to any person detained by the UK in Afghanistan.

(2) Derogations under Article 15 ECHR could also be used in an extraterritorial context.

(3) The detention of SM by UK forces in Afghanistan was attributable to the United Kingdom, and not to the UN .

(4) No conflict arose between relevant UNSC resolutions, which did not authorize SM’s continued detention, and Article 5 ECHR, and Article 103 of the Charter was inapplicable.

(5) SM’s detention was not authorized by IHL either, since IHL in NIACs contains no detention authority, and cannot prevail over Article 5 ECHR as lex specialis.

(6) SM’s detention violated Article 5 ECHR. While the detention up to 96 hours was Article 5-compliant, the 110 days that SM spent in UK detention were not.

The Court makes it clear that the position the UK government found itself in is largely its own doing (para. 417 ff). This is exactly right. The government’s own legal advisers informed it of the limited extant legal authority for prolonged detention. The UK government failed to enact its own domestic legislation on detention in Afghanistan, or to come to different arrangements with Afghan authorities. Similarly, the UK government chose not to derogate from the Convention, preferring instead to argue that the Convention does not apply. And now that this strategy has failed (and on several levels), much of what it has been doing is exposed as unlawful.

I imagine that the judgment will be appealed, and we shall we see what happens there. But whatever the appellate courts’ conclusions, I can only hope that their judges will show as much diligence and analytical precision as Mr Justice Leggatt.

Here are the highlights, with some commentary:

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The Genesis of Lex Specialis

Published on April 30, 2014        Author: 

When it comes to describing the relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law, the lex specialis principle is frequently taken for granted, as if it has somehow always been there, carved in stone. But what is its actual genesis? By ‘genesis’ I do not mean its ancient history. Yes, it was in the Digest of Justinian. But, honestly, who cares? We have little or no idea of what exactly the lawyers of the Roman and Byzantine empires meant by the expression and how they applied it in practice, and indeed there are several different ways of conceptualizing lex specialis.

My question is rather this: when did we, the community of international lawyers, start using this language to describe the relationship between IHL and IHRL? The timeframe for answering that question is necessarily more limited and easier to manage, since IHRL did not become a part of public international law until after the Second World War. I am obviously too young to have direct experience of this, but my impression has been that during the first fifty years or so of their co-existence very little thought was given to how IHL and IHRL would interact, and when the issue was discussed it was generally not framed in terms of lex specialis. My hypothesis is thus that the term entered common parlance among the international lawyers who have dealt with the issue only after the end of the Cold War, and specifically only after the ICJ’s 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, para. 25, when the Court itself first used the term:

In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.

To prove or disprove this hypothesis, which is what I am doing in a paper I’m writing right now, I need to do two things. First, I need to establish how the Court itself got the idea to use the lex specialis principle to describe the relationship between the rules of IHL and IHRL. Was it complete innovation on its part? Did it come from the pleadings of some of the participants in the advisory proceedings? Or did it come from generally accepted scholarship on the issue? Second, I need to look at the scholarship itself, specifically those works that examined the issue before the Nuclear Weapons opinion and immediately after it.

The pre-1996 scholarship I will leave aside for the purpose of this post, but from what I’ve read so far there are few, if any references to the lex specialis principle as a solution to normative conflicts between IHL and IHRL (I will obviously very much appreciate it if readers could point me to any such references in scholarship in whatever language). But I’ve read through all of the pleadings in the two nuclear weapons cases (the WHO and GA requests), both written and oral. And out of the 40 or so states that appeared before the Court in the two cases, do you know how many referred to the lex specialis principle? Just one – the United Kingdom.

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The Use of ‘Do it Yourself’ Barrel Bombs under International Law

Published on April 10, 2014        Author: 

Among the continuing horrors reported from Syria, it is the use of certain weapons that time and again makes the headlines. While the use of chemical weapons led to an important response from the international community, in recent months attacks with so called ‘barrel bombs’ triggered an international echo. In its latest resolution on Syria the UN Security Council demanded all parties to cease ‘the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs’. UN Secretary General Ban called these weapons ‘horrendous’, France found that these weapons ‘sought to indiscriminately kill people’, and for the UK the use of these weapons against civilian areas constitutes ‘yet another war crime’ by the Assad regime. Different human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch or the Syrian Network for Human Rights, report that the use of barrel bombs has caused high numbers of dead, the vast majority of which are civilians. There is no question that war crimes are committed in Syria, especially by the Assad regime. It is, however, less clear to what extent international law prohibits the use of barrel bombs in non-international armed conflicts, and whether their use constitutes a war crime.

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The Legal Framework of Future Military Operations: Inching Towards a More Strategic Approach?

Published on April 8, 2014        Author: 

In July 2013, the House of Commons Defence Committee launched an inquiry into the legal framework governing future operations of the British armed forces as part of its preparations for the next Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Committee has now published its findings in a report entitled ‘UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations’.

The very fact that the Defence Committee saw the need to launch an inquiry into the legal framework governing military operations is remarkable. It demonstrates just how much legal considerations are shaping the current strategic and tactical landscape. It also lays bare a substantial degree of unease about the role that rules of law and legal processes play in an area as politically sensitive as the deployment of the armed forces.

Bearing in mind the complexity, contested nature and sheer scope of the topic, those who followed the inquiry closely may be forgiven for awaiting the publication of the Committee’s report with a certain sense of trepidation. How would the Committee deal with the extraordinarily broad remit of the inquiry? And what might lie at the bottom of Pandora’s box? These concerns turned out to be misplaced. The Committee must be commended for producing a balanced and informed report, no doubt assisted by the breadth of the expert evidence available to it. Above all, it is refreshing to see that the Committee succeeded in avoiding some of the untested assumptions and high drama which have been evident in the debate about the legal regulation of the armed forces.

