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Competing Views on Libya’s Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC

Published on May 16, 2012        Author: 

Over at Opinio Juris, Kevin Jon Heller notes that the debate which he, Jens David Ohlin and I have had regarding whether Libya can postpone it’s obligation to surrender Saif Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court is now being waged by organs of the ICC. As Kevin notes:

Two organs of the Court have now weighed in on the issue, with a rather ironic inversion: the Office of the Prosecutor takes the position that Libya is under no obligation to surrender Saif, while the Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence, which is representing Saif, argues that it does have such an obligation.

The motions are a study in contrasts.  The OTP’s motion is a mere six pages, noting that Article 95 refers to postponements of requests under Part IX of the Rome Statute, a part that applies to both requests for surrender and other forms of cooperation, and analogizing Article 95 to Article 89(2), which allows surrender to be postponed when a suspect brings a ne bis in idem challenge in a national court.  It’s a very underwhelming motion, and I don’t say that simply because I disagree with it.  Had the OTP relied much more heavily on Dapo and Jens’s arguments, the motion would have been much stronger.

Kevin goes on to note that the OPCD motion makes arguments similar to his arguments in his Opinio Juris points on the issue and indeed cites his posts. In addition to the filings by these two organs of the ICC, there is a third motion on this question, which was recently filed before the ICC. This is the request by the National Transitional Council of Libya for the ICC to postpone or suspend the obligation to surrender Saif Gaddafi. Libya’s previous requests for postponement of the surrender obligation were rejected by the ICC (see my earlier post). Those requests were made at a time when Libya had not contested the admissibility of the ICC proceedings. However, Libya has now challenged the admissibility of the proceedings against Saif Gaddafi. Libya asserts that the case against Saif and Al Sanussi are inadmissible because Libya’s “national judicial system is actively investigating Mr Gaddafi and Mr Al-Senussi for their alleged criminal responsibility for multiple acts  . . .  amounting to crimes against humanity.” Libya’s admissibility challenge changes the picture significantly as it is now entitled to rely on Article 95 of the ICC statute which explicitly applies where admissibility has been challenged.

The question that arises is whether Article 95, which permits postponement of a State’s obligation to cooperate with the ICC extends to the obligation of surrender. Libya (and the OTP) argue that Art. 95 does. Libya argues that interpreting Article 95 as permitting postponement of the obligation of surrender upholds the principle of complementarity. This is a point that I made in my previous EJIL:Talk! post and which I develop more fully in my recent article on this issue published earlier this month in the Journal of International Criminal Justice. Indeed, Libya cites and rely on both my post and on my article. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Verdict in the Charles Taylor Case and the Alternate Judge’s “Dissenting Opinion”

Published on May 11, 2012        Author: 

Charles Jalloh is Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; formerly the Legal Advisor to the Office of the Principal Defender, Special Court for Sierra Leone and duty counsel to former Liberian President Charles Taylor. He blogs at International Criminal Law in Ferment and we are grateful to him for accepting our invitation to contribute this piece to EJIL:Talk!

1.      Introduction

On 26 April 2012, Trial Chamber II of the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) sitting in The Hague, comprised of Judges Richard Lussick, presiding; Julia Sebutinde, and Teresa Doherty, gave their long awaited verdict in the case involving former Liberian President Charles Taylor.

As has been widely reported since, the judges unanimously found Taylor guilty of five counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of war crimes and one count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels acting in concert with the mutinying elements of the Sierra Leone Army known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in the period between 30 November 1996 and 18 January 2002.

Taylor was convicted as a secondary perpetrator, i.e. as a planner and aider and abettor, of murder, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, other inhumane acts, acts of terrorism, pillage, outrages upon personal dignity, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder and cruel treatment, and conscripting or enlisting children under 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.

Although the Chamber has not yet issued its authoritative trial judgment setting out the full reasoning behind its conclusions, the judges made some significant factual and legal findings in the 44-page “summary” that Presiding Judge Lussick read out in open court for about two hours. Having convicted Taylor, they fixed 16 May 2012 for an oral sentencing hearing with each of the parties allocated one hour to address the Chamber. Taylor was offered up to half an hour to make a statement, should he so wish. The sentencing judgment will follow two weeks later (on 30 May 2012).

