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Our terrorists, your terrorists? The United Nations Security Council urges states to combat “foreign terrorist fighters”, but does not define “terrorism”

Published on October 2, 2014        Author: 

The aim of Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council, which was passed unanimously on 24 September, is laudable in principle: to combat the growing jihadi “terror tourism”, coming from France, Germany, the UK and other Western states, in a comprehensive manner, not just through criminal and police laws. In its preamble, the eight-page Resolution explicitly recognises that international terrorism cannot be defeated through military and other repressive measures alone. However, it does not define terrorism, its key object of reference, instead speaking vaguely of “terrorism in all forms and manifestations”. Its operative paragraphs (paras. 2 ff.) refer to “terrorists”, “terrorist groups”, “individuals” and “person[s]” travelling abroad to fulfil a terrorist “purpose”, making no distinction between them. This terrorist purpose supposedly consists of the perpetration or preparation of terrorist acts, or the participation in terrorist acts or terrorist training. UN member states must prosecute the persons in question. Furthermore, they must make any financing of such journeys and assistance in carrying them out, including the recruitment of “terrorist” fighters, subject to criminal sanctions and prosecution. Finally, the listing of the persons in question – famously called a ‘civil death penalty’ by Dick Marty, the former chairman of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe – is also provided for (para. 7).

But how is all of this to work under the rule of law if the phenomenon to be combatted is not defined? The Resolution remains silent on this issue, referring only to fighters belonging to ISIL, ANF and other groups deriving from Al-Qaida (para. 10), without, of course, presenting this as a definitive list. One wonders why the Resolution did not adopt para. 3 of Security Council Resolution 1566. This paragraph defines terrorist acts as acts (1) committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, (2) with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which (3) constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. This is, in essence, the definition of international terrorism recognised by customary international law, which also forms the basis for a UN draft treaty of 2010 and is referred to in international jurisprudence, such as the famous jurisdictional decision (15 Feb. 2011) of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon, mainly authored by the late Antonio Casesse.

Unfortunately, Resolution 2178 ignores all of these definitions and thus ultimately leaves it up to each UN member state to apply the measures called for to those individuals defined as “terrorist” by that respective state itself. Read the rest of this entry…

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Filed under: Security Council, Terrorism
 

UN Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on Drones

Published on October 1, 2014        Author: 

Last week the United Nations Human Rights Council convened a panel to  discuss the use of armed drones (remotely piloted aircraft) in counter-terrorism and military operations in accordance with international law. The panel was convened as part of the Human Rights Council’s 27th regular session, which finished last week.  The session held last Monday took the form of an interactive dialogue between a panel of experts, members of the Human Rights Council (i.e States), as well as observers. I had the honour to be invited to moderate what turned out to be a very interesting panel discussion. The panellists were Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; Ben Emmerson QC, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism; Shahzad Akbar, Legal Director, Foundation for Fundamental Rights; Alex Conte, Director of International Law and Protection Programmes, International Commission of Jurists;  and Pardiss Kebriaei, Senior Attorney, Centre for Constitutional Rights. Flavia Pansieri, the UN’s Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights opened the discussion.

There was a really interesting exchange of views, not only amongst members of the panel but also between states and NGOs. Over 20 states spoke, including all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, as did the ICRC. There was discussion of the entire range of legal issues relating to targeted killings in counterterrorism and other operations. In particular, there was consideration of the applicable legal framework regulating the use of armed drones with much attention given to the applicability of international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL). In this context there was discussion of the substantive legal issues relating to the determination of the applicable legal framework – such as the classification of situations of violence (for the purpose of determining the applicability of IHL) and the extraterritorial application of the right to life. However, perhaps the most significant disagreement between states related to the question of institutional competence for discussing and monitoring compliance with the law. In a divide which appeared to mirror the range of views as to whether norms of human rights or IHL constitute part of, or the main applicable legal framework, some states (like the US, the UK and France) insisted that the Human Rights Council was not an appropriate forum for discussion of the use of armed drones whereas many other states, observers and panellists insisted that the Council was such a forum.

