Abstaining from Abstention: UNSC Resolution 2774 (2025) and Obligatory Abstention under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter

UN Security Council resolution 2774 (2025) was a long-awaited resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as non-procedural draft resolutions had been vetoed by Russia since the invasion. However, its content is very simple: it has only two preambular paragraphs and one operative paragraph, which urges a ‘lasting peace’ between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, the vote was divided: 10 votes in favour (Algeria, China, Guyana, Panama, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the USA) and five abstentions (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, the UK). With the advent of the Trump administration, the landscape of political confrontation within the Council has dramatically shifted from the traditional one (the UK, the USA and France vs Russia and China) to a new one (the UK and France vs the USA, Russia and China).

Resolution 2774, which does not find any threat to the peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter, can be regarded as adopted under Chapter VI. Thus, the application of the proviso in Article 27, which provides that ‘in decisions under Chapter VI …, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting’, must be considered. This post discusses the possible application of this obligatory abstention rule to the adoption process of resolution 2774, as well as its implications for the ongoing negotiations, which, according to some reports, could include territorial concessions by Ukraine.

Which is relevant to the application of the obligatory abstention rule: ‘dispute’, ‘situation’, ‘question’ or ‘conflict’?

It has long been discussed whether the characterisation of a matter as a ‘situation’ precludes the application of the obligatory abstention rule (the Namibia Advisory Opinion, para.25). The term ‘situation’ is ubiquitous in the Council’s activities. The Council also uses the term ‘question’, such as ‘The question concerning Haiti’ (S/PV.9808) and ‘the Palestinian question’ (S/PV.9794). In particular, resolution 2774 describes the present matter as a ‘conflict’. Yet, a close examination of Council practice reveals that the different labels do not determine whether the obligatory abstention rule applies. For example, at the 868th meeting in 1960 on the Eichmann question, Argentina abstained from voting, explicitly mentioning Article 27(3)—presumably the last case of obligatory abstention. The resulting resolution 138 (1960) does not contain the word ‘dispute’, but only ‘this situation’ (pre.para.4). Likewise, at the 524th meeting in 1950 on the Palestine question, Egypt abstained from voting by virtue of Article 27(3). The resulting resolution 89 (1950) does not speak of a ‘dispute’. 

Of particular note is the India–Pakistan question, in which the two parties repeatedly complied with the obligatory abstention rule (Security Council Report). Resolution 126 (1957) referred to ‘the dispute’ between the two parties (pre.para.5) and, at the same time, requested the two governments to refrain from any acts which might aggravate ‘the situation’ (op.para.1). This demonstrates that a ‘dispute’ and ‘situation’ can coexist in relation to the same matter. In other words, the Council’s characterisation of a matter as a ‘situation’ does not exclude the existence of a ‘dispute’ in the sense of Article 27(3) (Kato, pp.10-13). Therefore, the word ‘conflict’ in resolution 2774 in itself cannot exclude the application of the obligatory abstention rule.

What is ‘a dispute’ and who is ‘a party to a dispute’ under Article 27(3)?

The absence of any definition of ‘dispute’ in the UN Charter has led some scholars to rely on the PCIJ’s well-known Mavrommatis formula—‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons’—for Chapter VI procedures (Zimmermann, ‘Article 27’, p.1220; Kato, pp.15-16). Francois Naaman, largely relying on this formula, also defines ‘a dispute as a bilateral issue involving an accusation and a response’.

However, accusations and responses are a common phenomenon in Council meetings. At the 8974th and 8979th meetings, while Russia justified its invasion of Ukraine as the exercise of the right of self-defence, Western Council members, such as the UK, France, the USA and Norway, refuted this view. These were clear cases of ‘an accusation and a response’. If so, there have been numerous bilateral disputes between Russia on the one hand, and Ukraine, the UK, France, the USA, Norway and so forth on the other. Then, is it reasonable to argue that not only Russia but also these other Council members are obliged to abstain on the adoption of draft resolution (S/2022/155)? 

A significant precedent is the Palestine question, in which Egypt imposed restrictions on passage through the Suez Canal. This case also shows that a formalist standard such as regarding a dispute as a conflict of claims can lead to absurd results (Kato, pp.16-18; Conforti and Focarelli, pp.96-97). At the 553rd meeting in 1951, Egypt asserted that France, the Netherlands, the UK, the USA and Turkey (then Council members), which were disputing Egypt’s right to impose those restrictions, were parties to the dispute with Egypt, and hence were obliged to abstain under Article 27(3). Egypt attempted to paralyse the Council by preventing the adoption of a draft resolution (S/2298/Rev.1) which called upon Egypt to terminate its restrictions. 