Taylor is the first former President to have been indicted, fully tried and now convicted in an international criminal tribunal since the immediate post-World War II trial of German Admiral Karl Doenitz at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Not surprisingly, many thoughtful legal commentators have already weighed in on key issues raised by the verdict. These include the Chamber’s findings on Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and Gender Crimes (see, for example, Bill Schabas, Diane Marie Amman, Jens Ohlin, Valerie Oosterveld, Kelly Askin).

 2.     An Omission and a Problem

Briefly mentioned by Kirsty Sutherland, Kevin Heller and Bill Schabas, but not as well discussed (with the exception of Jennifer Easterday and Sara Kendall), was the weighty decision of the alternate (fourth) judge in the Taylor Trial, El Hadji Malick Sow, to enter a “dissenting opinion” to Trial Chamber II’s unanimous judgment.

In this post, I examine Alternate Judge Sow’s views on the verdict. I argue that, while his statement gives cause for concern, and ultimately reflects the tension throughout the trial between him and the other three judges, expressing public views on the verdict was unfortunate because the effect might be to impugn the credibility and legitimacy of an otherwise fair trial that met the due process standards of the SCSL Statute and international human rights law. Read the rest of this entry…

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Surface to Air Missiles to be Deployed at the Olympics: One More Step to Dystopia?

Published on May 11, 2012        Author: 

It was recently announced that the security measures for this year’s London Olympics will include the deployment of surface to air missiles in the vicinity of the various Olympic venues. Oddly, there has been very little discussion of the implications that these security measures might have for civil liberties or human rights. Unlike the games themselves, these legal issues are important in the wider scheme of things.

Call me cynical, or at least bitter and twisted, if you like.   I simply have never seen the point of the Olympic Games, unless one sees it as a continuation of politics through sport (which we now have to assume includes synchronised swimming, (see this YouTube clip), or as a nice little revenue stream for construction companies, fund-raisers, and those successful in their chosen sport, or as a laboratory for the development of new undetectable drugs.  With few exceptions, for instance Bannister’s achievement in breaking the four-minute mile, who remembers a world-record-breaking performance once it has itself been broken?  This is an investment in ephemera, and the substitution of chauvinistic public emotion for reason and decorum.

So I, for one, am dreading the descent of the Olympics on London later this summer.  I shall not be waving flags or cheering the athletes on, and that is not simply because there is no Scottish team.  It is bad enough that I cannot look out my office window without seeing the “count-down to the games” revolving around the top of what used to be called the Post Office Tower.  It is a constant reminder of dread.  A dread which has been increased by the press reports of the enhanced security measures currently being proposed—in particular, the deployment of surface–to–air missiles which some reports claim can down a 747 (see here and here).

Perky army types in uniform have stressed that any decision to use missiles against a threat from the air will be taken not by them on the ground, but rather at the highest levels of government.  Security analysts are, of course, claiming that the aim of these draconian measures is to reassure the public and deter potential air attacks.

Oh really?  Even if we assume that the current crop of senior UK politicians might be able to make a sensible decision under extreme pressure, I am not at all reassured by the thought that they might entertain the possibility of shooting down planes over central London.  And all the publicity that has been given to these extreme security measures might simply give rise to the new unofficial Olympic sport of outwitting security in a spectacular manner.  And it too will be televised.  Rather than being a deterrent, this might be seen as a challenge—and if an aerial threat were to be posed by, say, a drone, or those intent on a suicide attack, how could these measures deter in the first place?  Leaving unmanned aircraft to one side, the question that I have not yet seen discussed is the threat that these measures pose to civil liberties and human rights.  Are these, once again, to be swept aside without comment by alleged considerations of “security”?  Is this, once again, politicians goading the public into mute acceptance and aquiescent complicity by ratcheting up a climate of fear?  Is this just one more step to dystopia?

