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Home Archive for category "Amnesty"

A War Crimes Trial That Needs More Attention

Published on November 15, 2018        Author: 

Introduction

There is an ongoing landmark domestic trial for international crimes that is steadily progressing at this very moment in relative obscurity. The case is about one of the worst single-event crimes that has occurred since the Second World War and was matched in its methods and gravity only by the likes of the Nyarubuye, Gikondo, and Srebrenica Massacres of 1994 and 1995. In 3 days, 1000 people from several neighboring villages were rounded-up, imprisoned, tortured, raped and killed. More than 500 of them were children. The crime was committed during an internal armed conflict that lasted 12 years during the final decade of the Cold War. The crime was then denied, forgotten and eventually literally exhumated by Argentinian forensic experts in 1992. The crime took place between 11 and 13 December 1981 in a cluster of small villages in North-East El Salvador. The crime is remembered as the El Mozote Massacre.

It will be 37 years in December since this massacre took place. So far, nobody has been held criminally responsible for it, despite the fact that the details of the incident were well documented in the 1993 Report of the UN Truth Commission for El Salvador. This is largely because of the General Amnesty Law which was passed in 1993, shortly after the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accord by which the Salvadoran civil war ended. However, in 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights passed the Judgment in the Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador in which it declared the Amnesty Law incompatible with the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights and with the peace accord itself.

It took some 4 years for the Salvadoran Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court to declare the Amnesty Law unconstitutional. Shortly after the law was derogated, the investigation into the El Mozote Massacre continued, and in March 2017 charges against 18 high-ranking military officers were brought before the criminal court of first instance in San Francisco Gotera, a small municipality in Morazán department. The charges were not brought by the Salvadoran Attorney General (Fiscalia), but by two NGOs – Fundacion Cristosal and Tutela Legal Maria Julia. The Attorney General initially claimed that the case was res judicata and that, therefore, it should be rejected. The trial judge, Guzman Urquilla, disagreed and let the proceedings continue. Read the rest of this entry…

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Achieving Justice Through Restorative Means in Colombia: New Developments in Implementing the Peace Deal

Published on May 3, 2017        Author: 

On 4 April 2017, the Colombian Congress passed amendments to the Constitution creating the ‘Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-repetition’ (‘El Sistema law). This law is part of the fast-track package used to implement the peace deal signed between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas on 24 November 2016. The new El Sistema law brings the implementation of the deal one step closer to reality as it creates a unique transitional justice mechanism oriented towards truth and reparations to victims. Yet the law’s limited reach and lack of popular support for the deal may stall further progress.

The Legitimacy Question

The document signed in November 2016 is the second version of the peace deal, after Colombian voters rejected by a narrow margin the first draft in the referendum of 2 October 2016. This result was largely unexpected. There are many factors that explain the failure of the first peace deal in the national plebiscite. The first is the strong cult of personality and influence of the former President Álvaro Uribe, who actively campaigned against signing a peace treaty with guerillas by appealing to concerns of different groups of population. Bad weather conditions on the polling day, coupled with the lack of infrastructure in many parts of the country, also effectively prevented many people from travelling to polling stations. Finally, little information and time was allotted to voters to study the deal prior to the referendum.

The ‘no’ result created serious challenges for the government, which wished to press ahead with the deal. Over the course of several weeks following its initial rejection, the government of President Santos introduced amendments tackling some of the concerns of the ‘no’ campaign. For example, the new deal provides for a more limited role of international judges within the newly created Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) and guarantees special treatment for the army. These changes were limited, however, as the negotiators balanced conflicting interests of different stakeholders – ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns, FARC, and the civil society. Read the rest of this entry…

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