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New EJIL:Live! Interview with Niels Petersen on his Article “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law”

Published on September 7, 2017        Author: 

In this latest episode of EJIL: Live! the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, Professor Joseph Weiler, speaks with Professor Niels Petersen of the University of Münster, whose article, “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying Customary International Law”, appears in Volume 28, Issue 2 of the journal.

In the article, Professor Petersen explores International Court of Justice decisions confirming the existence of customary international law.  The abstract of the article states that:

It is often observed in the literature on customary international law that the identification practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for customary norms deviates from the traditional definition of customary law in Article 38 (1) lit. b of the ICJ Statute. However, while there are many normative and descriptive accounts on customary law and the Court’s practice, few studies try to explain the jurisprudence of the ICJ. This study aims at closing this gap. I argue that the ICJ’s argumentation pattern is due to the institutional constraints that the Court faces. In order for its decisions to be accepted, it has to signal impartiality through its reasoning. However, the analysis of state practice necessarily entails the selection of particular instances of practice, which could tarnish the image of an impartial court. In contrast, if the Court resorts to the consent of the parties or widely accepted international documents, it signals impartiality.

The EJIL:Live! discussion focuses on the principal empirical findings of the article, and Petersen’s novel conceptualization of those arguments in terms of “judicial politics”, explicable by the institutional constraints that the Court faces. This conversation offers a reflection on how this assessment of the jurisprudence could alter scholars’ normative conceptions of the Court’s decisions, particularly in regards to customary international law.

 

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The Partition of India and Pakistan: Lessons on UN Membership in the Event of a Break-Up of a State

Published on August 21, 2017        Author: 

70 years ago today (21 August 1947) the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 29 recommending that the General Assembly admit Pakistan to membership of the United Nations. That resolution was adopted a few days after British India was partitioned, and the emergence on 15 August 1947 of the newly independent countries of India and Pakistan. Of the many issues that arose out of the decolonisation of India, one new legal issue was how to deal with membership of the emergent states in the recently created United Nations. The UN was faced for the first time with an issue, which has proved to be a recurring one in the history of the UN: how should the organization deal with the break-up of an existing member? There have since been many cases where a number of states have emerged on the territory of an existing member after a break-up of the member (the most recent cases being Montenegro’s separation from Serbia in 2006 and South Sudan’s separation from Sudan in 2011). In all of these cases, one of the key questions that arises is whether the legal personality of the existing state continues and, if so, whether it may simply retain its membership in the UN despite the break-up. Or alternatively, is the previous state to be taken as no longer existing with all the entities emerging on its territory to be regarded as new states? Where new states have emerged from a UN member should such new states be required to apply anew for UN membership? The principles that emerged from the partition of India, with respect to the membership of India and Pakistan, came to be relied upon in later situations, particularly in the 1990s upon the break up of the Soviet Union, and ultimately also in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

India’s membership of the UN is also interesting because it (meaning British India) was an original member of the United Nations and had previously been a member of the League of Nations, even though it did not become independent until 1947. It held that membership in the UN despite Articles 3 and 4 of the UN Charter stating that membership in the UN was open to “states”. British India, being a dependent territory, was not a state as a matter of international law before August 1947. However, pre-independence India was not the only entity that was an original member of the UN that was not a state. Read the rest of this entry…

 
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Composition of the Bench in ICJ Advisory Proceedings: Implications for the Chagos Islands case.

Published on July 10, 2017        Author:  and

In our previous post we discussed the prospects of the International Court of Justice giving an Advisory Opinion, as requested by the UN General Assembly, on the matter of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from the territory of Mauritius that was granted independence from the UK in 1968. We focused on whether the ICJ would be likely to refuse to render an Advisory Opinion because the request might be seen as seeking to circumvent the principle of consent. We explained how the ICJ has reinterpreted the principle of consent as it applies to advisory opinions and how the Court has stressed that as an organ of the UN it would not ordinarily refuse a request for an advisory opinion which the requesting organ deems of assistance for the proper exercise of its functions. In deciding whether to give the opinion, the Court will have to consider whether the proceedings relate to a purely bilateral dispute between two states.

