A State consent dilemma in the current work of the International Law Commission on the theory of sources

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The International Law Commission (ILC) has published its advance report on the work completed during its 76th session this May. This post focuses on progress in two topics related to the theory of sources: the second reading of conclusions on general principles of law, and the first reading of conclusions on subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. I explore the dilemma the Commission faces in striking a balance between developing methodologies coherent with state consent and ensuring they are not entirely divorced from the practice the Commission aims to restate.

The mainstream theory of sources in international law holds that consent underpins any legal obligation of states. Since its inception, the ILC has fleshed out methodologies source by source as listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. In the absence of settled methodologies, practitioners retain flexibility in identifying sources of international law, which at times comes in tension with state consent. In contrast, some commentators argued that the ILC’s increasing emphasis on preserving state consent in the work on customary law has rendered its methodology impractical. This may make tribunals reluctant to follow requirements detached from their established practices. Current codification efforts face a similar dilemma where striving for acceptance of the Commission’s work by states risks undermining its adoption by practitioners.

General principles of law

According to classic legal positivism, principles are rooted in morality and can be incorporated into law only through other positive sources such as treaties or custom. Accordingly, some viewed reference to general principles in Article 38 as superfluous [Kelsen, 540], while their use by the ICJ in certain circumstances was considered judge-made law [Anzilotti, 117-118]. In contrast, modern positivists seek to construct a methodology that explains the reference to general principles in Article 38 as an independent source of law remaining coherent with state consent.

The Commission addressed the issue of consent by introducing recognition of the ‘community of nations’ as a requirement for the existence of principles. The Special Rapporteur Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez proposed clarifying that this chiefly means recognition by states, which was an understanding shared by many states and other members of the Commission. However, the Drafting Committee opted for an ambiguous formulation in Draft Conclusion 2 subject to clarification in the commentary:

Draft Conclusion 2, Recognition

For a general principle of law to exist, it must be recognized by the community of nations.

The general requirement of recognition is operationalized differently in respect of two categories of principles defined by the Commission. For general principles derived from national legal systems, they must be transposable to the international legal system, i.e. compatible with it. Interestingly, some early explanations of this requirement stipulated that a principle must be recognized in custom or treaty (Tunkin, 202). For general principles formed within the international legal system, they must be recognized by the community of states as ‘intrinsic’ to that system. The exact meaning of these requirements remains unclear and was widely debated during the session. To this extent, the Special Rapporteur is expected to develop details in the commentary.

Some Commission members felt that the draft conclusions did not sufficiently preserve state consent in the formation of general principles. Proposals were made to include a separate draft conclusion possibly introducing the persistent objector doctrine for general principles formed within the international legal system. Given the peculiarities of the second reading process, such a change would have required a strong support from many members to reopen discussions on the structure of the draft conclusions. Voiced only by a couple of members, the proposal for a new conclusion was rejected and the Drafting Committee followed the preference of the Special Rapporteur to preserve the original structure. That said, there was an understanding in the Committee that the issue of state consent and persistent objectors will be revisited and addressed in the commentary.

The further work of the Commission on the commentary poses a dilemma of construing methodology based on practice and coherent with the notion of state consent. International tribunals currently apply principles flexibly due to the absence of a widely recognized methodology. Some commentators even argued that the ICJ simply asserts the existence of unwritten legal sources, although this has been explained by pragmatic considerations pertaining to drafting rather than flaws in methodology. The Commission’s proposed recognition requirements may improve the credibility of its conclusions in the eyes of states but could reduce flexibility for tribunals. Conversely, overly rigid criteria might result in few principles surviving scrutiny under a methodology akin to that used for custom [Bordin, 297]. In that case, tribunals might avoid applying principles unsupported by other sources or disregard the Commission’s methodology altogether. Striking the right balance is thus essential to ensure the conclusions are both practical and acceptable to states.

Subsidiary means

The Commission’s work on subsidiary means presents a similar dilemma. Subsidiary means, including decisions of tribunals and teachings, are strictly speaking not sources of law as they only support identification of other sources. Nevertheless, they shape the general framework of the theory of sources as the materials used influence the result of the legal analysis. To this extent, an important feature of the draft conclusions on subsidiary means is a methodology for determining the weight of different materials for the purposes of establishing sources of international law. During the first reading, there was a thrust from the Special Rapporteur Charles Jalloh to allocate more weight for subsidiary means creation of which is driven by states [3rd Report, para 130].

The draft conclusions contain several elements that could shift the balance to subsidiary means favoring identification of rules consistent with state consent. Draft conclusion 4 sets out general criteria for assessing the weight of subsidiary means:

(a) their degree of representativeness;

(b) the quality of the reasoning;

(c) the expertise of those involved;

(d) the level of agreement among those involved;

(e) the reception by States and other entities;

(f) where applicable, the mandate conferred on the body.

As the practice of the Commission shows, appeal to the attitude of states on the issue is a ubiquitous way to advance an argument which could not be easily overridden by the considerations of quality. Even if there is no formal hierarchy, the reception by states could be a decisive element for the relative simplicity of its application. Whether and how draft conclusions try to balance this issue will likely be addressed in the commentary.

Additionally, draft conclusion 11 (e) specifies the mandate of expert bodies, such as the ILC itself, as relevant for the weight of its works. During this session, Jalloh explained this to mean that the work of such bodies carries special weight because they are mandated by states. In contrast, other members have maintained that the quality of work should be the decisive factor. The special expertise of some bodies in relation to specific treaties could matter, but it has nothing to do with endorsement by states. The discussion is still open and will be developed further in the second reading.

Increasing the weight of subsidiary means endorsed by states may contribute to the formation of an echo chamber around subsidiary means, in particular teachings, that favours the theory of sources based on state consent. States seeking to maintain control over law-making are more likely to support such scholarship, which may in turn incentivize scholars to align their work with state preferences. On the one hand, this shift could secure reception by states of the Commission’s work on the theory of sources. On the other, if the methodology diverges from practice too far it could be received by practitioners not as a restatement of practices to be followed, but as a less persuasive progressive development.

The Commission’s ability to reshape the theory of sources

In its current work on the theory of sources, the ILC faces a dilemma: should it prioritize aligning its methodologies with state consent, or focus on proximity to actual legal practice and the utility of its product? The former aims at the positive reception of the work by states, while the latter strives for the actual use of the Commission’s work by practitioners. The Commission’s output is not a mere codification; it can reshape international law by emphasizing certain past practices as exemplary and discouraging others [Werner]. In this respect, choosing to adopt conclusions rather than guidelines reflects the Commission’s intent to produce an authoritative restatement of law.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of this effort depends on how the Commission balances the state consent dilemma in its commentaries. There is no one way to conduct this balancing exercise, while completely different approaches to the issue are possible. One may even argue that any outcome inherently reflects the consent of states, which entrusted the Commission to codify and progressively develop international law including the theory of sources. In any event, the Commission’s further work on general principles and subsidiary means will crystallize the mainstream theory of sources as it hits the bottom of Article 38.

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