Another Brick in the Wall: Israel’s Seizure of UNRWA Facilities in East Jerusalem

1. Introduction: background of the seizure of UNRWA facilities in East-Jerusalem

On 8 December 2025, Israeli police, accompanied by municipal Israeli officials, forcibly entered the facility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), located in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, replaced the flag of the United Nations by the Israel national flag and, according to information provided by the United Nations, “(…) cut communications (…) while furniture, IT equipment and other property were seized”. This action raises a significant number of issues related to the legal status, under international law, of the compound, and the compatibility of this operation with Israel’s obligations vis-à-vis the United Nations.

As is well-known, UNRWA was created in 1949 by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV), with the initial mandate to provide “direct relief and works programmes” to Palestine refugees, in order to “prevent conditions of starvation and distress (…) and to further conditions of peace and stability”. UNRWA thus took over from the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) established in 1948 (for details cf. B. Richardson, The United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, International Organization 1950, pp. 44-54). Following the hostilities of June 1967, General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) requested UNRWA to “continue to provide humanitarian assistance (…) on an emergency basis, and as a temporary measure, to persons in the area who are currently displaced and in serious need of continued assistance”. Ever since, the General Assembly repeatedly confirmed UNRWA’s mandate for Palestinians, later urging the Agency to also “undertake effective measures to guarantee the safety and security and the legal and human rights of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories”.

Most recently, on 5 December 2025, the General Assembly prolonged the mandate of UNRWA for a period of another three years with 151 yes votes, ten no votes and 14 abstentions. On the same day, it also adopted its resolution on ‘Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’ in which the General Assembly requested Israel to respect the premises of UNRWA, including those located in East Jerusalem.

Israel and UNRWA had concluded on 14 June 1967 an ‘Exchange of Letters (…) Constituting a Provisional Agreement concerning Assistance to Palestine Refugees’, in which Israel inter alia agreed

[t]o recognize [emphasis added] that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, to which Israel is a party, shall govern the relations between the Government and UNRWA in all that concerns UNRWA’s functions.

The Israeli parliament, however, on 28 October 2024 adopted two laws, namely the ‘Law to Cease UNRWA Operations’ and the ‘Law to Cease UNRWA Operations in the Territory of the State of Israel’ (unofficial English translations thereof available in the letter of the UN Secretary General addressed to the General Assembly and to the Security Council of 9 December 2024), with the former providing that the above mentioned bilateral letter will be terminated, while the latter aimed at preventing “UNRWA operations within the territory of the State of Israel” and prohibiting the operation of “any representative office [or to] provide any services or carry out any activities, directly or indirectly, within the sovereign territory of the State of Israel”. Following up on the adoption of this domestic legislation, Israel authorities then on 3 November 2024 notified UNRWA of its intention to terminate the said exchange of letters, which in turn now led to the seizure, by Israel, of the UNRWA facilities in East Jerusalem described above.

2. Israel’s obligations vis-à-vis UNRWA under international humanitarian law

At the outset, it is worth recalling that, despite the purported annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem by adopting the ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel’ on 30 July 1980 and ensuing further legislation and practice, East Jerusalem remains occupied territory, as having been consistently confirmed inter alia not only by the International Court of Justice, but also by both, the General Assembly (cf. e.g. General Assembly resolution A/RES/79/81) and the Security Council (see e.g. Security Resolutions 465 (1980), 476 (1980) and 478 (1980).

This entails that, apart from any question as to the privileges and immunities UNRWA is entitled to, an issue addressed below, Israel also continues to be obliged to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law as being the occupying power with regard to East Jerusalem. Said obligations have recently been laid out and analyzed in detail in the 2024 ICJ advisory opinion on the ‘Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory’. Notably, the Court found that UNRWA did not violate the principle of impartiality within the meaning of Article 59 4^th Geneva Convention (ibid., para. 114.), nor that of neutrality (ibid., para. 118).

The Court however also stated that, at least as a matter of principle, Israel as the occupying power “is in principle free to choose the humanitarian organizations through which it fulfils its obligation to agree to and facilitate humanitarian relief” (ibid., para. 120). At the same time the Court still concluded that “the United Nations, acting through UNRWA [emphasis added], has been an indispensable provider of humanitarian relief” when it comes to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. While focusing in that regard on the specific situation prevailing in Gaza, the Court in doing so referred to the above-mentioned letter of the Secretary General. The Secretary General in turn, in said letter (p. 2), had referred to UNRWA’s “essential work in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” and that “[t]he cessation of or restrictions on UNRWA activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory would have devastating consequences for Palestine refugees”.

