What if we took the justice of international law seriously? This is the gamble that Ratner makes in his new and exciting book, which proposes a theory not of international justice per se nor of the nature of international law, but of the nature of the justice that is in international law. I should say from the outset that I think this is a worthwhile pursuit and that Ratner’s book can serve as a useful bridge between international lawyers and global justice theorists. Whilst the former traditionally profess to not be particularly interested in questions of justice, they have always flirted with the notion that international law is somehow just; and whilst justice theorists have long proceeded happily to devise theories that are oblivious to international law as it is, one cannot say that the result has always been felicitous. At any rate, this is a conversation worth having and it is interesting to have that particular book written by an international lawyer who is open to normative theory rather than the other way round, at least for the purposes of engaging the international legal discipline.
Ratner is nothing if not methodical, moving with great circumspection alongside what is in the end quite a narrow path. The book is rigorous, honest and searching, even as its author ultimately does not shun from taking positions. Its breadth of knowledge and intuition is stupendous, and it is constantly challenging analytically. One of the most deserving aspects of the book is the way in which the theory is deployed systematically to test the ethical character of existing norms. In the end, some rules are judged more ethical than is commonly assumed, and others insufficiently so. Ratner does not shy from the conclusions to which his theory leads him, and is forthcoming about what the theory cannot be expected to achieve.