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The Turkish Operation in Afrin (Syria) and the Silence of the Lambs

Published on January 30, 2018        Author: 
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Operation Olive Branch

On 20th January 2018, the Turkish military started to attack the Kurdish-populated region of Afrin in Syria (“Operation Olive Branch“). With its letter to the Security Council of 22nd January 2018, Turkey justified this action as self-defence in terms of Art. 51 UN Charter. The relevant passage of the letter is: “[T]he threat of terrorism from Syria targeting our borders has not ended. The recent increase in rocket attacks and harassment fire directed at Hatay and Kilis provinces of Turkey from the Afrin region of Syria, which is under the control of the PKK/KCK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization, has resulted in the deaths of many civilians and soldiers and has left many more wounded.” (UN Doc. S/2018/53; emphasis added). Two elements are troublesome in this official Turkish justification.

Non-state armed attacks?

First, it is controversial whether armed attacks of the YPG, a non-state actor, suffice to trigger self-defence in terms of Article 51 UN Charter and underlying customary law. The current law (both Charter-based and treaty-based) is in flux, and still seems to demand some attribution to the state from which the attacks originate. (See for a collection of diverse scholarly opinion, ranging from “restrictivists” to “expansionists”: Anne Peters, Christian Marxsen (eds), “Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Impulses from the Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War”, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 77 (2017), 1-93; SSRN-version in Max Planck Research Papers 2017-17).

The ICJ case-law has not fully settled the question (see for state-centred statements: ICJ, Oil platforms 2003, paras. 51 and 61; ICJ Wall opinion 2004, para. 139). Read the rest of this entry…

 

Announcements: Conference on Margin of Appreciation at Court; Lecturer in International Law; CfP Palestine Yearbook of International Law; CfS International Law for the Sustainable Development Goals; Director/Senior Legal Expert IHLRC; CfP Identity on the International Bench Series; CfP Colloquium on International Investment Law & Competition Law

Published on January 28, 2018        Author: 
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1. Conference on Margin of Appreciation at Court. The conference, entitled ‘European Human Rights Culture – What Role for the Margin of Appreciation‘, asks a simple question – what is the role of the Margin of Appreciation doctrine in contemporary Europe? By linking the interpretation of the doctrine to a broader conception of human rights, understood as complex political and moral norms, leading experts in the field will explore to what extent the tension between human rights and politics, embodied in the doctrine, might be understood as a mutually reinforcing interplay of variables rather than an entrenched separation. More information here

2. Lecturer in International Law. The University of Glasgow, School of Law, is looking to appoint a Full Time Lecturer in International Law. Closing date for applications is the 26th February 2018. More information here.

3. Palestine Yearbook of International Law Call for Papers. The Palestine Yearbook of International Law is now inviting submissions of scholarly articles for publication for its next volume, XXI (2018). This is a general call for papers. As such, the editors encourage the submission of scholarly pieces of relevance to public international law, including but not necessarily in relation to Palestine. The Yearbook is published in the English language, is edited at Birzeit University’s Institute of Law (Birzeit, Palestine), and published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (The Hague, The Netherlands). The Yearbook is now accepting abstracts for review. Abstracts should include a working title, with a preliminary outline of the author’s research and arguments, along with a current CV. For more information, see here. Prospective authors should express interest by e-mailing an abstract (of under 750 words) of the suggested paper as indicated above, along with a CV by 15 March 2018  All submissions should be made to Reem Al-Botmeh: rbotmeh@ Birzeit.edu and iol.pyil {at} birzeit(.)edu; Ardi Imseis: ai295 {at} cam.ac(.)uk; and, Ata Hindi: ahindi {at} birzeit(.)edu. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Activation of the Crime of Aggression in Perspective

Published on January 26, 2018        Author: 
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In its final hours soon after midnight of 14 December 2017, the 16th Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court decided to activate the Court‘s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This is the effect of operational paragraph 1 of resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5. But in the same breath, the Assembly in operative paragraph 2 confirmed “that in the case of a State referral or propio motu investigation the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments.”