Hence, provided Israel is not in a position to meet the needs of the Palestine refugees, “it has an obligation to allow and facilitate the activities of UNRWA until all those needs are met” (ibid., p. 5). In that regard, it is moreover important to note that the UNRWA compound in East Jerusalem served as a facility that not only provided services for Palestinian refugees living in East Jerusalem and the other parts of the West Bank, but also for Palestinians living in Gaza. As a matter of fact, the said compound, i.e. what UNRWA referred to as its ‘West Bank Field Office’, has since 1994 also, at least partially, housed UNRWA Headquarters including inter alia the Commissioner-General, the Department of Legal Affairs, and the External Relations and Communications Department. Not the least it also served as a warehouse for items for use in Gaza including food, but also served as a liaison office with Israeli authorities in support of UNRWA operations in Gaza until the Israeli legislation purporting to ban the work of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory became effective. Accordingly, the seizure by Israel of the UNRWA facilities in East Jerusalem not only hampered UNRWA’s operations in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), but also those in Gaza on which the International Court of Justice had, as mentioned, specifically focused in its 2025 advisory opinion.

Finally, it is also worth recalling that the determination by the International Court of Justice in its 2024 advisory opinion on the ‘Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’ that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful under international law (ibid., para. 285, (3)) notwithstanding, its obligations under applicable rules of international humanitarian law continue until the occupation is de facto brought to an end (ibid., para 264). It follows that the seizure and closure by Israel of the UNRWA compound already raises significant issues under applicable rules of international humanitarian law.

3. Legal status of UNRWA facilities in East Jerusalem under international law

Apart from the just mentioned issues arising under international humanitarian law, the Israeli action however also raises questions as far as the legal status of the compound under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is concerned.

While it is already Article 105 UN Charter that provides that the ‘Organization’ shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members “such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes” it is notably the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (often referred to as the so-called ‘General Convention ‘) that spells out in more detail the privileges and immunities to be granted to the United Nations.

Yet, Article 105 UN Charter, just like the 1946 Convention, refers to the privileges and immunities of the ‘Organization’ only, i.e. the United Nations as such, but not those of its specialized agencies. The immunities of the latter are governed by the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, of which Israel is however not a party. This therefore raises the question whether UNRWA is to be considered part of the United Nations, and hence enjoys privileges and immunities under the 1946 General Convention.

a) UNRWA and the scope of application ratione personae of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations

This issue has recently come up in a civil case in US federal court, where the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on 30 September 2025 confirmed that “UNRWA is a subsidiary organ of the U.N.” and accordingly concluded “that UNRWA enjoys absolute immunity” (ibid., p. 16; on the history of the case cf. Damrosch here). This decision is in line with the fact that General Assembly resolutions extending the mandate of UNRWA have on several occasions explicitly referred to UNRWA as a ‘subsidiary organ’ of the General Assembly” (cf. e.g., G.A. Res. 513 (VI) (26 January 1952) (referring to UNRWA as a “subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly”); G.A. Res. 1315 (XIII) (12 December 1958) (“Recalling that the Agency is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations”), while others have confirmed that UNRWA, “as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the [General Convention].” (G.A. Res. 1456 (XIV), Preamble (9 December 1959). Besides, the UN’s Repertory of Practice has also classified UNRWA as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly (cf e.g., United Nations, Repertory of United Nations Organs, Volume 1, Article 7, para 16 (1945-1954) (citing UNRWA as an example of a ‘subsidiary organ’). The UN Secretariat, in its publications, also repeatedly referred to UNRWA as a subsidiary organ (cf. e.g. U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 1968, p. 182, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/6 (“[UNRWA] is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, with a mandate established by that body, and must at all times act as a United Nations agency.”); U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 1969, p. 209, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/7 (referring to UNRWA as “subsidiary organ”); U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 1976, p. 159, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14 (same); U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 1997, p. 439, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/41 (same); U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 2000, p. 354-58, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/38 (same).) As a matter of fact, since UNRWA’s structure and terms of reference are determined, may be modified, and even be discontinued, by or under the authority of the General Assembly, it shares what has been referred to as “[t]he constitutional features common to all subsidiary organs of the United Nations”(cf. W. Dale, UNRWA: A Subsidiary Organ of the United Nations, 23 ICLQ (1974), p. 576 et seq. (577)). It is further worth noting in passing that in the just mentioned case the former US government had shared that very same position, while the Trump administration then changed course and tried to convince the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, albeit in vain, that UNRWA did not enjoy immunity as allegedly not being a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly.

b) Legal consequences of UNRWA’s protected status

Given its status as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, and further given that Israel is a party of the General Convention, it had to make sure under Article II, Section 2 thereof that UNRWA, as well as

its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity”.

What is more is that under Article II, Section 3, 1^st sentence of the Convention, “[t]he premises of the United Nations [and hence in the case at hand the premises of UNRWA as being a subsidiary organ thereof] shall be inviolable, and that finally and according to Article II, Section 3, 2^nd sentence thereof

[t]he property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.

It goes almost without saying that the entry of Israeli authorities into the UNRWA premises and the searches and seizures undertaken constitute an almost blatant violation of those provisions. The fact that Israel had previously terminated the above-mentioned exchange of letters between Israel and UNRWA could not terminate the protected legal status of UNRWA’s facilities.

As a matter of fact, the said exchange of letters merely constituted a modus operandi e.g. as to the entry of UNRWA staff into the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza. In particular, this letter could not provide for a unilateral right of Israel to set aside the privileges and immunities arising under the General Convention given that its Final Article, Section 35 provides that

[t]his convention shall continue in force as between the United Nations and every Member which has deposited an instrument of accession for so long as that Member remains a Member of the United Nations.