A significant part of the discussion also covered the applicable human rights  and IHL rules that apply to the use of drones. The panellists spoke about the right to life as it might apply to drones; the principles relating to targeting under IHL; and other potentially applicable human rights, such as the right to a remedy.  A key part of the discussion was about accountability with respect to the use of drones. All the panellists spoke about the obligations of states under IHL and human rights law to conduct investigations in cases where there was a credible allegation of violations, as well as the obligations relating to transparency with respect to drone operations. This issue was also raised by a number of states with some seeking examples of best practices that may be employed with respect to disclosure of data relating to drone operations.

A press release summarising the discussion is available here and a video of the entire panel discussion is available on UN Web TV. Christopher Rodgers of the Open Society Foundations has also written an excellent report of the session on Just Security. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights will submit a report on this discussion to the Human Rights Council’s 28th regular session which will take place early in 2015. At this point, the matter will return to the Council for further consideration.

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Social Capital and the Limits of Network Analysis

Published on September 29, 2014        Author: 

I want to start by thanking each of the commentators for their kind, forgiving and thought-provoking comments on my article, and by recognizing that the work of DaphaMichael and Tom set the foundations and served as the inspiration for this work. I will organize my responses into three different clusters:  methodology, extensions and other, more general comments.

Methodology

I will first address Tom’s comments on the record of appointment as a proxy for displayed preferences. Can we ignore the fact that an appointment does not necessarily indicate that the arbitrator was the appointer’s first choice? I like to think of this question as a job offer to a candidate who decides not to accept an offer. The truth may be that certain candidates are in high demand and that many companies are offering jobs to the same well-qualified candidates.  Hence it is possible that parties who nominate arbitrators and may be trying to enlarge the diversity of the pool of arbitrators in ICSID may be somewhat restricted by the broader market of arbitration professionals.  This is true especially where, as Michael points out (and as confirmed by arbitrators during my interviews), the compensation provided by ICSID is lower than that of other arbitration opportunities and venues.   This is a limitation of the assumptions that can be made from the ICSID appointments. We are left with only the record of appointments as a second-best proxy.

A second point raised by Tom as to why the mid-2000s witnessed the first appointments of today’s power-brokers is also relevant. We must take into consideration that these years saw a boom of investor-state cases and, hence, more appointments. It is also true that this is when we started seeing more awards discussed publically.  Although I did not report these statistics in this paper, measures that reflect the connectivity of the network start stabilizing and changing in less intense ways during this period.  Thus I’m not surprised that the network acquired self-organizing qualities during this time.  One plausible hypothesis for future exploration is how the development of transparency rules may have helped cement public knowledge of decisions and with that, some of the insights that come with understanding the decision-making philosophy of arbitrators.

On the methodology of determining the average compensation per arbitration of US$200,000, I admit that the number is not incredibly precise. However, it is the best approximation I could divine. I followed a complex, yet not foolproof strategy to arrive at what I consider a very rough average. First, I computed the amount in 2010 dollars from roughly 70 awards that provided information on compensation in my sample of ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility awards. I divided this amount by the months of duration of each case and averaged the result. Using the dollars per month estimate, I calculated the possible amount paid to an arbitrator on settled or dismissed cases based on an average duration of the case. I confirmed that this rough estimate was in the right ballpark with one scholar who has done extensive empirical work with ICSID data as well as through my interviews with arbitrators. It is not an exact appraisal, but what is relevant for the purpose of the article is whether ICSID’s rate completely changes the incentives to accept an appointment and hence whether the distribution of ICSID appointments is completely different from that of other institutions. We cannot know the answer to this question for certain, but with a grain of salt, my educated guess (taking into account what I gleaned from working at ICSID) is that it does not. Most appointments are accepted and most rejections occur when a conflict exists. In my experience it was only in very few cases that, for other reasons (such as being too busy) an arbitrator decided not to accept an appointment. Read the rest of this entry…

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Announcements: EJIL: Live!, New Journal on the Use of Force, Symposium in Luxembourg on Protection of Persons Fleeing Situations of Armed Violence; BIICL Call for Papers on British Influence on International Law

Published on September 26, 2014        Author: 