I must admit that I am surprised that lawyers have been silent because we have been here before.  Read the rest of this entry…

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Goettingen Journal of International Law Essay Competition: “The Interplay of International and National Law”

Published on May 10, 2012        Author: 

The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL) has just announced the topic for its an annual International Law Essay Competition. This year’s topic is “The Interplay of International and National Law”. GoJIL is the first student-run journal in the field of International Law in Germany. Published, since 1999, the journal aims to foster debate among scholars of diverse fields in International Law and related disciplines. The backbone of GoJIL is formed by the Editorial Board, a group of enthusiastic students and scholars from various academic disciplines. The stated aim of the journal  is “to give young scholars the chance to gain practical experience and  make their own professional scientific publication with GoJIL.”

The call for papers for this year’s essay competition reads as follows:

In our current global political and legal system, international law does not only influence national law, but also depends on it. Can national law set borders for the content of international treaties or does it become more flexible as treaties force interaction with other judicial systems? Can it be used to settle conflicts between national powers? How are treaties, both bi-lateral and multi-lateral, implemented on the domestic level? What is the impact of UN Security Council Resolutions or Human Rights agreements on States’ law and politics? These are just a few of the numerous questions you could raise and address in your essay.

The deadline for your submission is 15 August 2012. The maxim word count is 3 000 words (without footnotes).

If you would like to write an article or are already working on the subject, send in your essay! The best article will be published in the Goettingen Journal of International Law – GoJIL Vol 4 No 3. If you have any questions, please write to info {at} gojil(.)eu or visit the journal’s website

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Journals
 
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The Passions of International Law

Published on May 10, 2012        Author: 

A symposium convened by Gerry Simpson at Melbourne Law School in September. The flyer is available here.

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Filed under: Conference, EJIL Analysis
 
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Review of Expert Determinations of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association by Domestic Courts

Published on May 2, 2012        Author: 

A central policy concern since the onset of the Greek debt crisis in 2010 has been whether sovereign debt restructurings trigger credit default swaps (CDS). CDS are insurance-like financial products whereby a protection seller agrees to pay the protection buyer in case of a credit event on a reference entity (in this case Greece) in return for a premium over a defined period of time. The legal framework for CDS transactions is largely standardized. More than 90 percent of CDS transactions are based on the ISDA Master Agreement. As a mechanism for creditors to hedge against the default of a debtor, CDS are financial instruments to redistribute risk (or, according to their defenders, to shift risk onto those entities willing and capable of better bearing such risks). Over the last two decades, CDS on sovereign debtors became increasingly common.

Greece’s debt restructuring in February/March 2012 was the first to be implemented under the umbrella of a large number of CDS (more than 2.5 billion Euros in net terms).  During the implementation phase of the Greek restructuring in March 2012, several interested market participants raised the question whether the Greek restructuring triggered an obligation for the sellers of CDS on Greece to pay. The Determinations Committee (DC) of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for Europe, Middle East and Africa, the body established by ISDA and given decision-making power under the ISDA documentation to rule on credit events,  found that a restructuring credit event was triggered on March  9 2012.  The parties to CDS have agreed by contract that a credit event occurs only if the competent DC has said so.

As the Greek restructuring in February/March 2012 demonstrated, the consequences of such expert determinations by DCs can be momentous in financial terms not only for the parties to CDS transactions themselves, but also for the broader public and for taxpayers. A case in point is the Austrian bank KA Finanz, the bad bank split off from Kommunalkredit, the comparatively small Austrian lender to municipalities previously owned by Dexia that the Austrian government nationalized at the height of the global financial crisis. KA Finanz had taken over about 500 million Euros of CDS on Greece from Kommunalkredit. As a result of the payouts following the March 9 decision, the Austrian government had to inject another 1 billion Euros into the bank in order to stave off its collapse.