As is well known, whether or not the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over a crime of aggression committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute that has not ratified the crime of aggression amendments was subject to intense controversy and negotiations in the run-up to the activation decision. In fact, the Assembly recognized this in preambular paragraph 4 of the resolution, where it made approving reference to the report of the facilitation process led by the Austrian delegation summarizing the diverging legal views held by States Parties on this issue. (In the following, I assume some familiarity with the controversy between what could be called the adherents of the “restrictive” and “extensive” positions. For more explanations see the posts prior to the activation decision by Dapo Akande, Stefan Barriga and Astrid Reisinger Coracini).

So how did the Assembly arrive at operative paragraph 2? What is the Court to make of a resolution that, on the one hand, confirms one legal view while, on the other hand, notes with appreciation the summary of the diverging views of States Parties, and finally, in operative paragraph 3, reaffirms the independence of the judges of the Court? Dapo Akande, Kevin Jon Heller and Jennifer Trahan have already commented on this outcome. The following is an account from the viewpoint of the Swiss delegation witnessing and engaging in the negotiations. Read the rest of this entry…

 

Ecuador Seeks to Confer Diplomatic Status on Julian Assange: Does this Oblige the UK to Allow Him to Leave the Embassy & Is the Matter Headed to the ICJ?

Published on January 25, 2018        Author: 
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There is a recent twist in the Julian Assange saga leading to new claims that the UK has the legal obligation to allow Assange to leave the Ecuadorian embassy in London without arresting him. In December, Ecuador granted Assange its nationality following which it then purported, this January, to appoint Julian Assange as one of its diplomats to the UK (see here). Apparently, the UK rejected that appointment. It has now been reported by Reuters that a legal team is working on filing a case at the International Court of Justice in order to have Assange’s Ecuadorean diplomatic status affirmed under international law. The strategy being pursued by Ecuador is a very interesting one raising tricky questions of diplomatic law. Undoubtedly, Ecuador was aware that the UK would seek to deny diplomatic status to Assange. However, Ecuador argues that what has happened is that while it has appointed Assange as a diplomat, what the UK has done is to declare him persona non grata, and that having done that, the UK now has an obligation to allow Assange to leave the UK within a reasonable period of time, whilst enjoying diplomatic immunities within that period of time.

There are a number of issues that arise as a result of these developments. First, is the issue of whether Ecuador has a unilateral right to appoint Assange as a member of its diplomatic staff, or whether instead, the approval of the UK was required for the conferral of diplomatic status on Assange. Second, assuming that Ecuador is right, and that as a matter of international law Assange did at some point in time have diplomatic status because of a unilateral right of appointment of Ecuador, does the rejection of his status by the UK impose an obligation on the UK to allow him to leave the embassy, and indeed leave the UK, with the immunities that a diplomat would ordinarily be entitled to. Third, is there a basis for the ICJ to hear and determine the matter between those two states?

Let me start with the question of ICJ jurisdiction. Read the rest of this entry…

 

Public Opinion Survey in Serbia Sheds Light on ICTY Legacy

Published on January 22, 2018        Author: 
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In anticipation of the closing of the ICTY, there has been plenty of discussion, including at EJIL: Talk! (see here), on the court’s impact in the former Yugoslavia, particularly relating to the public’s acceptance of ICTY findings and reconciliation. I’d like to contribute to this discussion with findings from the most recent public opinion survey conducted in Serbia – published in December 2017 (“Awareness of citizens of Serbia about the wars of the ‘90s, war crimes and war crimes trials” designed by the Humanitarian Law Center, commissioned by the Serbian daily Danas and conducted by Demostat – available only in Serbian here).

The latest survey mostly confirms what we already know from those previously conducted – revisionism and denialism are prevalent, and ethnic bias is entrenched – but it also provides additional information about these phenomena.