1.   In case you missed it: Episodes 1 and 2 of EJIL:Live! are available online. Episode 1 presents both video and (edited) audio versions of a “Fireside Chat” between the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, Joseph H. H. Weiler, and Maria Aristodemou, whose article “A Constant Craving for Fresh Brains and a Taste for Decaffeinated Neighbours”, appears in EJIL 25:1 (2014). The audio podcast also features a conversation with EJIL’s Book Review Editor, Isabel Feichtner; and a discussion with the Editors of EJIL: Talk!, Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic, on the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), the crisis in Crimea, and much more. Episode 2 features an extended “Fireside Chat” between Joseph Weiler and Oliver Diggelmann (University of Zurich) and Tilmann Altwicker (University of Basel), whose article “How is Progress Constructed in International Legal Scholarship?”, appears in Vol. 25, Issue 2 of EJIL.

2.  Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (including the Digest of State Practice on the Use of Force). Hart Publishing is delighted to announce that the first issue, published in August, of the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law is now available online. Please click here for the table of contents. The Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (JUFIL) is the first peer-reviewed journal covering all aspects of the law governing the use of force (jus ad bellum), as distinct from other areas of international law relating to security issues, such as International Humanitarian Law or International Criminal Law. From the first issue, Hart Publishing is pleased to make available the article by Claus Kreß, “Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force” free to view online. To access this article please click here and follow the instructions shown. For subscription rates and details on how to subscribe please visit the journal’s website or contact Subscriptions Department, Macmillan Distribution (MDL), Brunel Road, Houndmills, Basingstoke RG21 6XS, UK. Tel: +44 (0)1245 302572 Fax: +44 (0)1256 363223 Email: MDLsubs {at} macmillan(.)com.

3.    University  of  Luxembourg/UNHCR  Symposium  on  the  Protection of Persons Fleeing Situations of Armed Violence. On  Monday  20  October  2014,  the  University  of  Luxembourg will host a symposium,  jointly  organised with the UNHCR, on the protection of persons fleeing situations of armed violence.  The event will consider the issue of assessing  claims  for  international  protection for persons fleeing armed conflict  or  other  situations  of  violence: using Article 2A of the 1951 Geneva  Convention  or  Article  15  of  the  EU  Qualification  Directive? Particular  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  new UNHCR guidelines on the subject.  Participants  will include Pascale Moreau (UNHCR), Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston  (CJEU),  Judge Lars Bay Larsson (ECJ), Judge Ledi Bianku (ECHR), Alice  Edwards (UNHCR), Prof. James Sweeney (Lancaster University), Blanche Tax  (UNHCR),  Serge  Bodart  (ULB), Prof.  Matthew Happold (University of Luxembourg), and  Philippa  Candler  (UNHCR).   Further  details  of  the programme can be found here.   The  event  will  take  place  in  English  and  French with simultaneous translation.  Attendance at the symposium is free but registration is required and can be done online here.

4. The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) is making a worldwide Call for Papers on British Influences on International Law 1915-2015. The Institute is publishing a series of books to commemorate the centenary of the establishment in London of the Grotius Society (a forerunner of BIICL) in 1915. One of these books is on British Influences on International Law in the period from 1915 until today. We invite anyone who has an interest in writing a chapter on an aspect of this topic to submit an abstract for consideration. This invitation extends to established academics, early career researchers, doctoral researchers, those with experience in government and other practice, and anyone else with relevant expertise, whether based in the UK or elsewhere. The authors of the selected papers may be chosen for presentation as part of a seminar series which is likely to be held in the first half of 2015. For further information, please visit www.biicl.org/newsitem/6086 or contact the project co-ordinator Dr Jean-Pierre Gauci on j.gauci {at} biicl(.)org

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Filed under: Announcements and Events
 

UK House of Commons debate on the use of force in Iraq, 26 September 2014

Published on September 25, 2014        Author: 

On September 26th, the UK House of Commons will debate a Parliamentary motion which seeks to authorise:

Her Majesty’s government, working with allies, in supporting the government of Iraq in protecting civilians and restoring its territorial integrity, including the use of UK air strikes to support Iraqi, including Kurdish, security forces’ efforts against ISIL in Iraq.