Two main themes emerge from the report. The first is that the legal framework governing military operations is complex. This point may not come as a revelation to legal experts working in the field, yet acknowledging this complexity has very significant policy implications. As I have suggested in greater detail elsewhere (‘Deployed Operations and the ECHR’), legal complexity is here to stay and cannot be resolved for good. If all that we can achieve is a better balance of the competing considerations, we must focus our efforts on reducing the adverse effects of legal uncertainty on the armed forces, rather than chasing unrealistic attempts to simplify the law. The Committee’s recommendation to enhance the armed forces’ understanding of the law by providing them with better legal training, manuals and advice would go some way towards this end.

The second theme which emerges from the report is a strong sense that the Government must act more proactively and look at the legal framework for future military operations from a more strategic angle. Read the rest of this entry…

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Refining Al-Skeini v UK: The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber hearing in Jaloud v Netherlands

Published on March 7, 2014        Author: 

The Grand Chamber at the ECtHR recently heard the case of Jaloud v the Netherlands. The case raises interesting issues concerning both extra-territorial jurisdiction and the obligations States owe to foreign nationals when deployed in foreign military operations. The facts are reasonably straightforward. The applicant’s son drove his car through a checkpoint without stopping in Iraq in 2004. A Dutch lieutenant at the checkpoint opened fire, hitting the applicant’s son who later died of his wounds. No weapons were found within the car. The Dutch forces there investigated the use of force and concluded that the use of force had been justified.

Jurisdiction

To begin with the jurisdictional issues, any hope that the question of extra-territorial jurisdiction had been settled in Al-Skeini v UK was dashed when both the Dutch and the UK, who acted as third party interveners, presented arguments that the applicant’s son was not within Dutch jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR when he was killed.

In principle there are 2 main forms of extra-territorial jurisdiction: spatial jurisdiction, which arises when the State exercises effective control over some foreign territory and personal jurisdiction, which arises where the State exercises authority and control over an individual. In Al-Skeini v UK, the ECtHR held that the UK was obliged to provide Convention-compliant investigations into the deaths of Iraqi civilians which occurred in the context of UK military operations while it occupied Iraq. The ECtHR applied a jurisdiction model somewhere between spatial jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction by holding that jurisdiction arises when a contracting State ‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised [by the government of the State]’, (Al-Skeini at [135]) and then exercises authority and control over a person. In these circumstances instantaneous acts of UK soldiers, such as shootings, automatically created a jurisdictional link to the State:

 the United Kingdom […] assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government […] the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in South-East Iraq. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom’ – (Al-Skeini at [149])

 The key difference between this model and standard personal jurisdiction is that where the State is exercising some public powers, the ECtHR treats the power to kill and the instantaneous act of killing as ‘authority and control’ over the individual (discussion of this here and here). Historically, the ECtHR had ruled that instantaneous acts, such as firing a missile from a plane, did not give rise to authority and control over the airstrike victims (see Bankovic and Ors v Italy and Ors).

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Appeal from the Ukrainian Association of International Law

Published on March 5, 2014        Author: 

The Ukrainian Association of International Law has issued an analysis of recent events in the Ukrainian. An English translation of this analysis and appeal is included below. I am told that the original can be found here. The Association argues that Russia’s decision to move military forces into Ukraine is not only a violation of the UN Charter and general international law, but also of the bilateral treaty permitting Russia to retain the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine, and also of the security assurances given in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 by Russia (and also by the US, the UK, France and China). Much of the analysis contained in the Appeal by the Association is undoubtedly correct.

The Association rejects Russian claims that it is acting to protect rights of the Russian population in Ukraine. However, it is surprising to read that “[the Association] would like to stress that no duly authorized national, foreign or international institution has declared any violation of human rights on the territory of Ukraine, or specifically in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which would have required the intervention of any subject of international law or the international community.” Is this to say that it would have been lawful for Russia to intervene had there been such a declaration of violation of human rights?

“An Appeal from the Ukrainian Association of International Law to the people of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the fraternal people of the neighboring States with whom we share close family ties and historical connections, as well as the international community as a whole:

On 1 March 2014 at 17.21 (Kyiv time), the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (the Council of the Federation) unanimously supported the appeal of the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, on sending a “limited contingent of military troops” of the armed forces of the Russian Federation into the territory of Ukraine.

This decision was taken in breach of the United Nations Charter, Read the rest of this entry…

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Special Agreements Concluded by Armed Opposition Groups: Where is the Law?

Published on February 27, 2014        Author: 

Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions binds the parties to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) without making any distinction between the obligations of States and those of armed opposition groups (AOGs). Additionally, it encourages the parties to expand their obligations by concluding special agreements in order to bring other provisions of the GCs into force. These agreements’ importance has been recognized here by the ICRC, when identifying them as valuable methods to improve respect of IHL. In a recent post in Opinio Juris, Rogier Bartels has mentioned some contemporary peace agreements which could potentially also be framed within that category. However, CA3 doesn’t really determine their legal nature. Are they regulated by international or domestic law? What kind of obligations do they create?

Unraveling these questions isn’t merely an intellectual exercise. Special agreements serve to strengthen public confidence in IHL as a useful, practical and relevant body of law. Indeed, they help achieve willingness and material conditions to augment AOGs’ compliance. Whatever approach one selects, it will inevitably have consequences on the way we think about IHL’s effectiveness at large.

This post will analyse three alternatives regarding the legal nature of special agreements: i) special agreements under domestic law; ii) special agreements under a sui generis regime; iii) special agreements under international law. We will argue that this last perspective provides a more accurate description of the current dynamics of international law and is more useful to engage with AOGs on IHL compliance issues.

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