Against this background, it is worth considering what the bench will look like if those proceedings touch on a legal question actually pending between two states. At least two questions arise here. First, may judges who have been involved in the related legal disputes between Mauritius and the UK sit in the advisory opinion? Second, may a state that is involved in a dispute that is related to the question put to the Court appoint a Judge ad hoc to the Bench? The first question arises because two of the current Judges of the Court took part, between 2010 and 2015, in an international arbitration under Annex VII of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea brought by Mauritius against the UK regarding the Chagos Archipelago (Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration). Judge Greenwood was appointed to the Tribunal by the UK (and was indeed challenged by Mauritius, see the Reasoned Decision on Challenge (2011)), while Judge Crawford was, before his election to the ICJ, Counsel for Mauritius in that case. Read the rest of this entry…

 

Can the International Court of Justice Decide on the Chagos Islands Advisory Proceedings without the UK’s Consent?

Published on June 27, 2017        Author:  and

As Marko has noted in this post, last week Thursday, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice provide an advisory opinion on the legality of the separation by the United Kingdom of the Chagos Archipelago from the colony of Mauritius prior to the grant of independence to Mauritius by the UK in 1968. Under Article 96 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly can request from the ICJ an advisory opinion on “any legal question.” However, in the process leading to the adoption of the General Assembly resolution, the UK argued that the question put to the Court is essentially about a bilateral dispute between States, and that it is inappropriate for the ICJ advisory opinion procedure to be used to obtain adjudication of a bilateral dispute between states that have not consented to ICJ jurisdiction over that dispute (see summary of debate here and UK statement here). As Marko noted in his post, the Assembly resolution is drafted so as to try to demonstrate that the matter is not (or not just) a bilateral dispute over sovereignty to the Islands but rather a question of self-determination within the remit of the General Assembly. Undoubtedly, the question of the Court’s competence to render the opinion, and of the appropriateness of doing so will be raised again before the Court. This post focuses on the role of state consent in the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, and explores the previous jurisprudence of the Court on whether it can render an advisory opinion which requires it to pronounce on the obligations of states and in particular to pronounce of disputes between states. A key preliminary question the Court will be faced with in the Chagos Islands advisory opinion is whether it (the ICJ) should, for the first time, exercise its discretion not to give an advisory opinion on the ground that the request offends against the principle requiring consent for international adjudication of inter-state disputes. If it does that, the Court would be following a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice refusing to give an opinion on such grounds.

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The ICC Assembly of States Parties Prepares to Activate the ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression: But Who Will be Covered by that Jurisdiction?

Published on June 26, 2017        Author: 

The states parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court have been meeting in New York recently to begin discussions that it is hoped will lead to a decision at this December’s Assembly of States Parties to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. These discussions are taking place seven years after the ICC states parties, meeting in Kampala, Uganda, adopted a series of amendments to the ICC Statute dealing with the crime of aggression. Those amendments remedied the failure to agree in 1998 in Rome on the definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions under which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over aggression. However in Kampala, states parties decided that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over aggression would require 30 ratifications or acceptances [(Arts. 15 bis (2); Arts. 15ter (2), ICC Statute], and could not happen prior to the taking of a decision by the states parties to activate that jurisdiction, with such decision not to be taken before 1 January 2017 [(Arts. 15bis (3); Arts. 15ter (3), ICC Statute]. In Kampala states parties “Resolved to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as early as possible” [Resolution RC/Res. 6]. States parties now face the moment of decision.

It was a privilege to be invited to a meeting of states parties held on June 2, at the UN Headquarters in NY, to present my views on what has turned out to be the most contentious question in the current discussions about aggression: who will be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression? It should be recalled that states parties to the Rome Statute may choose to opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression under Art. 15bis (4) of the amended ICC Statute by simply lodging a declaration with the Registrar of the Court. However, some states that have not yet ratified the amendments are of the view they should not be required to opt out in order for their nationals to be exempt from ICC jurisdiction over aggression. Thus, the most important question on which there are different views among state parties is this:

Are nationals of states that do not ratify or accept the Kampala amendments, and which also do not opt out of ICC jurisdiction as provided for in those amendments, subject to ICC jurisdiction over aggression in cases where the situation is referred to the Court by a state, or the prosecutor takes up the matter propio motu?