The motion expressly states that it does not endorse air strikes in Syria, the authorisation for which would require a separate vote in Parliament, and that the government will not deploy UK troops in ground combat operations. The text of the motion is here. The UK government’s legal position is that there is “a clear and unequivocal legal basis for deployment of UK forces”.  A summary of this position is here.

So what do you think?

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ICSID Arbitrators: The Ultimate Social Network?

Published on September 25, 2014        Author: 

waibelMichael Waibel is a University Lecturer at the University of Cambridge.

Sergio Puig’s article offers a refreshingly new, thought-provoking analysis of the links between investment arbitrators. Who the parties appoint as arbitrators matters for how the investment treaty regime operates. Criticism of the appointment process in investment arbitration is widespread, yet rigorous empirical work on this important aspect of the investment treaty regime remains rare. Relying on the theoretical frame of social network analysis, Sergio sheds light on the interactions among ICSID arbitrators. His analysis suggests that a core group of 25 arbitrators enjoys disproportionate influence on the development of the investment treaty regime. To understand what animates the regime, it may suffice to analyse the preferences and political philosophy of these 25 ‘power-brokers’.

The Core-Periphery Divide and Underrepresentation

The core of the arbitration network is composed of 25 arbitrators. Members of this elite group are on average connected to 11.75 other arbitrators. The core’s cultural and legal homogeneity is striking: 14 Europeans, 4 Latin Americans, 3 Canadians, 1 New Zealander and only 1 US arbitrator. Similarly, among the top ten countries of origin of ICSID arbitrators overall, five are Euro-Atlantic states (US, France, UK, Canada and Switzerland) and five Latin American. By contrast, African and Asian arbitrators have rarely been appointed to ICSID tribunals, despite significant inward- and outward flows of foreign investment to and from Asia in particular. In such data-intensive work, minor errors are bound to creep in. For instance, in Figure 4, Vaughan Lowe appears as a US, rather than a UK national, and the 26th arbitrator in the core between Jonny Veeder and Jan Paulsson remains nameless.

The formal bond of nationality may be only a crude measure of arbitrator behaviour. As Sergio rightly highlights (p. 405), many arbitrators with nationalities of developing countries have received at least part of their legal education in developed countries (chiefly the UK, the US and France). Indeed, if one focuses on arbitrators who have spent most or all of their adult lives in a developing country and have not worked or received part of their educated in developed countries, the voice of developing countries in even less represented among ICSID arbitrators than the formal link of nationality would suggest.

Other demographics are also underrepresented among ICSID arbitrators, most notably women. 93 percent of all ICSID appointments were male arbitrators (p. 404). Given that Brigitte Stern has accumulated the highest number of appointments of any ICSID arbitrator, the share of female arbitrators is even lower at 5 percent (p. 405). Two female super arbitrators apart, women are at the periphery of the arbitration network. This gender imbalance mirrors the general characteristics of the entire arbitration network (p. 411).

Yanhui Wu and I have recently assembled data on a control group composed of more than 700 potential ICSID arbitrators, i.e. individuals with similar characteristics and qualifications to those who have already been appointed to at least one ICSID tribunal. Our control group includes current and former ICJ and WTO Appellate Body (AB) Members who, unlike some of their judicial colleagues, have yet to be appointed to an ICSID tribunal, and partners at leading arbitration practices in the same position. Ten former AB members and 18 current and former ICJ judges since 1990 have never been appointed. The following table compares some characteristics of the treatment and control groups. Read the rest of this entry…

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UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Published on September 24, 2014        Author: 

The Security Council, in a special sitting in which most members were represented by their heads of state or government and chaired by President Obama, has just unanimously adopted resolution 2178 (2014) on foreign terrorist fighters. Full text available here and here. The resolution is one of the most important quasi-legislative efforts of the Council since resolution 1373 (2001). Adopted under Chapter VII, it requires states to take a series of measures to prevent the movement and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters. Some of the key operative paragraphs include:

5. Decides that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities;

6. Recalls its decision, in resolution 1373 (2001), that all Member States shall ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice, and decides that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense:

a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training;

b) the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to finance the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; and,

c) the wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training;