Revisionism and denialism

The latest survey confirms that there is overwhelming public distrust in the ICTY and its findings. For example, 56% of the respondents find the ICTY to be partial and biased, while only 6% believe the opposite. Almost half of the respondents consider that the ICTY didn’t contribute in any way to establishing the truth about the wars (p. 17). In line with the findings from earlier surveys, only 12% believe that what happened in Srebrenica is as established in ICTY judgments, while the ignorance pertaining to other ICTY-adjudicated crimes is even greater (e.g. regarding Ovčara 64% don’t know what happened, for the siege of Sarajevo it is 71%, for mass graves in Serbia 83%).

Serbia, through its highest officials, has a long record of refusing to accept findings made by the ICTY, particularly relating to the Srebrenica genocide. In 2015, upon Serbia’s request, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution intending to mark the 20th anniversary of the genocide. Most recently, the Serbian Parliament amended its Criminal Code, supposedly in order to align it with the EU acquis, and criminalized the public denial of genocide but – and here’s the twist – did so only if the crime has been established by Serbian courts or the ICC. The amendment does not include the ICTY or ICJ – the only two courts which have adjudicated on the Srebrenica genocide. Read the rest of this entry…

 
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Announcements: UN Audiovisual Library of International Law; CfA UN Regional Course in International Law for Latin America and the Caribbean; Summer Academy on the Continental Shelf; V Biennial Conference of the LASIL-SLADI; Goettingen Journal of International Law New Issue; CfP PluriCourts – Responding to Legitimacy Challenges

Published on January 21, 2018        Author: 
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1. New Additions to the UN Audiovisual Library of International Law. The Codification Division of the UN Office of Legal Affairs has added new lectures to the UN Audiovisual Library of International Law website, which provides high quality international law training and research materials to users around the world free of charge. The latest lectures were given by Professor Claus Kress on “The Crime of Aggression under International Law” and Professor José E. Alvarez on “The Human Right of Property”.

2. Call for Applications: 2018 United Nations Regional Course in International Law for Latin America and the Caribbean. The 2018 United Nations Regional Course in International Law for Latin America and the Caribbean is organized by the Codification Division of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs in cooperation with the Government of Chile and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The Regional Course will be held in Santiago, Chile, from 23 April to 18 May 2018, and will be conducted in English. The Office of Legal Affairs is still accepting applications (deadline is 22 January 2018). For more information, visit here.   

3. Summer Academy on the Continental Shelf. The Summer Academy on the Continental Shelf (SACS) will be held from 21 to 28 April 2018 under the auspices of the University of the Faroe Islands and the African Institute of International Law, and sponsored by the Korean Maritime Institute. SACS 2018 will be held in Arusha, Tanzania. The purpose of SACS is to disseminate scientific and legal knowledge relating to the regime of the continental shelf, in particular the area beyond 200 nautical miles. SACS will be limited to 32 attendees with particular interest for scientific and legal aspects relating to the continental shelf. SACS will be tutored by judges of international courts and tribunals, members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and international practitioners with lengthy experiences in continental shelf matters. Any query relating to SACS can be addressed to sacs {at} setur(.)fo. The deadline for submitting an application for admission is 1 February 2018. For more information see here.   Read the rest of this entry…

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EJIL Debate. Thirlway’s Rejoinder

Published on January 19, 2018        Author: 
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I am grateful to Professor d’Aspremont for his interesting and courteous response to my somewhat critical piece. I think we agree . . . that there is plenty on which we agree to differ! However, may I mention a few points?

A minor linguistic matter: the terms ‘the logic of sources’ and ‘the logic of interpretation’ seem to me unfortunate. I trust that Prof. d’Aspremont will agree that the rules of logic, or if you like of logical argument, are surely identical whatever the subject under discussion. The postulates and the facts are unique to the context and the problem examined, but to arrive at an intellectually correct result, the reasoning processes must follow the universal rules of logic; the expressions quoted seem to undermine this universality.