In summary, my view on that question, which I will set out below, is that the Court will not have jurisdiction in such a situation. Read the rest of this entry…

 

Election of Judges to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Published on June 17, 2017        Author: 

2017 will be a busy year for elections to international tribunals. There will be elections later this year to elect five Judges of the International Court of Justice and six judges of the International Criminal Court (see here). Earlier this week, the States Parties to the United Nations Convention of the Sea elected seven Judges to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). ITLOS is composed of 21 judges and elections for seven judges are held every three years. As with the ICJ and the ICC, ITLOS judges serve for a term of 9 years and may be re-elected [Art. 5(1)ITLOS Statute]. The purpose of this post is to simply to report the results of the 2017 ITLOS election and to make a few observations about possible trends in elections to international tribunals.

The States Parties re-elected two judges currently on the ITLOS bench: Judge Boualem Bouguetaia (Algeria) and Judge José Luís Jesus (Cabo Verde). The five new judges taking up their seats on the 1st of October 2017 will be: Mr Oscar Cabello Sarubbi (Paraguay), Ms Neeru Chadha (India), Mr Kriangsak Kittichaisaree (Thailand), Mr Roman Kolodkin (Russian Federation), and Ms Liesbeth Lijnzaad (The Netherlands).  The full list of candidates for the elections can be found here. Judges are elected where they obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of the States Parties present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the States Parties [Art. 4(4), ITLOS Statute]

An interesting development in the current ITLOS election is the failure of two serving judges: Judges Joseph Akl (Lebanon) and Rudiger Wolfrum (Germany) to be re-elected.  The qualifications and experience of these judges are beyond doubt. However, both have been on ITLOS since its formation in 1996 and there might be a feeling that 21 years is long enough for anyone. I have heard it said at the UN there is a feeling among states that though there are no formal term limits for judicial positions, treaty bodies and the like, it is not healthy for individuals to be there for too long. It was a surprise to some (myself included) when the late Sir Nigel Rodley was not re-elected to the Human Rights Committee last year and perhaps the long period of service on the Committee was a factor. This is an issue that states should take into account in nominating candidates.

Two of the seven judges elected are women (Neeru Chadha and Ms Liesbeth Lijnzaad, who both recently represented their states in the Enrica Lexicie and Artic Sunrise proceedings before ITLOS.). Read the rest of this entry…

 

Trivia: International Organizations Headquartered in Non-Member States

Published on May 5, 2017        Author: 

Michael Waibel’s post of yesterday highlighted one of the significant issues that will need to be sorted out in the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU. Another issue, though of less significance, that will need to be resolved is the (re)location of a couple of EU agencies that currently have their headquarters in London: the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA). It has been reported that the EU, understandably, wishes to move these agencies out of London once Britain leaves the EU and apparently a number of cities are competing to have these agencies relocated to them (see here and here). However, it has also been reported that Britain would like to keep these agencies located in the UK even after Brexit.

“David Davis, Brexit secretary, does not accept that the two agencies and roughly 1,000 staff will have to move from London’s Canary Wharf, even though the EU is about to run a competition to relocate them. A UK Brexit department spokesman said: ‘No decisions have been taken about the location of the European Banking Authority or the European Medicines Agency — these will be subject to the exit negotiations.’

The government has left open the possibility of keeping part of some EU agencies, at least in the short term, but the idea of the UK hosting key institutions after Brexit is unacceptable in Brussels.”

While the idea that EU institutions may remain based or even headquartered in the UK after the UK remains in the EU might, at first sight, seem unrealistic, it should be remembered that Geneva was the “European headquarters” for many decades when Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002, over 50 years after the UN was formed and had based its major European office there.

From time to time I have posed trivia questions on the blog, but usually related to international tribunals. This time I have a question that relates to international organizations.

My question is this: Which international organizations have their headquarters or main offices located in a non-member state?

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New Addition to our Team of Editors

Published on April 11, 2017        Author: 

It is such a pleasure to announce that Anthea Roberts has accepted the invitation to join the team of EJIL:Talk! Contributing Editors. Anthea is an Associate Professor at the School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet) at the Australian National University.