7. Expresses its strong determination to consider listing pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for them, or otherwise supporting their acts or activities, including through information and communications technologies, such as the internet, social media, or any other means;

8. Decides that, without prejudice to entry or transit necessary in the furtherance of a judicial process, including in furtherance of such a process related to arrest or detention of a foreign terrorist fighter, Member States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the acts described in paragraph 6, including any acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with Al-Qaida, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2161 (2014), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals or permanent residents;

The measures are far-reaching. Martin Scheinin has an important post on Just Security on the potential for abuse inherent in some of the provisions of the resolution, especially since it finds that all forms of terrorism (and not just international terrorism, however exactly defined) are a threat to international peace and security and subject to the measures set out in the resolution. It is entirely possible that some governments will use this resolution to justify repressive measures. We can certainly expect a wave of domestic legislation which may go even further beyond the requirements of the resolution. On the other hand, many of the resolution’s paragraphs expressly invoke international human rights law or other rules of international law, as did many of the delegations in the Council in their statements, including President Obama. This at least will serve to blunt overly extravagant arguments relying on the primacy clause in Article 103 of the UN Charter (cf. para. 102 of the European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment). But there can be no doubt that we will be dealing with this resolution for many years to come.

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Social Capital and Arbitral Decision Making

Published on September 24, 2014        Author: 

DDaphnaaphna Kapeliuk is a Senior Lecturer at Radzyner Law School, IDC Herzliya. Her research interest focuses on international arbitration in general and on arbitral behavior in particular and on private international law.

In his brilliant article “Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”, Sergio Puig seeks to map the social arrangements that result from interactions among ICSID arbitrators, as part of the social dynamics of international arbitration. Using data of all appointments of ICSID arbitrators made between 1972 and 2014 and applying a social network analysis methodology, Sergio sets out to understand the role of social capital in investment arbitration by relying upon proxy measures for social connectivity.

The sophisticated maps of the interactions among ICSID arbitrators represent a picture of the social landscape of the arbitration market. These maps are of great importance, especially since ICSID tribunals are composed of three arbitrators, and the dynamics between the arbitrators within the panels are important to understand the outcome of disputes. Sergio’s article joins prior scholarship that has claimed that ICSID arbitrations are handled by a closed group of arbitrators, sometimes referred to as “grand old men”, or “blue chip men”, who are being repeatedly appointed to decide large scale investment disputes. He argues that the network analysis of ICSID arbitrators “provides important evidence of a dense network”, in which a limited number of prestigious arbitrators increase in prestige, while the others remain in the periphery.

Sergio’s major contribution to understanding the interconnections among these arbitrators is presented in figures 4 and 6. Figure 4 focuses on the inside and outside of core ties and common cases of the 25 most central arbitrators, and figure 6 represents a sociogram of appointments of arbitrators (as presiding arbitrators) by other arbitrators to the same panels. These figures clearly show the strong ties between the central arbitrators within arbitration panels.
While the main objective of the article is to map the social dynamics of ICSID arbitrators, Sergio argues that the network analysis provides evidence that the dense network of arbitrators “reinforces prevailing norms and behavior and insulates its most important members from outside influence”. Although the social landscape presented in the article supports the claim that the core of the prominent ICSID arbitrators is small, that the article does not analyze how this network might reinforce prevailing norms and behavior. It does not define or analyze these terms. The remainder of this comment offers one possible mechanism for how the social structure might lead to the postulated outcome.
There is no doubt that the entry barriers to the investment arbitration market are extremely high. An arbitrator who wishes to be admitted to the core of the prestigious network, and thus repeatedly appointed, must establish a reputation that justifies a “membership” in the “club”. It is through his connections, behavior and decision making that he can establish such reputation. Sergio’s article focuses on the interconnections among arbitrators, but not on their behavior or decision making. Read the rest of this entry…

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Comments on Sergio Puig’s ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’

Published on September 23, 2014        Author: 

Tom SchultzThomas Schultz is a Reader in Commercial Law in the Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College London and a Swiss National Science Foundation Research Professor in the International Law Department at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Dispute Settlement (Oxford University Press).

