Anthea Roberts

About/Bio

Anthea Roberts is a Professor at School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet) at the Australian National University and a Visiting Professor for the Masters of International Dispute Settlement at the Graduate Institute and the University of Geneva. Anthea attends UNCITRAL Working Group III as part of the Australian delegation but she acts and writes in her independent academic capacity. She is a specialist in public international law, investment treaty law and arbitration, comparative international law and geoeconomics. Prior to joining the ANU, Anthea taught at the London School of Economics, Columbia Law School and Harvard Law School. She is serving or has served on the editorial boards of the American Journal of International Law, the European Journal of International Law, the Journal of World Trade and Investment and ICSID Review. She is also a Contributing Editor for EJIL: Talk! and International Economic and Policy Law Blog and a Reporter for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Follow Anthea on @AntheaERoberts.

Recently Published

The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, Revolutionaries and Undecideds

The investor-state arbitration landscape is shifting under our feet. The utility and legitimacy of traditional investor-state arbitration have come under fire, but states have not converged on a viable alternative. In simplified terms, three main camps are developing, which I call the “loyalist,” “reformist,” and “revolutionary” camps. The vast majority of states, however, are yet to take a…

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A Turning of the Tide against ISDS?

The Court of Justice for the European Union fired a significant shot at investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) this week, and the result is likely to be much more than just a flesh wound. In deciding that the European Union did not have exclusive competence to enter into agreements including ISDS clauses, the Court made it significantly more likely…

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Would a Multilateral Investment Court be Biased? Shifting to a treaty party framework of analysis

I have recently been pondering a common complaint voiced against the EU and Canada’s proposal for a multilateral investment court, which is that it would be biased against investors because all of the judges would be selected by states (see, for example, the ABA’s Report here and Judge Schwebel’s speech here). In my view, this…

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