Indeed, Naaman argues that ‘the definitional threshold appears to be met primarily in cases involving two directly opposed States’ (emphasis added). Certainly, a distinction can be made between direct and indirect opposition, but by what standard? I have previously argued that ‘A dispute in the sense of the proviso in Article 27(3) is defined as a conflict between States that are directly involved with a particular matter. States directly involved with the matter and hence obliged to abstain from voting under the proviso are those which, in a given draft resolution, are referred to by their State names’. This is because the wording of a draft resolution normally reflects the configuration of the relevant States’ interests and, in particular, direct references to State names in draft resolutions are a strong indication that those States have particular stakes in matters before the Council (Kato, pp.18-19). Notably, in all resolutions on the India–Pakistan question that were adopted with the obligatory abstention either by India or Pakistan, the only State names expressly mentioned were ‘India’ and ‘Pakistan’. By this standard, a clear distinction can be made between direct and indirect opposition, enabling a rational delimitation of the scope of ‘a party to a dispute’.

Who should have abstained from voting on the adoption of resolution 2774?

Let us apply the present standard to the adoption of resolution 2774. The US draft resolution (S/2025/112) was adopted as resolution 2774 with 10 affirmative votes, including Russia’s. Under the present standard, Russia and Ukraine—the only States mentioned by name in the draft resolution—are regarded as directly involved with the present matter and thus a dispute exists between them. Russia should have abstained from the vote as a party to the dispute. 

Regarding the three draft amendments submitted by Denmark, Greece, France, Slovenia and the UK (S/2025/114, S/2025/115 and S/2025/116) to the US draft, it is noteworthy that the present standard would have significantly, if not wholly, removed ‘the false equivalence between aggressor and victim’ (Denmark) from resolution 2774. The first amendment was to replace ‘the Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict’ with ‘the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation’; the second was to insert a new third preambular paragraph to read ‘Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty … and territorial integrity of Ukraine …’; and the third was to add, at the end of the operative paragraph, ‘in line with the UN Charter and the … territorial integrity of States’. The first failed to obtain the required number of votes, and the second and third were vetoed by Russia. However, since all amendments presupposed a draft resolution containing the State names ‘Russian Federation’ and ‘Ukraine’, Russia should have abstained from these votes. Accordingly, the last two would have been adopted. 

Also notable is Russia’s first amendment (S/2025/118), which was to replace ‘Russian Federation–Ukraine conflict’ with ‘conflict around Ukraine’ and to replace ‘between Ukraine and the Russian Federation’ with ‘in Ukraine’, thereby erasing all instances of the word ‘the Russian Federation’ from the US draft. With the present standard applied to this amendment, Russia is not a party to the dispute and thus is not obliged to abstain under Article 27(3). Could this amount to a crafty strategy to avoid the obligation to abstain? Absolutely not. The only State that cast an affirmative vote for that amendment was Russia; whether or not Russia had the right to vote, there was no chance at all that the amendment would be adopted. This means that draft resolutions with arbitrary wording, intended to negate the status of a particular State as a party to a dispute, hardly gain support among Council members (Kato, p.21). Council members normally hesitate to vote for draft resolutions whose wording largely deviates from actual circumstances, irrespective of their political positions. Even China, a close ally of Russia, abstained from voting on Russia’s amendment. Thus, the possibility of manipulating the wording of draft resolutions to circumvent the obligation to abstain cannot be a sufficient ground for rejecting the present standard. 

Expected consequences of the obligatory abstention rule in the ongoing negotiations

According to Hans Kelsen, ‘the vote illegally cast by the representative [in violation of the obligatory abstention rule] must not be counted’ (Kelsen, p.264). Consequently, the rule can prevent Russia not only from using the veto, but also from casting an affirmative vote. The latter effect would have significant practical implications in the case of a split vote, such as the vote on the adoption of resolution 2774. The appropriate application of the rule could contribute to increasing the opportunities for the Council to intervene.

As Kriener indicates, it is not unlikely that the USA and Russia will seek a Council resolution affirming a settlement of the dispute that includes legally questionable territorial concessions by Ukraine. When the chips are down, the veto powers of France and the UK to prevent the adoption of such resolutions will be of decisive importance. Peters argues that ‘The current situation between Russia and Ukraine (and its allies) is a “dispute” broadly conceived’(Peters, p.166). This argument has problematic aspects. A dispute in the sense of Article 27(3) surely exists between Russia and Ukraine, but, as far as the draft resolutions examined in this post are concerned, not between Russia and Ukraine’s allies, such as France and the UK. Here as well, the present standard could play a critical role in avoiding the overinclusion of parties to a dispute, and thus in preserving the veto powers of France and the UK. 

The obligatory abstention rule under Article 27(3) occupies a unique place in United Nations law in terms of limiting the use of the veto. Attention must be paid not only to Chapter VII but also to Chapter VI in the current circumstances, where veto threats have been so immense. Whether the long-forgotten potential of the Security Council can be restored at this juncture depends on its members.