Professor Puig’s article ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’ is a quite wonderful contribution to a number of things: our understanding of the dynamics of investment arbitration, the literature on arbitrator appointments, the methodological diversification of studies in international law, and certainly a few more. And it brings us rather convincing evidence, in a field where claims and representations (not to speak of copious discussions of what other people happen to have said) are more readily found than data and studies to substantiate claims. It is, in other words, intellectually edifying. The experimental design is well done, the plan well executed and the findings credible. In this, it is intellectually responsive to developments in the social sciences and the humanities. We don’t even need a mood-elevating metaphor to set great store by this sort of works, and this work in particular. (Incidentally, the study is also a formidable ‘who’s who in investment arbitration’, which undoubtedly will make for welcome entertainment in certain circles.)

A few small methodological points would probably deserve more discussion. (I said ‘would deserve’, not ‘would have deserved’: the article is long enough as it is and this is a law journal after all.) For instance, the author says that ‘The network analysis advanced in this article relies upon displayed preferences by the appointing entity (litigation parties, arbitrators, and the institution) to provide a larger picture of the network’s aggregate topology.’ But how do we know the preferences of the appointing entity? Right, by looking at appointments. But do effective appointments really tell us what the preferences are? What if individuals, who are the preferred choices of the appointing entity, refuse an appointment, and the appointing entity has to turn to their second or third choice? Never happens. Well… Actually, could such situations be statistically relevant?

Another methodological point: Figure 8 is puzzling. Not puzzling as in ‘probably wrong’. Puzzling as in ‘how come’? Here’s the author’s accompanying notes: “Figure 8 shows how, despite the fact that most ICSID cases were registered in the last 10 years, most ‘power-brokers’ or those arbitrators at the top of the profession entered the network in or prior to 2004.” In other words, the mid-2000s is the moment when you see the network effects. Why? Why did the network stabilise at that point in time? The network seems to have acquired self-organisational elements at that point in time, but, again, why then? Any hypothesis? Just happenstance? Just puzzling.

Beyond methodological considerations, we may also wonder–and perhaps the author wants to elaborate on this–why, in fact, it is a bad thing that a small number of arbitrators decide a great number of cases. Read the rest of this entry…

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Social Capital in the Arbitration Market

Published on September 22, 2014        Author: 

sergio puig-picDr. Sergio Puig is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.

I am grateful to Professor Weiler, the editors of EJIL and the organizers of EJIL: Talk! for hosting the discussion of my article. I am privileged to have Daphna Kapeliuk, Michael Waibel, and Thomas Schultz as collaborators in this endeavor.  This is a great opportunity to engage with wonderful scholars in the field of international law, all of whom have produced very interesting and inspiring empirically-based research in the field. Below I summarize the methodology and main arguments of this piece.

In this modest contribution, I try to bring together different scholarly traditions. In framing the question, I note that scholars with different academic traditions have provided diverse and, at points, conflicting explanations regarding why arbitration professionals are such a seemingly small and homogenous group in terms of gender, national origin and educational background. In this article, I seek to empirically assess this observation and to explore why this may be happening. Given the limited access to the record of appointments under most arbitration facilities, I used the data of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In spite of critiques regarding ICSID’s practices with respect to transparency, it is the sole arbitration institution to publicize its entire record of appointments.

By surveying the list of ICSID appointments, I seek to operationalize the basic characteristics of the social structure of international arbitrators.  Anticipating some reactions, I must admit that this is an imperfect alternative. Ideally we would have more information about international arbitration appointments generally. But given the shared characteristics between general international arbitration and the more specific field of investor-state arbitration, I argue that ICSID’s record of appointment can imperfectly inform this scholarly debate. So, while the article focuses on ICSID arbitrators–a group that has not escaped controversy in recent years–my point is more general and tries to speak to a broader scholarly debate.

Applying network analytics (and some basic statistical analysis) to ICSID’s record of appointment, I confirm what we already knew: a few, socially prominent actors are dominant in the field. But not all arbitrators are equal; hence there are different sources of social capital. Read the rest of this entry…

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