DCs recruit their members from among financial institutions and investment managers, which will often have positions on either side of CDS transactions. In view of their composition and the considerable practical importance of their decisions, concern has arisen that DC members may be tempted to “vote their own book” – i.e. to reach credit determinations in part based on whether the firm is on the buying or selling side of CDS for a particular reference entity.  For instance, two members of the Steering Committee of the Institute of International Finance  which negotiated the restructuring of Greek debt on behalf of private creditors of Greece, are voting members of the DC for Europe (BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank). They were net sellers of CDS protection on Greece, meaning that both institutions had to pay out to protection buyers when the credit event occured. Given these concerns about independence of DCs and the right to a fair trial in civil matters under Article 6 of the European Convention, it is an open question whether competent domestic courts could in effect review decisions and potentially overturn decisions of DCs. Read the rest of this entry…

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Extraterritorial Civil Jurisdiction: Obstacles and Openings in Canada

Published on May 1, 2012        Author: 

Bruce Broomhall is a Professor at the Department of Law of the University of Quebec at Montreal, teaching mainly international and Canadian criminal law. He thanks François Larocque, Mark Arnold and others for their input.

On 18 April 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a trio of decisions promising to have an important impact on how Canadian law responds to attempts at civil recovery for international law violations occurring abroad, or partly abroad.

The cases are based on issues of classic private international law, not human rights or public international law. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda dealt jointly with two cases (of plaintiffs Van Breda and Charron) asking whether an Ontario court had and should exercise jurisdiction over civil claims arising from Cuban sun vacations in which severe personal injury (Van Breda), death (Charron) and related damages were claimed. The importance of Van Breda lies in the test that the Supreme Court lays out for determining the existence of jurisdiction in a case with trans-boundary elements. The accompanying Éditions Écosociété Inc. v. Banro and Breedan v. Black are actions in defamation that examine primarily (and Van Breda also examines) the issue whether jurisdiction, once recognized, should in fact be exercised, or whether it should instead be declined on grounds of forum non conveniens. This posting looks at the former question.

Van Breda presents an assessment of the ‘real and substantial connection’ required for the exercise of civil jurisdiction under the exclusive competence over “Property and Civil Rights” that Canada’s Constitution Act 1867 (at s.92(13)) accords to the Provinces and their courts. As the Court points out, this test has been the source of confusion to litigants and judges alike. It is both a principle of constitutional law used to prevent ‘jurisdictional overreach’ by any given province (a question left aside in Van Breda), as well as a principle of private international law, typically for purposes of international jurisdictional coordination (the focus of the decision) (paras. 22ff.). [One might add that it is also the concept set out in the seminal Libman case for determining the scope of territorial jurisdiction for criminal law purposes.] The Court’s aim in reformulating the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in the instant case was to encourage predictability in jurisdictional determinations based on the test and so to restrict case-by-case variability. The Court identifies four connecting factors that raise a rebuttable presumption that a court has jurisdiction over a given case: that the defendant is (1) domiciled or resident in or (2) carries on business in the forum province, or (3) the tort was committed or (4) a contract connected with the dispute was made there (para. 90). The Court allows (at para. 91ff.) for courts to develop additional connecting factors in accordance with strict criteria. Nonetheless, where no listed or new presumptive connecting factors are present, “a court should not assume jurisdiction on the basis of the combined effect of a number of non-presumptive connecting factors” (para. 93).

  Read the rest of this entry…

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Judge Al-Khasawneh Resigns, Again

Published on April 27, 2012        Author: 

This time resigning as Prime Minister of Jordan, according to the Washington Post. Readers will recall our earlier reports here and here on Judge Al-Khasawneh’s (belated) resignation from the ICJ in order to take up the post of prime minister, in which he’s been only some six months. He thus unfortunately won’t be able to return from Jordan to the Peace Palace. Coincidentally, in some act of cosmic irony, the General Assembly and the Security Council are voting today in elections for Judge Al-Khasawneh’s replacement on the Court – What’s in Blue report here. Only two candidates are in the running:

The two nominees for the single position are Dalveer Bhandari (India) and Florentino P. Feliciano (Philippines). (In an 18 April note verbale, Lebanon announced that its candidate, Ghaleb Ghanem, had withdrawn from the race.) Bhandari (64), currently serves as a senior judge in the Supreme Court of India. Feliciano (84), served on the Supreme Court of the Philippines and is now a Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (one of the potential arbitrators appointed by member states). (Both candidates’ curricula vitae are included in a note by the Secretary-General of 11 April – S/2012/213.)