Before returning to Australia, Anthea was an Associate Professor at the London School of Economics, a Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School and a Professor at Columbia Law School. In addition to her ANU appointment, she is also a Visiting Professor on the Masters of International Dispute Settlement at the Graduate Institute and the University of Geneva. Anthea is a leading voice across many areas of public international law, having published on the sources of international law, investment treaty law and arbitration, use of force, jurisdiction, among other topics, in the leading international law journals. She has twice been awarded the annual Francis Deák Prize for the best article published in the American Journal of International Law by a younger scholar .

In addition to being on the editorial board of the European Journal of International Law, she is also on the editorial board of the American Journal of International Law, the Journal of World Trade and Investment, and ICSID Review. She is also a Contributing Editor for the International Economic and Policy Law Blog and a Reporter for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Before beginning her academic career, Anthea worked in private legal practice, served as an Associate to the Chief Justice of the Australian High Court and clerked at the International Court of Justice.

Anthea has already written a number of posts for EJIL:Talk! (see here and here), including that of yesterday. We very much welcome her contributions to the blog! Read the rest of this entry…

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The International Legal Framework Regulating Armed Drones

Published on March 25, 2017        Author: 

Last week I had the pleasure and honour of delivering the International and Comparative Law Quarterly’s Annual Lecture for 2017 together with Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne. Our lecture was based on an article – “International Legal Framework Regulating Armed Drones” – that we co-authored with Professor Christof Heyns and Dr Thompson Chengeta which was published in Volume 65 (2016) of the ICLQ. The article arose out of a project to support Christof’s work in his capacity as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. We began the collaboration in the summer of 2013 in the lead up to Christof preparing a report for the 68th session of UN General Assembly on “Armed Drones and the Right to Life”. The project commenced with an expert workshop organized by the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and the Oxford Martin Programme on Human Rights for Future Generations and has concluded with this article which is an expanded version of the UN GA report.

As the abstract of the article sets out:

This article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, Read the rest of this entry…

 

Applications for Revision of the International Court of Justice’s Judgments: The Curious “Case” for Revision of the Bosnian Genocide Judgment

Published on March 13, 2017        Author: 

Last Thursday, the President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made a statement announcing that the Court was “not properly” seised of a request for revision of the Court’s merits Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the Bosnian Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia). The key question was whether the request for revision should have been considered as one made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and this depended on whether the person who made the request was to be considered as Agent for Bosnia. In coming to its decision not to take any action with regard to the request for revision, the Court concluded “that no decision has been taken by the competent authorities, on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a State, to request the revision of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia)”.

In effect, the Court rejected the request for revision on the grounds that the person who claimed to be the Agent for Bosnia, Mr. Sakib Softić, had not in fact been appointed as Agent by the state for the purpose of these particular proceedings. Mr Softić had been appointed the Agent for Bosnia, in 2002, in the original Bosnian Genocide Convention case. The present controversy surrounding his authority arose from the nature of the Presidency of Bosnia – the Head of State – which is not a single individual but rather composed of 3 individuals: one Bosniac, one Serb and one Croat. As it emerged from separate letters written to the Court by each of the members of the Presidency, no decision was made by the Presidency to request revision and only the Bosniac member of the Presidency, Mr. Bakir Izetbegović, was of the view that the appointment of Mr Softić as Agent in the original case remained valid.

Whether the Court was right to reject the “request” for revision in this case depends on whether a request for revision is to be considered as a new case as opposed to a separate phase of a previous case. If a request for revision is simply a separate phase of a prior case – a form of incidental proceedings – then the authority of the previous Agent would extend to that new phase as Agents exercise their functions throughout a case, unless they are replaced by the state. However, if a request for revision is a new case the Court would be right to require a new indication from the state as to who the Agent is, thus impliedly confirming that the state has authorised the initiation of those new proceedings.

In my view, the Court was right to hold, if only implicitly, that requests for revision are new proceedings and not simply continuations of a previous case. There is a qualitative difference between a request for revision (or indeed interpretation) of a prior judgment arising from proceedings that have essentially concluded with the case removed from the Court’s list of pending cases, on the one hand, and the initiation of incidental proceedings (such as provisional measures for interim protection or making preliminary objections) in an on-going case, on the other hand. Read the rest of this entry…