Prof. d’Aspremont does not find my use of the concept of opposability helpful. Maybe my point will be clearer if expressed in this way: in the relevant part of the ICJ Whaling judgment, the Court was, in his view engaged in a process of interpretation, but applied to it the intellectual approach appropriate to a problem of sources.  But was it a process of interpretation? Before the Court could enquire into what exactly were the obligations of Japan under the Whaling Convention as interpreted by the challenged resolution – a matter of interpretation – it had to decide whether the resolution was relevant at all – a question of sources (consent to a treaty-instrument). If the resolution was relevant, its effect on the reading of the Convention would be a matter of interpretation; but that stage was never reached.

Prof. d’Aspremont denies that he is ‘thinking from the Bench’; but surely whenever a scholar criticises a judicial decision, he is in effect saying ‘This is what the Court ought to have said: this is what my dissenting opinion would have said had I been among the judges?’ And to my mind this is so whether the critic is saying ‘The Court was wrong on its own premises’, or contending that ‘The matter should have been approached in a different way, viz. .  . .’

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Hybrid Threats and the United States National Security Strategy: Prevailing in an “Arena of Continuous Competition”

Published on January 19, 2018        Author:  and
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The dividing line between war and peace is blurred. This is one of the messages emerging from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America adopted in December 2017. The United States is accustomed to viewing the world through the binary lens of war and peace, yet in reality, warns the new National Security Strategy, international relations is an “arena of continuous competition” (p. 28).

This is not exactly a new theme. The idea that war and peace are relative points on a continuous spectrum of confrontation, rather than mutually exclusive conditions, has become quite popular in recent years. Writing in 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, observed that the 21st century has seen a tendency “toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace”. Speaking in 2015, Sir Michael Fallon, the former British Secretary of State for Defence, declared that contemporary adversaries are deliberately seeking to “blur the lines between what is, and what is not, considered an act of war”. More recently, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, suggested that in the past “it was easy to distinguish whether it was peace or war … [b]ut now there’s a much more blurred line”.

The fluidity of war and peace is central to the vocabulary of “gray zone conflict” and “hybrid warfare”. Both concepts are preoccupied with the strategic challenges that adversaries operating across multiple domains present. The notion of gray zone conflict puts the emphasis on the sphere of confrontation, concentrating on the fact that adversaries operate in the area of ambiguity that lies between the traditional state of war and state of peace (see US SOCOM, The Gray Zone). By contrast, the notion of hybrid warfare emphasises the modus operandi adopted by certain adversaries and competitors, focusing on their use of the full range of military and non-military means in a highly integrated manner (see NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, para. 13). Read the rest of this entry…

 
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EJIL Debate. The Whaling case and the Duty to Cooperate: Responding to Professors Thirlway and d’Aspremont

Published on January 17, 2018        Author: 
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I am puzzled by the very terms of the debate between Professors Thirlway and d’Aspremont for several reasons. First, there is a considerable ambiguity in both Japan’s argument and the Court’s position as to the legal effects yielded by the IWC resolutions. Hence, it is inevitable to have a variation of interpretations. Second, I believe that the determination of the implications of the judgment should not be made dependent on an “objectivised” subjective intention of the Parties or the Court — a task which is no work for legal scholars anyway.

Yet, my main source of puzzlement lies elsewhere. While the focus of Thirlway and d’Aspremont’s debate is on the Court’s position on Article 31 of the VCLT with regards to Japan’s non-assertion to the resolution, I submit that the most ground-breaking part of the judgment is that the Court brought back the legal effect of the resolutions from the backdoor, that is via the concept of ‘the duty to cooperate’. In this post, I would like to draw the attention of the readers to the unique characteristic of the duty to cooperate referred to in the Whaling case, and the possible necessity for a new conceptual framework. In particular, I argue, neither the logic of sources nor the logic of interpretation can sufficiently explain what the Court did with the duty of to cooperate. Read the rest of this entry…