It is true that Section 36 further stipulates that the “Secretary-General [but the Secretary General only and not the Commissioner General of UNRWA that entered into the 1967 Exchange of Letters with Israel] may conclude with any Member or Members supplementary agreements adjusting the provisions of this convention so far as that Member or those Members are concerned”. Even assuming that the 1967 Exchange of Letters did constitute such a ‘supplementary agreement’, and further  assuming it had been validly entered into at the first place by the Commissioner General of UNRWA, it would have been “subject to the approval of the General Assembly” which never occurred.

The merely declaratory character of the exchange of letters is confirmed by the fact that it recognized that the 1946 General Convention did apply to UNRWA. Otherwise it would have been most natural to, on the one hand, delete the ‘recognize’, and on the other hand, state that the content of the General Convention (rather than the General Convention as such) shall govern the relations between Israel and UNRWA.

Nor could the fact that Israel has now unilaterally purported to terminate the operation of UNRWA in the Occupied Palestinian Territory have an impact on the legal status of the UNRWA premises located in East Jerusalem. For one, and to state the obvious, any such domestic law could not have altered in any manner the legal situation prevailing under international law. Besides, given Israel’s obligation to cooperate with the United Nations, as laid out in the ICJ’s recent advisory opinion (cf. supra) and the role of UNRWA’s premises in East Jerusalem in providing humanitarian aid for Gaza, any such action, even assuming that the premises’ legal status could have changed, would have been impermissible. Finally, even after all of the UNRWA staff had left the premises, these premises did not lose their protected status since, as confirmed by Article II, Section 3, 2^nd sentence, United Nations premises shall be inviolable “wherever located and by whomsoever held” (emphasis added).

One cannot therefore but deplore the action undertaken by the Israeli authorities, Israel not only being a contracting party of the General Convention, but also of the United Nations as such, and thus being not only bound by the General Convention but also by Article 105 UN Charter. It is also worth noting in passing that whatever allegations Israel has vis-à-vis UNRWA as such, which in any event have been rejected by the ICJ in its recent advisory opinion, they might not justify the violation of UNRWA’s privileges and immunities, just like an alleged misuse of diplomatic premises might not serve as a pretext to violate the immunity of embassy premises; indeed, just like the rules on the privileges and immunities of diplomatic premises constitute a self-contained regime (cf. for such  proposition the holding of the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case, para. 86).

4. Possible advisory proceedings at the ICJ related to the difference between Israel and the United Nations

On 8 December 2025, i.e. the very day of the seizure of the UNRWA building by Israel, the United Nations issued a ‘Statement by the Secretary-General on Israeli unauthorized entry into the UNRWA Sheikh Jarrah compound’ in which the Secretary General not only “strongly condemn[ed] today’s unauthorized entry into the United Nations Sheikh Jarrah compound held by UNRWA located in occupied East Jerusalem by Israeli authorities” but also

urge[d] Israel to immediately take all necessary steps to restore, preserve and uphold the inviolability of UNRWA premises and to refrain from taking any further action with regard to UNRWA premises, in line with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and its other obligations under international law, including those concerning privileges and immunities of the United Nations.

While no reply by Israel to this protest is publicly available, it seems safe to assume that a difference (‘différend’ in the equally authentic French text of Section 30 of the General Convention) has thus arisen between Israel and the United Nations within the meaning of the ICJ’s well-established jurisprudence as to the notion of what constitutes a ‘dispute’/ ‘différend’ as a prerequisite to bringing a contentious case before the Court.

Yet, Article VIII, Section 30, 2^nd sentence of the 1946 General Convention provides that

[i]f a difference [‘différend’] arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court.

It thus opens the possibility that the General Assembly may request (yet another) advisory opinion, this time related specifically to the legal status of UNRWA’s premises located in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. What is crucial in that regard is that Article VIII, Section 30, 3^rd sentence of the 1946 General Convention explicitly provides that such “opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive [‘’décisif’ in the French version] by the parties”. While the wording ‘decisive’/’décisif’ is different from the wording used in Article 59 ICJ Statute (‘binding’ / ‘obligatoire’) for ICJ judgments, it still entails a legally binding force for both parties to the dispute, i.e. Israel and the United Nations, of any such advisory opinion. Otherwise that very sentence would be redundant.

5. Concluding remarks

As shown, the seizure by Israel of the UNRWA compound runs counter to its obligations arising under international law. One may, however, doubt whether even a legally binding advisory opinion by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations confirming such finding would be able to change the situation on the ground. One cannot but note that Israel’s action, unfortunately, constitutes yet another attempt to provide for another brick in the wall separating East Jerusalem from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and further trying to limit the role of the United Nations in bringing about a solution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict with two States living side by side.

As a matter of fact, the overarching relevance of international law in setting the parameters for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East seems to have decreased in the last years, if international law ever was able to effectively do so. It is then even more important to remind States, not only of their obligations vis-à-vis the United Nations and its organs, but also that international law is a long haul sometimes only able to rectify an illegal situation decades after the fact.