UPDATE: Dalveer Bhandari was elected to the ICJ today by the GA and the UNSC – ICJ press release here.

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Kiobel: Universal Civil Jurisdiction under international Law

Published on April 26, 2012        Author: 

 Barrie Sander has law degrees from Cambridge and Leiden, and from September 2012 will be a PhD candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

In an earlier post, I considered the question of corporate liability under international law in light of the case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum (“Kiobel”), which is currently before the US Supreme Court.  Kiobel, a case brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), concerns claims that various Shell entities (“the respondents”) planned, conspired and facilitated extrajudicial executions, torture and crimes against humanity by Nigeria in the Niger Delta between 1992 and 1995.

It had been thought that the question of whether corporations may be sued under the ATS would be the central issue before the Supreme Court in Kiobel. However, during oral argument the Justices became preoccupied with the wider issue of the extraterritorial nature of the ATS. In particular, they focussed on the question  whether US federal courts may rely on the ATS to exercise jurisdiction over human rights abuses which have no connection to the US, i.e. abuses committed by non-US entities against non-US victims on non-US territory.  In short, is universal civil jurisdiction permissible under the ATS?  Such was the focus of the Justices on the extraterritorial reach of the ATS that on 5 March 2012, only one week after hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court ordered briefing and re-argument on:

“[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”

Prior to this order, almost all briefing on this issue had been submitted by the respondents and their supporters, who have argued that broad assertions of universal civil jurisdiction by US federal courts may violate international law. In this post I consider some of the counter-arguments that the petitioners and their supporters may seek to raise in response. I suggest that though reliance on the Lotus principle, which would require a rule prohibiting an exercise of jurisdiction (rather than one permitting jurisdiction) may initially seem attractive, that approach is likely to fail. The strongest point that may be put in support of universal civil jurisdiction is that the existence of universal criminal jurisdiction contemplates a degree of civil jurisdiction as well. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Application of Universal Jurisdiction in South African Law

Published on April 24, 2012        Author: 

Christopher Gevers is a Lecturer in the School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He is author of the War and Law Blog.

One of the contentious issues that arises in debates about universal jurisdiction is whether international law allows for what has been called “universal jurisdiction in absentia”. The question is whether a State may initiate criminal proceedings, for international crimes, against persons who are not present within the territory of the prosecuting State? Usually, the initiation of the proceedings is followed by the issuance of an international arrest warrant or a request for extradition. In 2002, the judges of the International Court of Justice split on the question of universal jurisdiction in absentia in the Arrest Warrant Case. [See Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735]. In March, precisely ten years after the Arrest Warrant case, a South African Court heard a landmark case on the domestic prosecution of international crimes which raises the issue of whether domestic proceedings may be initiated under the principle of universal jurisdiction with regard to persons outside South Africa. The case was brought to court by the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) following unsuccessful attempts to persuade the South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to investigate and prosecute, in South Africa, 17 Zimbabwean suspects for torture as a crime against humanity. The torture was allegedly committed in connection with a raid on opposition headquarters in Zimbabwe in March 2007.

Background

In June 2009, over a year after receiving a complaint from the SALC, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) decided not to investigate the matter. The reasons given for the decision, included issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, ostensible problems in obtaining further evidence from Zimbabwe, concerns over whether South Africa’s authorities had jurisdiction in respect of the investigation, and the fear of undermining Zimbabwe’s sovereingty.

In December 2009, SALC launched a legal challenge asking the Court to set aside the decision not to open an investigation and to order that the matter be remitted to the authorities for them to reconsider the decision. Read the rest of this entry…

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